Національний педагогічний університет імені М. П. Драгоманова

Міністерство освіти і науки України

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ТКАЧЕНКО РОСТІСЛАВ ЮРІЙОВИЧ

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ДИСЕРТАЦІЯ

PETER LOMBARD'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

Спеціальність 09.00.14 – богослов'я

Подається на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата філософських наук. Дисертація містить результати власних досліджень. Використання ідей, результатів і текстів інших авторів мають посилання на відповідне джерело. _____ Р. Ю. Ткаченко

Науковий керівник: Чорноморець Юрій Павлович, доктор філософських наук, професор

Київ – 2019

АНОТАЦІЯ

Ткаченко Р.Ю. Філософська теологія Петра Ломбардського (англійською).
– Рукопис.

Дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата філософських наук
за спеціальністю 09.00.14 – богослов'я. – Національний педагогічний
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В дослідженні вивчається філософська теологія ключового
середньовічного богослова Петра Ломбардського, автора основного
середньовічного підручника теології, відомого як *«Книга сентенцій»*. Перший
том цього твору, в якому представлено підхід Петра до теологічної дисципліни
та його власний виклад теології як вчення про Бога, становить текстуальну
основу даного дослідження. Вчення Ломбардця про основні атрибути Бога, які
він визначає як божественне знання, силу та волю, а також філософсько-
теологічні засоби, які він використовує, вперше стають об'єктом
індивідуального дослідження. Його актуальність перш за все пояснюється тим,
що саме Майстер Петро задав концептуальне поле для теологічних дискусій
XIII-XVI століть, адже першою академічною працею абсолютно кожного
нового теолога піздього Середньовіччя ставав коментар на *Книгу сентенцій*, і
тому вихідним пунктом й текстуально-ідейною основою богословських думок
таких мислителів, як Бонавентура, Тома Аквинський, Генріх Гентський, Іоан
Дунс Скот та багато інших аж до Мартіна Лютера, Томи Каетана й Джона
Мейджора (Меєра). Ломбардець систематизував вчення отців церкви (перш за
все Августина) про Бога, запропонувавши студентам і вчителям університетів
збірник авторитетних цитат, кожна з яких буле ним представлена, розташована
згідно з його авторською сіткою розділів і коментована за допомогою відомих
йому теологічних і філософських ресурсів. Богослови наступних поколінь
дивились на християнське віровчення через окуляри питань, глав и цитат, з
яких складається *Книга сентенцій*.

Дисертаційне дослідження доводить, що Петро Ломбардський підходить до теми божественних атрибутів крізь призму концепту божественної тринітарної сутності і лише після викладу цієї доктрини. Такі атрибути, як воля Бога чи знання Бога, не можуть аналізуватися абстрактно. Вони є аспектами або «сторонами» однієї, досконалої і простої божественної сутності, яка називається «однією і найвищою реальністю». Тому ломбардівський богословський підхід передбачає ретельний і нюансований аналізу того, що стосується природи та властивостей Бога.

Дослідження показує, що Петро Ломбардський не просто цитує стародавніх авторитетів. На додаток до часто обговорюваних організаційних та структурних рішень, якими характеризуються *Сентенції*, він використовує множину логічних, богословських та філософських засобів, прийомів та аргументів, щоб викласти свої судження. Тим самим він відходить від філософських засобів, характерних для августиніанського неоплатонізму раннього Середньовіччя і адоптує елементи аристотеліанської, боеціанської та абелярдівської логіки. Зокрема, він звертається до таких логічних правил аргументації, як *modus tollens*, принципи перетворення пропозицій, а також кон'юнктивне («сполученне», «з'єднувальне») та диз'юнктивне («роз'єднувальне») читання пропозиції. Дисертація демонструє строгість ломбардіанських аргументів тим, що виявляє такі логічні прийоми, візуалізує їх у вигляді схем та використовує набір простих логічних символів та формул для їх ілюстрації. Таким чином, дослідження висвітлює елементи філософської логіки, які використовує Ломбардець. Крім того, це показує, що його власне богослов'я передбачає семантичну теорію, яка вимагає, щоб богослов використовував як традиційну технічну лексику (Божа природа, знання Бога, Божа мудрість тощо), так і більш досконалу «перекладену» та метафоричну мову (субсістенція, «існуючи» тощо) і допускає різні типи предикацій про Бога. Яку б властивість ми не присвоювали Богові, завжди є лише один означуваний предмет, сутність Бога як така, і кілька значень, приписаних йому за допомогою іменників або прикметників. Це означає, що поняття, які використовуються для

позначення божественних атрибутів, таких як Боже знання Бога та Божа воля, означають сутність Бога як пов'язану з певними речами або категоріями речей поза Богом.

Цей семантичний підхід приводить Ломбардця до висновку, що знання Бога є Богом або божественною сутністю як знаючою все пізнаване, Божа воля є сутністю Бога як активно бажаючою чогось, а Божа сила є сутністю Бога, здатною робити все, що воліє зробити Триєдиний Бог. Важливо відзначити, що Ломбардець тісно пов'язує божественне знання та волю, оскільки вчення про знання Бога є доктриною, яка включає в себе багато вужчих атрибутів, хоча деякі з них передбачають не лише знання, але воління та прийняття рішень. Боже провидіння, розпорядження та приречення є переліченими як аспекти божественного знання, поєднані з його деякими волевиявленнями. Але між двома ключовими атрибутами, знанням і волею, немає плутанини, тому що Майстер *Сентенцій* розмежовує між чистим чи простим, «далеким», знанням та знанням «близьким». Перше – це просто усвідомлення Бога або, строго кажучи, знання, тоді як друге означає його знання, з'єднане з певною прихильністю та доброзичливістю, тобто з волею Бога. Ломбардець пояснює, що все, що Бог робить або дозволяє, включаючи всі події та істоти у створеному світі, передбачає певну причетність його волі. Нічого не відбувається без того, щоб Бог або волів, або «розволів» чи «не-волів» цього. Воління – це безпосередній акт божественої волі, коли Бог наказує чомусь бути; «розвоління» – це Божий наказ чомусь не бути; «не-воління» – а це акт волі, яким Бог дозволяє чомусь бути. Таким чином, коли мова йде про добрі речі, Бог воліє та ефективно їх створює, а коли йдеться про злі речі, Бог не бажає, не воліє їх, а дозволяє. У цьому аспекті Майстер Петро систематизує й розвиває далі напрямок, який задав Августин з його наголосом на Божій волі, який часто іменують волюнтаризмом. *Сентенції* малюють значно чіткішу, хоча й недосконалу картину щодо того, як «працює» Божа воля, і досить добре співвідносять її з силою і знанням Бога. Це основи ломбардіанської теології божественних атрібутів, яку досліджує ця дисертація.

Крім того, його власне богослов'я включає такий важливий аспект, як віра в те, що знання Бога чи вольові рішення Бога могли бути іншими. Це – божественна свобода від необхідності та будь-якого роду детермінізму, яка також транслюється у створений світ, який міг бути інакшим, і, отже, він є контингентним. Ці міркування допомагають зрозуміти, що вчення *Сентенцій* про Бога містять деякі елементи модальної семантики. Ломбардець стверджує, що потенційно, знання Бога здатні включати більше предметів, ніж він знає, і його сила передбачає, що він може чи міг би зробити інакше. Божественна сила як така є величезною множиною можливостей, які можуть бути реалізовані, і вона регулюється божественною волею. Навіть після того, як Бог вирішив діяти певним чином, все ще існують гіпотетичні альтернативні варіанти, відкриті для нього у його вічності. Бог нічим не обмежений і не підпадає під примус якоїсь необхідності. Він міг би зробити інакше, якби хотів і волів це, тому що його здатність робити те, що йому було можливо «колись», залишається вічно незмінною. У випадку з Богом один раз здатний означає завжди здатний. Але божественна справедлива і досконала воля «регулює» Божі силу та акти. Як стверджується в даній дисертації, логічно зробити висновок, що згідно з *Першою книгою сентенцій*, Божа сила передбачає негайне знання Бога (у його вічному «тепер»), але обидва атрибута логічно передують волі Бога. Бог вічно знає, що він може зробити чи дозволити, і вічно воліє перетворити деякі з цих можливостей у актуальності.

Крім того, ця картина взаємозв'язків між трьома атрибутами передбачає певні значення таких понять, як «можливість» та «необхідність». Дана дослідницька робота показує, що Ломбардець неявно приймає та передає нащадкам ряд конкретних модальних теорій. У такий спосіб він продовжує почату Боецієм і обговорювану Ансельмом, Абеляром і Даміаном практику апеляції до певних парадигм модальної логіки і формує поле для синтезу телогії й філософії, який стане метою теологів XIII сторіччя: Томи Аквінського, Генріха Гентського, Дунса Скота та інших. Петро Ломбардський думає про можливість з точки зору потенції та необхідності як примусу, або

темплоральної фіксованості та незмінності, або необхідності (логічної) імплікації, логічного умовиводу. В решті-решт в Бозі існує лише необхідність імплікації, оскільки його можливості як потенції вічно і незмінно присутні для нього. Але це необхідно, що, якщо він воліє (чи не воліє) щось, це воління буде відповідати його досконалості і те, що він зволів, відбудеться саме так, як Бог це знає, може це зробити і воліє.

Мета дослідження – проаналізувати філософську теологію Петра Ломбардського і, зокрема, його вчення про ключові атрибути Бога – знання, силу та волю – з подвійною ціллю: щоб визначити його теологічні тези та виявити філософські й логічні засоби, які він використовує у своїй аргументації.

Об'єктом дослідження є філософська теологія Петра Ломбардського як вона викладена в його *Першій книзі сентенцій*.

Предметом дисертаційної роботи є доктрини Петра Ломбардського про знання, силу та волю Бога, а також логічні, богословські та філософські засоби, прийоми й аргументи, які він використовує, щоб представити свої тези.

Наукова новизна дисертаційного дослідження полягає в тому, що вперше пропонується системний аналіз філософської теології Петра Ломбардського, зокрема, реконструкція його вчення про ключові божественні атрибути: знання, силу та волю, з особливою увагою до філософських та логічних засобів, які він використовує.

Зокрема, результати дисертації та її науковий внесок складаються з таких тез, які виносяться на захист і конкретизуються у наступних положеннях:

Вперше:

– продемонстровано як саме Ломбардець використовує різні логічні засоби та прийоми у своїй роботі. Він користується *modus tollens* для вирішення проблемних парадоксів, закликає до кон'юнктивного або диз'юнктивного прочитання пропозицій (пост-Абелярівські інтерпретації *coniunctim* та *disiunctim*), використовує метод *reductio ad absurdum*, коли відслідковує можливі помилкові наслідки певних богословських позицій, та застосовує

правила перетворення пропозицій, грунтуючись на квадраті опозицій. Схематичні пояснення та формалізації, викладені в дисертації, обгрунтовують претензії автора та допомагають побачити, як ці методи служать цілям Майстра, тобто побудови аргументів та відповіді на критику.

– виявлено, що Ломбардець звертається до модальних понять та модальні теорій, наявних у XII столітті, та показано, як він їх трактує. Доведено, що, хоча Ломбард не має розвиненої модальної теорії, він послідовно звертається до деяких вже вживаних понять та ідей. Зокрема, (a), як і багато інших середньовічних мислителів, він думає про силу (потенцію) як здатність діяти тим чи іншим чином або як об'єктивну можливість того, що речі чи події відбудуться так чи інакше; (b) подібно до Ансельма Кентерберійського, він неявно розмежовує три значення необхідності: внутрішнє чи зовнішнє *примушення та примус* як певну детермінуючу чи непереборну силу, *діахронічну необхідність* як фіксованість і незмінність того, що є темпорально минулим чи теперішнім (тобто «минуючим») та *необхідність (логічної) імплікації, умовиводу* (або «подальшу необхідність», «необхідність послідовності») як незмінний зв'язок між передумовою і наслідком логічної імплікації, логічною формулою якої є «N ($p \rightarrow q$)». Останнє має особливе значення, оскільки Ломбардець часто застосовує цю нову ідею до власне теології, вчення про Бога, і використовує її у своїй теорії божественої сили та волі. Тим самим він значно розширює августиніанське представлення про «божествені модальності» і впроваджує ансельміанський концепт в схоластичний теологічний дискурс. Надалі цей концепт стане невід'ємною частиною систем Александра Гельского, Томи Аквінського, Дунса Скота і пізніше війде в класичне протестантське і католицьке богослов'я часів Реформації.

– з'ясовано, яким є багатошаровий зміст ломбардіанської теорії божествених атрибутів. В теологічному розрізі, Майстер Петро трактує ці атрибути так: знання Бога – це божественна сутність *як* знаюча, Божа сила – божественна сутність *як* здатна зробити певні речі, а Божа воля – божественна

сутність *як* воліюча деякі речі. Ці та наступні, більш детальні спостереження підтверджують і розширюють наукові доробки Коліш, Роземана та інших.

– Щодо знання Бога, підкреслюється, що ключовими рисами ломбардівської теорії божественного знання є його (a) чітке визначення знання Бога як мовно-теологічної концепції, що належним чином означає сутність Бога і в якій йдеться про усвідомлення та знання Трійцею всіх речей, які можна знати, куди входять речі, які Бог може зробити (потенційності чи «потенції»), зволіти та зробити (актуальності) і дозволити (недобрі актуальності); (b) наголос на вічність знання Бога про тимчасові речі, що дозволяє сказати, що Бог не знає речей, споглядаючи їх нібито у часі, так що його передвічне знання передбачає незмінність і усвідомлення всього одразу; (c) важливе роз'яснення, що, власне, божественне знання не може ні зростати, ні зменшуватися, але, потенційно, могло б бути іншим; і (d) позиція, що це знання як таке не має причинної сили, якщо не пов'язане з божественною волею (тобто, знання логічно передує будь-якому волевиявленню).

– Щодо волі Бога, то підкреслюється, що ключовими рисами ломбардівського сприйняття божественної волі є його: (a) ототожнення цієї волі з доброзичливістю чи диспозицією Бога; (b) його визначення волі як акту волі, акту воління Бога; (c) приписування цій волі ефективної та причинної сили; (d) підкреслення свободи й недетермінованості цієї волі; і (f) творча диференціація між декількома «режимами» чи способами дії волі: волінням, коли Бог безпосередньо наказує, щоб щось було; розволінням, коли Бог воліє, щоб чогось не було; не-волінням, коли Бог дозволяє чомусь бути. Причому ототожнення волі не з бажанням і нахилом, а саме за актом воління свідчить про те, як Петро Ломбардський відходить від класичного значення волі і погоджується з її другим значенням: воля – це не непереборне бажання, з яким воював Августин «Сповідей» и яке добре знали греки й римляни, а вільний, активний вибір, актуалізація певної здатності, *воління* як таке, що виділяв Ансельм Кентерберійський. *Сентенції* підкреслюють цей новий зміст класичного концепту і роблять його основною функцією Божою волі. Пізніше

це уявлення про волю як в першу чергу акт *velle* підхопить, коментуючи книгу Ломбардця, Дунс Скот. Він же, на противагу «інтелектуалісту» Томі буде стверджувати, що Божа воля не слідує за його інтелектом і не має ніякої причини своіх волінь окрім самоі себе. Тобто, Скот повторить тезис Ломбардця (а також Августина, Ансельма та іншіх, на кого той орієнтується) про те, що Бог воліє певну річ, тому ща така його воля.

– Щодо Божої сили, у дослідженні доводиться, що ключовими характеристиками ломбардівського розуміння божественної сили чи потенції є його (а) визначення всемогутності не стільки як здатності робити все, а скоріше як здатності робити все, що йому забажається (буквально, «все, що йому воліється»), і все, що відповідає його істотним властивостям; (б) наголос на величезному числі Божих можливостей та речей, які він може зробити, хоча лише деякі з них стають актуалізованими; (с) читкий зв'язок між силою і волею Бога, що, вченню Ломбардця, означає, що Боже *posse* логічно передує Божому *velle*, в той час як його воля регулює його «потенції», бо саме божественна воля визначає, які потенційності будуть реалізовані; (г) ретельне роз'яснення, що здатність Бога діяти певним чином завжди залишається реальною здатністю, незважаючи на його волевиявлення щодо актуалізації деяких з них; та (е) припущення про відкриті для Бога гіпотетичні альтернативні варіанти, з яких випливає, що після того, як Бог зволив і зробив певну річ, вона не може бути скасована, але Бог всеодоно *міг* би зробити інакше, і ця здатність є вічною.

Уточнено:

– Продемонстровано, що з точки зору теологічної семантики Петро Ломбардський не просто приймає та копіює знамените Августинське розрізнення між означенням і значущим; він також формулює досить тонке розмежування двох видів предикацій про Бога, які або означають божественна сутність «просто і абсолютно» (*simpliciter et absolute*), або позначають її «не просто і абсолютно» (*non simpliciter et absolute*), тобто відносно, у зв'язку з чимось іншим. Це розрізнення було недооцінено в попередніх дослідженнях

Ломбардця, але, на мій погляд, є важливою семантико-теологічною розробкою, яку слід визнати.

– Пропонується теза, що це семантико-богословське розрізнення може і, ймовірно, повинно відповідати нашим сучасним граматичним та логічним уявленням про перехідність (транзитивність) та неперехідність (інтранзитивність), які модифікують структуру та значення пропозицій. «Просте і абсолютне» значення пропозицій Ломбардця може бути ототожнено з якістю неперехідності, а його «не простий» або відносний тип предикацій – з якістю перехідності. Тоді висловлювання, як-от «Бог знає», можна розуміти двома способами: або *неперехідно*, коли «Бог» є предметом пропозиції, і «знає» – предикатом, або *перехідно*, коли «Бог» є суб'єктом, «знає» предикатом, а ще у пропозиції є об'єкт або адресат дії предиката.

– Щодо гіпотетичних альтернативних варіантів, які назавжди залишаються відкритими для Бога, а також тези про те, що Бог *міг би* вчинити інакше навіть після того, як він щось зволів і зробив, в дисертації пропонується коментар та критична оцінка інтерпретації Марсії Коліш. Критикується її пізніша позиція і відстоюється правильність її попередньої позиції щодо цього питання. Доводиться, що всемогутність Бога, яка передбачає гіпотетичні альтернативні варіанти, не означає здатність повторювати події, які він колись робив. Натомість стверджується, що Петро Ломбардський наполягає на постійності та незмінності вольових рішень Бога, і, таким чином, правильно буде казати, що Бог зараз здатен втілитися в (нашому, чітко означеному) минулому, але не можна сказати, що він може зараз втілитися в (нашому, чітко означеному) теперішньому, тому що його волевиявлення щодо втілення вже здійснено в часі і стало діахронічною необхідністю в актуальному світі та необхідністю (логічної) імплікації чи «послідовності» у вічності Бога.

Набув подальшого розвитку:

– детальний історико-богословський аналіз філософської теології Петра Ломбардського як вчення про Бога. Дисертація висвітлює численні аспекти теологічного підходу Ломбардця (його «методу»), його звернення до логіки,

модальної семантики та філософських понять, а також змісту його власного богослов'я як вчення про Бога. Вона робить внесок в подальше просування в галузі ломбардіанських досліджень на хвилі досягнень Брейді, Коліш, Роземана, Монейгл та інших науковців.

Ключові слова: Петро Ломбардський, філософська теологія, середньовічна теологія, Бог, божественні атрибути, Боже знання, Божа воля, всемогутність, необхідність.

SUMMARY

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The present research examines the philosophical theology and, specifically, the theology of divine attributes of a key medieval theologian Peter Lombard whose importance lays in that he managed to compose the basic textbook of dogmatic theology for later Middle Ages. This so-called *Book of Sentences* and its first volume that deals with Peter's approach to theological discipline and his exposition of theology proper constitute the textual basis of the studies presented here. It is the first time that the Lombard's teaching about God's fundamental attributes, which he identifies as divine knowledge, power, and will, and the philosophical-theological means he uses become an object of an individual study. Its relevance is explained by the fact that it was Master Peter that set the conceptual stage for theological discussions of the 13th-16th centuries, because, in this period, every single medieval theologian's first major work was a commentary on the *Book of Sentences*. Therefore, the Lombard's oeuvre became the starting point and a textual-conceptual basis for the thought of such thinkers as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and many others until Martin Luther, Thomas Cajetan, and John Mair. Peter Lombard systematized the church fathers' teachings and offered to the early university audience a collection of authoritative quotations which he presented, located within

his authorial network of chapters and topical sections, and commented with the help of theological and philosophical resources he had. As a result, many later generations of theologians looks at the Christian doctrine through the glass of questions, chapter headings, and quotations contained in the *Book of Sentences*.

It is demonstrated that Peter Lombard approaches the topic of divine attributes through the lens, and only after the treatment of, the divine Trinitarian essence. Such attributes as God's will or God's knowledge cannot hang on in the air or be analyzed purely dialectically. They are aspects or "sides" of one, perfect, and simple divine essence which is called "one and the highest reality." It is called here an essentialist perspective which prescribes that any divine attribute must be identical with what God is, with his essence. Therefore the Lombardian theological approach presupposes a careful and nuanced way of dealing with God's nature and attributes. For him, God is a very complex and literally outstanding topic, which presupposes a sensitive approach. Therefore the study is focused on an analysis of both content and means one finds in the *First Book of Sentences*.

The research reveals that Peter Lombard does more than simply quote ancient authorities. In addition to frequently discussed organizational and structural decisions which characterize the *Sentences*, he espouses several logical, theological, and philosophical means, techniques, and arguments to make his points. By doing this, he adopts some elements of the Aristotelian, Boethian, and Abelardian logic and adds them to the means, which were traditional for the Augustinian neoplatonism of the early Middle Ages. In particular, he appeals to such logical rules as the *modus tollens*, the principles of propositional conversion, and the conjunctive and disjunctive readings of a proposition. The dissertation demonstrates the rigor of the Lombardian arguments by detecting such logical techniques, visualizing them in the form of schemes, and using a set of simple logical symbols and formulae to illustrate them. Thus, the study highlights the elements of philosophical logic the Lombard employs. Additionally, it shows that his theology proper implies a semantic theory that requires that a theologian use both traditional technical vocabulary (God's nature, God's knowledge, God's wisdom, etc.) and more sophisticated "translated" and

metaphorical language (subsistence, "being ones," etc.) and allows for different types of predications about God. Whatever property we assign to God, there is always only one signified object, God's essence as such, and several significations ascribed to it by a few nouns or adjectives. It means that the notions used to denote divine attributes, such as God's knowledge and God's will signify God's essence as connected to certain things or categories of things outside God.

This semantic approach leads the Lombard to the conclusion that God's knowledge is God—or divine essence—as knowing everything knowable, God's will is God's essence as actively willing something, and God's potency is God's essence as capable of doing whatever the Triune God wills to do. It is important to note that the Lombard closely links the divine knowledge and will because he includes a lot of narrower attributes under the umbrella doctrine of God's knowledge although some of them strictly imply not only knowing but willing and taking decisions. God's providence, disposition, and predestination are all listed as aspects of the divine knowledge joined with some volitions. But there is no confusion between the two key attributes—of knowledge and will—because Master of the *Sentences* differentiates between pure or simple "distant" knowledge and the "close" knowledge. The former is God's mere awareness or, strictly speaking, knowing whereas the latter means his knowledge with approbation and good pleasure, that is, with God's will involved. The Lombard explains that everything God does or allows to be, including all events and beings in the created world, implies a certain involvement of his will. Nothing happens without God willing, unwilling, or not-willing it. Willing is God's directly commanding something to be; unwilling God's willing something not to be; not-willing God's permitting something to be. Thus, when it comes to good things, God wills and efficaciously creates them, and, when it comes to evil things, God not-wills, permits them. This point reveals that Master Peter systematizes and further develops Augustine's thoughts and the whole direction he once showed by emphasizing the will of God. The *Sentences* draw a much clearer, albeit incomplete, picture of the divine will's operations, and explain quite well its relations with God's will and

potency. These are the basics of the Lombardian theology of divine attributes this dissertation explores.

Besides, his theology proper includes such prominent aspect as a belief that God's knowledge or voluntary decisions could be different. This is the divine freedom from necessity and any kind of determinism that also translates into the created world, which could have been different and, therefore, is contingent. These musings help one to see that the *Sentences*' teachings about God have some elements of modal semantics. The Lombard argues that, potentially, God's knowledge is capable of including more items than he knows and his potency implies that he can or could have done otherwise. Divine potency as such is an immense reservoir of realizable potentialities and it is regulated by the divine will. Even after God has decided to act in a particular way, there are still hypothetical alternative options open for him in his eternity. God is not necessitated or constrained by anything. Therefore he could have done otherwise if he willed so because his ability to do things, which he "once" was able to do, remains eternally intact. In the case of God, once able means always able. Yet, it is the divine just and perfect will that "regulates" God's potency and acts. As the given dissertation argues, it is logical to conclude that, according to the *First Book of Sentences*, God's potency implies immediate God's knowledge (in the eternal now) but both logically precede God's will. God eternally knows what he can do or allow and eternally wills to turn some of these potentialities into actualities.

Additionally, this picture of the relationships between the three attributes implies certain meanings of such notions as "possibility" and "necessity." The given research work shows that the Lombard implicitly accepts and hands over to posterity a number of specific modal theories. This is how he accepts and promulgates the practice of appealing to certain modal-logical paradigms that was initiated by Boethius and continuated by Damian, Anselm, and Abelard. Thus, he forms the field for a later synthesis of theology and philosophy which will be an aspiration of the thirteenth-century theologians: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and others. Peter Lombard thinks of possibility in terms of potency, and of necessity as

either compulsion, or temporal fixity and immutability, or necessity of (logical) entailment. In the last analysis, it is only the necessity of entailment that exists in God as his possibilities as potencies are eternally and immutably present for him. But it is necessary that if he wills (or not-wills) something it accords with his perfection and comes to existence just as God knows, can do, and wills it.

The main research goal is to closely examine and analyze in detail Peter Lombard's philosophical theology and, in particular, his doctrine of God's key attributes—knowledge, potency, and will—with a double purpose, to identify his theological points and detect the philosophical and logical means he uses to drive his arguments home.

Peter Lombard's philosophical theology, as presented in his *First Book of Sentences*, is the object of the given research.

The particular subject matter is identified with Peter Lombard's doctrines of God's nature, knowledge, potency, and will and the logical, theological, and philosophical means, techniques, and arguments he uses to make his points.

The main scholarly contribution of the dissertation consists of the following. For the first time, there is offered a close, detailed analysis of Peter Lombard's philosophical theology proper and, in particular, a reconstruction of his doctrine of key divine attributes of knowledge, potency, and will, with special attention to philosophical and logical means he uses. Also, it is the first instance of the historical-theological dissertation on Peter Lombard being written and defended in Ukraine.

In particular, the dissertation's findings and its scholarly contribution consists of the following theses which are going to be defended publicly:

For the first time, the following has been demonstrated and established:

− how the Lombard uses various logical tools and techniques in his rather compilative work. It is shown that, in terms of logic, Peter Lombard regularly refers to and uses a number of logical tools and techniques. He uses the *modus tollens* in dealing with problematic paradoxes, appeals to the conjunctive and disjunctive reading of propositions (i.e. post-Abelardian readings *coniunctim* and *disiunctim*), employs the *reductio ad absurdum* method while tracing possible false implications

of certain theological propositions, and applies the rules of conversion based on the square of oppositions. The schematic explanations and formalizations produced in the dissertation substantiate the author's claims and help to see how these techniques serve Master's purposes of building arguments and responding to critics.

– how the Lombard appeals to and implicitly interprets the modal notions and modal theories available in the twelfth century. In terms of modal logic and theory of divine modalities, it is proved that, although the Lombard does not have an elaborate modal theory, he consistently appeals to and uses some earlier notions and concepts. In particular, (a) like many other medieval thinkers, he thinks of potency as one's *ability* to act in this or that manner or, alternatively, as an objective possibility of things' turning out to be this or that way; (b) like Anselm of Canterbury, he implicitly differentiates between three meanings of necessity: internal or external *compulsion and coercion* as a certain determining or irresistible force, *diachronic necessity* as fixity and immutability of what is temporally past or present (i.e. "passing"), and *necessity of entailment* (or subsequent necessity, necessity of consequence) as an unalterable connection between the antecedent and the consequent of the implication, its logical formula being "N ($p \rightarrow q$)." The latter is of special importance, as the Lombard frequently applies this new idea to theology proper and uses in his treatment of the divine potency and will. Thus, he significantly broadens the Augustinian vision of divine modalities and introduces the Anselmian notion into scholastic discourse. Later, this notion will be part and parcel of the thirteenth-century discussions and will make its way into the classical Roman Catholic and Reformed theology.

– what the multilayered content of the Lombard's theory of divine attributes is. In terms of theology, Master Peter interprets God's knowledge *as* the divine essence as knowing, God's potency (power) *as* the divine essence as being able to do, and God's will *as* the divine essence as willing some things. These and the following, more detailed, observations confirm and expand the earlier scholarly discoveries by Colish, Rosemann, and others.

– As for God's knowledge, it is stressed that the key features of the Lombardian theory of divine knowledge are his (a) clear definition of God's knowledge as a

linguistic and theological concept that properly signifies God's essence and means the Trinity's awareness and knowledge of all knowable things which include things God can do (potencies, potentialities), wills and does (actualities), and allows to be (evil actualities); (b) stress on the eternality of God's knowledge of temporal things which allows to say that God does not know things by contemplating them as if from within the time so that his knowledge from all eternity implies immutability and awareness of everything at once; (c) important qualification that, actually, the divine knowledge can neither grow nor dimish, but, potentially, could be different; and (d) a stance that this knowledge as such has no causative power unless connected with the divine will (with the knowledge logically preceding any volition).

– As for God's will, it is highlighted that the key features of the Lombardian perception of divine will are his (a) identification of this will with God's good pleasure or disposition; (b) its definition as the execution of the will, the active willing of God; (c) ascription of perfect efficiency and causal power to this will; (d) emphasis on the free and indeterminate nature of God's will; and (e) creative differentiation between several modes of will's operations: willing as God's directly commanding something to be; unwilling as God's willing something not to be; not-willing as God's permitting something to be. Moreover, this association of the will not with desire and inclination but with the execution of will testifies to Peter Lombard's deviation from the ancient meaning of "will" and acceptance of the new meaning. The will is not an irrisistible desire that ancient Greeks and Romans, and the Augustine of the *Confessions* knew so well but free choice, execution of a certain capacity, *willing* as such, what Anselm of Canterbury used to underscore. The *Sentences* highlight this new meaning of an old concept and make it the key feature of the will of God. Later, Duns Scotus, while commenting on the Lombardian text, will take up this notion of will as active *velle*. He will also defend a thesis that God's will does not follow his intellect, as Aquinas suggests, for it has no reason for its volitions but itself. That is, Scotus will repeat the Lombard's statement, which he inherited from Augustine, Anselm, and others, that God wills something because he wills it.

– As for God's potency, the dissertation states that the key characteristics of the Lombardian understanding of divine power or potency are his (a) definition of the omnipotence not so much as ability to do all things but rather as ability to do whatever he wills to do and whatever is in accordance with his essential properties; (b) emphasis on the immensity of God's capacities and things he can, only some of which become actualized; (c) unambiguous connection between God's potency and will, which, according to the Lombard, means that God's *posse* logically precedes God's *velle* while his will regulates his potency, for it is the divine will that decides which of potentialities are going to be realized; (d) careful clarification that God's potency to act in a certain way never ceases and always remains a power to act in that way, God's volitions notwithstanding; and (e) allowance for hypothetical alternative options open to God, which implies that, once thing has been willed or done by God, it cannot be undone but God *could* have done otherwise, and this capacity is eternal.

The following has been specified:

– It is demonstrated that, in terms of theological semantics, Peter Lombard does more than accept and replicate the famous Augustinian distinction between the signification and the signified, he also formulates a rather subtle distinction between two types of predications about God, that is, those signifying the divine essence "simply and absolutely" (*simpliciter et absolute*) and those denoting it "not simply and absolutely" (*non simpliciter et absolute*) but relatively, in connection with something else. This distinction has been downplayed in earlier Lombard research but is, in my view, an important semantic-theological development that should be acknowledged.

– Also, I propose that this semantic-theological distinction can and probably should be matched with our contemporary grammatical and logical idea of transitivity and intransitivity that modifies the structure and meaning of propositions. The Lombard's "simple and absolute" meaning of propositions may be identified with the quality of intransitivity and his "not simple" or relative type of predications with transitive reading. Then, statements such as "God knows" can be understood in two ways: either *intransitively* whereby "God" is the subject of the proposition and

"knows" is the predicate, or *transitively* whereby "God" is the subject, "knows" the verbal predicate, and there is also the object or addressee of the predicate's operation. It helps clearly differentiate between propositions about God's essence as such and God as seen in relation to something external to him.

– Concerning hypothetical alternative options, which remain eternally open to God, and the thesis that God *could* have done otherwise even after a thing has been willed or done by God, I offer a comment on and critical assessment of Marcia Colish's account. I criticize her later stance and defend the correctness of her earlier position on the issue. I disagree that God's omnipotence that implies hypothetical alternative options means an ability to replicate the events he once did. Instead, I contend that Peter Lombard insists on the permanence and unchangeability of God's voluntary decisions and, thus, it is correct to say that God *can have become* incarnate now but wrong to say that he *can become* incarnate now because his volition has already been realized in time and become a diachronic necessity in the actual world and the necessity of entailment in God's eternity.

The following has been further developed:

– A detailed historical-theological analysis of Peter Lombard's philosophical theology of God. The dissertation illumines numerous aspects of the Lombard's theological approach ("method"), with its appeal to logic, modal semantics, and philosophical notions, as well as the contents of his theology proper. This is a further advancement in the field of the Lombard research, in the wake of achievements made by Brady, Colish, Rosemann, Monagle, and other scholars.

Key words: Peter Lombard, philosophical theology, medeival theology, God, divine attributes, God's knowledge, God's will, omnipotence, necessity

СПИСОК ОПУБЛІКОВАНИХ ПРАЦЬ ЗА ТЕМОЮ ДИСЕРТАЦІЇ
(THE LIST OF PUBLICATIONS)

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1. Tkachenko, Rostislav. "A Thomistic Untraslatable: A Conceptual Analysis of Aquinas' Doctrine of Transubstantiation." *Sententiae* 34, no. 1 (2016): 61–79. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent34.01.061.

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10. Tkachenko, Rostislav. "Apostle Peter's Place in the Ecclesiology of the Gospel of Matthew: An Inquiry into the Theological Meaning of 'the Rock' and 'the Keys of the Kingdom' in Matthew 16:18-19." *Theological Reflections: Euro-Asian Journal of Theology*, no. 15 (2014): 67–85. (Также на русском: "Место апостола Петра в экклезиологии Евангелия от Матфея: Изучение богословского значения «скалы» и «ключей царства» в Матфея 16:18-19." *Богословские размышления: Евро-Азиатский журнал богословия / Theological Reflections: Euro-Asian Journal of Theology*, no. 15 (2014): 44–66.)

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Introduction

Relevance. Peter Lombard (Latin *Petrus Lombardus*; ca.1095/1100–1160) is one of the key figures in the history of Christian theology, because his famous *Book of Sentences* used to be the basic textbook of dogmatic (or systematic) theology for about three hundred years, from the thirteenth to the first half of the sixteenth centuries. Nevertheless, after the end of the Middle Ages, his true mastery, as well as his ideas, slowly came into oblivion, and it is only recently that "the Master of the *Sentences*" has returned to the scholarly world, as his life and work became subjects of serious critical research. The relevance of the Lombard's teaching about God's fundamental attributes, which he identifies as divine knowledge, power, and will, and the philosophical-theological means he uses, is explained by the fact that it was Master Peter that set the conceptual stage for theological discussions of the thirteenth-sixteenth centuries, because, in this period, every single medieval theologian's first major work was a commentary on the *Book of Sentences*. Therefore, the Lombard's oeuvre became the starting point and a textual-conceptual basis for the thought of such thinkers as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and many others.[1] Peter Lombard systematized the church fathers'—first of all, Augustine's—teachings and offered to the early university audience a collection of authoritative quotations which he presented, located within his authorial network of chapters and topical sections, and commented with the help of theological and philosophical resources he had. Contemporary scholars turn their attention to the Lombard's legacy because they see that his writings helped to form the debate about God's essence and attributes which both went on in the Middle Ages and has continued well into confessional theologies of western Europe in the Modern Era. It is common knowledge that contemporary versions of systematic theology interact with analytic philosophy and take up some of its ideas in order to offer a new analysis of transcendental divine attributes. As part and parcel of this process, contemporary

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[1] On this, see: John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2007), 207–8; Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 99; Richard W. Southern, *The Heroic Age*, with notes and additions by Lesley Smith and Benedicta Ward, vol. 2, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 143.

theologians rediscover the figure of Peter Lombard and turn to his legacy, what results in a scholarly discussion both about his contribution to western philosophy and theology and about his place in this intellectual tradition.

Connection with research programs, plans, and projects. The dissertational research has been conducted in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the Faculty of Philosophical Education and Science in the National Pedagogical University named after M. P. Dragomanov, Kyiv, Ukraine (the Dragomanov NPU). It is part of the larger research program entitled "Methodology and content of teaching in social sciences and humanities" («Методологія і зміст викладання соціально-гуманітарних наук»), which belongs to the thematic plan of research activities of the National Pedagogical University named after M. P. Dragomanov in the research area "Current issues in humanities," which was approved by the Academic Council of the University (Minutes No. 5 from January 29, 2009), and the plan of research activities of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies that concentrates on the following topic: "Development of Academic Theology in Ukraine within the context of current educational transformations" (state registration number: U 0117U004903).

Also, the dissertation project has been conducted within the framework of the Integrated Educational and Research Program of the Center for the Study of Religion of the Dragomanov NPU with the specialization in Contemporary Protestant Theology, which is established and being developed in cooperation with the Euro-Asian Theological Association in accordance with the supplementary agreement No. 1 that is appended to the Cooperation agreement between the Dragomanov NPU and the public organization "Euro-Asian Theological Association," dated December 19, 2015.

Goal. The main research goal is to closely examine and analyze in detail Peter Lombard's philosophical theology and, in particular, his doctrine of God's key attributes—knowledge, potency, and will—with a double purpose, to identify his theological points and detect the philosophical and logical means he uses to drive his arguments home.

Objectives. The research goal requires that the inquiry must fulfill the following objectives:

- To identify and explicate Peter Lombard's theological views on God's attributes of knowledge, potency, and will, paying attention to the authoritative texts he uses—that is, the Bible, Church Fathers, Doctors of the Church, or his own contemporaries—and the arguments he builds to support his conclusions;

- To detect and explain how and to what extent Peter Lombard uses philosophical—that is, logical or metaphysical—means to construct his theological arguments;

- To analyze and show which of the medieval modal logical tools and theories the Lombard uses in his argumentation;

- To detect and interpret both the meaning of important philosophical and theological points the Lombard makes about divine attributes and, also, their place in the tradition of medieval scholastic theology.

Thus, it is Peter Lombard's philosophical theology as presented in his *First Book of Sentences* that is **the object** of the given research.[2]

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[2] Hereafter I regularly refer to Peter Lombard's philosophical theology. I believe that he did have a *philosophical theology*, although this is obviously a contemporary term, and the twelfth-century thinkers would not be able to recognize it. By philosophical theology, I mean a rational explication of theological doctrines with the help of certain philosophical means. In contemporary parlance, it is the discipline or approach that, in Thomas Flint and Michael Rea's formulation, "is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God, and God's relationship to the world and things in the world." (See: Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, "Introduction," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology*, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.)

In an adapted form, that would be closer to the terminology and the conceptual world of Peter Lombard's age of the nascent scholasticism, it would probably look like the following definition, which I adapt for my research. Philosophical theology is an explanation of who and what God is according to the Christian dogmatic teaching on the basis of the Scripture (the *sacra pagina* of the twelfth century), in accordance with the authoritative statements (*sententiae*) of the ancient or recent ecclesial doctors (*auctores, auctoritates*), and with recourse to certain rational—dialectical or logical—techniques (*ratio, dialectica*). (For more information on the terms used and the notions referred, see: Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 16–28, 33–65.)

I am convinced that Peter Lombard *does* have such a philosophical theology. He writes about God's nature and attributes and, in doing so, he starts with authoritative statements of the Bible and Church Fathers, but then arranges them and comments upon them "theoretically," employing a number of selected philosophical and logical tools. Thus, his is the theology based on the Christian sacred text and the Christian teachers that is explored with certain use of rational, philosophical means. It will be the chief task of this work to look at and explore the Lombard's philosophical theology.

The particular subject matter is to be identified with Peter Lombard's doctrines of God's knowledge, potency, and will and the logical, theological, and philosophical means, techniques, and arguments he uses to make his points.

Methodology. The proposed research project is of interdisciplinary character and is located within the spheres of history of philosophy and history of theology (historical theology). Fundamental methodological notions and findings are taken from the works of such researchers as of I. Brady, G. Silano, M. Colish, Ph. Rosemann, C. Monagle, L.-M. de Rijk, S. Knuuttila, U. Leinsle, and J. Marenbon.

New contribution. The main scholarly contribution of the dissertation consists of the fact that, for the first time, there is offered a close, detailed analysis of Peter Lombard's philosophical theology proper and, in particular, a reconstruction of his doctrine of key divine attributes, that is, knowledge, potency, and will, with special attention to philosophical and logical means he uses.

In particular, the dissertation's scholarly contribution consists of the following theses, which are going to be defended publicly:

For the first time, the following has been demonstrated and established:

– How the Lombard appeals to and implicitly interprets the modal notions and modal theories available in the twelfth century. Although the Lombard does not have an elaborate modal theory, he consistently appeals to and uses some earlier notions and concepts. In particular, (a) like many other medieval thinkers, he thinks of potency as one's *ability* to act in this or that manner or, alternatively, as an objective possibility of things' turning out to be this or that way, and, hence, tacitly but undoubtedly rejects the deterministic vision of the world and accepts its contingency. Also, (b) like Anselm of Canterbury, he implicitly differentiates between three meanings of necessity: internal or external *compulsion and coercion* as a certain determining or irresistible force, *diachronic necessity* as fixity and immutability of what is temporally past or present (i.e. "passing"), and *necessity of entailment* (or subsequent necessity, necessity of consequence) as an unalterable connection between the antecedent and the

consequent of the implication, its logical formula being "N ($p \rightarrow q$)." The latter is of special importance, as the Lombard frequently applies it to theology proper and uses in his treatment of the divine potency and will. What is diachronically necessary in our world is necessary for God only through the necessity of logical entailment.

– What the multilayered content of the Lombard's theory of divine attributes is. In terms of theology, he interprets God's knowledge *as* the divine essence as knowing, God's potency (power) *as* the divine essence as being able to do, and God's will *as* the divine essence as willing some things.

– As for God's knowledge, it is stressed that the key features of the Lombardian theory of divine knowledge are his (a) clear definition of God's knowledge as a linguistic and theological concept that properly signifies God's essence and means the Trinity's awareness and knowledge of all knowable things which include things God can do (potencies, potentialities), wills and does (actualities), and allows to be (evil actualities); (b) stress on the eternality of God's knowledge of temporal things which allows to say that God does not know things by contemplating them as if from within the time so that his knowledge from all eternity implies immutability and awareness of everything at once; (c) important qualification that, actually, the divine knowledge can neither grow nor dimish, because it is eternal, essentially simple, and immutable, but, potentially, it could be different, which is explained by an idea that it is only the modal and ontological status of the known objects God knows that changes, not God's knowledge of them; and (d) a stance regarding the knowledge of God and causality, which has it that this knowledge as such has no causative power unless connected with the divine will (with the knowledge logically preceding any volition).

– As for God's will, it is clarified and highlighted that the key features of the Lombardian perception of divine will are his (a) identification of this

will with God's good pleasure or disposition; (b) its definition as the execution of the will, the active willing of God; (c) ascription of perfect efficiency and causal power to this will which makes it the attribute that signifies divine ability to reasonably will certain things and decide to act in a certain way; and (d) emphasis on the free and indeterminate nature of God's will; and (e) creative differentiation between several modes of will's operations: willing as God's directly commanding something to be; unwilling as God's willing something not to be; not-willing as God's permitting something to be. Moreover, this association of the will not with desire and inclination but with the execution of will testifies to Peter Lombard's deviation from the ancient meaning of "will" and acceptance of the new meaning. The will is not an irrisistible desire that ancient Greeks and Romans, and the Augustine of the *Confessions* knew so well but free choice, execution of a certain capacity, *willing* as such, what Anselm of Canterbury used to underscore. The *Sentences* highlight this new meaning of an old concept and make it the key feature of the will of God. Later, Duns Scotus, while commenting on the Lombardian text, will take up this notion of will as active *velle*. He will also defend a thesis that God's will does not follow his intellect, as Aquinas suggests, for it has no reason for its volitions but itself.

- As for God's potency, the dissertation states that the key characteristics of the Lombardian understanding of divine power or potency are his (a) definition of the omnipotence not so much as ability to do all things but rather as ability to do whatever he wills to do and whatever is in accordance with his essential properties; (b) emphasis on the immensity of God's capacities and things he can, by his power, do, since such potency implies a huge amount of possible acts, objects, and state of affairs some of which become actualized and others remain mere potentialities; (c) unambiguous connection between God's potency and will, which, according to the Lombard, means that God's *posse* logically

precedes God's *velle* while his will regulates—but never limits—his potency: the potency is an immense reservoir of realizable potentialities but it is the divine will that decides which of them are going to be realized in the created world; (d) careful clarification that God's potency always remains a power to act in a certain way or do something because, God's volition to realize some of these potentialities notwithstanding, God is eternally able to do what he is able to do "once;" and (e) allowance for hypothetical alternative options open to God, which implies that, once thing has been willed or done by God, it cannot be undone but God *could* have done otherwise, and this capacity is eternal.

− It is demonstrated that, in terms of theological semantics, Peter Lombard does more than accept and replicate the famous Augustinian distinction between the signification and the signified: God's nature is what is truly signified by our theological propositions and our notions of the divine attributes are the significations or signs of that simple essence. What is more, he also formulates a rather subtle distinction between two types of predications about God, that is, those signifying the divine essence "simply and absolutely" (*simpliciter et absolute*) and those denoting it "not simply and absolutely" (*non simpliciter et absolute*) but relatively, in connection with something else. This semantic-theological distinction can and probably should be matched with our contemporary grammatical and logical idea of transitivity and intransitivity that modifies the structure and meaning of propositions. The Lombard's "simple and absolute" meaning of propositions may be identified with the quality of intransitivity and his "not simple" or relative type of predications with transitive reading. Then, statements such as "God knows" can be understood in two ways: either *intransitively* whereby "God" is the subject of the proposition and "knows" is the predicate, or *transitively* whereby "God" is the subject, "knows" the verbal predicate, and there is also the object or addressee of the predicate's operation.

The following has been *specified*:

– Concerning hypothetical alternative options, which remain eternally open to God, and the thesis that God *could* have done otherwise even after a thing has been willed or done by God, I defend a thesis that God's omnipotence does not mean an ability to replicate the events he once did. Instead, I contend that Peter Lombard insists on the permanence and unchangeability of God's voluntary decisions and, thus, it is correct to say that God *can have become* incarnate now but wrong to say that he *can become* incarnate now because his volition has already been realized in time and become a diachronic necessity in the actual world, and the necessity of entailment in God's eternity.

The following has been *further developed*:

– Understanding of the way logic was used in medieval theological arguments concerning philosophical theology proper (doctrine of God).

Theoretical significance. The research undertaken allows to understand better the early stages of the formation of philosophical theology within European intellectual tradition. The findings and key theses the dissertation contains can be used for further historical-theological and historical-philosophical research. It contributes to both intellectual history and theology with its historical and systematic branches and, thus, can help to increase the knowledge of medieval Christian thought.

Practical significance. The dissertation may serve as a source of materials, theories, and clues not only for research but also for teaching theology, history of theology, church history, and history of philosophy. The discoveries made and the findings presented can be used for pedagogical purposes in institutions of higher education, whether affiliated with religious organizations or representing non-confessional schools and universities.

The personal contribution of the author. The given dissertation is a piece of independent academic research, which presents ideas and findings independently formulated by the author in accordance with his scholarly goals and objectives. The

relevant ideas, hypotheses, and positions of other authors used in the dissertation are diligently documented and have relevant references.

Approbation of the research results. The key theses and findings the dissertation contains and the results of supplementary studies have previously been presented and discussed at the following Ukrainian and international conferences, colloquia, and seminars: A scholarly conference of the Donetsk Christian University faculty (Donetsk, 2011); International Scholarly Conference "Church yesterday, today, tomorrow: forms and the essence" (Donetsk, 2013); Annual Doctoral Colloquium of Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (Leuven, Belgium, 2014); International Theological Conference "The Knowledge of God East and West: Dogmatic and Spiritual Dimensions" (Lviv, 2014); Annual Doctoral Colloquium of Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (Leuven, Belgium, 2016); The Day of Aristotle Scholarly Conference at H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2016); Annual Doctoral Colloquium of Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (Leuven, Belgium, 2017); Scholarly Conference "The Protestant Reformation in Sumy Region: history, current situation, future prospects" (Sumy, 2017); All-Ukrainian Scholarly Conference "The Reformation: its historical and contemporary contexts" (Kherson, 2017); International scholarly conference "The Reformation and the social transforamtion: the lessons from the past and the challenges of the present" (Lviv, 2017); Annual Doctoral Colloquium of Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (Leuven, Belgium, 2018); International Theological Conference "Theological Research Methodologies: issues and perspectives" (Kyiv, 2018); 2nd International Theological Conference "The Church and [the] Public: Love in Action" (Lviv, 2019).

Publications. Some major findings and theses of the dissertation as well as supplementary studies have been presented in 11 publications. Specifically, 7 articles were published in Ukranian scholarly journals, 1 in an international scholarly journal, and 3 in professional theological journals.

Structure and length of the dissertation, just as its outline, are conditioned by the research logic that is for the most part determined by the set purpose and

objectives. The dissertation has the following outline: introduction, six chapters, conclusion, and the list of references (bibliography). The overall length of the dissertation is 259 pages, whereas its main part (without bibliography and supplements) is 212 pages. The list of references consists of 225 names, of which 196 are in classical and foreign languages (and 29 in Russian and Ukranian).

1. Peter Lombard's theology as a subject of recent research

Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences* (also abbreviated as the *Sentences*) played a crucial role in the formation of the scholastic theological and philosophical discourse of the Later Middle Ages, from the thirteenth through the sixteenth centuries, but then remained forgotten for quite a while in the early modern period. The critical historiography and the new discipline of historical theology of the nineteenth and early twentieth century paid some attention to the long-forgotten book and its author, but the interpretations offered at that period were somewhat distorted. Ermenegildo Bertola, Marcia Colish, and Philipp Rosemann provide an excellent overview of the trends and tendencies in the Lombard studies in the modern period,[3] so there is no need to repeat their observations and conclusions in detail. However, it is worth noting the most important works and the most recent developments in this area. Therefore, in the coming paragraphs I, on the one hand, name a number of keynote Lombard scholars of the last one hundred fifty years and their publications, highlight some of their theses, and offer a few very brief conclusions[4] and, on the other hand, try to supplement Bertola, Colish, and Rosemann's comments by pointing out some of the works that appeared after their respected publications.

1.1. The Lombard in the scholarship of the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth-centuries

After the age of almost total neglect in the early modern era, Peter Lombard resumed being mentioned in the handbooks of the history of theology in the wake of the *Dogmengeschichte*'s rise. Ferdinand Baur mentions his *Sentences* among the medieval "scholastics' main texts" (*Die Hauptschriften der Scholastiker*) and locates the Lombard in the first phase of scholasticism which was characterized by the tension between "the new dialecticians and the theologians, who adhered strictly to

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[3] Ermenegildo Bertola, "Pietro Lombardo nella storiografia filosofica medioevale," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 95–113; Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden; New York; Köln: Brill, 1994), 1–11; Philipp W. Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard: The Current State of Research and Some Desiderata for the Future," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 72, no. 1 (2005): 133–52.

[4] In doing this, I partly rely on Bertola, Colish, and Rosemann's conclusions and partly express my own observations.

traditional dogma" (*zwischen den neuen Dialektikern und den streng am traditionellen Dogma festhaltenden Theologen*). But he allows the Master of Sentences only the pride of place of a systematizer who laid the foundation of the "scholastic system" (*Die Systeme des Scholastik*) but does not really discuss the intricacies of his theology. It is the method of the Lombard's theology and not its content that is important for Baur, as he notes the latter only in bypassing, very sketchily.[5]

A quite similar approach may be found in Adolf Harnack's chef-d'oeuvre, as well. Here Peter Lombard is called "the great disciple of Abelard" (*der grosse Schüler Abälard's*) who "fittingly placed the learning of his master at the service of the Church theology" (*in zweckmässiger Weise die Gelehrsamkeit des Meisters in den Dienst der kirchlichen Theologie stellte*). But his influence is, once again, limited to the authorship of a handy theology handbook – "a compendium for the study of theology" (*ein Compendium zum Studium der Theologie*) which drew heavily upon the patristic tradition that remained "the only subject of doctrine" (*der einzige Lehrgegenstand*).[6] The Lombard's theology *per se* receives only minor and often ill-grounded comments from the great Protestant historian of dogma.[7]

But there were a few thinkers who dedicated their separate treatises to Master Peter alone. They belonged to the German and the French school of medieval philosophical historiography and, thus, comprised the two ways of reading the Lombard.[8]

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[5] Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte* (Stuttgart: Ad. Becher's Verlag, 1847), 170–71, 158, 159, also 175, 179, passim.

[6] Adolf von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 3: Die Entwickelung des kirchlichen Dogmas 2/3, Register zu den drei Bänden*, dritte verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, vol. 3 (Freiburg; Leipzig; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1897), 344, 377–78. The English translations are taken from: Adolf von Harnack, *History of dogma*, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 5, History of dogma (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899), 42, 81–82.

[7] Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 3*, 3:346, 469, 473.

[8] On this division and the two schools' main tenets, see: Marcia L. Colish, *Remapping Scholasticism*, The Etienne Gilson Series, 21 (3 March 200) (Toronto, Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2000), 5–8; Helen Damico, ed., *Philosophy and the Arts*, vol. 3, Medieval Scholarship: Biographical Studies on the Formation of a Discipline (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 2000), 13ff, 43ff, 55ff, 75ff; cf. Timothy B. Noone, "Medieval Scholarship and Philosophy in the Last One Hundred Years," in *One Hundred Years of Philosophy*, ed. Brian J. Shanley, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 36 ([Washington, D.C.]: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 111–32; Alain de Libera, *Où va la philosophie médiévale?*, Leçon inaugurale - Collège de France (Paris: Fayard; Collège de France, 2014). On the two schools' opinions about Peter Lombard, see: Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:5–7.

In an 1881-year monograph, Félix Protois offered a biographical note and a detailed overview of Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*.[9] His assessment was more adequate than that of Harnack and company but still was one-sided. Protois denied the Lombard of any philosophical prowess by stating that he did not create anything that deserved to be called original (*ne créa rien, et... les idées qu'il émit n'eurent point... le mérite de l'originalité*).[10] However, he fully agreed that Master Peter made "un pas gigantesque" in the theological sphere by composing a fundamental source-book for the discipline which became "the universal guide" and "the only theological handbook" of medieval masters (*le guide universel des docteurs pendant tout le moyen-âge; le seul manuel théologique de toutes les écoles*) and systematizing various citations and doctrines of the authoritative church fathers (*ce sublime travail de la coordination et de la synthèse des dogmes; un abrégé lumineux [de] l'enseignement des Pères*).[11] Protois highlighted a number of intrinsic qualities of the *Sentences* and said that it is thanks to this work that theology was studied as a science by a method that implied a careful study of the authoritative quotations, analysis of their theories, and, by consequence, further intensive discussions of the questions raised.[12] Still, the treatment of the Lombard's doctrines—including those of God's knowledge and will[13]—remained rather cursory and wanting in analytical depth.

Other francophone scholars of the twentieth century—such as Maurice de Wulf, Étienne Gilson, Émile Bréhier—shared this overall assessment and therefore frequently ignored the Lombard as a real thinker *sui generis*, barely mentioning him in their works.[14] They tended to reiterate the thesis that he was neither a philosopher nor a good scholastic theologian of an Aquinas type and, hence, described his

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[9] Félix Protois, *Pierre Lombard, évêque de Paris, dit le maitre des sentences : Son époque, sa vie, ses écrits, son influence* (Paris: Société générale de librairie catholique, 1881).

[10] Protois, 40–41.

[11] Protois, 181, 158, 183–84.

[12] Protois, 150, 155–59.

[13] See Protois, 65–69.

[14] Maurice De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale précédée d'un aperçu sur la philosophie ancienne* (Louvain; Paris; Bruxelles: Institut supérier de philosophie; Félix Alcan; Oscar Schepens, 1900), 208–9; Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie au Moyen Âge*, vol. I and II (Paris: Payot et Cie, 1922), 55–56; Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge: des origines patristiques à la fin du XIVe siècle*, 2éme édition revue et augmentée, Bibliothèque philosophique Payot (Paris: Payot, 1947), 251–52; Émile Bréhier, *La philosophie du Moyen Âge*, Nouvelle édition corrigée mise á jour et augmentée d'un appendice, L'Évolution de l'humanité (Paris: Albin Michel, 1949), 197–98.

theology as insufficiently philosophical and logical. For instance, Bréhier plainly states that the Lombard is one of "the enemies of dialectics" (*les ennemis de la dialectique*) and his *Sentences* lack originality, their theses being feeble and uncertain, and the only reason why they were popular is that they were later used as a theological textbook.[15] Continuing this trend, Philippe Delhaye finds in the *Sentences* and then analyzes in detail the Lombardian moral teaching but, still, underscores the same overall characteristic: Master Peter's theological and ethical thought suffers from the exclusion of, and aversion to, philosophy and is based upon "the cult of theological tradition" (*Le culte de la tradition théologique*).[16] This is the sentiment of the French school and it can be found in other scholarly works as well,[17] although Joseph de Ghellink's research is rather an exception in its very detailed and relatively positive portrait of the Lombard and his thought.[18] De Ghellink quite expectedly admits that the *Sentences* bear no traces of true originality and intellectual brilliance but asserts more than once that they are composed with a wonderful sense of moderation, balance, and order: the topics are presented cogently, the patristic citations are well-chosen and documented, and the select number of complex (theo)logical issues are also treated well.[19] Hence, he exerts a rather positive attitude to and evaluation of the Lombard's work.

The German tradition offers a slightly different assessment. Starting with Julius Kögel,[20] this line of scholarship tended to highlight that Peter Lombard provided a very good summary and a compendium of the Christian philosophical-theological

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[15] "Les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard sont écrites après beaucoup d'autres ouvrages du même genre ; peu originales, de pensée faible et incertaine, elles ne doivent leur célébrité qu'à ce qu'elles ont servi de texte de commentaire aux théologiens pendant les siècles qui ont suivi. … Comme tous les ennemis de la dialectique, il n'use pas moins d'elle, ne fût-ce que pour concilier des autorités de sens opposé." Bréhier, *La philosophie*, 197–98.

[16] Philippe Delhaye, *Pierre Lombard, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa morale* (Montréal; Paris: Inst. d'études médiévales; Librairie J. Vrin, 1961), esp. 99-101.

[17] See, for example, similar observations in David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 262–80; Дарио Антисери and Джованни Реале, *Средневековье (От библейского послания до Макиавелли)*, пер. с итал. С. Мальцевой, Западная философия от истоков до наших дней (СПб.: Петрополис, 1997), 115–17.

[18] Joseph de Ghellink, "Pierre Lombard," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: contenant l'exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire* (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1908), cols. 1941–2019; Joseph de Ghellink, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle: études, recherches et documents* (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1914), 132, 137–41, passim.

[19] De Ghellink, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 132, 137–41, *passim*.

[20] Julius Kögel, *Petrus Lombardus in seiner Stellung zur Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Greifswald: Julius Abel, 1897).

tradition, so that his text was in a sense detached from its author and played the role of a mirror in which the major scholarly debates of the twelfth century were well reflected. The book had become "a convenient reference book for guidance" in theological and philosophical debates (*ein bequemes Nachschlagebuch zur Orientierung*) despite its focus on the past and lack of originality for the present.[21] Some elements of the relevant philosophical theories, dialectical tools, and theological concepts are to be found in the *Sentences*, indeed. Therefore, being a non-philosophical personality (*Petrus selbst nicht als eine philosophische Persönlichkeit anzusehen ist*), Master Peter turns into a *de facto* philosopher and an author who has composed a crucial philosophical text, which massively influenced the later development of philosophical and theological thought.[22] But the prism through with Kögel analyzes Peter Lombard's teaching is very narrow and biased, because he commits an error of modernist historiographical imposition by trying to fit the Lombard into a Procrustean bed of "realism" vs. "mysticism" controversy. The German scholar plainly writes about the Lombard as a realist and a mystical thinker (*Der Realismus des Lombarden; Der Lombarde als Mystiker*).[23] But this is obviously a reductionist and unfair approach.

A few years later, Johannes Espenberger criticized Kögel's methodology and findings and offered his vision of the Lombardian legacy.[24] Nevertheless, he fell prey to another biased historiographical assumption, that about the realist vs. nominalist schools and the Aristotelians vs. the Platonists. Since the Lombard could not be put into any of these camps and since, as Espenberger correctly recognizes, his main purpose was to summarize, harmonize, and present the church doctrine supplied with the authoritative quotations from both the Bible and Church fathers, the twelfth-

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[21] Kögel, 13, 18.

[22] Kögel asks, "…[W]elch wichtiges Moment für die Geschichte der Philosophie dieses Werk in sich schlösse?" and then gives an answer, "Es brachte mit sich einen Kinschnitt von der grössten Tragweite, und Ritter hat vollkommen recht, wenn er die Sentenzen ein 'geeignetes Lehrbuch nennt, in dessen weiten Falten alle philosophischen Lehren des Mittelalters eingetragen werden konnten.' … seine Sammlung einen um so grösseren Einfluss auf die Entwickelung der Philosophie ausgeübt hat. Das Werk ist losgelöst von seinem Verfasser zu betrachten und redet für sich allein." Kögel, 17–18.

[23] Kögel, 21–32.

[24] Johannes Nepomuk Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus und ihre Stellung im zwölften Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1901).

century Italian theologian ends up as an eclectic (*Eklektiker*), although he must have had some leaning towards philosophical realism.[25] In the end, since Master Peter "wished to write a Catholic dogmatics in the true sense of the word, he had to resort to philosophy; even more so because he wanted to bring contradictory fathers' passages and school opinions into harmony as far as possible" (*Schon weil er im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes eine katholische Dogmatik schreiben wollte, mußte er nach der Philosophie greifen; um so mehr aber noch deshalb, weil er widersprechende Väterstellen und Schulmeinungen soweit als möglich in Harmonie bringen wollte*).[26] However, this rather adequate perception of the *Sentences*' essence does not save Espenberger from other inadequacies. His whole approach to the Lombard's philosophy is an imposition of later philosophical categories upon a twelfth-century theology. Such categories as ontology, space, proof of God's existence, psychology, the morality of human actions cannot be found (in a strict sense) in the *Sentences* but it is upon them that Espenberger founds his quasi-Lombardian intellectual construction.[27] In the last analysis, Espenberger is to be praised for his careful treatment of Master Peter's "method" or, better, "an invariably held practice" (*eine ausnahmslos festgehaltene Praxis*), but there is next to nothing to gain from his description of the Lombard's doctrine of God's knowledge and will.[28]

This German way of seeing *Petrus Lombardus*' legacy continued well into the mid-twentieth century and, with variations and reappraisals, is found in works written by, among others, Otto Baltzer, Clemens Bauemker, and Martin Grabmann.[29] All of them read the *Sentences* from a methodological point of view and, consequently,

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[25] Espenberger, 1–11.

[26] Espenberger, 10.

[27] These comprise a number of chapters/sections and, also, the lenses through which Espenberger sees the Lombard's theology: *Ontologie, Raum, Gottesbeweise, Psychologie, Moralität der menschlichen Handlungen*, etc. See: Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus*, 36ff, 70ff, 87ff, 103ff, 127ff.

[28] Cf. Espenberger, 25–30 and 108–15. As for the Lombardian approach to the doing of theology, Espenberger rather rightly, albeit pretentiously, says that Master Peter should be considered the founder of the scholastic method (p.30): *Mit gutem Rechte kann man darum Petrus einen Begründer der streng scholastischen Methode nennen, welche im 13. Jahrhunderte üblich wurde, da ja er ihr hauptsächlich zum Siege verhalf.*

[29] Otto Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus: Ihre Quellen und ihre dogmengeschichtliche Bedeutung* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1902); Clemens Baeumker, *Die christliche Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1913); Martin Grabmann, *Die scholastische Methode im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert*, vol. Band 2, 2 vols., Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode: nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957).

keep comparing him to the great scholastic giant(s) of the thirteenth century – primarily, Thomas Aquinas, whose *Summa theologiae* is an epitome and summit of the scholastic method. These scholars either tend to focus on the Lombard's sources, thus seeing him as nothing but a compiler of the church fathers' opinions (*sententiae*) and completely subjecting his own thought to that of his ancient authorities, such as Baltzer,[30] or attempt to answer the question as to how the *Sentences* were organized and why they became the main source- and textbook, thus concentrating on the didactic qualities and methodological aspects of the Lombard's work, such as Grabmann.[31] In either case, there is little attention to the *meaning* of what Master Peter did with his source material while composing his chef-d'oeuvre.

The achievements, as well as shortcomings of the German and French Lombard scholarship of the period from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, were, for the most part, accepted and many times reduplicated by a number of later historians of theology and philosophy. For instance, David Luscombe bluntly calls the Lombard "a cautious, sober and apparently dull expositor" of the theological and philosophical texts and thinks of him exclusively in terms of his belonging to the school of Peter Abelard. Yet, the British scholar pays some attention to the Lombardian theology proper and speaks about his notion of God's knowledge and power.[32] Italians Antonio Brancaforte and Enrico Nobile criticize their medieval compatriot for non-originality, but admit that he made some theological—not really intellectual or philosophical—contribution to the development of western thought.[33] A Slovak-American Jaroslav Pelikan gives the Lombard some theological credits and mentions some of the teachings the *Sentences* promulgated but assumes that this is a mere "reaffirmation of the Augustinian-catholic tradition."[34] Quite similar assessments, with mixed positive and negative comments but without detailed analyses of Peter Lombard's

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[30] Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen*, 1–14 and passim.

[31] Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:359–407.

[32] Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 262, 265–67.

[33] Antonio Brancaforte, "Contributo di Pietro Lombardo all'unità del pensiero medioevale," *Teoresi*, no. 8 (1953): 230–45; Enrico Nobile, "Appunti sulla teologia dei *Quattro libri delle Sentence* di Pier Lombardo," *Pier Lombardo*, no. 4 (1960): 49–59.

[34] Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)*, vol. 3, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 272–73, 275–76, 279, esp. 271–72.

philosophical theology, are also to be found in works by M.-D. Chenu, A. Forest, B. Hägglund, J. Leclercq, U. Leinsle, and others.[35] Yet, one can easily find publications which dismiss the Lombard altogether and do not give him the pride of place inside the twelfth-century intellectual landscape.[36] Such was the unhappy lot the Master of the *Sentences* has received more than once.

1.2. The Lombard in the scholarship of the second half of the twentieth and the turn of the twenty-first centuries

In the meantime, the revolution in the Lombard research was coming along. One side of it was "material" or, better, textual and the other had to do with the perspective on and the methodology of dealing with the Lombardian legacy.

First of all, Artur Landgraf did some critical textual studies on the text of the *Liber sententiarum* and published his findings.[37] Then, Ignatius Brady produced the new, critical, text of the book and supplied it with a very informative introduction, commentaries, and textual apparatus.[38] (It superseded earlier, rather defective,

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[35] Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle*, Préface d'Etienne Gilson (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 93, 96; André Forest, "La théologie des sommes et des sentences," in *Le mouvement doctrinal du XIe au XIVe siècle*, by André Forest, Fernand van Steenberghen, and Maurice de Gandillac, Histoire de l'Église, depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours 13 (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1951), 157–60; Bengt Hägglund, *History of Theology*, trans. Gene J. Lund (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), 168–69; (рус. перевод: Бенгт Хегглунд, *История теологии*, пер. с швед. В.Ю. Володина [СПб.: Светоч, 2001], 136–37); Jean Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture*, trans. Catherine Misrahi (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1982), 3–4, 6–7; Jean Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 68–87; Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 98–102.

[36] Peter Dronke, ed., *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); David E. Luscombe, *Medieval Thought*, A History of Western Philosophy 2 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[37] Artur Michael Landgraf, "Notes de critique textuelle sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, no. 2 (1930): 80–99; Artur Michael Landgraf, *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik, unter dem Gesichtspunkte der Schulenbildung* (Regensburg: Gregorius-Verlag, 1948), 93–96; Artur Michael Landgraf, *Introduction à l'histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante*, trans. Albert M. Landry, Université de Montréal. Institut d'études médiévales Publications 22 (Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales, 1973), 130–32.

[38] Petrus Lombardus, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 3rd revised edition (Editio tertia. Ad fidem codicum antiquiorum restituta), 2 vols., Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971); Ignatius C. Brady, "Prolegomena," in *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, by Petrus Lombardus, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 3rd revised edition (Editio tertia. Ad fidem codicum antiquiorum restituta), vol. 1, part 1, 2 vols., Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), 5*-148*.

editions.[39]) Finally, in 1947 Friedrich Stegmüller published an extremely valuable index of the commentaries on and books related to the *Sentences*,[40] which has remained a major resource for Lombard scholars for years and been supplemented and updated more recently by Victorin Doucet, Steven Livesey, and Ueli Zahnd.[41] Also, in 1979 John Van Dyk provided an additional bibliographical guide to the study of the medieval *Sentence* commentaries[42] and demonstrated the importance of research in this field in his doctoral dissertation.[43] These collective efforts resulted in the appearance, in the second half of the twentieth century, of a reliable Latin text of Peter Lombard's most important book and the availability of supplementary biographical and bibliographical catalogs. So far about the revolution in resources.

Parallel to that, there was the revolution in scholarly approach. A few scholars refueled and reconfigured the Lombard studies as they rejected the ahistorical and modernist approaches favored before and moved to a type of research that was based on new textual materials and informed by most relevant historical-philosophical and historical-theological data. Ermenegildo Bertola documented and challenged the prevalent historiographical conceptions in 1950-60s with the already mentioned Ignatius Brady summarizing the most crucial of them in his encyclopedia article; Marcia Colish started a full-fledged methodological and conceptual revolution in the 1990s; and, lastly, Philipp Rosemann and G.R. Evans, accompanied by a number of other scholars, have seriously advanced the Lombard research in 2000-2010s.

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[39] Petrus Lombardus, "Sententiarum libri quatuor," in *Petri Lombardi, magistri sententiarum, parisiensis episcopi, Opera omnia*, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 2, 2 vols., Patrologia Latina 192 (Parisiis: Apud J.-P. Migne, 1855), col. 0519-0964, http://www.augustinus.it/latino/trinita/index.htm; Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum* (Ad Clara Aquas prope Florentiam: Ex Typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1916).

[40] Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols. (Würzburg: F. Schöningh, 1947).

[41] Victorin Doucet and Friedrich Stegmüller, *Commentaires sur les* Sentences*: Supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller* (Florentiae; Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1954); Steven J. Livesey, "*Lombardus Electronicus*: A Biographical Database of Medieval Commentators on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. G. R. Evans, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002), 1–23.

[42] John Van Dyk, "Thirty Years since Stegmüller: A Bibliographical Guide to the Study of Medieval Sentence Commentaries Since the Publication of Stegmüller's *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (1947)," *Franciscan Studies* 39 (1979): 255–315.

[43] John Van Dyk, "The Value of the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* for the History of Medieval Philosophy: An Inquiry and an Assessment" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975).

As early as 1960, Bertola offered a stimulating and well-documented survey of the twisted perception of Peter Lombard's figure that had been dominating the philosophical historiography for decades or even centuries.[44] Also, he turned attention to the Lombard of history and his actual thought by publishing a couple of articles that deal with some aspects of the Lombard's philosophical theology.[45] Additionally, by publishing a number of books and articles, which shed some light on the intellectual milieu of the twelfth century, Bertola helped to understand better the context in which Master Peter lived and worked.[46]

It is to the importance of this context and the fallacies in so many historiographical perceptions that Brady called on his readers in his brief but insightful text which summarized his own and Bertola's findings.[47] His article criticized the authors who dismissed the Lombard "as primarily an unoriginal compiler almost completely lacking any philosophical foundations" and defended the thesis that Master Peter "made no pretense of being a philosopher," but, instead, was a very competent theologian. In fact, "his work seems consciously to exclude the speculations of philosophy and to be primarily, if not exclusively, a work of theology based on Scripture and the doctrines of the Church Fathers. The Lombard was undoubtedly a compiler, yet a compiler who was master of his sources and of his own thought."[48] This is Brady's thesis, which, I think, Bertola would embrace, as well. Yet, one swallow does not make a spring, and so, the Italian historian—even accompanied by a brilliant American Franciscan—cannot be credited with the true revolution in the Lombard research, albeit his work gave some sense of direction to other scholars.

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[44] Bertola, "Pietro Lombardo nella storiografia."

[45] Ermenegildo Bertola, "Il problema di Dio in Pier Lombardo," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 48, no. 2 (1956): 135–50; Ermenegildo Bertola, "La dottrina della creazione nel *Liber Sententiarum* di Pier Lombardo," *Pier Lombardo* 1, no. 1 (1957): 27–44.

[46] Ermenegildo Bertola, "Le critiche di Abelardo ad Anselmo di Laon ed a Guglielmo di Champeaux," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 52 (1960): 495–522; Ermenegildo Bertola, "I precedenti storici del metodo del 'Sic et non' di Abelardo," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 53 (1961): 255–80; Ermenegildo Bertola, *Il problema della coscienza nella teologia monastica del 12 secolo*, Pensiero medioevale, ser. 2; 1 (Padova: Cedam, 1970); Ermenegildo Bertola, "La dottrina morale di Pietro Abelardo," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 55 (1988): 53–71.

[47] Ignatius C. Brady, "Peter Lombard," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwars (New York; London: Macmillan Company & Free Press; Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967).

[48] Brady, 124.

It was an American Marcia Colish who brought about the true "reversal of perspectives on Peter Lombard, and the revival of interest in his achievement," as another Lombard scholar acknowledges.[49] In 1994, she published an extremely thorough, scrupulous, and ample two-volume monograph dedicated to the person, career, and intellectual legacy of Peter Lombard.[50] Very soon this work acquired a status of magisterial and fundamental for the medieval theological and philosophical historiography. But its particular achievement lies in the fact that Colish revolutionized the scholarly understanding of the Lombard's works. She carefully located him in the appropriate historical setting and analyzed his thought as related to and, in fact, born inside the world of theological discussions of the twelfth century. Thus, Peter's *Sentences* and Scriptural commentaries were compared with major treatises of Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, Robert of Melun, and others. For, as Colish asserts, "the best way to place Peter Lombard in his own time is to read him, always, in conjunction with the theologians in the first half of the twelfth century."[51] This a truly historical and context-sensitive attitude.

As the result, her approach is characterized by regular alternation between two methods: (i) systematic analysis of what Peter Lombard said on the given issue and (ii) comparative analysis of how it related to what other masters of theology and philosophy said. Such a double lens allows for a very vivid picture of Peter's thinking and contribution to the ongoing debates: he is shown to be constantly interacting with the Christian tradition of the past and present and, at the same time, thoughtfully offering his own "thoroughgoing and independent" take on various issues.[52] Colish step by step unfolds his position and arguments on the nature of the theological project, the doctrines of God, creation, man, Christ, sacraments, etc. Also, she provides some important biographical details and discusses the Lombardian way of

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[49] Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 137.

[50] Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols., Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden; New York; Köln: Brill, 1994).

[51] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:11.

[52] Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden; New York; Köln: Brill, 1994), 718ff.

reading and commenting on the Scripture and understanding what she, rather anachronistically, calls ethics.

In the last analysis, the two-volume set covers almost all topics Master Peter dealt with in his time and, hence, must be regarded as a really comprehensive introduction to the Lombard. The text is not without shortcoming or bias,[53] but it has truly changed the Lombard studies forever. Moreover, it was supplemented by a number of articles published before and after 1994 which either treat the background of Peter's professional enterprise, or scrutinize some of his methods and practices, or, finally, trace the developments and later destinies of his work. (Some of them were later collected in a volume entitled "Studies in Scholasticism.")[54] In sum, Marcia Colish managed to build on Bertola, Brady, and Stegmüller's achievements, break through the negative or disregarding depictions of the Lombard, and demonstrate that his approach, exhibited in the *Sentences*, was in many respects superior to those of his contemporaries. For, in dealing with the inherited tradition, Master Peter did

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[53] For some of most important criticisms, see: Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 137–45.

[54] Marcia L. Colish, "Gilbert, the Early Porretans, and Peter Lombard: Semantics and Theology (Previously published in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la logica modernorum*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1987)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), IV: 229-250; Marcia L. Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Previously published in *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18, Durham, NC, 1988)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), I: 135-156; Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard as an Exegete of St. Paul (Previously published in *Ad Litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, Ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), IX: 71-92; Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard: The *Opinio Nominalium* and Divine Transcendence," *Vivarium* 30, no. 1 (1992): 139–56; Marcia L. Colish, "The Development of Lombardian Theology, 1160-1215 (Previously published in *Centres of Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East*, Ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald. Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 207-216)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), XIII: 1-9; Marcia L. Colish, "From the Sentence Collection to the *Sentence* Commentary and the *Summa*: Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130-1215 (Previously published in *Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse. Louvain-La-Neuve: Lnstitut d'Études Médiévales, 1994)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), XII: 9-29; Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy (Previously published in *Issues in Medieval Philosophv: Essays in Honor of Richard C. Dales*, ed. Nancy van Deusen. Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 62:6. Ottawa: The Institute of Mediaeval Music, 2001)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), X: 121-129; Marcia L. Colish, "'Discipline' and 'Science' in Peter Lombard (Previously published in *Wissenstheorie Und Wissenschaftspraxis Im 12. Und 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Rainer Berndt, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Ralf M. W. Stammberger. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), XI: 175-186; Marcia L. Colish, "Authority and Interpretation in Scholastic Theology (Previously published in *Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation: The Foundational Character of Authoritative Sources in the History of Christianity and Judaism*, ed. Judith Frishman et al. Leiden: Brill, 2004, Pp. 369-386)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), II: 1-16; Marcia L. Colish, "The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 1–33.

much more than just copy the quotations from ancient authorities. He actually arranged his material in a special, very methodical, way and definitely formulated his own statements and arguments, albeit they are difficult to be seen on the surface.

In the wake of Colish's publications, a few other people offered their contributions and continued the Lombardian revolution. Most important is the research done by Philipp Rosemann. This Irish-American scholar of German origin not only provided readers with a more easily accessible introduction to Peter Lombard which, still, incorporates all recent discoveries and makes some original suggestions[55] but also came up with a number of new proposals.

Firstly, he more than once highlighted the importance of the tradition of commentaries on the *Sentences* which proliferated in the Middle Ages: it is through the study of this tradition that we can better understand the significance the Lombard's work had and better appreciate the evolution of medieval scholastic discourse. He stresses that when we pay attention to the reception history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) and further destinies of the *Sentences* after their publication, we, in fact, follow the arrow of the medieval theological (and philosophical) history.[56] "As a consequence," Rosemann writes, "the literary genre of the *Sentences* commentary is able to serve as a window upon a long and crucial segment of the Western Christian tradition. It witnesses—and of course contributed to—the major transformations in the structures of thought that occurred during more than three centuries," from 1158 to, roughly, 1520.[57] Thus, Peter Lombard emerges not only as an individual theologian worthy of studying but as the—unconscious and unwilling—originator of the whole tradition of theologizing who gives us the means to carefully trace the developments of medieval theology.

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[55] Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, Great Medieval Thinkers (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[56] Rosemann, 198–211; Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 145–51; Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's* Sentences, Rethinking the Middle Ages 2 (Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2007); Philipp W. Rosemann, "Conclusion: The Tradition of the *Sentences*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 495–523; Philipp W. Rosemann, "Introduction: Three Avenues for Studying the Tradition of the *Sentences*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 1–25.

[57] Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 19; a similar argument is found in Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 145–46; for some more details, see also Rosemann, "Three Avenues for Studying," 18–23.

Secondly, Rosemann shows how Peter Lombard's theological work contributed to and participated in methodological and conceptual shifts of the late twelfth-thirteenth centuries. The whole notion of theology as science (*scientia divina*) emerges only with Aquinas and his contemporaries while the Lombard used to employ the traditional idea of dealing with the "sacred page" (*sacra pagina*) of the Christian Scripture. Yet, although Master Peter was still a holder of "a biblically structured imagination," his theological approach to different topics displays a systematic, scholarly touch and some use of dialectic. There is no "methodical subject" in the *Sentences* yet, but there is already the presence of a hesitant but thinking, questing, and reasoning mind which heavily contributes to the invention of systematic theology as such.[58] These methodological and historical musings Rosemann has formulated in his publications widen the picture of who Peter Lombard is for the medieval theology and indicate some roads that further research in his legacy might take.

Moreover, together with G.R. Evans and a whole company of other scholars Ph. Rosemann unleashed a series of publications on the medieval *Sentences* commentaries. So far, three volumes have been published.[59] They treat various periods of the medieval intellectual history, present a number of commentaries on the Lombard's *opus*, underline their key features and teachings, and highlight the developments these works testify to. Thus, the multivolume project focuses scholarly attention on the *Sentences'* contents, its distribution, and its interpretation during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era, and this is highly praiseworthy. After all, this commentary tradition played a crucial role in the theological education of the time and, in a sense, formed and was (re)formed by such figures as Alexander of

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[58] Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 145; Philipp W. Rosemann, "*Sacra Pagina* or *Scientia Divina*? Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas and the Nature of the Theological Project," in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar. The Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, Volume 2: 2002-2010*, ed. James McEvoy, Michael Dunne, and Julia Hynes (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), 50–70; Philipp W. Rosemann, "Peter Lombard [on the Saraments]," in *Christian Theologies of the Sacraments: A Comparative Introduction*, ed. Justin S. Holcomb and David A. Johnson (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 59–80.

[59] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994; G. R. Evans, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard: Current Research*, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002); Philipp W. Rosemann, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010); Philipp W. Rosemann, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015).

Hales, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Martin Luther, and other luminaries of the age.

This was the revolution in a scholarly approach to Peter Lombard. Its outcome is seen in the emergence of a new—less biased, more historically accurate, and more informed—methodology and the whole new vision of the Lombardian legacy. Master Peter is no longer a forgotten name or, what is worse, a forgettable "dull expositor," and his personality and works are now carefully studied by historians, theologians, and philosophers because it has been shown that he did contribute a lot to the intellectual discussions of his age and helped to form the medieval scholastic discourse, especially in theology. This is the result of the revolution led by Landgraf, Stegmüller, Brady, Colish, Evans, and Rosemann. It has recently been supported and continued by many others.

1.3. The Lombard in the early-twenty-first-century scholarship

After the just-mentioned revolution, there has been the rise of the global "Lombard research." The interest in the figure of Peter Lombard has been growing and a number of scholars have produced new publications, which open new vistas and break new grounds.

First of all, one has to thank Giulio Silano for the appearance of the English translation of the Lombard's *opus magnum*, the *Book of Sentences*. He published it in four successive volumes, which correspond to the original four books dealing with the Mystery of the Trinity, Creation, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments or Signs, respectively.[60] Silano translated the whole text and also supplied it with his

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[60] Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. Giulio Silano, 4 vols., Medieval Sources in Translation 42–43, 45, 48 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS), 2007–2010).

introductions and selected bibliography.[61] This is a very reliable translation and a real asset for medieval scholarship,[62] and I will regularly use it in my inquiry.

In the meantime, many scholars engaged in the analysis of the Lombard's writings. Some of them turned to Peter Lombard's figure as part of their bigger projects but their publications need to be mentioned. In this fashion, Briola and Harkins situate him in his historical context and compare some of his theological assertions with those of Peter Abelard and the Victorine theologians while Baylor connects some of his Christological thoughts with John Calvin's opinion.[63] Clark argues for Peter Comestor's acquaintance with, and extensive use of, Peter Lombard's Second Book of the *Sentences* in his own *Historia Genesis* and thus calls us to reexamine the prevalent views on the latter Peter and on both Peters' relationship.[64] Also, in another article, he provides some insightful comments on the Lombard's exegetical work and its contribution to the late twelfth-century tradition of biblical interpretation.[65] At the same time, a number of scholars continue to privilege another towering figure of the medieval scholasticism, that of Thomas Aquinas, as their primary research interest and compare the Lombard's views to those of the Angelic Doctor. This is what, for example, Hoffmann, Miner, Raschko, West, and Zuijdwecht do with some psychological and theological issues touched on by both masters.[66] A much more remarkable approach is found in Kappes' article where the

[61] Giulio Silano, "Introduction," in *The Sentences. Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity*, by Peter Lombard, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS), 2007), vii–l; this is both the general introduction to the *Sentences* and a short commentary on the first book. Silano has written similar introductory commentaries to each volume. As for bibliographies, Silano offers a separate bibliography for each volume, as well, and one should find it at the end of the book.

[62] Note a very positive, yet not devoid of insightful criticisms, review of the publication: Marcia L. Colish, "Review of *The Sentences* by Peter Lombard, Translated by Guilio Silano," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49, no. 2 (April 2011): 247–49.

[63] Lucas Briola, "A Case Study of Scholasticism: Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard on Penance," *Journal of Moral Theology* 5, no. 1 (January 2016): 65–85; Franklin T. Harkins, "'Homo Assumptus' at St Victor: Reconsidering the Relationship between Victorine Christology and Peter Lombard's First Opinion," *The Thomist* 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 595–624; T. Robert Baylor, "'With Him in Heavenly Realms': Lombard and Calvin on Merit and the Exaltation of Christ," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 17, no. 2 (April 2015): 152–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/ijst.12104.

[64] Mark J. Clark, "Peter Comestor and Peter Lombard: Brothers in Deed," *Traditio* 60 (2005): 85–142.

[65] Mark J. Clark, "Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton, and the School of Paris the Making of the Twelfth-Century Scholastic Biblical Tradition," *Traditio* 72 (2017): 171–274.

[66] Tobias Hoffmann, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus," *The Thomist* 67, no. 1 (January 2003): 73–94; Robert Miner, "Thomas Aquinas's Hopeful Transformation of Peter Lombard's Four Fears," *Speculum* 92, no. 4 (2017): 963–75; Michael B. Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's Subsistence Theory," *The Thomist* 65, no. 3 (July 2001):

author intends to trace the lines of reception of, and engagement with, the *Sentences* in the medieval Byzantine theological discourse.[67]

Nevertheless, one expects more significant and groundbreaking contributions from the scholars who made the Lombard's legacy the focal point of their research. There have been quite a few recently.

An interesting gaze at the Lombard's role in the formation of medieval discussions in the scholastic camp has been provided by the scholars who started to excavate the *Sentence* tradition. In addition to a number of important texts published in the already cited three-volume *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*,[68] one should mention, for example, the articles by Aroztegi Esnaola, Ols, Fiorentino, and Schabel,[69] and, of course, a recent book by Severin Kitanov.[70] In this volume, he describes how Peter Lombard actually ignited the later discussion about human destiny and, in particular, their intended earthly and heavenly enjoyment of God. The Lombard appears as *the* transmitter of the Augustinian vision who also critically engages with his source texts and modifies some of the *Doctor gratiae*'s statements. Kitanov commends Master Peter for his "hermeneutic skills" in his work

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409–39; Jason L. A. West, "Aquinas on Peter Lombard and the Metaphysical Status of Christ's Human Nature," *Gregorianum* 88, no. 3 (2007): 557–86; Geertjan Zuijdwegt, "'Utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima': Aquinas on the Lombard's Identification of Charity with the Holy Spirit," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 79, no. 1 (2012): 39–74, https://doi.org/10.2143/RTPM.79.1.2168978.

[67] Christiaan Kappes, "A New Narrative for the Reception of Seven Sacraments into Orthodoxy: Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in Nicholas Cabasilas and Symeon of Thessalonica and the Utilization of John Duns Scotus by the Holy Synaxis," *Nova et Vetera* 15, no. 2 (2017): 465–501.

[68] E.g., Claire Angotti, "Les listes des *opiniones Magistri Sententiarum quae communiter non tenentur*: forme et usage dans la *lectio* des *Sentences*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 79–144; John F. Boyle, "Thomas Aquinas and His *Lectura Romana in Primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 149–73; Russell L. Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250-1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. G. R. Evans, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002), 41–128; Franklin T. Harkins, "*Filiae Magistri*: Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and Medieval Theological Education 'On the Ground,'" in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 26–78; Richard Quinto, "Stephen Langton," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 35–77, see more in the volumes indicated.

[69] Manuel Aroztegi Esnaola, "San Buenaventura sobre el matrimonio: comentario a IV Sent d 26 cap 6," *Scripta Theologica* 43, no. 2 (2011): 265–96; Francesco Fiorentino and Christopher Schabel, "Henry of Harclay's Prologue to His *Sentences* Commentary, Question 1: Theology as a Science," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 78, no. 1 (2011): 97–159, https://doi.org/10.2143/RTPM.78.1.2125162; Daniel Ols, "Aperçus sur la christologie de Thomas d'Aquin: *Commentaire aux sentences, Somme contre les gentils* et *Somme de théologie* suite," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 99, no. 3 (July 2015): 409–91.

[70] Severin Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates: The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2014).

with the ancient authorities and emphasizes his ability to structure the theology textbook, the *Sentences*, very efficiently: here we see "an ingenious combination of a historical-biblical narrative plan with a rational schema."[71] I think this beautiful description is not far from reality.

Besides the *Sentence* commentary tradition, there have been a good amount of publications closely dealing with Master Peter's texts and ideas. I will mention some of them, also.

Thomas Finn studies the *Sentences* with a purpose of understanding the "sacramental world" of Master Peter and, in particular, his teachings about holy matrimony, including a few specific issues with sex and marriage.[72] He carefully surveys the Lombardian theology of seven sacraments of Christian Church, paying attention to the twelfth-century context and the methods used, and contends that it is "clarification" of the sacramental theology that should be counted as the Lombard's major contribution to the discussion. Also, Finn highlights how the author of the *Sentences* builds his argument so as to show that the sacrament's critical function is to be "an encounter with saving and sanctifying grace," with each sacrament doing it in a unique way,[73] and how partners' consent and later consummation play an important role in the sacrament of marriage which makes "husband and wife companions in a relationship of equals."[74] These and other insights Finn brings to the fore allow for a more detailed picture of the Lombard's sacramental thinking.

Atria Larson looks at Peter Lombard's legacy through the lens of the correlation that existed between Canon Law and theology.[75] She convincingly shows that the famous compiler of the *Sentences*, although being a theologian per se, regularly appeals to and skillfully uses some materials from Gratian's *Decretum* and *De*

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[71] Kitanov, 1-27, the quotations are taken from pp. 17 and 14, respectively.

[72] Thomas M. Finn, "The Sacramental World in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard," *Theological Studies* 69, no. 3 (2008): 557–82; Thomas M. Finn, "Sex and Marriage in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard," *Theological Studies* 72, no. 1 (March 2011): 41–69.

[73] Finn, "The Sacramental World," 568.

[74] Finn, "Sex and Marriage in the *Sentences*," 54-65, the quotation is from p. 60.

[75] Atria A. Larson, "The Reception of Gratian's *Tractatus de Penitentia* and the Relationship between Canon Law and Theology in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century," *Journal of Religious History* 37, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 457–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9809.12081; Atria A. Larson, "From One Master to Another: Peter Lombard's Usage of Gratian's *De Penitentia*," in *Master of Penance* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 315–42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vj8g3.15.

penitentia when it seems necessary or helpful. Larson emphatically writes, "Among all the intellectuals of the twelfth century who drew on *De penitentia* and incorporated its texts and arguments into their own writings, no one did so more than Peter Lombard."[76] And her close comparisons of Gratian and the Lombard's texts offer a very clear picture of what was going on in the *Sentences* and to what extent theology and canon law intertwined.[77] In this manner, she substantiates, validates, and further advances the intuitions spelled out earlier in Colish and Rosemann's works:[78] the Lombard's reading and mastery of resources were not limited to theological literature alone, for his systematizing grasp went as far as the canonical *auctoriatates*.

But this man of the twelfth century can be studied also from a more sociological and theological perspective. In her praised monograph,[79] Clare Monagle explores and explains how, decades after his death, Peter Lombard came to be regarded "as the voice of orthodoxy and as the builder of a reverent and authoritative system of theological speculation" at Lateran IV in 1215, in spite of being earlier considered a controversial figure in regards to his doctrines of the Trinity and Christ's natures. She does it through placing him in his immediate social and cultural context of cathedral schools and intense intellectual debates and outlining "his most important scholarly and patronal relationships."[80] Overall, Monagle research connects the ecclesial politics of the long twelfth-century, the scholastic milieu of the age, the gradual rise of *clerici* to power, and the Christological controversy around the *Sentences'* teachings. And the major point she makes in her book and articles

> is that Lateran IV reveals the necessity of the intellectual technologies produced by the schools in the previous century and a half. The heroic figure of Peter Lombard deployed at Lateran IV was a necessary one… partly because, I will argue, the method that he was made to stand for, that of dialectical

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[76] Larson, "The Reception of Gratian's *Tractatus de Penitentia* and the Relationship between Canon Law and Theology in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century," 466.

[77] See, especially: Larson, "From One Master to Another," 319–32.

[78] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:89–90, 601–4, 651–52; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 56.

[79] Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's Sentences and the Development of Theology*, Europa Sacra 8 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013).

[80] Monagle, xiii, xvi.

reasoning, was found to be so instrumental in the making of law and the functions of government in the early thirteenth century.[81]

But, besides these intersections of ecclesial policies and theological texts, Monagle also offers a decent sketch of the Lombard's life and discusses the nature and the key aspects of the project he undertook, the composition of the *Book of Sentences*.[82] She observes that Peter was "strategically and overtly conservative" in his arrangement of authoritative quotations and his comments on them, showing himself to be "an orthodox and careful thinker firmly rooted in the Augustinian tradition."[83] But this theological conservatism went hand in hand with methodological innovations, which included careful citation techniques, a clear scheme of the whole work, and the rational way of reconciling the conflicting views of the fathers. The latter even led to some departures from the great Augustine: Monagle pays special attention to the Lombardian trinitarian teaching with its definition of the Triune God's essence as *una quaedam summa res* and his opinion(s) on the human nature of Christ.[84]

The overall conclusion reads: the *Sentences* are the "combination of tradition and innovation" because Peter Lombard aims "to produce a compendium of applied knowledge, with extensive quotations from the morass of biblical, patristic, and canonical arguments that constituted the history of Christian doctrine" and "to nuance the use of these arguments," being "governed not by the story of scripture, but by the 'order of reason' / *rationis ordo*."[85] This is how Monagle percieves the creative effort of Master Peter. Although the emphasis on the order of reason as the governing principle is slightly overestimated, it is true that the whole Lombardian project must be acknowledged to reflect both tendencies, tradition and innovation. Yet, one must remember that Monagle's goal is not to analyze the Lombard's theology *per se* but,

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[81] Monagle, xviii, for more details, see pp. 139-165; Clare Monagle, "Theology, Practice, and Policy at the Turn of the Thirteenth Century: The Papacy and Peter Lombard," *Journal of Religious History* 37, no. 4 (December 2013): 441–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9809.12083.

[82] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 43–71.

[83] Monagle, xvi.

[84] See chapters 2 and 3 in the cited volume.

[85] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 63–64.

instead, to look at the reception history of some of its most controversial and innovative features in order to find out how the controversies around his legacy were embedded in ecclesial political games and connected to clerics' and schoolmen's rise to power. Thus, her theological points can be the matter of discussion but the argument of the whole book is no doubt well made.[86]

A more purely theological glance at the Lombardian legacy is offered in a few publications by Alberto Mestre and Brian Zimmerman. The latter seems to have something substantial to say about the *Sentences'* doctrine of creation[87] whereas the former focuses his attention on the relationship between divine and human will, as they are described in the *Sentences* and Thomas Aquinas' commentary on it. This field of research is of particular relevance to my inquiry. Firstly, Mestre gives an exposition of the Lombard's doctrine of God's will and notes an important distinction between God's will as assent and God's will as a sign or expression of the will.[88] Secondly, he looks at how this divine will is supposed to work with human will and then draws the reader's attention to Aquinas' assessment of Peter Lombard's theory. Mestre shows that the Angelic doctor, being dissatisfied with the Lombard's suggestions, re-explains the idea of "conformity" of man's will with God's will by recourse to the Aristotelian four causes.[89] The angle from which Mestre looks at the Lombard's understanding of divine will is similar to my approach. Yet, in my view, the Italian's publications lack analytical depth. Mestre's exposition is clear and accurate, but it is barely anything more than an exposition. There are dimensions of Peter Lombard's thought that need to be dug up and discovered as they lay hidden

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[86] See, e.g., the acclamations, with rare and minor criticisms, of the following reviewers: Peter Gemeinhardt, "Review of *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* by Clare Monagle," *The Catholic Historical Review* 100, no. 4 (2014): 811–12; Ian Christopher Levy, "Review of *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* by Clare Monagle," *Journal of Religious History* 38, no. 1 (2014): 156–58; Roger W. Nutt, "Review of *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* by Clare Monagle," *Speculum* 89, no. 3 (2014): 807–9; Spencer E. Young, "Review of *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* by Clare Monagle," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 65, no. 4 (2014): 893–94.

[87] Brandon Zimmerman, "Peter Lombard on the Doctrine of Creation: A Discussion of *Sentences* Bk II, D.1, C.1-3," *The Australasian Catholic Record* 96, no. 1 (January 2019): 83–90.

[88] Alberto Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio e la conformità della volontà umana con quella di Dio nel *Libro delle Sentenze* di Pietro Lombardo," *Alpha Omega* 20, no. 1 (2017): 49–80.

[89] Alberto Mestre, "Il tema della conformità della volontà umana con la Volontà Divina nel libro di San Tommaso d'Aquino: *Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo*," *Alpha Omega* 20, no. 2 (2017): 223–50.

under the surface. Additionally, he is interested in the relationship between the will of God and the will of man whereas my focus lies in the relationship between God's own attributes of knowledge, power, and will.

Finally, the great Lombardian mind has been studied from a more biographical point of view. Two decades ago, the late Richard Southern wrote a mini-biography of Peter Lombard and included it in his volume on the "Heroic Age" of scholastic humanism.[90] Instead of a scrupulous treatment of the intellectual aspects of Peter Lombard's writings, Southern chose to sketch the story of his remarkable achievement wrapped in a series of biographical details.[91] He credited the Italian *magister* with writing a textbook, which truly helped the scholars organize the body of theological knowledge. For the Lombard, in Southern's estimation, composed "a clearer, more authoritative, and better organized view of the subject-matter of theology than had ever before been available in the West" but, arguably, its "completeness was one facet of his limitations." In a sense, this magnificent achievement "brought to an end the first period of very widely ranging and often confused intellectual enquiry," thus stopping the vivid and thriving search for innovative notions, solutions, and techniques. After the *Sentences'* publication and growth in importance, "scholastic theology entered a placid phase in its development in which it put on weight and grew in importance in the world without making any spectacular advance or asking any fundamental new questions."[92] Hence, an ambivalent assessment of Peter Lombard's work. But, otherwise, Southern succinctly and quite informatively tells his personal story and the story of the *Sentences'* appearance, with the importance of Odo of Lucca's patronage rightly underscored. Also, his essays on the Lombard's predecessors and contemporaries help to see brighter and more vivid "personal" pictures of other twelfth-century theologians which is helpful.

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[90] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:133–47.

[91] Actually, this is the title of the chapter in question: "Peter Lombard: The Great Achiever" (Southern, *The Heroic Age*, 2:133.).

[92] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:146, 147, 145, respectively.

More recently, Matthew Doyle published what Marcia Colish called "a study in biographical and institutional history… accenting the schools and patronage settings in which [the Lombard] studied and taught."[93] Doyle decided to shed light on his life, social contacts, and pedagogical approach.[94] Thus, he managed to expand on earlier findings by Hödl, Monagle, Rosemann, and Southern[95] and portray Master Peter as a pupil, peer, and teacher. Of special value is Doyle's treatment of the Lombard's preaching career, because it underscores the mentoring and counseling activity in which he was involved. It definitely adds another dimension to the historical figure in question.

As for Ukrainian scholarship, so far it has participated in the explorations of the medieval intellectual world to a rather limited extent. Peter Lombard has not been seriously studied until recently.[96] Russian scholars published a translation of the short excerpt from his *Sentences* that deals with the Trinity and supplemented it with an introduction, and their publication was well known and used in Ukraine.[97] But, unfortunately, they chose an old, and not critical, Latin text as the basis for this translation, therefore the reader should be careful with it. Also, Peter Lombard has been from time to time mentioned in the church history handbooks or historical-theological monographs written by Ukrainian specialists and, thus, made his appearance in their works. This is the case with Sergey Sannikov and Cyril

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[93] Marcia L. Colish, "Review of *Peter Lombard and His Students* by Matthew Doyle," *Speculum* 93, no. 4 (2019): 1191–92.

[94] Matthew A. Doyle, *Peter Lombard and His Students*, Studies and Texts, 201; Mediaeval Law and Theology, 8 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2016).

[95] Ludwig Hödl, "Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus in der Diskussion seiner Schule," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. G. R. Evans, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002), 25–40; Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's Sentences and the Development of Theology*, 2013, 43–111; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 34–53; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:133–47.

[96] Rostislav Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Knowledge: *Sententiae*, Book I, Distinctions 35-39, as the Basis for Later Theological Discussions," *Sententiae* 36, no. 1 (2017): 17–30, https://doi.org/10.22240/sent36.01.017; Rostislav Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Knowledge and Its Capacities: *Sententiae*, Book I, Distinctions 38-39," *Sententiae* 38, no. 1 (2018): 6–18, https://doi.org/10.22240/sent37.01.006; Rostislav Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Will: *Sententiae*, Book I, Distinctions 45-46," *Multiversum / Мультиверсум. Філософський Альманах*, no. 1-2 (163-164) (2018): 136–52.

[97] Пётр Ломбардский, "Четыре книги сентенций," в *Антология средневековой мысли: Теология и философия Средневековья*, ред. С. С. Неретина, т. 1, 2 тома (СПб.: Издетельство РХГИ; Амфора, 2008), 481–93; Л. В. Бурлака, "Пётр Ломбардский," в *Антология средневековой мысли: Теология и философия Средневековья*, ред. С. С. Неретина, т. 1, 2 тома (СПб.: Издетельство РХГИ; Амфора, 2008), 481–93.

Hovorun's publications.[98] They do not examine the intricacies of the Lombard's theology but pay him a tribute by considering him an important figure in the development of ecclesial thought and referring to his crucial contributions to theology, in general, and ecclesiology and sacramentology, in particular. In the same manner, Master of the *Sentences* is accidentally mentioned in the books and articles by and others – primarily, in relation to the develoment of philosophical-theological thought and education in the Middle Ages and beyond.[99]

Still, a few other scholastic figures of medieval Europe who used to be Peter Lombard's predecessors or students have become objects of solemn translation work and philosophical analysis. In particular, Rostislav Paran'ko, Oleg Khoma, Iryna Lystopad, Andrii Baumeister, and Iryna Pihovs'ka have produced a series of high-quality commented academic translations of the selected works of Anselm of Canterbury, Achard of Saint-Victor, Boethius, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and other crucial medieval thinkers.[100] Andrii Baumeister has written a number of articles and two monographs that deal extensively with Thomas Aquinas and, more

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[98] Сергей Санников, *Двадцать веков христианства: Учебное пособие*, т. 2. Второе тысячелетие (Одесса: ОБС; "Богомыслие," 2001), 93–94; Сергей Санников, "Феномен водного хрещення у контексті сучасної баптистської сакраментології" (Дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня доктора філософських наук за спеціальністю "богослов'я," Національний педагогічний університет імені М.П. Драгоманова, 2018), 254; Кирило Говорун, *Мета-еклезіологія: хроніки самоусвідомлення Церкви*, пер. з англ. Олексія Панича (Київ: Дух і літера, 2018), 69.

[99] E.g., Ілля Бей, "Богословська освіта в Чехії та Словаччині: історія та сучасний стан," *Філософська думка – Sententiae*, no. Спецвипуск III: Християнська теологія і сучасна філософія (2013): 222, 223; Дмитрий Бинцаровский и Ярослав Вязовский, ред., *Богословие Реформации: Бог, Евангелие, церковь* (Минск: Альтиора Форте; Евангелие и Реформация, 2017), 51, 61–63, 72, 101; Виталий Иванов, "Вопрос Дунса Скота об интенсивной бесконечности в Троице в контексте истории жанра теологических вопросов *Quodlibet*. Предисловие к переводу," *EINAI: Проблемы философии и теологии* 1, no. 1/2 (2012): 213; Ірина Листопад, "Невідоме XII сторіччя: твір Ашара Сен-Вікторського «Про єдність Бога та множинність творіння»," *Філософська думка*, no. 3 (Філософія перекладу) (2010): 85.

[100] Аніцій Манлій Северин Боецій, *Теологічні трактати*, перекл. з латини й коментарі: Ростислав Паранько (Львів: Видавництво Українського католицького університету, 2007); Ансельм Кентерберийський, *Монологіон. Прослогіон*, перекл. з латинської мови: Ростислав Паранько, вступна стаття, коментарі: Андрій Баумейстер (Львів: Видавництво Українського католицького університету, 2012); Ашар Сен-Вікторський, "Про єдність Бога та множинність творіння," пер. Ірина Листопад, *Філософська думка*, no. 3 (Філософія перекладу) (2010): 67–79; Бонавентура, *Путівник мислі до Бога. Про приведення мистецтв до богослов'я*, переклад з латинської мови, вступ, коментарі: Ірина Піговська (Львів: Видавництво Українського католицького університету, 2014); Тома Аквінський, "Диспутаційні питання про істину, питання X (Про ум), артикул 1 (Чи є ум, оскільки в нього вміщують образ Трійці, сутністю душі?)," пер. Олег Хома, *Sententiae* 33, no. 2 (2015): 177–89, https://doi.org/10.22240/sent33.02.177; *Книга про причини*, перекл. з латинської мови: Ростислав Паранько, вступна стаття і коментарі: Андрій Баумейстер (Львів: Видавництво Українського католицького університету, 2018).

succinctly but still acutely, with John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham.[101] The Thomistic thought in general and Aquinas' doctrines, in particular, were regularly discussed in academic journals by other Ukrainian scholars as well: among them, Viktor Kotusenko, Sergey Sekundant, Rostislav Tkachenko, Yuriy Chornomorets', and others.[102] Also, the same Chornomorets' wrote a monograph that sheds light on the Byzantine neo-platonic tradition and which, together with Cyril Hovorun's analysis of the predominantly Greek Christological controversies of the seventh century, might be considered a great window to the eastern way of doing philosophical theology during the Middle Ages.[103] Thus, the contemporary Ukranian scholarship has made some inroads into the medieval studies and, especially, the intellectual historiography of the Middle Ages. But there is still the need to widen the range of the studied topic and figures, and an examination of one of the most important handbooks of the medieval scholasticism, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, looks like an appropriate vista for further exploration.

1.4. Summary

What is the outcome of all these developments? And what is the relevance of my research project?

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[101] Андрій Баумейстер, "Апофатизм у мисленні св. Томи Аквінського," *Філософська думка – Sententiae*, no. Спецвипуск I: Антична і середньовічна філософія (2010): 5–19; Андрій Баумейстер, "Світло інтелекту й світло слави: метафізика пізнання у св. Томи Аквінського," *Sententiae* 23, no. 2 (2010): 3–41; Андрій Баумейстер, "Осягнення реального буття: дискусійні питання томістичної епістемології в світлі сучасних досягнень," *Sententiae* 24, no. 1 (2011): 5–25; Андрій Баумейстер, *Тома Аквінський: вступ до мислення. Бог, буття і пізнання* (Київ: Дух і літера, 2012); Андрій Баумейстер, *Біля джерел мислення і буття* (Київ: Дух і літера, 2012), 249–380, 446–70.

[102] Віктор Котусенко, "Теорія аналогії буття у філософії томізму як предмет історико-філософського дослідження," *Філософська думка – Sententiae*, no. Спецвипуск I: Антична і середньовічна філософія (2010): 50–88; Сергей Секундант, "Фома Аквинский и Декарт: идея как объект познания," *Sententiae. Наукові праці дослідників модерної філософії (Паскалівського товариства)* 19 (2)-20 (1) (2009 2008): 43–70; Сергей Секундант, "К вопросу об употреблении и переводе терминов «species» и «idea у св. Фомы Аквинского," *Sententiae* 25, no. 2 (2011): 209–14; Rostislav Tkachenko, "A Thomistic Untraslatable: A Conceptual Analysis of Aquinas' Doctrine of Transubstantiation.," *Sententiae* 34, no. 1 (2016): 61–79; Юрій Чорноморець, "Апорії неотомізму: Роздуми над книгою Андрій Баумейстер. *Тома Аквінський: вступ до мислення. Бог, буття і пізнання,*" *Sententiae* 30, no. 1 (2014): 182–95; Андрій Баумейстер, "Про мистецтво розрізнення, або про 'Апорії неотомізму': Реакція на роздуми Юрія Чорноморця," *Sententiae* 31, no. 2 (2014): 203–10.

[103] Юрій Чорноморець, *Візантійський неоплатонізм від Діонісія Ареопагіта до Геннадія Схоларія* (Київ: Дух і літера, 2010); Cyril Hovorun, *Will, Action, and Freedom: Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century*, Medieval Mediterranean 77 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008).

For a long while, Peter Lombard was not considered a serious and original thinker. He was largely ignored or studied only sketchily in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship. However, in the second half and, especially, the last decade of the twentieth century the Lombardian fortunes began to change. I. Brady provided historians of ideas with the reliable text of the *Sentences*, and Stegmüller, together with his younger "assistants", indexed the medieval commentaries on it.

It is on this ground that M. Colish commenced building a new construction: a more adequate, less biased, and historically rooted Lombard research. She, together with Ph. Rosemann, G.R. Evans, and a group of other competent scholars revolutionized the medieval historiography and gave a totally new footing to our understanding of who Peter Lombard was and what he actually did. But this footing is just the fundament for the new building, not the whole construction. In fact, Colish and Rosemann laid the foundation, but there was still the need to build walls, make windows, and create the roof. This task was undertaken by numerous scholars and now, with Colish and Rosemann's groundbreaking studies (foundation) and significant contributions by Larson, Finn, Monagle, and many others (walls and windows), we enter the new stage of the Lombard research. The walls of the building have been growing but there is still a lot to be done before one can enter the house and really enjoy the comprehensive view of all facets and aspects of the Master of the *Sentences'* legacy.

Our understanding of the twelfth-century intellectual, social, and political setting and Peter Lombard's place in it keep on improving. The same holds true for a number of purely philosophical and theological topics, as the publications on his method(ology), sacramentology, Christology, and theology proper continue to get out of print regularly. Yet, some topics which the Lombard touched upon and discussed in his *Sentences* are still to be analyzed. For example, Zimmerman writes about God's creative act according to the *Sentences* 2, distinction 1, and Mestre examines the notion of God's will as it is related to human will on the basis of the *Sentences* 1,

distinctions 45-48.[104] But until recently, there has not been a separate exegetical and analytical study of the Lombard's doctrine of God's attributes. However, as was already said in the *Introduction*, such an undertaking would be justified by both the situation in the current Lombard research, the importance of Peter Lombard's text and teachings for later scholastic discussions, and the significance he ascribed to the key divine attributes of knowledge, potency, and will. Therefore my investigation, I hope, will contribute to the currently thriving Lombard research whose dynamics I tried to capture in this chapter. After all, I think Rosemann is perfectly right when he says: "there is still much to be done. We must learn to read Peter Lombard more consistently on his own terms."[105] Now, it is time to turn full attention to the very medieval book that is an object of this dissertation, the *Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*.

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[104] Zimmerman, "Peter Lombard on the Doctrine of Creation: A Discussion of *Sentences* Bk II, D.1, C.1-3"; Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio."

[105] Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 145.

2. The *Book of Sentences* and the Lombard's theological approach

Before one can proceed to an analsys of what Peter Lombard taught in his philosophical theology, it is important to understand how he percieved his task. In modern parlance, if one needs to understand the content of a certain thinker's works it is crucial to understand his method or approach. Or, as a famous intellectual historian from the Cambridge School Quantin Skinner put it,

> in the case of *any* serious utterance… we need to grasp not merely the meaning of what is said, but at the same time the intended force with which the utterance is issued. We need, that is, to grasp not merely what people are saying but also what they are *doing in* saying it. To study what past thinkers have *said* about the canonical topics in the history of ideas is, in short, to perform only the first of two hermeneutic tasks, each of which is indispensable if our goal is that of attaining an historical understanding of what they wrote. As well as grasping the meaning of what they said, we need at the same time to understand what they meant by saying it. [We should] take seriously the fact that there is always a question to be asked about what writers are *doing* as well as what they are saying if our aim is to understand their texts.[106]

Thus, an effort to decipher and lay out Peter Lombard's thoughts on the philosophical theology of God's attributes should start off with an overview of his whole vision. Also, a few observations about his background must be inserted in the exposition, as well. Therefore, in this chapter, I will introduce the *Book of Sentences*, name the Lombard's most crucial peers and colleagues, comment on the *Sentences'* place in the twelfth-century theological discourse, and explain its rationale and purpose as the author himself expressed it. The understading of these things will help to contextualize the following chapters and provide the historical-intellectual framework for my further analysis of the Lombard's thought.

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[106] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in *Visions of Politics. Volume 1: Regarding Method* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univesity Press, 2002), 82–83.

2.1. Basic facts about the *Sentences*

The *Book of Sentences* (*Libri quattuor sententiarum*, also referred to as *Sententiae in quattuor libris distinctae*), or simply the *Sentences*, is a work Peter Lombard composed ca. 1154-1158.[107] At that time Peter was an already-established Parisian lecturer (*magister*) in theology,[108] a canon of Notre Dame de Paris and later the bishop of the city.[109] The *Sentences* are considered to be his *magnum opus* and were recognized as a work deserving attention and esteem (or criticism) immediately after its composition and circulation.[110] Peter Lombard's contemporaries and students—whether critical of his labors like Gerhoch of Reichersberg[111] or enthusiastic about his personality and oeuvres like Walter Mapes,[112] Jacques de Vitry,[113] Alberic of Trois Fontaines,[114] Vincent of Beauvais,[115] and others—valued it

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[107] For the dating, see Colish, 1:25; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 55.

[108] This fact is proved by both (a) the very fact of clerical recognition and, as a result, the official invitation to become a canon of Notre Dame in Paris that Peter received ca. 1145, and (b) a peculiar literary witness that a poem of Walter Mapes, written in 1144, bears to his reputation. A part of the poem initially investigated and presented by R.B.C. Huygens in "Metamorphosis Goliae," *Studi medievali* 3:2 (1962): 771, and later referred to and quoted by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:20, and; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 36–37, respectively, reads:
    Celebrem theologum vidimus Lumbardum,
    Cum Yvone, Helyam Petrum, et Bernardum,
    Quorum opobalsamum spirat os et nardum,
    Et professi plurimi sunt Abaielardum.

    The translation by Rosemann reads:
    The famous theologian we have seen, the Lombard,
    With Yvo [of Chartres], Petrus Helias, and Bernard,
    Whose mouth[s] breathed balsam and nard,
    And very many [of whom] professed [the teachings of] Abelard.

[109] For detailed overviews of his life and career see: Brady, "Prolegomena," 8*-35*; de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 126–30; Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus*, 1–11; Protois, *Pierre Lombard*, 1881, 27–56, and more recently; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:133–41; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:15–32; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 34–53.
    For brief overviews and concise, yet valuable, introductions, see: Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard," in *The Medieval Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period*, ed. G. R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 168–83; de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," DTC; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 43–71; Rolf Schönberger, "Petrus Lombardus," in *Alcuin: Infothek der Scholastik - Autoren und Texte der Denkgeschichte des Mittelalters (500-1500 n. Chr.)*, accessed September 9, 2015, http://www-app.uni-regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/PKGG/Philosophie/Gesch_Phil/alcuin/philosopher.php?id=1766; John T. Slotemaker, "Peter Lombard," in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht; Heidelberg; London; New York: Springer, 2011); Rik van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 147–66.

[110] Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 17–26; de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 250–77; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 73–138.

[111] Latinized name: *Gerhohus Reichersbergensis*, years of life: 1093–1169. Hereafter I give the Latin form of the name and the years of life or flourishing of mentioned medieval thinkers in the footnotes.

[112] *Walterus* or *Gualterus Mapus*, fl. ca. 1142–1145.

[113] *Iacobus de Vitriaco* or *Iacobus Vitriacensis*, ca. 1160/1170–1240.

[114] *Albericus de Tribus Fontibus*, d. ca. 1252.

[115] *Vincentius Bellovacensis*, ca. 1184/1194–1264.

as a high-quality sourcebook for theological studies and even "a most excellent book" (*opus excellentissimum*).[116]

In spite of the fact that the method employed or some doctrines contained in the *Sentences* did evoke some opposition[117]—for instance, from Walter (Gautier) of St. Victor,[118] John of Cornwall,[119] Joachim of Fiore,[120] and the aforementioned Gerhoch—it also acquired a number of supporters, continuators, and imitators.[121] Among them, there were such masters as Gandulph of Bologna,[122] who produced his own *Sententiae* ca. 1170-85, which were apparently an abridged version of those of the Lombard;[123] Peter Comestor,[124] who knew well Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and used some of its features and ideas—especially contained in the Book two, in his own *History of Genesis*;[125] Peter the Chanter,[126] who used the Lombard's composition in his own undertakings and tried to develop his ideas further;[127] Peter's direct disciple Peter of Poitiers,[128] whose major achievement was his five-volume *Sententiae* (*Super expositione magistri sententiarum*), characterized by intensified use of the new logical tools (*logica nova*),[129] as well as the anonymous author(s) of the earlier *Glossae super Sententias*, ascribed to the same Peter but more correctly referred to as

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[116] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:30–31; see also; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:144–45.

[117] De Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 150–63.

[118] *Gualterus de Sancto Victore*, d. 1180.

[119] *Iohannes Cornubiensis*, ca. 1125/1130–ca. 1199/1200.

[120] *Ioachimus Florensis*, 1135–1202.

[121] See: Hödl, "Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus."
Also see the more detailed studies of the early history of reception of the *Sentences* in the 12th and 13th centuries in: Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 21–92; Rosemann, *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences, 2:1-262 (selected chapters); Harkins, "Filiae Magistri." Some summarizing observations may be found in: Rosemann, "The Tradition of the *Sentences*," 497–514.

[122] *Gandulphus Bononiensis*, d. 1185.

[123] Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 18–19.

[124] *Petrus Comestor*, ca. 1100—1179.

[125] Clark, "Peter Comestor and Peter Lombard," 89–119; Monagle, "Theology, Practice, and Policy," 114–15, 117–21, 133–34, 137–38.

[126] *Petrus Cantor*, ca. 1130–1197.

[127] de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 165; Marcia L. Colish, "Christological Nihilianism in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century (Previously Published in *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 63, 1996)," in *Studies in Scholasticism*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006), 153–55; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 132–33.

[128] *Petrus Pictaviensis Victorinus*, ca. 1130 – ca. 1205/1215.

[129] Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 21–23; Giulio D'Onofrio, *History of Theology II: The Middle Ages*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell, Angelo Di Berardino, and Basil Studer, vol. 2, History of Theology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 189–90; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 122–26.

"The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss,"[130] Stephen Langton,[131] who produced "the first high medieval *Sentence* commentary" with an addition of the *quaestio* genre elements;[132] and most significantly, Alexander of Hales,[133] who promoted the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as *the* theological textbook at the University of Paris around 1222.[134] Such a decision of Alexander, who at the time was Regent Master, in a sense followed and reflected the ecclesiastical approbation that Peter Lombard and his collection of theological statements finally gained at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, when his name was freed from the charges of heresy and heterodoxy. Joseph de Ghellink calls this double posthumous success at the university and the church a "triomphe définitif du « Liber sententiarum »" and—following some medieval sentiments—"la victoire du Lombard."[135] Such an assessment seems to overestimate the event's significance and Clare Monagle provides its more sober and multifaceted account.[136] But she is definitely right when she calls the Lateran IV's pronouncement on Peter the "endorsement of Lombard." The result was that "the figure of Peter Lombard was constructed as the voice of orthodoxy and as the builder of a reverent and authoritative system of theological speculation."[137] The Lombard's orthodoxy was vindicated on the most authoritative level.

Since then, that is the second quarter of the thirteenth century, the *Sentences* gradually became the second major resource and textual basis—after, and along with, the Bible—for theological education on the masters level in intellectual centers of

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[130] Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 20–21; Colish, "The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers"; Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 41–51.

[131] *Stephanus Langton*, ca. 1155 – 1228.

[132] Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 24–25; Quinto, "Stephen Langton"; Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 55–60.;

[133] *Alexander Halensis*, ca. 1185 – 1245.

[134] Slotemaker, "Peter Lombard," 951; Finn, "The Sacramental World," 560; Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 91; Hubert Philipp Weber, "The *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum* by Alexander of Hales," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, vol. 2 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 84. See also Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 26–27; Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 60–70.

[135] De Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 150, 163. He writes quite pathetically, yet noting a rather unique thing: "Le concile de Latran de 1215, qui devait, d'après les visées de ses adversaires, donner le coup de grâce au *Liber Sententiarum*, assure définitivement son triomphe dans l'enseignement de la chrétienté et inscrit le nom du *Magister* à une place d'honneur dans un des premiers canons dogmatiques du concile. … Son nom meme intervient dans la formule de foi qui introduit cette partie : *Nos autem, sacra et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro (Lombardo)…*" Ibid., 162-163.

[136] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 139–65; Monagle, "Theology, Practice, and Policy."

[137] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, xiii.

western Europe: in the universities of Paris (ca. 1222-1227), Oxford (ca. 1245) and later throughout the network of *studia generalia* and *universitates* of France, England, Germany, Italy and other countries. Despite some resistance (for example, from Robert Grosseteste and Richard Rufus), it won the day and became "the standard theological textbook in western Europe up until the sixteenth century."[138] The fact of its wide reception can be illustrated by the huge number and the diverse geography of manuscripts of the *Sentences* preserved in various monastic or scholastic libraries[139] and, also, contemporary witnesses like that of Vincent of Beauvais. He writes in his *Memorial of All Times* (*Memoriale omnium temporum*) ca. 1244-1250:[140] "During the reign of Louis, the French king, the father of Philipp, there shone master Peter Lombard, the bishop of Paris, who expediently compiled out of numerous statements of the Catholic fathers and put in order the *Book of Sentences* and the glosses on Psalter and on Paul's epistles, all of which are now publicly taught in the schools."[141] Yet, the wide acceptance and use of the *Sentences* should not be overstated and overestimated, since, as Russel Friedman points out, "while there were commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* even before Alexander of Hales' early effort of 1223-27, nevertheless by the time Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas read the *Sentences* at Paris, the genre was still in its beginning stages."[142]

The *Sentences*' reputation and imporance for the medieval scholastic theology grew gradually. But, in the end, this book won the day. This text became the standard textbook for the study of theology and, in due course, formed and transformed the theology of later centuries. But now let me finish the post-history of the Lombard's *opus* and turn to its pre-history, background, and genre.

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[138] Slotemaker, "Peter Lombard," 951–52. See also Félix Protois, *Pierre Lombard, évêque de Paris, dit le maitre des sentences : Son époque, sa vie, ses écrits, son influence* (Paris: Société générale de librairie catholique, 1881), 150, 155–57, http://archive.org/details/pierrelombardv00prot; Rosemann, "The Tradition of the *Sentences*," 506.

[139] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:25; de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 164.

[140] Rolf Schönberger, "Vincentius Bellovacensis OP," in *Alcuin: Infothek der Scholastik - Autoren und Texte der Denkgeschichte des Mittelalters (500-1500 n. Chr.)*, accessed September 9, 2015, http://www-app.uni-regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/PKGG/Philosophie/Gesch_Phil/alcuin/philosopher.php?id=2267.

[141] Vincent of Beauvais, *Memoriale omnium temporum*, MGH (Monumenta Germaniae historica), Scriptores (Hannover, 1879), 24: 157-158: "Sub Ludovico Francorum rege, patre Philippi, magister Petrus Lombardus Parisiensis episcopus claruit, qui Libri Sententiarum et glossas psalteri et epistularum Pauli, que omnia nunc in scholis publice leguntur, ex multis catholicorum partum dictis utiliter compilavit et ordinavit." Quoted in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:31–32. The translation is partly Colish's and partly mine.

[142] Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary," 44. Cf. Rosemann, "The Tradition of the *Sentences*," 504–6.

2.2. The *Sentences'* literary form and the spirit of the twelfth-century theology

It is not an exaggeration to state that the *Sentences'* were the product—though sufficiently original to gain attention and sufficiently fitting to the context to be valued[143]—of its age: the whole concept, purpose, genre, and relevance were rooted in, and actually came out, of the historical, educational and theological tendencies of the late eleventh-twelfth centuries. I shall not examine these phenomena and movements, because this falls outside the scope of my study, and, additionally, there are a number of descriptive and analytical materials shedding light on this stage of development of the medieval thought and culture.[144] However, I will observe and underline the *literary and conceptual features* of the Lombard's *Sentences*, that is, its genre and overall concept,[145] since it would be useful for an adequate understanding of the analyzed book.

2.2.1. Genre

First of all, the *Sentences* belonged to the literary genre of so-called "sentence collection" (Grabmann's *Sentenzensammlung*[146]), which originated in the late antiquity and early Middle Ages, when people like Prosper of Aquitaine[147] and Isidore of Seville[148] composed collections of sayings of various church fathers and

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[143] For a survey of the often contradictory or one-sided opinions and value judgments concerning the (un)originality and (un)importance of the *Sentences* see: Bertola, "Pietro Lombardo nella storiografia"; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:3–11; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 3–7.

[144] A good overview of the "theological enterprise" before, at the time of, and after the period of Peter Lombard's scholarly activity is to be found in Marie-Dominique Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" in *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, with a Preface by Étienne Gilson (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 270–309; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:33–77; Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal"; D'Onofrio, *History of Theology II: The Middle Ages*, 2:164–216; Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology"; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 1–41.

A bright and accurate depiction of some theological masters active at the time and their place in the social and theological developments of the epoch is in: Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:7–132; Richard W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (London: Pimlico, 1993), 115–208. Cf. John W. Baldwin, "Masters at Paris from 1179 to 1215: A Social Perspective," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 138–72; Jacques Le Goff, *La civilisation de l'occident médiéval* (Champs: Flammarion, 1982), 266–279, 286–289, 315–322.

[145] "In our view, the best way to place Peter Lombard in his own time is to read him, always, in conjunction with the theologians in the first half of the twelfth century. This is the context within which he worked and the audience to which he spoke." Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:11.

[146] Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:22.

[147] *Prosper(us) Aquitanus*, ca. 390 – ca. 463.

[148] *Isidorus Hispalensis*, d. 636.

authoritative authors (*auctores*).[149] These frequently non-systematic anthologies were traditionally called *flores, deflorationes*, or *florilegia*, what meant "flowers" or "flower-like sayings" (that is, selections of colorful and important sayings).[150] There existed, for example, *Flores ex S. Augustino, Opus theologicum in capita circiter CCXX distinctum ex SS. Augustino, Hieronymo, Rufino, Anselmo, Origene aliisque decerptum* (of the twelfth century) and other *Flores sententiarum, Libelli auctoritatum*, or *Sententiae sanctorum*, created in the period from the seventh to the twelfth centuries.[151] Martin Grabmann has dubbed them "der Florilegien- und Katenenliteratur" and "Mosaikarbeiten," that is, the literature of collections of "colorful" sayings and "strings" of authoritative quotations, or the "mosaic works" of exegetical, theological, practical (ecclesiastical), moral-ascetical or some other character.[152]

Thus, as the evidence shows, there is no doubt that by the mid-twelfth century, when Peter Lombard was working on his *Libri quattuor sententiarum*, both the term "sententia" and the genre of sentence collections had already acquired quite specific, let alone technical, meaning. The *sententiae* in the plural were understood as a work in which one "selects different instructions and doctrines of the [church] fathers (*ex diversis praeceptis et doctrinis*) and collects these 'flower-like' sayings (*flores*) in one whole," as one of the compilers of such a collection wrote ca. 1121-1141.[153] Hence, the books of sentences were "anthologies of statements, questions, solutions,

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[149] Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:21; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 17.

[150] See: Michel Parisse et al., *Lexique latin-français: antiquité et Moyen Âge* (Paris: Picard, 2006), s.v. "flos, oris"; Jan Frederik Niermeyer, C. van de Kieft, and G. S. M. M. Lake-Schoonebeek, *Mediae Latinitatis lexicon minus: lexique latin médiéval-français/anglais = a medieval Latin-French/English dictionary* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), s.v. "flos"; Richard Ashdowne, David Howlett, and Ronald Latham, eds., *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources (DMLBS)* (Oxford; New York: The British Academy; Oxford University Press, 2018), s.v. "flos," http://logeion.uchicago.edu/.

[151] Martin Grabmann, *Die scholastische Methode von ihren ersten Anfängen in der Väterliteratur bis zum Beginn des 12. Jahrhunderts*, vol. Band 1, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode: nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 183–89.

[152] Grabmann, Band 1:183.

[153] *Ut ex diversis praeceptis et doctrinis Patrum excerperem et in unum colligerem eos flores quos solemus, quasi singulari nomine, sententias appellare*. Cod. Brug. 191, fol. 2r, quoted in Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:22. Grabmann even states that we can accept this phrase as a 12th-century formal definition of the sententia: "Wir haben hier eine förmliche Begriffsbestimmung der *Sententiae* durch einen *Collector Sententiarum* aus der ersten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts vor uns."

and theses of other scholars."[154] But a *sententia* in singular signified "an opinion expressed by an authoritative writer," as Philipp Rosemann aptly summarizes.[155] This is how, in a quite concise manner, it was defined by the Lombard's contemporary Robert of Melun:[156] the *sententia* is the actual "meaning of the text" or, literally, its "understanding" (*textus intelligentia*).[157]

Consequently, it is logical to conclude that Peter Lombard's aim to prepare another collection of authoritative sayings[158] was in accordance with the spirit of his age, which valued this type of literature.[159] But it was only a part of the issue.

2.2.2. Systematic element

Not every collection of an author's or multiple authors' judgments (*Sentenzensammlung*) was a systematic one (*systematische Sentenzensammlung*).[160] At earlier stages of the genre's development, it was not seen as a problem. But by the mid-twelfth century, there was a new awareness of the need for a systematization of various opinions, what some contemporary observers call "the urge for systems"[161] or *l'esprit de système*.[162] The theologians of the epoch had acquired a deeper sensitivity to, and awareness of, the diversity of opinions existing in theology, and this awareness led them to search for a way to harmonize the discordant voices of the supposedly unified tradition. The availability of information in the form of

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[154] "…Sammlungen von Aussprüchen, Quästionen, Lösungen und Thesen anderer handelt." Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 52; quotation in English is given according to the following translation: Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 54. Cf. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2:21-22.

[155] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 17.

[156] *Robertus de Meliduno*, ca. 1100 – 1167.

[157] "Quid enim aliud in lectura queritur quam textus intelligentia, que sententia nominatur?" B. Pez, *Thesaurus Anecdotorum Novissimus* IV, iii—iv, quoted in Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2:22.

[158] G. Silano compares them to a legal casebook and speaks of "[t]he *Sentences* as a medieval casebook." Silano, "Introduction," xix–xxvi.

[159] Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 1:186ff.

[160] Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 52.

[161] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2:55. He states, "Real success in systematization could be achieved only when the urge for system came, not from some outside impulse, but from scholars for whom to think was to think systematically. When such scholars appeared, although the *sententiae* of the great writers of the (generally distant) past remained the foundation on which all thought was based, the great organizers of the future injected an intellectual power and independence of view into the system as a whole."

[162] Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 135.

anthologies called for harmonization.[163] Marie-Dominique Chenu captures this aspiration of the epoch and depicts it in the following way:

> From the level of patristic tradition, where different expressions were employed and more often complemented than opposed one another because they generally involved spontaneous instead of philosophical notions, men passed to the mature level of reasoned theology where traditional expressions took on an intellectualized character, a particular metaphysical significance, newly precise and defined, and varying with the systems which scrutinized and made use of them. (…) Involved here was not only the problem of how to handle authorities critically—for example, how to resolve the difficulties raised by the Latin translation of the acts of the Council of Ephesus—but also a difficult task of sensitive theological discernment.[164]

The twelfth-century thinkers' theological thinking was getting more and more intensive, subtle, and systematic. This is (partly) why these theologians undoubtedly made a great contribution to the further elaboration and development of classic Christian theology, so that, as Jean Leclercq notes, "[l]'importance du XIIe siècle dans l'histoire doctrinale du moyen âge n'est plus à établir."[165] But the concept of system, as well as of "sensitive theological discernment," can be interpreted and implemented differently.

Following Adolf Trendelenburg and Philipp Rosemann, it is possible to differentiate between system as "methodical arrangement" (*ein System der Anordnung*) and system as "organic growth" (*ein System der Entwickelung*). The former implies a procedure that would take into account specific phenomena or ideas as potential elements for the system, with their idiosyncrasies and inevitable

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[163] "Consequently the doctrinal explanations helped to promote a general expectation that it would be possible to extract a single systematic body of doctrine from the multitude of expositions of individual texts. … The possibility of organizing this gigantic area of knowledge as a systematic body of doctrine, with rules of behaviour appropriate to it, was the central driving force in the development of the schools and universities in western Europe." Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2:133, 135.

[164] Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" 286.

[165] Jean Leclercq, *L'Amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu: initiation aux auteurs monastiques du Moyen Age* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1990), 9.

contradictions, and reconcile them on the basis of a set of formal and external criteria; this is the analytical and synthetic approach. The latter implies an organic and maximally natural growth of a system out of its roots and principles whereas a (re)organization and (re)conciliation of various elements takes place around the certain concept(s) and lines of argumentation, which are determined by the initial settings of the system.[166]

I agree, that one can speak of the *system of the methodical arrangement* wherein a sophisticated procedure produces a unified structure. But I do not think that the notion of the *system of organic and natural development* or *evolution* (that is, Trendelenburg's *Entwickelung* and *die genetische methode*) straightforwardly fits the realm of philosophy and theology. The concept is problematic because it is not always easy to determine, which development of an idea is the most *natural* and correct. There is no such thing as an automatic development of logical or metaphysical systems: every turn in the history of ideas has been taken by specific people, against a specific cultural background, and in frequently unexpected directions. There should be—and actually has been—a place for, in a sense, unnatural, unique and contingent decisions.

This is why I would rename and redefine the second category of the system and rather speak of a *system of conceptual arrangement* or *content-development* (as vs. purely formal *methodical arrangement*). It is an approach whereby the given set of doctrines or system is being expanded or advanced by means of continuous (re)definition, (re)employment, and (re)positioning of notions, statements, and ideas, that are—partially or fully—contained in the system itself and not imposed from the

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[166] Trendelenburg introduces the concept in the following way: "Wir unterscheiden ein System der Anordnung und ein System der Entwickelung. Beide beherschen eine Vielheit der Erkenntnisse durch die Einheit. In dem einen waltet die Uebersicht der Eintheilung, in dem andern die lebendige Erzeugung eines Princips. In jenem werden fertige Substanzen nach ihrer Verwandtschaft zusammengestellt, in diesem entstehen sie aus ihren Gründen. Die Herrschaft eines Eintheilungsgrundes bestimmt das System der Anordnung; die genetische Methode, wenn sie sich vollendet, bringt das System der Entwickelung hervor." Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1870), 446f.

At the same time, Rosemann interprets this double notion and applies it to theology in this way: "To bring these [i.e. authoritative theological] quotations into a unity, it is possible to apply rules of reconciliation to isolated instances, proceeding step by step toward a greater whole. This method results in a systematicity that arises from methodical arrangement. Or one can attempt to grasp the living core of the thought, the tradition, and the faith that have generated the quotations, together with their contradictions. This speculative approach yields a system that is the result of organic growth." Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 24.

outside. Hence, when it comes to the need to arrange certain diverse categories or sentences, one can either use some criteria and procedures to reach this goal, or employ a metaphysical model or theme as the foundation, or, finally, try to combine both approaches.

The Christian thinkers of the eleventh and the twelfth century tested these various methods of a more-or-less systematic treatment of miscellaneous and sometimes contradictory authoritative texts. In the light of the classification of systems given above as well as some useful insights, provided by M.-D. Chenu, M. Colish, J. Leclercq, P. Rosemann, and R. Southern,[167] it should be established that some systematizers tended to build methodically arranged systems while others preferred a more conceptual or content-oriented approach.

On the one hand, there is Anselm of Canterbury[168] who inaugurated and actually incorporated in his own work a systematic, that is, logically coherent, rational, mode of thinking. He avoided citations and direct references to the tradition, but still built his theology on the basis of faith and traditional doctrine (*intellectus fidei*) and with constant appeals to rational arguments and necessary causes, explored by reason (*rationes necessariae*). He did not create a formally unified system but nevertheless succeeded in producing a logically coherent and interconnected set of doctrines in the late eleventh-early twelfth century.[169] Anselm exemplifies the approach focused on the content of a tradition. Hence, he is rightly dubbed by Rosemann a "contemplative genius," whose importance (and here he quotes Reinhold Seeberg) "consists in the fact that he led [the tradition] from the formulae of Augustine back to his spirit and way of thought."[170]

On the other hand, there is Peter Abelard,[171] who formulated and vigorously discussed "some fundamental methodological problems" that any attempt at the

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[167] See: Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science'"; Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 138–51; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:34–77; Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," 77–85; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 21–33; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:selected chapters.

[168] *Anselmus Cantuariensis*, 1033–1109.

[169] Cf. Gilson, *La Philosophie*, I and II:54–55.

[170] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 24–25.

[171] *Petrus Abaelardus*, 1079–1142.

harmonious and systematic compilation of *sententiae* raises.[172] In his *Sic et non* written about 1121-1122, he provided a "special" collection of church fathers' sayings, which brought to the fore and highlighted their contradictory and frequently inconsistent character. However, Abelard also offered a method—quite in the spirit of the *System der Anordnung* approach, which would lead to the reconciliation of authorities and the discovery of the *consensus partum*. In fact, he borrowed his method from the "dialectical jurisprudence," elaborated and developed by Bernold of Constance,[173] Ivo of Chartres[174] and Gratian of Bologna, the author of *Concordia discordantium canonum*.[175] This method implied the following steps:

> First, consideration of the complete text (rather than an excerpted version) and its context, careful collation, and comparison will help to shed light upon individual sentences, thus resolving contradictions that are merely apparent. Moreover, often it will prove useful to consider the historical circumstances—time, place, and people—in which a certain pronouncement occurred; it may turn out to apply specifically to a particular situation. Similarly, the causes that have occasioned an opinion need to be taken into consideration. Finally, it may be the case that some decrees and canons were instituted for a limited time only, whereas others were meant to be of unlimited validity. In another treatise, Bernold cautions that sometimes seemingly authoritative sentences may have been falsely attributed to a Church Father.[176]

Thus, with Abelard and his "teachers," we have some rules for the methodical harmonization of authoritative texts without achieving a harmonized theology of the fathers. The apparent contradictions and tensions between various authoritative

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[172] "Die Sammlung und systematische Ordnung von Sentenzen birgt jedoch einige grundsätzliche methodologische Probleme…" Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 53.

[173] *Bernoldus Constantiensis*, ca. 1050–1100.

[174] *Ivo Carnotensis*, ca. 1040–1115.

[175] *Gratianus de Clusio* or *Gratianus Bononiensis*, fl. 12th century.

[176] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 22. See also Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 214ff; Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 53–54; Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 56–57; Bertola, "I precedenti storici"; John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 61–62, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511582714.

statements remain unresolved, but there is a possibility that they can be reconciled. It is an attempt to produce the system of the methodical and formal arrangement.

Between these two extremes and along the spectrum of systematizers of the twelfth century a number of other thinkers are to be located. Since other authors have provided informative overviews of these men's efforts and their results[177] there is no need for a detailed exposition. Yet, it is important to name them and approximately indicate their approach to the task of theological systematization.

Two German Benedictines, Rupert of Deutz[178] and Honorius Augustodunensis,[179] stand closer to Anselm, since their projects of more-or-less systematic theology—*De Trinitate et operibus eius* and *Elucidarium* respectfully— are treatises of a reflective and meditative type, where everything is ordered around the lines of the *Heilsgeschichte* and specific theological themes. Yet, it is considered that Hugh of St. Victor[180] with his classic *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, completed ca. 1137, supersedes them. His work is fundamental and well-arranged, although his method is not dialectical: the theological system unfolds along the biblical-historical span – from the divine work of creation (*opus conditionis*) through the work of restoration (*opus restaurationis*). Hence, the conceptual system or, in other words, "an elaborate organizational scheme"[181] is obvious here, although his exposition of the doctrine fails to solve the problem of discordant voices of the fathers.

The school of Laon—or, as Leclercq contends, "the school *at* Laon"[182]—is methodologically closer to Abelard. Anselm of Laon[183] and his brother Radulf or Ralph of Laon[184] together with their followers left a few collections of sayings and teachings (*dicta*), which are neither methodically structuralized, nor thematically organized. Nevertheless, their work definitely reveals a very systematic and careful

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[177] See the works of Chenu, Colish, Leclercq, Rosemann, and Southern cited above.

[178] *Rupertus Tuitiensis*, ca. 1075/1085–1129/30.

[179] *Honorius Augustodunensis*, ca. 1070–1140.

[180] *Hugo de Sancto Victore*, 1096–1141.

[181] Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 143.

[182] Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," 72.

[183] *Anselmus Laudunensis*, 1070–1117.

[184] *Radulphus Laudunensis*, d. ca. 1131/1134.

approach to quotations and theologizing, which Ulrich Leinsle even identifies with academic theology, since it shows something of a critical approach to the sources.[185] Here we can see a combination of (a) a tendency to avoid unnecessary dialectical debates (*pugna verborum*) and encourage the posing of questions (*potest quari, quaeritur*, etc.), (b) the "patristic orientation" and reverence for authorities of the past, since the answers to the questions discussed should be found "*in* the saying" (*in sententia*) of one of the *auctores*, and (c) the methodically carried effort to reach a concordance and harmony (*convenientia, armonia*) between the seemingly contradictory statements by means of careful rendering of its theological meaning(s).[186] Anselm of Laon states: "The different but noncontradictory sentences of all Catholic authors, moreover, meet in one agreement" (*Sententiae quidem omnium catholicorum diversae, sed non adversae, in unam concurrunt convenientiam*).[187]

Finally, somewhere in the center of this spectrum, there are Odo (Otto) of Lucca, Robert of Melun, Robert Pullen,[188] and Roland of Bologna.[189] They all produced their own *Sententiae* or *Summae sententiarum*. Robert Pullen wrote the lengthiest sentence collection of his time (eight books) but left many questions unresolved. Roland of Bologna tried to unite the model of Hugh of St. Victor and the rational methodology of Peter Abelard, by "giv[ing] clear definitions of his terms and present[ing] his material in a highly formal, question-oriented manner," as Colish observes.[190] Robert of Melun aimed at almost the same target, though paying more attention to the model of Abelard's *theologia*, but left his project unfinished. However, it is worth noting that he equipped his book with a table of contents, where

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[185] Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 76. Cf. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 2001, 2:36ff, 49ff. Quite interestingly early Colish disagrees with their assessment in "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 142–143; but later moves closer to its positive evaluation in *Peter Lombard*, 1:44–47. In the latter work, she even says: "Well before Peter Abelard… the Laon masters indicate that they had already grasped and had learned how to apply the principles of authorial intention and historical criticism."

[186] Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 76–80; Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 82–86.

[187] Anselm of Laon, *Letter to Abbot Heribrand of St. Laurentius monastery in Lüttich*, quoted in Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 79, with the quotations translated to English by Miller in; Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 85. Cf. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 139.

[188] *Robertus Pullus*, fl. mid-12th century.

[189] *Rolandus Bononiensis*, fl. mid-12th century.

[190] Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 150.

he indicated all the topics and titles of sections. Besides, he was careful and precise in handling citations and giving references to works used, although his approach to the fathers was very selective.

Hence, "it becomes clear that a central imperative, in early twelfth-century thought, was the development, for the first time, of systematic theology. Systematic theology was an invention of the early twelfth century. It was carried on, on both sides of the Alps and on both sides of the Rhine, not only by scholastics but also by monks… And, systematic theology could be and was harnessed to a variety of practical agendas in this period, so that this activity was anything but monolithic."[191] Of course, the legitimacy of the somewhat anachronistic insertion of the modern concept of "systematic theology" into the twelfth-century world is a matter of dispute. But what is clear and valuable for the given research is the inevitable conclusion about the place and significance of Peter Lombard's work.

In this non-monolithic context, the mission of the Lombard's *Sentences* would be to create a thoroughly systematic corpus of *sententiae* without the deficiencies of his predecessors and colleagues' books, with the best overarching scheme (à la the Hugonian one) and the best way of reconciling conflicting authorities (à la the Abelardian and "Laonian" ones). Thus, it could—or should—incorporate both types of systems and become a combination of the two that was not realized by Robert of Melun, Roland of Bologna and others. But there was also another factor that contributed to, and had posed some requirements and perhaps even the *raison d'être* for, the upcoming *Four Books of Sentences*.

2.2.3. Professional-educational aspects

The Lombardian opus needed to be a book of a special kind: a *textbook* for theological study. The age had already known the sourcebook (sentence collection, *catenae*, etc.) and the treatise (a monograph dedicated to just one or few individual

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[191] Colish, 138. Southern adds in *Scholastic Humanism*, 2:4: "No doubt the foundations of this programme had been laid in earlier centuries, but the aim now was much more ambitious than ever before: it was nothing less than to embrace all knowledge and every kind of activity in a single world-view." Cf. Henri Cloes, "La systématisation théologique pendant la première moitié du 12e siècle," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 34, no. 1 (January 1958): 277–329; Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" 297–300; van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 147–48, 166.

topics). But by the mid-century, there arose—and was understood—the need for not simply systematized sourcebooks, but for a user-friendly, convenient and handy collection of theological opinions. This "requirement" of the time was practical in nature and corresponded to another tendency that was quite new to western Christendom: professionalization and "academization" of theological science in general and theological education in particular. By *professionalization,* I here mean an appearance of people who dedicated their life, time, and power to investigation, explanation (in the form of teaching and writing), and further elaboration of theological doctrines of the classic Christian tradition.[192] Additionally, by *academization* I mean a trend to organize the intellectual activity and the educational process along more vigorous and methodical-systematic lines within, around or in close connection to certain schools.

Perhaps, it is too stereotypic to speak of the twelfth century as "the century of the schools" (*il secolo delle scuole*), as D'Onofrio does,[193] and it is more appropriate to speak of the age of monasteries, schools, and individual masters. As Chenu, Leclercq, and Southern showed, it was indeed the time of continuous monastic theologizing carried on by inhabitants of the cloister (*claustrales*) and of emerging academic theologizing done by clerics or lay persons who taught in the school (*scholastici, scholarii, magistri scholae*).[194] All this was connected to and partially caused by the quantitative expansion and qualitative development of the cathedral and secular schools in some cities as well as, clearly in parallel to that, the flourishing of individual masters.

This educational enterprise led to a *social diversification* of those who were "doing theology," as both clerics and laymen, monks and ordinary people could join their company. Consequently, it resulted in a *methodological diversification* of theological projects, which was spoken of and commented upon in the previous

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[192] See Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 25f.

[193] Giulio D'Onofrio, *Storia della teologia: Età medievale*, ed. Angelo Di Berardino and Basil Studer (Piemme, 2003), 185; D'Onofrio, *History of Theology II: The Middle Ages*, 2:164.

[194] Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society*, 273ff; Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," 68–80; Richard W. Southern, "The Schools of Paris and the Schools of Chartres," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 114–18. See also Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*.

paragraphs. Thus, these "new theologians" stepped out of (some of) the more traditional contexts of theological reflection. But, on the other, hand, this step entailed a *new social unification* and a *formation of their professional setting*. The former implied the growth and crystallization of the new social class of "masters" and their students who were to become masters in the future, who would later create guilds and universities; and the latter meant systematization of their techniques, elaboration of technical vocabulary, sharpening of methods, etc.[195]

The crucial thing about these developments is that this new—more professional and more demanding—milieu needed also special resources, pertaining to their field. What was particularly needed, was the source-, hand- or textbook, which would meet two requirements of the early scholastic theological education: "On the one hand, they [that is, textbooks] introduced the student to the methodology of theological thinking, especially to the strategies involved in the successful handling of authorities. On the other hand, they had to unfold before the eyes of the young theologian the whole theological curriculum, presented in as coherent and well-organized a manner as possible."[196] Hence, for preparing a sentence collection, suitable for its use in the classroom, one would need a clear and transferable (that is, reader-friendly) methodology and a systematic exposition of theology. Thus, the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard had to meet these expectations of the early scholastic context.

Hence, the Master of the *Sentences'* work, which was finished around the middle of the twelfth century, was thought of and issued in a setting which imposed some literary and theological principles on it: for example, the sentence-collection form, the idea of constant appeal and faithfulness to the tradition, the potential

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[195] See: Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" 276–91; Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," 79–84; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 25–27; Goff, *La civilisation de l'occident médiéval*, 317–20; Jacques Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 86–96.

[196] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 27. Cf. Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 9. Elsewhere Colish puts the same thought in different wording: "They [that is, theological masters] needed a syllabus offering a cogent and defensible rationale for its coverage and organization. And, they needed to teach their students how to reason theologically, how to come to grips with the Christian tradition as they had inherited it, and how to use its resources and their own learning and intelligence to deal with the great speculative and practical questions of the day, both the enduring ones and those that the needs of the time prompted them to reevaluate." In Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 142.

usability for classroom purposes, etc. His *Sentences* in its literary and methodological form were indeed a product of its age. Its literary form was the collection of the church fathers' sayings and a systematic exposition of the Christian teaching and its methodology implied a coherent interpretation and masterful reconciliation of various authoritative opinions. The *Zeitgeist* of the epoch gave Peter some ideas of what should or should not be done: he was acquainted with his predecessors' and colleagues' approaches to the writing, composing and systematizing of theological questions. This is why he could push the development of both literary and theological methods of the so-called early scholasticism[197] further on and, eventually, succeed where some others failed.[198] For it is true that for a medieval man who lived during his lifetime or afterward, he became *the* Master – the *Magister sententiarum*.[199]

2.3. The *Sentences*' rationale and purpose

Having looked at the *Sentences*' place in the twelfth-century historical-theological and educational environment, it is time to turn to its own stated purpose: task and structural form. For it is true that the context had its bearing upon this oeuvre, but still, it was *his* work, and not seemingly a faceless twelfth-century volume, that was unexpectedly highly assessed and praised by the medievals. Such success can but be related to Peter's own vision of his chêf-d'oeuvre and its

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[197] I use the term "early scholasticism," which is equivalent to German *Frühscholastik*, here to denote "all doctrinal writings of the period immediately preceding the great expansion of the thirteenth century, the "great scholasticism" (*Hochscholastik*) which in turn preceded "late scholasticism" (*Spätscholastik*)," following J. Leclercq and A. Landgraf.
Here I quote from Leclercq, *L'Amour des lettres*, 1; Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, 1; Artur Michael Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 4 in 9 vols. (Regensburg: Pustet, 1952).

[198] Among the reasons of the later success of the *Book of Sentences* Silano lists (1) clear structure, (2) "a certain open-endedness about the work," (3) its "middleness" and a balanced and at times even humble presentation of some topics and various opinions of the fathers, and (4) the pedagogical usefulness of the book for use in the medieval classroom. Silano, "Introduction," xxvi–xxviii. The most significant earlier scholarly efforts to explain the wide reception and popularity of the Lombard's publication were well cataloged and supplemented with some authorial suggestions in Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:404–7. Cf. more recent reflections on the same issue in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:77–90; Rosemann, "Peter Lombard," 2017, 62–65.

[199] "[For some people] he is the hero. His performance is an immediate and enduring hit. His *Sentences* are received enthusiastically and made the basis of mainstream Paris theology right after his death in 1160 and then are legislated into the theological curriculum of the University of Paris in 1215. The rest is history: Peter Lombard's work exerts a formative effect on theology and philosophy for centuries to come. This is the role in which medieval Europe cast him." Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal," 135.

realization on paper. This is why in the next paragraphs I will present the *Book of Sentences* as its own text presents itself and summarize its key features.[200]

2.3.1. Purpose(s)

The *Prologue* (*Prologus*) to the *Sententiae*,[201] taken together with the next sections of the book, immediately reveals the purpose of the whole book. In fact, the author indicates a triple purpose—or three purposes—for his undertaking.[202]

His first purpose is apologetic or polemical. The Lombard wants to "fortify our faith" (*munire*) or "show how it is fortified" (*munitam ostendere*)[203] against the errors of carnal, fleshly, non-spiritual men (*errores carnalium atque animalium hominum*) (*Sent*. 1, *Prol*., no. 2).[204] He criticizes them and their wicked ways (no. 2-4) and hopes that his work will help to stop this virus or venom of wickedness (*ne virus nequitiae in alios effundere queant*). Thus, Master Peter's aim has a moral theological flavor as

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[200] Hereafter I cite the Lombard's Latin text from the classic critical edition: Petrus Lombardus, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 3rd revised edition (Editio tertia. Ad fidem codicum antiquiorum restituta), vol. 1, 2 vols., Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), which superseded the earlier critical edition: Petrus Lombardus, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in quatuor libris distinctae. Primus liber sententiarum: De Deo unitate et trinitate*, edita studio et cura PP. Collegii A S. Bonaventura, vol. 1, 10 vols., Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia (Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), prope Florentiam: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882). I refer to the former as *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, and the latter as *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*.

As for the English translation, I will primarily use Giulio Silano's work: Peter Lombard, *The Sentences. Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Giulio Silano, vol. 1, 4 vols., Medieval Sources in Translation 42 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS), 2007), although at times I will refer to Alexis Bugnolo's translation, published as Peter Lombard, *The Complete Text of Lombard's First Book of Sentences: Book I - On the One and Triune God*, ed. and trans. Alexis Bugnolo, 1st ed., vol. Tome 1, 10 vols., Opera Omnia of St. Bonaventure (Mansfield, MA: The Franciscan Archive, 2014). I refer to the former as *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, and the latter as *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*.

My choice of the translation depends on its supposed closer rendering of the Latin original in my—apparently subjective but not necessarily wrong—view. Exceptionally I use other pieces of translations but always name the used source. If the source is not indicated, the English text in brackets is in my translation.

[201] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:3–4; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:16–17; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:16–17. Here I will also use the translation of Joseph Kenny, which I find lucid and adequate: Peter Lombard, "Prologue of Master Peter Lombard," *Commentary on the Sentences by Thomas Aquinas* (blog), accessed September 15, 2015, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Sentences.htm#02.

[202] Cf. Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 93: "Unmittelbarer Zweck des Werkes ist die Darlegung des katholischen Glaubens gegen alle Irrtümer und Häresein, wie der insgesamt apologetische Prolog unterstreicht." (English translation by Miller in Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 100: "The immediate goal of the work is to explain the Catholic faith against all errors and heresies, as emphasized in the prologue, which as a whole is strongly apologetic.")

As it is clear from my tripartite division, I would distinguish here between the presentation of the Catholic teaching as (i) its exposition, (ii) its explication and interpretation, and (iii) its apologetic defence. It is, so to say, *die Darlegung als Exposition oder Präsentation des katholischen Glaubens*, *als Erklärung oder Interpretation der katholischen Glaubens, dass heißt, Theologie, und als Apologetische Interpretation des katholischen Glaubens gegen alle Irrtümer und Häresein*. These are Leinsle's terms, but my rearrangment and interpretation.

Cf. an alternative analysis of the Lombard's prologue from a systematic-theological angle and in comparison with Thomas Aquinas' later effort in Rosemann, "Sacra Pagina or Scientia Divina?"

[203] Peter Lombard, "Prologue of Master Peter Lombard (Kenny)."

[204] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:3.

well as the intellectual appeal: he wants to write an exhortation for some carnal contemporaries and strengthen the faith of the faithful students of God's word.[205] It is needed because "there is an unceasing battle between the assertion of the truth and the defense of opinion, for so long as truth remains firm and the will to err persists" (*Inter veri namque assertionem et placiti defensionem pertinax pugna est, dum se et veritas tenet et se voluntas erroris tuetur*),[206] as it is stated at the end of paragraph 3. But the last phrase also indicates that there is the second purpose, connected but not limited to the first one.

The second purpose is pedagogical or instructive, for the Lombard also intends to "open up the hidden things of theological inquiry, and to transmit information about the Church's sacraments to the small level of our intelligence" (*ac theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire, necnon et sacramentorum ecclesiasticorum pro modico intelligentiae nostrae notitiam tradere studuimus*).[207] He is going to present and clarify these things for himself and his audience, which he identified as "the studious brothers" (*studiosorum fratrum*) (no. 2).[208] Using a biblical analogy from Mt. 5:15, master Peter says that he wants to elevate the light of Christian truth and put it on the candlestick, so that it may be seen by everybody (no. 4). Quite interestingly, in his view, this truth should be accessed, found, and explored in, or through the medium of, the testimonies of the church fathers. He even asserts that their theological statements are "the witnesses of truth established for all eternity" (*ex testimoniis veritatis in aeternum fundatis*).[209] Thus, he definitely accepts and thoroughly supports the classic Christian theological tradition. Indeed, the Lombard believes it to be *the* witness to the truth *par excellence*, that is, the Triune God who alone is the truth in the fullest sense. Hence, his second purpose is to lay out and explicate the Christian doctrines through the medium of a selection of "the

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[205] Cf. Rosemann, "*Sacra Pagina* or *Scientia Divina*?," 54.

[206] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:4; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:4.

[207] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:3; Peter Lombard, "Prologue of Master Peter Lombard (Kenny)."

[208] Rik van Nieuwenhowe is right when he states, "Peter's *Sentences* are an invitation to students of theology to engage in theology," though he is wrong in identifying it as "the main goal of *The Sentences*." See van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 147.

[209] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:4; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:4.

examples and doctrine of (our) elders" (*maiorum exempla doctrinamque*).[210] As the Lombard himself admits, it was an extremely difficult and challenging—albeit great and truly needed—labor that exceeded his power (*opus ultra vires nostras agere praesumpsimus*), so that he must have "worked and sweated hard" (*in labore multo ac sudore*) (no. 1 and 4) to complete it. It is quite logical, since, as noted by Rosemann, "Peter Lombard's principal task consists in synthesizing authoritative quotations from different sources and, where necessary, in adjudicating among them,"[211] which is an enormous task, if one takes into account the number of sources and their sometimes striking diversity of opinions and formulations. But there is also the third goal, which develops and, in fact, unfolds the second one.

The third and last, but not the least, purpose of the *Sentences* is practical or methodical-educational. It has to be found in the Lombard's efforts to compose a theological textbook in the form of sentence-collection, that would be well-organized, understandable, and accessible to his students and colleagues, that is, professional theologians of the twelfth century. The book was designed to serve "the laudable studies in Christ of… (our) studious brothers" (*studiosorum fratrum… in Christo laudabilibus studiis lingua ac stilo nos servire flagitantium*),[212] as the Lombard says, quoting Augustine. This is why he wished to create a literary-theological product which, according to *Prol.*, no. 4-5, would be characterized by (a) a faithful representation of Christian tradition (*per dominicae fidei sinceram professionem*), (b) the brevity and conciseness of exposition (*brevi volumine*), and (c) its clarity, methodical rigor, and systematicity in the organization of various parts and subdivisions of the text (*volumen Deo praestante compegimus in quatuor libris distinctum… moderamine utentes*).[213]

Hence, his aim is a combination of comprehensiveness, conciseness, and orderliness. The Lombard intended to create a textbook for theology, which would surpass and eventually substitute other works. Leinsle calls it the "future textbook"

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[210] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:4; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:17.

[211] Rosemann, "Sacra Pagina or Scientia Divina?," 55.

[212] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:3; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:16.

[213] Rosemann, "Sacra Pagina or Scientia Divina?," 55–56.

(*das künftige Schulbuch*), built around the so-called theological "encyclopedic principle" (*enzyklopädisches Prinzip*), which should have been expected to become "the sole foundation for theology" (*alleinige Grundlage für die Theologie*).[214] In fact, the Lombard clearly discloses this aim himself in *Prol.*, no. 5, after having quoted Augustine once again:

> "And so this work should seem superfluous neither to the lazy, nor to the very learned, since it is necessary to many who are not lazy and many who are not learned and, among these, even to myself." In this brief volume, we have brought together the sentences of the Fathers and the testimonies apposite to them, so that one who seeks them shall find it unnecessary to rifle through numerous books, when this brief collection effortlessly offers him what he seeks.[215]
>
> (« *Non igitur debet hic labor cuiquam pigro vel multum docto videri superfluus, cum multis impigris multisque indoctis, inter quos etiam et mihi, sit necessarius* », *brevi volumine complicans Patrum sententias, appositis eorum testimoniis, ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere, cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore*).[216]

Thus, it becomes obvious, that Peter Lombard's goal was both "traditional," in a sense that such a vision was discernable in the spirit of the epoch, and at the same time ambitious. He sought to compose a book that would surpass the quality of other books circulating at his time and have a long life in the scholarly world. As the later success of this opus shows, the effort was worth trying, because many people have

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[214] Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 92-93. English translation is from Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 99.

[215] Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:4–5. Cf. the more literal and slightly more complicated translation of Bugnolo in Peter Lombard, *Sentences: Book 1 (Bugnolo)*, 17: "'Therefore, this labor ought not seem superfluous to anyone learned sluggishly or much, since for the many diligent and the many unlearned, among whom even for myself, it is necessary', that one compile the sentences of the Fathers in a brief volume, with their appropriate testimonies, so that it is not necessary for one to seek to unroll numerous books, for whom a brief collection offers what is sought without the labor."

[216] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:4.

found it as "the most comprehensive balanced, and coherent" twelfth-century collection of sentences.[217]

Indeed, as the *Prologue* reveals, the Lombard, aspired to produce precisely such a textbook, that would (a) correspond to the standards of the genre of sentence collection and expose the reader to the richness of the ecclesial authorities' teachings, (b) contain and radiate the systematical, "harmonizing" element which would help to see the order and certain logic in the way as to how these authoritative quotations are organized and what is the good way to digest their thoughts, and, hence, (c) match the expectations of the academic theological education which was moving toward a greater professionalization and sophistication. Hence, I would perfectly agree with Monagle's observation that the Lombard's textbook was "methodologically and intellectually precise; [it] broke new ground in the organization of theological materials and essentially set the theological syllabus for coming generations."[218] Therefore, I claim that the combination of goals and, especially, the third, methodical-educational, goal set for the *Book of Sentences*, says something about the personality and the scholarly approach of the Lombard.

2.3.2. Approach

It is totally right that his attitude to and "use of authorities reveals a well-informed, knowledgeable, and critical spirit," who is ready to produce "a fresh and independent reading and an insightful application of them,"[219] as M. Colish concludes. Perhaps Colish pushes her conclusions too far and the Lombard was not as independent as it would seem to her, since he was very dependent on the Augustinian tradition and Augustine's own view of things (which is obvious from the number and character of references to the famous bishop of Hippo in the *Sentences*) and very reluctant to "determine" many difficult questions (which is seen in his periodic "stepping back" in humility).[220] Nevertheless, it is certainly not true that his goal was

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[217] Colish, "Peter Lombard," 169.

[218] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 54.

[219] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:90; Colish, "'Discipline' and 'Science.'"

[220] See Giulio Silano, "Introduction," in *The Sentences. Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity*, by Peter Lombard, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS), 2007), xxvii, xxxii, xxxiv–xxxv,

confined to the task of "reproducing tradition" (*die Ueberlieferung wiederzugeben*), that his whole work proves that "the patristic tradition still continued to be the only subject of doctrine (*der einzige Lehrgegenstand*), and that it was only with an effort that what was new asserted itself against it," as A. von Harnack describes it.[221] At least, the German historian agrees that "the whole undertaking to give a combined and connected view was itself new" and admits that Peter Lombard did that masterfully.[222] His way of approaching the ancient *auctores*, selecting and combining their quotations and, finally, giving his own judgments, was quite original and innovative in comparison to his predecessors and contemporaries.[223]

The end of *Prologus* reads: "In [this volume] … we have embraced an approach for demonstrating the truth and have not inserted the danger of an impious profession, using a temperate means of guidance among both. But if our voice has sounded out a little anywhere, it has not departed from the limits of the Fathers"[224] (*In quo* [i.e. *volumine*] … *aditum demonstrandae veritatis complexi, nec periculo impiae professionis inserti, temperato inter utrumque moderamine utentes. Sicubi vero parum vox nostra insonuit, non a paternis discessit limitibus*).[225] Here the Lombard clearly demonstrates both the awareness of his own voice (*vox nostra*) and "an attitude of humility,"[226] which in scholarly mode turns into a kind of theological

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passim, and, especially, *Sent*. 1, dist. 1, cap. 1-3; dist. 2, cap. 1, no. 3; *passim*. Cf. Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment*, xiii, 13, 16–18; Rosemann, "New Interest in Peter Lombard," 145, 152; Rosemann, "Peter Lombard," 2017, 64–65, 77.

[221] Harnack and Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 3*, 3:551, 378. (English translation: Adolf von Harnack, *History of dogma*, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 6, History of dogma (New York: Dover Publications, 1961), 276, 82.)

[222] Harnack and Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 3*, 3:378. (English translation: Harnack, *History of dogma*, 1961, 6:82.)

[223] See Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:86–87; D'Onofrio, *Storia della teologia*, 212; Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 139; Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 93.

[224] Peter Lombard, *Sentences: Book 1 (Bugnolo)*, 17. Here I prefer Bugnolo's translation, because it is better than that of Silano who, as proved by Rosemann, misses an important point. Silano translates this passage as "if in some places our voice has rung out a little loudly, it has not transgressed the bounds of our forefathers" (Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:4.) and, hence, commits two mistakes.

On the one hand, as notes Rosemann, Peter Lombard is not concerned about his voice being loud, but "appears to be apologizing for sometimes being too hesitant in advancing positions of his own" for he believes his voice is heard insufficiently well. Therefore the very best translation would be this: "But wherever our voice has made itself heard too little, it has [at least] not deviated from the bounds of the fathers" (Rosemann, "Three Avenues for Studying," 5n13.).

On the other hand, I would add, it is not clear why Silano translates "a paternis limitibus" as "the bounds of our forefathers," since it is absolutely clear that the Lombard implies here not ancestors but church fathers, that is, the fathers of the Christian tradition. Hence, Bugnolo's "the limits of the Fathers" and Rosemann's "the bounds of the fathers" would be a more impeccable translation.

[225] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:4.

[226] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 63.

conservatism[227] and a tendency to hold as close to the "patristic boundaries" (Miller's translation of *paternis limitibus*) as possible.[228]

However, the commitment to the teachings of the church fathers should not be interpreted as the absence of originality and a primitive reiteration of tradition, as A. Brancaforte, A. Harnack, J. Leclercq, D. Luscombe, and others have suggested.[229] Nor should it hide direct or indirect expressions of the Lombard's own theological acumen, which is recognized and affirmed by M. Colish, J. de Ghellink, U. Leinsle, C. Monagle, Ph. Rosemann, R. Van Nieuwenhowe, and other scholars.[230] The latter is expressed in the Lombard's order of presentation and exposition of his material as well as in the line of argumentation he chooses, while the former is unambiguously seen in his own opinions and determinations.

It is here that his achievement is to be found – in his idiosyncratic sense of balance and moderation, which accompanies his truly rich and massive material from the past and the present, that he accumulates, systematizes, discusses and judges.[231]

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[227] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, xvi, 61, 103.

[228] Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 100.

[229] See: Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:7–9; Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 3:378; Leclercq, *L'Amour des lettres*, 11–12, 192n2; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 262–263ff.

[230] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:11, 77–90; Colish, "'Discipline' and 'Science,'" 175, 180; Colish, "From the Sentence Collection," 12, 16; de Ghellink, "Pierre Lombard," DTC, cols. 1986-1987; de Ghellink, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 137–49; Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 91–96; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 58–59, 64–65; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 56–57, 62–64; van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 147, 166. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:11, 77–90; ibid., "'Discipline' and 'Science,'" 175, 180; ibid., "From the Sentence Collection," 12, 16; de Ghellink, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 137–149; ibid., "Pierre Lombard," 1986–1987; Leinsle, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 91–96; van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 147, 166; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 56–57, 62–64.

In general, Colish observes in "'Discipline' and 'Science,'" 175, that "each master who produced a sentence collection used it as a means of presenting and organizing the topics he thought systematic theology should address, with the schema and emphasis he thought was appropriate. The particular authorities he cited and the ways in which he applied them represent his own personal focus on the Christian tradition, used to bolster his own positions and to criticize those he opposed."

In specific, de Ghellink applies this principle to the case of the Lombard and then concludes in "Pierre Lombard," 1986: "Pierre Lombard est avant tout un compilateur; son originalité, si originalité il y a, réside exclusivement, peut-on dire, dans le choix très étendu des textes patristiques qu'il utilise et dans la sélection qu'il pratique entre les diverses opinions qu'il trouve en présence."

But Rosemann closes this discussion with the following summary and assessment in *Peter Lombard*, 7: "Peter Lombard's case is different. For reasons that are related to the methodological development of Christian thought in the Middle Ages… the originality and personal stamp of the Lombard's theological vision are more difficult to discern. To the eye of the untrained reader, the Sentences could appear as nothing but a string of quotations from Scripture and the Fathers, precariously held together by a few connecting words. What counts, however, is the selection of the quotations, their arrangement into a coherent theological system "with a place for everything and everything in its place," and the attempt to distill doctrine out of the often discordant voices of the tradition. This is where Peter Lombard's achievement lies."

[231] De Ghellink, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 137–38; de Ghellink, "Pierre Lombard," DTC, 1983, 1985–86.

Yet, I will not further ponder the issue of Peter Lombard's (un)originality, since it is a separate discussion. Instead, I will proceed to a brief introduction to the *Sentences'* structure and method. *Nunc explicit prologus*.

2.4. The *Sentences'* organizational structure and theological "method"

It is possible to distinguish—in a sense, *distinguere nec separare*—Peter Lombard's theological framework, organizational structure, and the "method" or "way" he uses. The first category corresponds to his Augustinian "vision of the theological project,"[232] the second to the factual division of the four-volume text of the Sentences, and the third to his approach to the themes he explores and sources he uses. I will briefly comment on each of them in the coming paragraphs, although the first two categories are intimately interconnected.

2.4.1. Framework

As for the general framework, the whole project is organized primarily around the division of everything in reality into things (*res*) and signs (*signa*) and, secondarily, the division of things into those that are to be enjoyed (*frui*) and used (*uti*).[233] Both originate from Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* and are presented and explicated by Petrus Lombardus in the very beginning of the *Book of Sentences* (*Sent*. 1, dist. 1, cap. 1, no. 1): "Every doctrine concerns things and/or signs" (*Omnis doctrina est de rebus vel de signis*).[234] Here the *res* means things or, better, entities that are what they are without signifying anything else—like God and most creatures—and the *signum* corresponds to the phenomena which are things that are what they are and which also signify something else. Peter Lombard does not formulate his own definition of things and signs but prefers to quote Augustine: "'Things' here properly designates whatever is not used to designate something; but 'signs' designates whatever is used in signifying." (*Proprie autem hic res appellantur, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur; signa vero, quorum usus*

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[232] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 61.

[233] A very good overview and analysis of this issue is provided in: Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment*, 1–27.

[234] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:55; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:26.

est in significando).[235] Then the Lombard continues this train of thought and applies the distinction to the sacramental realities. He states that the Old Testament sacraments (*Sacramenta legalia*) are signs which signify only – they signify God's grace without containing or conferring it to the recipients, while the Christian sacraments of the New Testament (*evangelica Sacramenta*) not only signify but also confer divine grace, thus justifying the recipients. Hence, according to the Lombard, the textbook of theology must describe and discuss the things as elements of the God-given reality and the sacraments as the signs of the divine grace.[236]

But the things should be approached appropriately as they differ from each other and require a different attitude. There exist "some things which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, and yet others which enjoy and use" (*res aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum est, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur*) (*Sent.* 1, dist. 1, cap. 1, no. 2; cf. dist. 1, cap. 3, epil.).[237] Here *frui* refers to appreciating certain things for their own sake, and *uti* to appreciating certain things in order to achieve something else. According to Augustine and the Lombard's vision, the Triune God alone is to be enjoyed, whereas everything else deserves only to be used, although it is true that God can be enjoyed in or through the "usable things." However, rational creatures have an additional feature: they can both use and enjoy other things.[238] As a result, the theology textbook has to treat God as the most elevated thing in the world and the object of theology *par excellence*. Yet, it also

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[235] Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana*, lib. 1, c. 2, n. 2 (PL 34, 195; CSEL 80, 9; CCL32, 7), quoted in Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:55; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:5.

[236] Interestingly, here in his *Prologue* Peter Lombard does not forget to mention another Augustinian teaching about some things functioning as signs in a certain respect. He quotes the same section of *De doctrina christiana* and agrees with the Bishop of Hippo that "every sign is also a thing… but it is not conversely the case that every thing is a sign" (*Omne igitur signum etiam res aliqua est... non autem e converso omnis res signum est*) (Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:55; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:5–6). But the Lombard does not push this idea further for here his task is confined to the presentation of the overall methodological scheme of his oeuvre and there is no need to delve into detailed metaphysical discussions at this point. The creation, the image of God in man, and the sacraments are to be discussed in Book 2 and 4 of the Sentences, respectively, while the short statement about the vestiges of the Trinity in the created world is to be found in Book 1, dist. III, cap. 1(9).

[237] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:56; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:6.

[238] Here I join A. Bugnolo, S. Kitanov, R. van Nieuwenhove, and G. Silano who agree that the division here is between things that are to be enjoyed, things to be used, and *things that enjoy and use* (in active voice and active sense) *contra* M. Colish and Ph. Rosemann, who insist that the division is between things enjoyed, used, and *those that are either enjoyed or used* (in passive voice and passive sense). In fact, this is the only plausible lexical—as well as conceptual—interpretation of the Augustinian and Lombardian dictum that I have cited above. See Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, Tome 1:26; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:6; Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment*, 2, 16; van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 148–49; cf. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:78–79; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 58–59.

needs to discuss the things that can be used but are nevertheless users themselves—angels and human beings—and, finally, things that are simply to be used, that is the world of material things like physical objects and abstract things like virtues. But the discussion should proceed in good order and reflect the just-presented metaphysical scheme.

2.4.2. Organizational structure

As for the organizational structure, it is determined by the conceptual divisions presented in the two preceding paragraphs. The *Sentences* are divided into four books,[239] and the first three are about things (God, humans, etc.), while the last one is about signs (sacraments) and is entitled *De doctrina signorum*. The first book, *De Dei unitate et trinitate*, discusses the questions about the mystery of the Trinity and divine essences. The second book, *De rerum creatione et formatione corporalium et spiritualium et aliis pluribus eo pertinentibus*, is concerned with issues related to creation and, specifically, with rational and "active" creatures like humankind and the angels and with inanimate, irrational and "passive" creatures like the cosmic elements and various things of the universe. The third book, *De incarnatione Verbi et humani generis reparatione*, speaks of "things to be used through which we come to the enjoyment of God,"[240] that is the salvific phenomena like the incarnation, the passion and salutary effects of the Son of God's life, death, and resurrection, etc. Lastly, the fourth book, *De doctrina signorum*, deals with signs proper and sacraments. Hence, the fourfold structure of the *Liber sententiarum*, which can easily be expressed in, and grasped with the help of, the following summarizing scheme, prepared by Van Nieuwenhove:[241]

Book I: God – things to be enjoyed

Book II: Creation

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[239] Its Latin titles are given in accordance with the nomenclature utilized by A. Bugnolo and the Franciscan Archive, who translate the *Scriptum* of Bonaventure. See *Peter Lombard: The Internet Guide to Master Peter Lombard*, accessed September 22, 2015, https://franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/index.html.

[240] Van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, 150.

[241] Ibid. For a more detailed exposition of the subject see, for example, Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, 2:364–366.

– things that enjoy and use: angels and men (dist. 1-11 and 16-44)

– things to be used: the world and its things (dist. 12-15)

Book III: Christology and Virtues

– things to be used through which we come to the enjoyment of God

Book IV: Signs or Sacraments

This is the organizational structure Peter Lombard himself chooses and consistently employs, although the famous "distinctions" which divine the four-volume set into a more reader-friendly reference work are a later innovation. Initially, the *Master of the Sentences* provided a table of contents for his whole oeuvre and subdivided the four books into "chapters" and "rubrics," that is, specific introductory phrases, notes, and overviews indicating the beginning and the ends of chapters (e.g. *incipiunt capitula primi libri sententiarum*[242]). But later, as Brady and Rosemann's research shows, ca. 1223-1227 Alexander of Hales "grouped the chapters further into topical units, employing the indications that the Lombard himself had furnished. … Once Alexander had introduced these units, or distinctions, the chapters were renumbered accordingly, now being counted within each distinction. That is how the *Book of Sentences* has been cited ever since—for example, *Book of Sentences*, book 1, distinction 5, chapter 3."[243] But even the distinctions are not the things that correspond to the author's intention, the very idea of systematic and careful division of the book into smaller units undoubtedly belongs to the Lombard himself. This is his achievement, as so many scholars emphasize.[244]

2.4.3. "Method"

Lastly, a couple of words about the theological "method" of the *Sentences*. Of course, it would be anachronistic to ascribe to Peter Lombard's a concept that he did not know. After all, "methodus" is an early modern notion that was not known in the

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[242] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:17.

[243] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 65. Se also Brady, "Prolegomena," 137-141, 143–44.

[244] E.g., Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:78–84; Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment*, 13–14; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 54, 58, 59, 61; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 61–65.

twelfth century. But I think it is legitimate to think about a so-to-say "method" or the way Master Peter proceeds with his task.

In terms of the *Sentences'* overall composition, the book is a string of quotations from the church fathers and, sometimes, contemporary thinkers, presented according to a certain order and strictly within the boundaries of specific theological topics, which are accompanied by the author's introductions, comments, and summaries. Ghellinck calls it "un tissu de citations des écrivains ecclésiastiques," which is supplemented by "tous les avis contemporains émis dans les écoles."[245] These sources[246] include the select works of Augustine, Tertullian, Hilary of Poitiers, John of Damascus, Julian of Toledo, Bede the Venerable, Ivo of Chartres, Gratian, Peter Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and others.[247] The quotations from their writings are presented selectively and in different proportions according to Peter Lombard's vision. When needed, they are compared, analyzed in detail and reconciled "in light of the inherent logic of the subjects being investigated"[248] and with "a systematic interest in the reasoning that has led his authorities to the conclusions they reach."[249]

In my view, these observations by de Ghellinck, Rosemann, and Colish are correct. Peter Lombard does not say *how* he is going about his huge task of reconciling the conflicting citations or driving home his own arguments. There is no "Lombardian algorithm" in approaching the varying or contradicting authorities, and one cannot find its coherent presentation or explanation in the *Sentences*, because the author did not lay it out. Nevertheless, Master Peter definitely demonstrates the ability to knit and weave a number of texts into a coherent and logical whole forming a tapestry of quotations. As Rosemann, notes, "[t]here is method in the *Book of Sentences*, one could say, yet little methodology, or systematic reflection upon

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[245] De Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," DTC, col. 1986–1987.

[246] For more details on Lombard's sources for the *Book of Sentences*, see de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," DTC, 1988–1990; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 55–57.

[247] Quite interestingly, the contemporaries are not indicated by name. Rather, they remain anonymous, hiding behind the formulas such as "quidam dicunt" (some people say), "alii" (others), or simply "quidam" (somebody). See Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:87–88; de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," DTC, 1988–1989; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 56.

[248] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 69.

[249] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:86-87.

method."[250] But, this compilation of numerous discordant voices from the past and the present (of the twelfth century) still enjoys and undoubtedly reflects the systematic organization, scholarly rigor, and theological depth exemplified by Peter from Lombardy. It is the matter of arrangment, proportion, and the angle from which the reader should see the given quotation. And this is why it is hard to systematize "the Lombard way" in a nice neat formulation. The perception depends on the specific theological problem Peter addresses and its status within the twelfth-century school world. Hence, I reserve specific comments on what and how Peter does to the chapter dealing specifically with his philosophical theology of God's attributes.

2.5. Summary

The just-presented overview of the *Sentences'* purposes, authorial vision, its general framework, organization structure, and "method" (sections 2.3 and 2.4), taken into account against its intellectual background (2.1), suggest the following conclusions.

Peter Lombard's most influential writing was composed as the work which could meet a few expectations: it needed to be a textbook in the traditional sentence-collection format suitable for use in schools and user-friendly for both the established professionals in theology (masters) and young professionals-to-be (students). But it was also expected to reflect the age's strive for comprehensibility and systematicity. This is what the context required.

What Master Peter produced managed to meet these needs and standards. His was definitely a sentence-collection but the one that was properly organized with a clear, traditional, Augustinian scheme in mind. Now, this *metaphysical* pattern of

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[250] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 62. In a more recent article Rosemann amplifies his observation: "Peter explicitly speaks [in the Prologue] of his 'method', *moderamen*; a word which signifies a means of keeping within bounds, of regulating, and ultimately, measuring (*moderamen* derives from *modus*, which has the same root as *metior*, 'to measure'). Where such measuring occurs we are no longer dealing with an author subjecting himself to a narrative flow, but rather with one who introduces structures, *his* structures, into this flow. That Peter Lombard considered such structures important to his work is thrown into relief by his explicit and prominently-placed announcement of the table of contents that he devised to facilitate his readers. It is method – that is to say, a carefully designed systematic framework into which the flow of scriptural and other authoritative quotations is inserted – it is such heightened methodological sophistication which makes it possible for the reader of the Book of sentences to approach the tradition of the faith efficiently…" Rosemann, "Sacra Pagina or Scientia Divina?," 56.

things and signs to enjoy and use turned into an *organizational structure* of the book and translated into the volumes on God as the enjoyable thing, the creation and creatures as the "things" which enjoy and use or, sometimes might be used, Christology and Soteriology as the things that need to be used for salvation and future beatific enjoyment, and signs and sacraments as signs as such. This conjunction of metaphysical scheme and the Lombard's organizational insight made the sentence collection more orderly and easily understood.

Moreover, the systematical element that was in high demand in the mid-twelfth century educational circles is found in the way how Master of the *Sentences* organizes his text by dividing it into themes and chapters. This small touch actually means a lot. It allows the reader to locate rather easily the section he needs or the question he wants to study within the four-volume set and, then, go right to the section where the citations of the church fathers are presented with clear references and with minor commentaries that are there to give guidance. This is how the Lombard fulfills the need for a systematic element in the *Sentences*: he structures, divides, says a little, but still, his voice gives direction so that the citations would form a tidy string and not a chaotic pile.

Now, it is time to finish general observation and procced to the subject matter. It must be clear now, that Peter Lombard wrote a systematic, well-thought, well-organized, and well-accepted work, which became the theology textbook of the later Middle Ages. So, he is methodically systematic and quite logical. But how systematic was his thinking contentwise? The following chapters should give a clearer glimpse of, and unpack, his philosophical theology.

3. Peter Lombard's *Book one* and the Triune God

Having presented a general introduction to the *Book of Sentences*, I proceed now to a more focused and detailed treatment of the *Sentences'* Book one. Before I examine the chapters that deal with the topic of God's knowledge, potency, and will (distinctions 35-48), which constitute my main focus, I will give a few comments on the structure of the *Sentences* 1, in general, and its last part, in particular, and highlight some crucial theological points regarding the Lombard's Triadology. It is needed because his Trinitarian teachings directly precede his thoughts on the key divine attributes. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity is the necessary starting point.

3.1. The Trinity: the prioritized doctrine

The twelfth-century Master of the *Sentences* takes the Christian belief in the triune God very seriously and prioritizes the "mystery of the Trinity"[251] over other purely theological topics: unlike his contemporaries Hugh of St. Victor, Roland of Bologna, Robert Pullen, and more like Robert of Melun, he treats the Trinity *before* a full exposition of God's attributes shared by all trinitarian persons.[252] The very structure of the first book of his sentence collection reveals the order of priorities its author has in mind while discussing the Godhead: (1) the trinity of persons and the perfect unity of essence,[253] and (2) distinct attributes of that Tri-unity. The Trinity *qua* Trinity is treated in distinctions 2-34 and the divine essential attributes – in the distinctions 35-48, although some elements of the latter topic are examined in distinctions 8, 20, 34, etc.

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[251] Thus reads the subtitle of the *Sentences* 1: "Here Begins the First Book: The Mystery of the Trinity" (*Incipit liber primus. De Mysterio Trinitatis*). See: Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:5; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:55.

[252] See observations and comments by Colish and Rosemann in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:57–90; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 25–33, 57–61.

[253] Note the more Neoplatonic and Augustinian term "essence" (*essentia*) and not traditional dogmatic "substance" (*substantia*) here and see a very good introduction to the "problem of God" and divine essence in the *Sentences* and its historical-theological context in Bertola, "Il problema di Dio"; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:125–26; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:718–23; Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 61–65; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 77–90.

3.1.1. Essence and Persons

As early as distinction 2, the Lombard states that in God there is "a unity of essence and a plurality of persons" (*unitas in essentia et pluralitas in personis*).[254] Then he explicates this rather classic description of who God is in the following way.

Firstly, Peter Lombard draws a sharp distinction between God's essence and God's persons and defines the former as "one and the highest thing" or "reality" (*una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia*)[255] and frequently identifies the latter with subsistence.

On one hand, the divine *essence* is divine *substance* and divine *nature* or, simply, *divinity*. Together with Augustine whom he quotes extensively, Peter Lombard regards the terms "essentia," "substantia," "natura," and "divinitas" as synonymous.[256] All of them tend to mean God's utterly simple being, that is, what God is. The very term "essentia" is identified with God's nature and interpreted lexically: *essentia* comes from *esse* and, consequently, means being.[257] For "God is a single and simple essence which does not consist in any diversity of parts or accidents" (*Deus una sit et simplex essentia, quae ex nulla diversitate partium vel accidentium consistit*), as the *Sentences* state.[258] Colish interprets it as "the intrinsic qualities that make a being itself, whatever kind of being it happens to be,"[259] but, in my view, it is too sophisticated and philosophical an explanation. Rather, for the Lombard, God's essence or substance is *simply divine being as such*. For he directly says, "by the term 'essence' we understand the divine nature, which is common to the three persons and is whole in each of them" (*Hic autem nomine 'essentiae'*

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[254] *Sent*. 1, dist. 2, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:62. Petrus Lombardus, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 3rd revised edition (Editio tertia. Ad fidem codicum antiquiorum restituta), vol. 1, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), 62.

[255] *Sent*. 1, dist. 5, cap. 1, no. 6. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:31; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:82. Cf. Monagle's suggestive insertion of "reality" as another appropriate rendering of Latin res in

[256] *Sent*. 1, dist. 4, cap. 2, no. 1; dist. 5, cap. 1-3.

[257] Here Lombard quotes Augustine's *De Trinitate* (cap. 2, n. 3; PL 42, 912; CCL 50, 207s): *Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum… Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:95.

[258] *Sent*. 1, dist. 3, cap. 1, no. 6. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:20; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:70.

[259] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:722.

intelligimus divinam naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis).[260] Hence, it seems, the Lombardian definition of the divine essence is as simple as it can be, as it means the one indivisible and perfect being (*essentia*) or highest reality (*summa res*) that is shared by all Three Persons and, at once, is present in each of Them perfectly and fully. It is *what* the Triune God is, and *what* the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are, because in dist. 25, it is clearly said that when somebody asks, "God is three what?" (*quid tres vel quid tria*), there can be only one answer: Three divine Persons are their essence, that is, divinity. For it "is indubitably true that no one other thing is to be found there which those three are, except essence: for those three are one thing, that is, divine essence" (*Indubitabiliter verum est quia non invenitur unum aliquid quod illi tres sint nisi essentia: unum enim sunt illi tres, id est essentia divina*).[261] God's "what" is God's essence.

On the other hand, Peter Lombard differentiates between many possible meanings of *persona* (see dist. 25), but affirms that, when used in singular, like in the phrase "God is a person" or "God the Father is a person," *persona* is predicated "according to substance" (*secundum essentiam dici, secundum substantiam dicitur*) and thus means essence (*essentia divina*), and when used in plural, like in the phrase "three persons" or "the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are persons," *persona* is predicated in a "translated" or "metaphorical" sense (*translatum est hoc nomen*) and means a subsistence, a being, or a hypostasis (*tres subsistentiae vel tres entes; subsistentias, vel hypostases*).[262] Hence, the term means something like "metaphorically" independent or intellectually distinguishable existences or realities *of* one undivided Godhead.

Nevertheless, in general, Peter Lombard understands the term *persona* as applied to God negatively and defines it through what it does *not* say about the Trinity. In dist. 24, cap. 1, no. 5 he writes: "when we say that 'the persons are plural,'

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[260] *Sent*. 1, dist. 5, cap. 1, no. 1. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:30; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:81.

[261] *Sent*. 1, dist. 25, cap. 2, no. 4. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:137; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:193.

[262] *Sent*. 1, dist. 25, cap. 1-2. The quotations are taken, especially, from: Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:136; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:192–193.

we exclude singleness and solitude, but do not posit diversity or multiplicity there… when we say several persons or plurality of persons, we exclude an understanding of singleness and solitude" (*cum dicimus 'plures esse personas', singularitatem atque solitudinem excludimus, non diversitatem vel multiplicitatem ibi ponimus… cum dicimus plures personas vel pluralitatem personarum, singularitatis et solitudinis intelligentiam excludimus*). Yet, Master Peter concedes that it is appropriate to say, together with Hilary, that the profession of triune God is the profession of "partnership" in God (*Hilarius in IV libro De Trinitate… nomine consortii pluralitatem significavit; professio ergo consortii est professio pluralitatis*).[263]

Thus, for the Lombard, the divine Persons have to be understood, in Marcia Colish's formulation, through their "distinct properties which can be viewed as relations, especially paternity, filiation, and procession."[264] They are constituted by paternity belonging to the Father who gives birth to the Son, generation, which is the way of the "appearance" of the Son, who has always been born from the Father (*semper natus de Patre*),[265] and by the procession which is the way of the "appearance" of the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son, because he is the mutual love of the Two (*amor est sive caritas sive dilectio Patris et Filii*).[266] Hence, the Three Divine Persons are determined by their unique properties or relations which do not compromise their unity: namely, by the Father's begetting (*unum Filium genuit*), the Son's filiation (*de Patris essentia natus est*), and the Spirit's procession (*de Patre Filioque procedit*).[267] These characteristics are indeed

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[263] *Sent*. 1, dist. 24, cap. 1, no. 5. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:131–32; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:188.

[264] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:144.

[265] *Dicamus ergo Filium natum de Patre ante tempora, et semper nasci de Patre, sed congruentius semper natum; et eundem fateamur ab aeterno esse et Patri coaeternum, id est auctori. Pater enim generatione auctor Filii est… Sent*. 1, dist. 9, cap. 4, no. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:109.

[266] *Sent*. 1, dist. 10, cap. 1, no. 2; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:110; see also the whole of dist. 10-12.

[267] *Sent*. 1, dist. 26, cap. 2, no. 2. And in the next paragraph Lombard summarizes this thesis based on Fulgentius' words: *Has proprietates designant nomina illa personarum, scilicet Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus, quae relativa sunt et ad se invicem dicuntur, quia notant rei ationes; quae non sunt Oeo accident ales, sed in ipsis personis ab aeterno sunt immutabiliter: ut non modo appellationes sint relativae, sed etiam ipsae relationes sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in personis, sint.* Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:198.

In later chapters and distinctions, he continues his thought and makes a few other crucial statements. In dist. 33, cap. 1, no. 4 Peter Lombard says that the three aforementioned properties not only are in the Three divine persons but also are the persons themselves, that is, God's very essence: *Fateamur ergo et proprietates esse in*

personal properties (*proprietates personarum*), also legitimately called notions or relations (*notiones sive relationes*) and signified by relative terms "Father," "Son" and "the Spirit [of Both]."[268] Unfortunately, Master Peter does not explain this paradoxical amalgam of personal uniqueness and full-fledged oneness in detail but prefers to slide away into apophaticism.[269]

The Son has been generated *by* the Father *from* the Father's substance and the Spirit has proceeded *from* both the Father and the Son as persons and, also, *from* the Father's and the Son's substance (dist. 5, cap. 1, no.1, 12, 17). Peter Lombard is not happy with the reference to the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession from God's substance, albeit this formulation is supported by quotations from Augustine, Hilary of Poitiers, and Fulgentius of Ruspe. He is reluctant to pronounce a final judgment on the issue[270] but indicates how he interprets the thesis: for the Son to be "from" the Father's substance means having the same substance as the Father and being coeternal with him due to the fact that he is born from the Father; for the Spirit to be "from" the substance of the Father and the Son is also to have the same substance with the Both because of his procession from the Both.[271] Thus, Peter Lombard tries to explain clearly how there are Three persons in God who share one essence without ascribing any active role to that essence understood without an

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tribus personis, et ipsas esse personas atque divinam essentiam. And, finally, in the paragraph no. 10 of the same section the following conclusion is made: *Ideoque, licet paternitas et filiatio sint divina essentia, cum earn non determinent, non ideo potest dici quod divina essentia et generet et generetur, vel quod eadem res sit sibi pater et filius. Ita enim proprietas determinat personam, ut hac proprietate hypostasis sit generans, et ilia alia, hypostasis alia sit genita; et ita non idem generat et generatur, sed alter alterum.* Thus, each divine *persona* is determined by a certain unique property, but the properties do not destroy the essential unity of God. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:241, 243.

[268] *Iam de proprietatibus personarum videamus, quae etiam notiones sive relationes in Scriptura plerumque dicuntur. (...) alia proprietas sive notio est generatio, et alia nativitas, alia processio; quae aliis nominibus dicuntur paternitas, filiatio. (...) Has proprietates designant nomina illa personarum, scilicet Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus, quae relativa sunt et ad se invicem dicuntur, quia notant relationes; quae non sunt Deo accidentales, sed in ipsis personis ab aeterno sunt immutabiliter: ut non modo appellationes sint relativae, sed etiam ipsae relationes sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in personis, sint. Sent.* dist. 26, cap. 2, no. 1–3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:197–198.

[269] *His aliisque multis evidenter ostenditur nobis nullatenus licere maiestatem perscrutari, ius ponere potestati, modum circumscribere infinito. Sent.* dist. 33, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:244.

[270] He writes: *Vehementer movent nos haec verba; quae quomodo intelligenda sint, mallem ab aliis audire quam tradere. Sent.* 1, dist. 5, cap. 1, no. 17. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:86.

[271] 'Natura coaeterna de Deo est', id est Filius eoaeternus Patri de Patre est, ita quod est eadem cum eo natura, vel eiusdem naturae…'Filium esse de substantia Patris', quia est de Patre genitus, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae cum eo; et 'Spiritum Sanctum esse de substantia Patris et Filii', quia ab utroque procedit, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae. *Sent.* 1, dist. 5, cap. 1, no. 17. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:86, 87.

immediate reference to person(s). The essence does not generate the Son, nor spirates the Spirit, nor is generated or breathed out. It is always a divine Person that does it, with the essence being shared and had by all Three.

Now, the observations offered can help to sum up the Lombardian notion of Trinity's oneness and threeness and understand the following complex passage from dist. 25 which I cite in full:

> What is signified when we say three persons [is] namely three subsistencies, or three beings [i.e. three being ones], not three essences. … Thus we take persons differently from substance. So when we say "three persons," we do not, by the term person, signify essence there. What, then, do we say? We say that they are three persons, that is, three subsistences, namely three beings; for which the Greeks say three hypostases. … And this meaning is supported by the words of Augustine set out above, if they are understood more deeply: "For because the Father is a person," that is, an essence, "and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, so they are called three persons," that is, three subsistences, three beings [i.e. three being ones]. For they could not be called subsistences or beings, unless each of them were a person, that is, an essence. "And so, because being a person," that is, essence, "is common to them, so they are rightly called three persons," that is, subsistences or subsistents: so that, just as the essence which is common to them truly and properly is, so those three are understood to be truly and properly subsistences or beings. And so Augustine, differentiating the reasons for the aforesaid, says that "the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, but not from the same essence, lest it be thought that it is one thing there to be a person, another to be an essence." For the three persons, that is, subsistences, are one essence and of one essence; but they are not one person, or of one person, notwithstanding that person is sometimes said according to substance: for if we were to say this, there would be confusion in the persons.
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> (*Quid significetur cum dicitur tres personae: scilicet tres subsistentiae vel tres entes, non tres essentiae. … aliter ergo nos accipimus personas quam substantiam. Cum ergo dicimus "tres personas", non ibi personae nomine*

essentiam significamus. Quid ergo dicimus ? Dicimus quia tres personae sunt, id est tres subsistentiae, scilicet tres entes; pro quo Graeci dicunt tres hypostases ... Et hic sensus adiuvatur ex verbis Augustini praemissis si interius intelligantur: "Quia enim Pater est persona", id est essentia, "et Filius persona, et Spiritus Sanctus persona, ideo dicuntur tres personae", id est tres subsistentiae, tres entes. Non enim possent dici subsistentiae vel entes, nisi singulus eorum esset persona, id est essentia. "Quia ergo eis commune est id quod est persona", id est essentia, "ideo recte dicuntur tres personae", id est subsistentiae vel subsistentes: ut sicut essentia quae est eis communis vere ac proprie est, ita illi tres vere ac proprie subsistentiae vel entes intelligantur. Ideoque Augustinus, causas dictorum discernens, dicit "tres personas esse unam essentiam vel eiusdem essentiae, non ex eadem essentia, ne aliud intelligatur ibi esse persona, aliud essentia". Tres enim personae, id est subsistentiae, una sunt essentia et unius essentiae; non autem sunt una persona vel unius personae, licet persona secundum substantiam aliquando dicatur: nam si hoc diceretur, confusio fieret in personis.)[272]

The passage encapsulates the Lombard's reading of Augustine and rendering of the orthodox Christian Triadology. The Triune God is one person (*persona*) and each divine Person is a person (*persona*) in terms of what he is. He is God, that is, one and indivisible substance (*substantia*) or divine essence, "being-ness" (*essentia*). But the Persons of the Triune God are three persons (*tres personae*) in terms of *who* he is. That is, each divine Person is the "being one," "that who is being" (singular *ens*, plural *entes*) or, alternatively, subsistence (singular *subsistentia*, plural *subsistentiae*) and "the subsisting one," "the existing one" (singular *subsistens*, plural *subsistentes*). But, still, these are translated, imprecise terms. The Three Persons are not different or separable from the one essence (by) which they are and of which they are (*tres personae una sunt essentia et unius essentiae*). The essence is Three Persons and is in

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[272] *Sent.* 1, dist. 25, cap. 2, no. 2-3. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:136; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:192–193. The quotations from Augustine are taken from *De Trinitate* 5, cap. 9, no. 10, and 7, cap. 6, no. 11; cap. 4, no. 7-8.

Three Persons. There is no ontic or "real" difference between God's essence and God's Persons as Gilbert of Poitiers supposed. In commenting on Augustine's theses, Peter Lombard insists that each divine *persona* is essence. Monagle aptly summarizes his point: "Here Peter Lombard, emphasized the importance of maintaining a conceptual separation between the persons and the uno qua.edam summa res. While the persons were in identity with the *una quaedam summa res spiritually*, he maintained that they ought to be kept separate *conceptually* in order to avoid error, in this case relating to issues of generation. This was a faint, but nonetheless distinct, departure from Augustine."[273]

I do not know what she means by "spiritually", but assume it is an ontological category. In this case, God's *being* cannot be divided in parts but we have to apply to this mysterious highest being the two-edged terminology of personhood and "essence-hood." In other words, God is God, God is one, God is three-in-one. But his essence should be regarded as God's *what* and his Threeness of Persons as God's *who*. Yet, ontologically speaking, the "who" is also the "what" and vice versa. Every "who" is also "what," and all three "who" are the same "what".

Therefore, as Master Peter insists, we need to use consistent terminology. God should be said to be one nature, substance, or essence, and three persons or subsistences. Yet, a careful theologian should remember all the subtleties and master the conceptual depth of this notion of the Trinity.

3.1.2. Divine will and modalities within the realm of the Trinitarian relations

The Lombard also carefully includes the notion of divine will and other attributes into his Triadological discussion. For example, he plainly denies that the generation of the Son—and, I would add, by extension, the procession of the Holy Spirit—happens willingly or unwillingly (*volens vel nolens*) or by necessity (*necessitate*).[274] Taking his stand with Augustine, Hilary, and Paul Orosius, the Lombard states that the Trinitarian relations—which are not Aristotelian predicables

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[273] Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 2013, 65, italics mine.
[274] *Sent.* 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 1.

but real "eternal relations"[275]—are constituted by God's very nature and with the participation of his will because his nature is identical with his will (*voluntas eius eadem divina essentia est*).[276] Yet, this willing is of a special kind: there is neither antecedent or efficient willing (*voluntatem praecedentem vel accedentem, voluntate praecedenti vel efficienti*) nor necessity (*necessitate*) in the trinitarian constitution of the Godhead. Rather, we need to say this:[277]

> For he is not God by a preceding or efficient will, or willing [before] being God; nor did he beget the Son by a preceding or concomitant will, nor did he beget the Son by willing before begetting. And yet he was willing when he begot, just as he was powerful, good, wise, and suchlike, when he begot. (…) For just as it is the same for God to be willing as to be God, so it is the same to be wise as to be God. And so let us say that the Father, as he was wise when he generated the Son, so was he also willing, but not by a preceding or concomitant will.
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> (*Non enim ipse est Deus voluntate praecedenti vel efficienti, vel volens prius quam Deus; nec voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti genuit Filium, nec prius volens quam generans genuit Filium. Volens tamen genuit, sicut potens genuit, et bonus genuit, et sapiens genuit, et huiusmodi. (…) cum ita sit Deo idem esse volentem quod est esse Deum, sicut idem est esse sapientem quod est esse Deum. — Dicamus ergo quia Pater, sicut sapiens, ita volens genuit Filium, sed non voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti.*)

Thus, Peter Lombard highlights the unchanging and coeternal nature of the Trinity of the divine persons but admits that the divine will plays a role in this process. The Trinity is the Trinity neither willingly, nor unwillingly, but by nature *and* also with the will willing it. Yet, any compulsion that is implied by the notions of necessity and antecedent or preceding will is totally excluded. Hence, here the Lombard seems to equate being compelled by something, which is inapposite for

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[275] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:124–25.

[276] *Sent*. 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 3 (resp.).

[277] *Sent*. 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 4. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:40; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:90–91.

God, with being willed antecedently and being generated by necessity. The quotation from Hilary he uses to close this discussion in dist. 6 confirms this suggestion. It says: "the Father was not compelled against his will nor was he unwillingly induced by a necessity of nature, to generate the Son" (*Non enim nolente Patre coactus Pater, vel naturali necessitate ductus cum nollet, genuit Filium*).[278] Hence, here is the denial of natural necessity *qua* compulsion, which should be paired with the inappropriateness of the notion of antecedent will as applied to the filiation of the Son, and the acceptance of another type of will that remains undefined.

Although the Lombard says nothing of the origin of this distinction, it sounds reminiscent of the Anselmian definition of necessity as coercion and restraint (*coactionem vel prohibitionem*)[279] and antecedent necessity (*necessitas praecedens*) as the causal compulsion, the necessity that "causes the event to occur" (*facit rem esse*).[280] Anselm of Canterbury totally excludes the *external necessity as compulsion* from his theology proper but leans to something like *internal necessity* wherein all God's acts are caused by his unnecessitated will (albeit the very term "voluntas" is not mentioned in the cited passage) and, in a sense, his immutable nature.[281]

In *Cur Deus homo* II, 10 and, additionally, in the unfinished "Lambeth Fragments" (also called "Philosophical Fragments"),[282] Anselm clarifies a few just-

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[278] *Sent*. 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:91; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:40–41.

[279] Anselmus Cantuariensis, "De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio," in *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, vol. 2 (Romae, 1940), 246–247.

Hereafter in this chapter, it is referred to in the following manner: DC (title = *De Concordia*) I (book), 1 (paragraph) and, additionally, S. II (the indication of Schmitt's volume): 246–247 (pages).27 (line).

[280] DC I, 3. S. II: 250.22-23.

[281] Courtenay expresses this thought in the following manner: "The only thing that binds or forces God to act in a particular way, the only kind of necessity that determines divine action, is the necessity that results from God's promise to act, a promise enforced by the consistency of God's nature and will, his integrity and sense of honor owing to himself, first of all, but also owed to those to whom the promise is made." Although Courtenay's idea of "enforcement" is not clear at all, he seems to catch the spirit of Anselm's argument quite well. William J. Courtenay, "Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God," in *Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 55.

[282] Anselmus Cantuariensis, "Cur deus homo," in *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, vol. 2 (Romae, 1940), 37–133; Anselm of Canterbury, "Why God Became Man," in *The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and Gillian Rosemary Evans, trans. Janet Fairweather (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 260–356; Anselm of Canterbury, "Why God Became a [God-]Man (Cur Deus Homo)," in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis, MN: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 295–389; Franciscus Salesius Schmitt and Anselm of Canterbury, *Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des Hl. Anselm von Canterbury*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXIII, 3 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1936); Anselm of Canterbury, "The Anselmian

mentioned terms. He makes it clear that properly predicated (*proprie dicitur*) necessity implies either external compulsion (*coactio*) or external prevention (*prohibitio*), and I would call it the Anselmian *proper necessity*.[283] This is what Augustine calls the "compelling necessity" (*cogens necessitas*)[284] and later scholastics and some contemporary Anselmian scholars identify as the physical necessity:[285] something is necessary, in this sense, if the agent's actions or movements are ultimately caused or forced by an external cause. However, this is not the necessity ascribed to God's volitions and acts. His is the necessity of internal fittingness and immutability which is the necessity improperly called so (*improprie dicitur necessitas*). This is the Anselmian *improper necessity*.[286]

Interestingly, Anselm also speaks of the subsequent necessity (*necessitas sequens*) which "does not compel anything to occur" (*nihil cogit esse*) but grants that what is the case is indeed the case.[287] "For, — as he puts it, — there is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a thing's being the case; and there is a necessity which succeeds and is caused by the thing's being the case. When the heavens are said to revolve because it is necessary for them to revolve, then this is a necessity which precedes and efficiently causes. But when I say that because you are speaking, you are—necessarily—speaking, this is a necessity which is subsequent and does not

Miscellany at Lambeth MS. 59," in *Memorials of St. Anselm*, ed. Richard W. Southern and Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (London: Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1969), 333–54; Anselm of Canterbury, "Philosophical Fragments," in *The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and Gillian Rosemary Evans, trans. Desmond Paul Henry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 475–501; Anselm of Canterbury, "Philosophical Fragments," in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis, MN: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 390–418.

Hereafter in this chapter, I cite the *Cur Deus homo* in the following manner: CDH I (book), 1 (paragraph) and, additionally, S. II (the indication of Schmitt's volume): 246–247 (pages).27 (line).

[283] In his *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 71–74; "Anselm on Modality," in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (Cambridge: University Press, 2004), 121, 125–27, Knuuttila regularly speaks of "proper and improper modalities" or their (im)proper "senses" and even once uses the term "improper necessity"to describe Anselm's modal notions but somehow does not call the properly ascribed necessity "proper necessity." In my view, it is a rather logical and helpful move.

[284] In *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, I.82. Quoted and translated in Lenka Karfíková, *Grace and the Will According to Augustine*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 115 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 320. See also Katherin A. Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," *Religious Studies* 40, no. 4 (2004): 415–35.

[285] Eileen F. Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; Springer Science+Business Media, 1981), 142; Willem J. van Asselt, Martin J. Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, "Introduction," in *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology*, ed. Willem J. van Asselt, Martin J. Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2010), 39.

[286] Anselmus Cantuariensis, CDH, S. II, 108.4–8.

[287] DC I, 3. S. II: 250.23-24.

efficiently cause anything but, instead, is caused" (*Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est ut sit res ; et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur caelum volvi, quia necesse est ut volvatur ; sequens vero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris*) (CDH II, 17).[288]

In other words, the truth-maker of any fact or proposition which is subsequently necessary is "the historical states of affairs" envisaged by God. For the subsequent necessity speaks of purely logical connection between terms and concepts and the impossibility of something's being the case when, or after, its being the case. In the former sense, it is the logical necessity or, particularly, the necessity of logical entailment, in the latter, it is the necessity in the sense of immutability. As succinctly put by S. Knuuttila, "[w]hen something is called necessary in the sense of subsequent necessity, there is no reference to such a constraint but only to the fact that nothing can affect its being the case."[289]

Additionally, Anselm's theory of modalities has more than one "improper sense" of necessity.[290] Subsequent necessity is certainly an improper necessity. It is defined as the "caused" (*fit*) necessity which "follows" (*sequens*) the actual event's happening. Antecedent necessity entails subsequent one, but the reverse does not obtain: the subsequent necessity does not imply the antecedent one and, therefore, may exist separately. It is to be found in all propositions of the type "if *p*, then *p*," as in, for example, "you necessarily speak, because you speak," or, in a modified form, "necessarily, if you speak, you speak." The pattern is clear:

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[288] Anselm of Canterbury, "Why God Became a [God-]Man," 379; Anselmus Cantuariensis, CDH, S. II, 125.8–11.

[289] Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," 122. See also some observations in: Rostislav Tkachenko, "An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man's Freedom in His *De Concordia*," *Sententiae* 32, no. 1 (2015): 6–35, https://doi.org/10.22240/sent32.01.006; Ростислав Ткаченко, "Бог і необхідність: Концепція необхідного у Аристотеля та Ансельма Кентерберійського," *Філософська думка*, no. 5 (Аристотель і аристотелізм) (2016): 56–64; Ростислав Ткаченко, "Концепція необхідного у Аристотеля та Ансельма Кентерберійського," в *Аристотель: традиція, адаптація, переклад*, ред. Олексій Панич (Київ: Дух і літера, 2017), 93–135.

[290] Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 125ff, 142–43.

Necessarily, if x is F, x is F.[291]

In this case, it is possible to understand necessity as merely logical, whose function is to signify unavoidable semantic or logical connection between the terms, concepts and propositions.[292] Here the subsequent necessity serves as a perfect illustration for and an application of the law of identity ($A = A$) and the law of non-contradiction ($A \neq non\text{-}A$). It defines identity or, in rare cases, inclusion, and fits the formula of the kind "x is x" or, in more detail, "for all p, if p, then [necessarily] p."[293] But, most importantly, the subsequent necessity implies the operation of logical entailment (Vos' implicative necessity[294]): the necessity operator refers to the implication itself and means that *if* the event happens, *then* the event happens. What is modalized is the connection between the antecedent and the consequent of the implication: neither of them taken alone is necessary but the consequent necessarily follows from the antecendent if the antecedent obtains. Formally,

$$N \, (p \rightarrow q).$$

Peter Lombard does not name here these two Anselmian types of necessity, but his argument seems to exclude precisely one type from the Trinitarian relations (antecedent will or necessity = antecedent necessity or causal compulsion) and allow for another type (a "not antecedent" will = subsequent necessity). Moreover, his argumentation possibly implies the necessity of entailment. The quote from dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 4, states that it is not the case that the Father's will causes the birth of the Son, "yet he was willing when he begot" (*Volens tamen genuit*). This can be

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[291] Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, "Anselm on Truth," in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 159.

[292] This is the position found in, e.g., Desmond Paul Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 177–80; Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, *Anselm*, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 158–61. Courtenay inheres to a very similar view, when he twice defines consequent necessity as that which "simply describes" a present action or "results from" it: Courtenay, "Necessity and Freedom," 57–58.

[293] Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm*, 179; Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 142; Visser and Williams, *Anselm*, 158–60.

[294] Antonie Vos, "Paul Helm on Medieval Scholasticism," *Journal of Reformed Theology* 8, no. 3 (2014): 266, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-00803003; Antonie Vos, *The Theology of John Duns Scotus*, Studies in Reformed Theology 34 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), 62, 77, 133.

interpreted as the implication: "if he begot, then he was willing to beget." It is impossible for a divine person to do something without his will being involved. But then what is highlighted here is the logical and essential connection between two intra-trinitarian acts. So it seems that the description of the divine willing which takes part in the Father's generation of the Son is parallel to Anselm's subsequent necessity and should be called the "subsequent" will.

In any case, the triadology of the *Sentences* states the Trinity of divine persons is constituted by essential yet unique properties with the participation of the not-antecedent ("subsequent") will of God. Thus, the very first sections of the Lombard's *chêf-d'oeuvre* refer to the divine will and allude to his knowledge, showing their connection with the triune nature of God,[295] but the deep treatment of these issues is postponed to the closing chapters of the Book 1 – the establishing of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity *qua* Trinity has a priority over the discussion of divine attributes looked through the lens of unity of the Godhead.

Nonetheless, Peter Lombard obviously connects God diverse attributes with his simple essence and, in dist. 8, says that these various properties or qualities are indeed identical with God's substance. Since God's essence is simple, it must have "no diversity or change or multiplicity of parts, or accidents, or of any other forms" (*nec partium, nec accidentium, seu quarumlibet formarum ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo*).[296] But then any attribute ascribed to God—like divine knowledge, will, power, etc.—is identical with his essence and must be regarded as such. After all, "in God there is nothing which is not God" (*non est in Deo aliquid quod non sit Deus*).[297] This might be called a "trinitarian essentialist" approach to the doctrine of God and it is from this perspective that the Lombard analyzes the "mechanisms" of God's knowledge and will in the last part of the First Book of the *Sentences*.[298]

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[295] E.g. *Sent*. 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no. 3.

[296] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:98.

[297] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 8, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:101; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:50.

[298] Fuller analyses of the Lombard's triadology is to be found in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:119-131, 245–63; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 73–92.

3.2. God's attributes: the structure of the Lombard's exposition

As the structure of Book one reveals, Peter Lombard builds the last third of the text around the discussion about three crucial divine attributes, God's knowledge, power (potency), and will. Distinctions 35-48 (e.g. 18 out of 48 distinctions or "sections" of the text) treat these topics from various angles and with references to different patristic texts, and the unidentified twelfth-century thinkers. The questions pertaining to the doctrine of God's knowledge find their place in distinctions 35-41 or, as the work was divided initially, chapters 150-180; the Lombardian doctrine of God' power (potency) is contained in distinctions 41-44 or chapters 181-189; the discussion of the doctrine of God's will is by and large found in distinctions 45-48 or chapters 190-210.

Master Peter's thought moves in the following direction. Firstly, in distinction 35 (chapters 150-157) he gives some basic definitions of God's wisdom, knowledge, predestination, and providence. Then, in the following two distinctions (36-37, chapters 158-172) he tries to explain how things are present in the omniscient God, and how omniscient God is present in the created things. After it, the Lombard devotes two more distinctions (38-39, chapters 173-178) to the topic of "capacities" of God's knowledge and asks, whether it can err, change, know something "anew," or cause things. Having answered these questions, the author of the *Book of Sentences* turns his attention to another age-old dispute and delves into the nature of predestination and reprobation as they relate to God's knowledge and power: distinctions 40-41 (chapters 179-183) provide some food for thought in this regard. The question about God's power and a possibility for man to be saved or damned logically leads to a discussion about God's omnipotence: what does being all-powerful mean for God? what is he really capable of? can he act otherwise than he does? can he do better than he does? how is his will related to his power? All these difficult issues are raised in the distinctions 42-44 (chapters 184-189). Finally, the last cluster of book sections deals with the topic of God's will: distinctions 45-46 (chapters 190-203) speak about the nature of the divine will taken in itself while

distinctions 47-48 (chapters 204-210) concentrate more on the relationship between God's will and human will. This is the overall plan of Peter Lombard's treatment of the mystery of God's knowledge and will.

This is the organizational order Master Peter chooses for his text, and this is going to be the order I proceed further. If one is to understand the author's thought correctly, it is crucial to follow the flow of authorial arguments as much as possible. This is why I pay so much attention to the way the Lombard proceeds with his theology proper. The structure of his work and, particularly, of Book one reveals his understanding of how theology—doctrinal and philosophical—should be done and lets one see both traditional orthodoxy and philosophical nuances of the Lombardian thought.

3.3. Summary

A preliminary study of Book one of the *Sentences*, its structure, and its triadological sections, shows the following.

Firstly, Peter Lombard approaches the topic of divine attributes through the lens, and only after the treatment of, the divine Trinitarian essence. Such attributes as God's will or God's knowledge cannot hang on in the air or be analyzed purely dialectically. They are aspects or "sides" of one, perfect, and simple divine essence which is called "one and the highest reality" (*una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia*). This essence or substance is God's very being or *what* God is. God is God, and this is it, this is his essence. And whatever is in God must be God, because "in God there is nothing which is not God." This is the doctrine of God's simplicity in a nutshell. From this perspective, any divine attribute is identical with what God is, with his essence. But what is, then, the difference between the various attributes the Christians ascribe to God? The answer to this question is reserved for later as the Lombard postpones his dealing with the "theology of God's attributes" for subsequent chapters.

Secondly, the notion of one essence cannot exhaust the doctrine of God. God is his essence and his essence is fully, equally, and unfathomably in the Three divine Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The *personae* are explained in terms

of subsistencies or "the ones" who subsist and exist. They are those who are (*entes, subsistentes*). This threeness is interpreted through the traditional grid of relations. The Trinity of Persons is the trinity constituted by eternal and actual relations of paternity, filiation, and spiration. Thus, in God, we see one simple being or essence which is in, within, and through Three Persons who constitute each other and are connected to each other in the network of relations. Or, in God, we see Three Persons who are essentially related to each other by their respective relations and subsist *as* one essence.

This is complex teaching that Peter Lombard seems to encapsulate in his *Sentences*. This teaching is partly inherited from Augustine, Boethius, and other authorities of old, partly formed as a development of and a reaction to more recent trinitarian theories of Anselm, Roscelin, Gilbert, Abelard, Hugh, and other masters of the twelfth century. But what is important about the Lombard's contribution is how he tries to express the orthodox doctrine by means of—traditionally or newly—used concepts which come not from theology but from the realm of philosophy and dialectic. He uses not only quite expected notions of "substance," "essence," and "persons," but also those of "subsistence," "subsistent," "being ones." And he wants to navigate through this tapestry of terms in order to reach the safe ground. On one hand, he does this through avoidance of philosophical discussions and sophisticated definitions. He simply equates substance to essence and both to nature, basically shows that persons are to be properly understood as relative terms signifying relations within the Godhead while other "meanings" of *personae* are only metaphorical, translated, and flights philosophically charged distinctions. But, on the other hand, he still appeals to philosophical notions, does not shy away from definitions, and, when defining something, wants to be as concise and precise as possible.

In brief, Peter Lombard does not do philosophy. He prefers thinking and writing as a faithful church theologian. But his expression of the accepted doctrines reveals his capacity to interact with philosophical concepts and his care in their interpretation and application. The Lombard's language even shows some shadow of possible familiarity with the Anselmian or Boethian modal notions, but so far the evidence

cannot induce one to fully embrace such a claim. Nonetheless, one cannot escape the obvious conclusion that Master Peter *does* understand and use such a complex modal notion as necessity (meaning compulsion and coercion). He overtly contrasts it with things that happen voluntarily, by choice, and says that in the trinitarian relations there is no place for an antecedent, that is, a compelling, necessity. He clarifies the doctrine of the Trinity by means of a number of philosophical notions and, thus, his Triadology demonstrates that his dogmatic theology is also philosophical theology.

Now, after having briefly looked at some basic theological assertions and the organizational structure of the *Sentences* 1, distinctions 35-48, it is time to proceed to the text itself. I will present each distinction, examine its key theses, and draw conclusions about Peter Lombard's position as it clearly shines through the text itself. In the end, I will summarize his theology of God's knowledge, potency, and will, and try to come to grips with the Lombardian philosophical theology of God's attributes.[299]

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[299] I will not discuss in detail the other thinkers' influence that Lombard had experienced and unavoidably reflected in these chapters his *opus magnum*. But it is worth noting that he heavily relied on Augustine and Augustinian tradition and borrowed many things from Hugo of St. Victor and the author of *Summa sententiarum*, while selectively using even the achievements of Peter Abelard and some nominalists. Find more details on this issue in the following works: Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard"; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy"; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:268–302; de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard, DTC," 1993–94; de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, 135ff; Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 1957, Band 2:371–87; Larson, "From One Master to Another"; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 262–67.

4. Peter Lombard's doctrine of God's knowledge[300]

4.1. Distinction 35: introducing the divine knowledge[301]

For the Lombard, God's knowledge is one of the essential divine properties (*quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur*).[302] In fact, he identifies the knowledge of God with the wisdom of God: they are one and the same thing so that one is allowed to speak of "God's wisdom or knowledge" (*sapientia vel scientia Dei*).[303] Such a conclusion follows from the Lombardian trinitarian essentialist approach to the doctrine of God and, thus, entails the conviction that the divine properties, like knowledge or power, are considered in relation to God's Trinitarian essence. Concerning the doctrine of God's knowledge, it means the following.

God's knowledge is identical to God's wisdom, and both are the one and the same property. Moreover, since God is absolutely simple—meaning that his essence has no parts, accidents, diversity, or multiplicity but is perfectly whole[304]—his properties such as knowledge, simplicity, or power "inhere, coincide with God's essence."[305] In other words, ontically God is one and indivisible, albeit He *is* three persons, and his various "qualities" are actually the linguistic and conceptual significations, which refer to some aspects of the same nature *as it relates to something external for God* and *as we see it manifested*. This nature is so perfect, multifaceted, and immense that it is inevitable to use a range of terms and ideas to describe it to a certain extent. This is, basically, the explanation of why we speak of multiple divine attributes, although his essence is utterly simple and indivisible.

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[300] An earlier version of the fragments of the following text (dealing with distinctions 35-36, 38-39) has been previously published in a form of two articles. They have been updated and slightly reworked since publication. See Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Knowledge"; Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Knowledge and Its Capacities."

[301] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:254–258; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:597–98; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:193–97; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:597–98.

[302] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 1, no. 1.

[303] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 1, no. 1; cap. 6 (or cap.1-6, no. 2 according to an alternative numeration).

[304] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 3. Cf. a brief but clear definition given by Bertola, which I in fact used: "Soltanto dopo le considerazioni sull'immutabilità di Dio, il Lombardo esamina l'attributo della semplicità, intendendo per semplicità la esclusione di parti, di accidenti, di diversità o variabilità o moltitudine." He also adds an explanation: "Che l'attributo di semplicità sia in senso assoluto proprio di Dio è una affermazione che troviamo varie volte ripetuta dai teologi del XII secolo. La semplicità è un concetto che nell'uso comune può avere vari significati, specialmente se applicato a Dio o alle creature." Bertola, "Il problema di Dio," 142.

[305] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 78.

Peter Lombard solves this conundrum semantically by distinguishing between the signification and the signified: God's nature is the latter and our notions of the divine attributes are the former. He states: "Here it is to be diligently noted why, although Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, yet he says that God is called in many ways… due to the diversity and multitude of names which are used about God. Although the names are manifold, yet they signify one thing, namely the divine nature" (*Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Augustinus, solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat eundem multipliciter dici. Sed hoc… propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum, quae de Deo dicuntur; quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam*).[306] Thus, there is only one signified object—God's essence—and several significations ascribed to it by other nouns or adjectives.

At the same time, on the metaphysical plane, Peter adds that these names are not just terms or deliberately picked ideas in the human mind – they are words that signify God's essence *qua* connected to "the varying states of things and (its) different effects" (*varios status rerum et diversos effectus*).[307] It means that although the *essentia Dei* is absolutely one, yet it acts differently, interacts with different things or objects, and, thus, obviously discloses its own richness of being and manifoldness of its activity. God relates himself to the world and acts in the world. As a result, the different objects and effects of his involvement—together with the theological reasoning based on the idea that God is the only true Being[308]—require a number of terms and concepts to rightly express what is going on. Hence, the Lombard explains the diversity of the attributes of God on two levels: on the level of

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[306] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:148; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:48.

[307] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 1, no.1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:254–55; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:597; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:194.

Silano's translation of the phrase "varios status rerum et diversos effectus" reads: "the varying states of things and *their* different effects" (italics mine), while Bugnolo has here: "the various states of things and (*its*) [that is, God's Knowledge's] diverse effects" (*italics mine*). I see no grammatical or theological necessity to agree with Silano's version and think that Bugnolo's reading is more correct: God's essence in general and knowledge, in particular, does not have to be concerned with the created thing's actions and effects in order to be named or described. Rather, God can have a kind of interaction with those things wherein he is the one who produces "the various effects."

[308] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 1, no. 2-3, 6-7. See also: Bertola, "Il problema di Dio," 139, 141; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 79.

language and logic (here properties are *names*) and on the level of metaphysics and ontology (here properties are *real relations, real actions, and real qualities*, just like in the earlier-formulated trinitarian theology[309]).

It is a good example of the terminist logic and complex thinking that developed in the middle ages. As L. M. de Rijk rightly summarizes this phenomenon,

> Thought was considered to be linguistically constrained by its very nature; thought and language were taken to be related both to each other and to reality in their elements and their structure. In the final analysis, language, thought, and reality were considered to be of the same logical coherence. Language was taken to be not only an instrument of thought, expression, and communication but also in itself an important source of information regarding the nature of reality. In medieval thought, logico-semantic and metaphysical points of view are, as a result of their perceived interdependence, entirely interwoven.[310]

When it comes to the doctrine of God's knowledge per se, it appears that this notion not only designates a specific aspect of the same divine essence but also implies a number of subaspects of the *scientia Dei*. In particular, it is called and can be understood as "simple" knowledge, foreknowledge, disposition, predestination or providence. Each of these aspects refers to, and concerns, a specific action of God:[311]

- foreknowledge or foresight (*praescientia sive praevidentia*) is the knowledge that "concerns only future things, but all of them, namely good and evil ones" (*de futuris tantum, sed de omnibus: de bonis scilicet et malis*);
- disposition (*dispositio*) is the aspect of divine knowledge that "concerns things that are to be done" (*de faciendis*);

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[309] See sections 3.1 and 3.3. above and, also, *Sent*. 1, dist. 27-28, 33.

[310] Lambertus Marie de Rijk, "The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 161. Cf. also Lambertus Marie de Rijk, Logica Modernorum*: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962).

[311] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 1, no. 2-6 (or cap. 1-6, no. 2 according to the alternative numeration). Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:255; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:94. Cf. Colish, "'Discipline' and 'Science,'" 180–81.

- predestination (*praedestinatio*) is the knowledge of "all who are to be saved, as well as the good things by which these are freed in this life and will be crowned in the future" (*de hominibus salvandis, et de bonis quibus et hic liberantur et in futuro coronabuntur*); it implies the act of election and that of preparation of some goods for those predestined;

- providence (*providentia*) is the aspect of knowledge "concerned with governance" (*gubernandorum*), which sometimes can be similar either to disposition (when it deals with God's active involvement with the world), or to foreknowledge (when it is taken for its literal meaning – *pro-videre*, "see beforehand");

- wisdom or "simple" knowledge (*sapientia vel scientia*) is the knowledge of "all things: namely good and evil, and present, past, and future, and not only temporal things, but also eternal ones" (*de omnibus est: scilicet bonis et malis, et de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, et non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis*).

Thus, divine knowledge is indeed manifold. But it is interesting that under this rubric the Lombard lists not only the qualities that have been traditionally associated with strictly cognitive abilities (knowledge, wisdom, foreknowledge) but also the properties that could have been put under a different "umbrella doctrine"– that of divine will (providence, predestination, disposition). However, he lists all of them in his distinction dedicated to wisdom, thus following Honorius Augustodunensis and the author of *Summa sententiarum*, and loading the doctrine of God's knowledge with much meaning.[312] Moreover, if we turn to distinction 6, we will find there an

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[312] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:285. Here Colish even theorizes that the rationale for doing that is pretty practical, for Master Peter must have recognized "that it is easier to annex to this mode of analysis the related questions concerning God's causation than it would be if one tried to cover the necessary ground under the heading of His will or power." This explanation is possible but not necessarily true. But our task is not to try to figure out the hidden motivation of the author, but to decode the meaning of his text.

interesting comment on the essential oneness of God's cognitive and voluntary properties:[313]

> For the knowledge or foreknowledge of God, by which be knows or foreknows good and evil events, is the divine nature or essence; and predestination, or his will, is the same divine essence; nor in God is it one thing to know or will, and another to be. And although God's knowledge and his will are one and the same, still not all that is said of his will is also said of his knowledge, and vice versa. Nor does God will by his own will all that he knows by his knowledge, since by his knowledge he knows both good and evil events, but by his will he only wills the good ones. Assuredly, God's knowledge and foreknowledge is of both good and evil things, but his will and predestination is only of the good ones, and yet in God knowledge and will are one and the same, as also are foreknowledge and predestination. Thus, although the nature and will of God are one, yet it is said that the Father generated the Son by nature, not by will, and that he is God by nature, not by will.

> (*Nam et praescientia Dei sive scientia, qua scit vel praescit bona et mala, divina natura sive essentia est; et praedestinatio sive voluntas eius eadem divina essentia est; nec est aliud Deo scire vel velle quam esse. Et cum sit unum et idem scientia Dei vel voluntas, non tamen dicitur de voluntate quid quid dicitur de scientia et e converso; nec omnia illa sua vol un tate Deus vult, quae sua sci entia scit, cum scientia sua noverit tam bona quam mala, voluntate autem non velit nisi bona. Scientia quippe Dei et praescientia de bonis est et malis, voluntas vero et praedestinatio de bonis est tantum; et tamen unum et idem est in Deo scientia et voluntas, et praescientia et praedestinatio. Ita, cum unum sit natura Dei et voluntas, dicitur tamen Pater genuisse Filium natura, non voluntate, et esse Deus natura, non voluntate.*)

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[313] *Sent*. 1, dist. 6, cap. 1, no 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:90; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:39–40.

Here we can discern the Lombard's rationale for the inclusion of what pertains to the will into his treatment of God's knowledge. On the one hand, both knowledge and will "merge" together because each of these properties *is* God's very nature or essence (*divina natura sive essentia*), so that when one considers the knowledge of the Trinity he considers its essence and when one speaks of the will of God he, again, speaks of the same undivided essence. On the other hand, the "predestination or his will" (*praedestinatio sive voluntas eius*) is obviously connected with the divine knowledge, for he knows what he wills and knows what he does not will. Thus, the scope of God's knowledge is wider than the scope of his actual willing and no doubt includes everything he wills or does not will. Moreover, the notion of God's will seems to mean God's active execution of the will, its use in taking the decisions, and nothing more. But the given definitions and basic explanations do not exhaust the Lombardian theo-epistemology and theo-gnoseology.

He continues and introduces the old idea of God's perfect awareness of absolutely everything. God "knows all things that are known" (*scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur*), which means that his mind, being eternal and being one with God's immutable and perfect essence, used to know and knows right now every single thing that was, is, or will be, whether in the eternity or in the temporal world. "Therefore from eternity, God knew eternity and all that was going to be, and he knew it immutably. He also knows past or future things no less than present ones" (*Scivit ergo Deus ab aeterno aeternum et omne quod futurum erat, et scivit immutabiliter. Scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura quam praesentia*).[314] Logically, by "all that is known" (*omnia quae sciuntur*) the Lombard must have meant everything *knowable* including the things that just can be, but the Italian theologian does not directly mention it, affirming only God's cognition of all actually *known* things.

He emphasizes the all-encompassing nature of Trinity's knowledge. Even if there had been no future or some other "segments" of the spatiotemporal continuum, his wisdom would still be perfect and exhaustive. But such theorizing about the

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[314] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:257; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:196.

possibility of the non-existence of the future raises a serious question,[315] for had there been no future, there could not have been such things as foreknowledge, predestination, and disposition. And Peter Lombard answers it again by means of the linguistic-metaphysical thinking (that is, terminist logic and speculative theology).

Metaphysically and theologically speaking, the question is about the fullness or completeness of the divine knowledge. And here the response must be simple: it is possible that there would be no future, "yet neither he nor his knowledge would be less thereby" (*non eo tamen ipse minus esset vel eius scientia*).[316] Linguistically or "terministically" speaking, the question is about the meaning of the terms "foreknowledge," "disposition," and "predestination," which refer to a very specific and non-contingent thing – God's knowledge. The double crucial thing here is that, firstly, behind every term, there is a *raison d'être* of its existence, which needs to be taken into consideration (*quia varia est ibi causa dicendi, distingui oportet rationem dicti*),[317] and, secondly, the just mentioned words are relative, that is, they are meaningful only when they are "said with regard to something" (*ad aliquid dici*).[318] Thus, the reason to speak of foreknowledge is that God is a knowing agent "related" to the future, and what is at stake here is not the fullness of his knowledge but the possible non-existence of the object of his action. If there is no future, the terms related to the future vanish, or at least they lose their meaning. Since they are relative and signify *relation*, it is inevitable. But since what is lost here is nothing but an object of God's activity, the divine agent and his abilities remain intact.

In other words, the relative terms such as *praescientia* or *praedestinatio* have a double reference: they indicate (a) the property of the agent who performs the described action—the divine knowledge or God as knower—and (b) the thing, which serves as object of the action, that is, the things "subject to his knowledge" (*ejus*

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[315] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:255–57; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:194–96.

[316] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 7, no. 6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:257; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:196.

[317] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 7, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:256.

[318] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 7, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:256; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:195.

scientiae… subjectae).[319] These idiosyncratic terms make sense and have meaning only when the double referring power is retained. But it might be retained if and only if the two referents of the term exist. When any one of them is lacking, the word loses its sense and cannot be used at all.[320] This linguistic-metaphysical distinction helps Master Peter to defend and clarify his thesis about the essential totality and perfection of God's cognition, which is entirely independent of the known objects, yet naturally connected to them if they exist or can exist. Quantitatively his knowledge could have been different (hypothetically); qualitatively it is always the same – full, exhausting, comprehensive. It is "the infinite reservoir of knowledge He possesses," as Colish dubs it. This is the double solution that the Lombard formulates for the posed question.[321]

It shows implicitly what will be laid out explicitly in the following distinctions: God is not dependent on and thus exists outside the temporal order.[322] His knowledge and he himself is eternal (*aeterna*), and therefore he knows what he knows eternally and immutably (*ab aeterno, immutabiliter*). Yet, the subject matter of his knowledge is double: it includes both eternal (*aeternum*) and temporal things (*quod futurum erat*), which means that his cognizing activity fully embraces (a) God himself as the *internal eternal thing* knowable to himself, (b) spiritual or angelic reality as the *external eternal object* of his *scientia*, and (c) the real world with its time-space continuum, (in)animate creatures, and all the events as the *external temporal object* of knowledge. Thus, the wisdom of God is as eternal as he himself, while the objects it acts upon can be either eternal (in two senses) or temporal.

Yet, there is something else important about this distinction of the *Book of Sentences*. The fact that God permanently and immutably knows absolutely

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[319] The wording is used in *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 7, no. 6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:257; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:196.

[320] Cf. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 265; Silano, "Introduction," xliii–xliv.

[321] Colish rightly acclaims such a double approach and aptly notes: "What is strikingly Lombardian about this whole analysis is Peter's success in finding a cogent substitute for the reduction of this problem to an exercise in formal logic. At the same time, he retains a philosophical no less than a theological perspective on it, by grounding the subject in the metaphysical distinction between God viewed in His transcendent essence and God viewed in those aspects of His being that He displays in His relations with other beings." Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:287.

[322] See *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:257; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:196. Cf. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:286.

everything and his knowledge is identical with his essence—notwithstanding the distinctions implied and employed—leads to a conclusion that the things known have always been and will be in God's essence. In other words, even "before these things were made, they were and were not: they were in God's knowledge, they were not in their own nature" (*Proinde antequam fierent, et erant, et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura*).[323] Such a thesis implies that God knows things not only as actualities of the past, present, or future but as potentialities, too, for he knows them before they become actual. Thus, the Lombard's "everything known" has been proven to include also everything knowable. But his words can also be interpreted as a statement about the knowable things' essential presence in God or their integration into the divine essence (*essentialiter sint in Deo*).[324] Does not this mean that God the knower and the things known then collide and merge together?

No, because, according to the twelfth-century master, what is meant here is the permanent presence of all the known things in God's knowledge (*in eius scientia semper sunt*), and not their being God himself.[325] No identification or mixture is implied here: what is known is not the same as knowing ability per se; therefore the things are not—and never can be—integrated with God's essence. Rather, they are but information or "virtual content" of the divine mind. Peter Lombard lacks words to express this idea clearly, but he employs a few helpful expressions, some of which are borrowed from Ambrose[326] and Augustine.[327] When it is said that God permanently and eternally knows everything, it means that every single thing is "present to him" (*ei praesentia*), is "in him or before him" (*in eo vel apud eum*), and "with him" (*cum illo*).[328] Hence, the things known *are* in God in the sense that they form the content of his knowledge, being the information—the "ideas"—known and not the essence knowing. As E. Bertola aptly expressed it, it means "to be in his

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[323] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 9, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:257–258; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:196–197.

[324] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 9, no. 1.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Ambrose, *De fide*, book 5, cap. 16, no. 36.

[327] Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 49, 11, no. 18; *De Genesi ad litteram*, 5, cap. 18, no. 36.

[328] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 9, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:258; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:197. Cf. *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 1.

presence and not in his essence" (*essere nella sua presenza, non nella sua essenza*).[329] It is hard to push this rather brief explanation further, since the Lombard does not go deep into details. Suffice it to say that he believes such an answer to be a good solution.

4.2. Distinction 36: describing the character of God's knowledge[330]

The question of the previous chapter leaves open an important distinction: are the things known by God only as *ideas* present to him and somehow contained inside his knowledge or also as *existing objects*?[331] Although the metaphysical part seems to be clearly presented and nailed down, the question of the mode of speaking remains: should one speak not only of the presence of things known to God but also of their existence in him – that is, in his essence? What is the right way to do a "God-talk" in this case?

The answer is entailed by the metaphysical structure presented above: from the true statements (a) "God's cognition is certainly his essence" and (b) "his presence, in which are all things, is his cognition", it does not follow (c) that therefore "all things which are in his presence or cognition should be said to be in his essence." Logically, it is formally tenable to make such a conclusion but the Lombard prefers theological and not strictly dialectical arguments. In metaphysical terms, the presented chain of thoughts is wrong because, firstly, it is impossible for anything that is not God to be in his essence, for his essence is he himself, and, secondly, the created things are better to be said to be in God *through* his essence, and not literally *in* his essence (*esse per essentiam, quod est divina*).[332] If the things known by God had been recognized as being in God's essence, then they could have been said to "be of the

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[329] Bertola, "Il Problema di Dio," 146.

[330] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:258–263; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:617–618; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:197–202; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:617–618.

[331] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:258–59; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:197–98.

[332] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:259; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:198.

same essence with him" (*esse eiusdem cum eo essentiae*),[333] which is impossible, since, as it was noted earlier, "in God there is nothing which is not God" (*non est in Deo aliquid quod non sit Deus*).[334] The known things cannot be in God literally because they are not and cannot be God himself. The ontic difference between God and everything else must be maintained.

Actually, in my estimation, this argument has a logical twist to itself as it is implicitly based on the law of non-contradiction: what is *A* cannot be not-*A*. If God is our *A*, and everything else is not-God, then, when we say that what is not-God is in fact in God and is identifiable with God, it amounts to a contradiction: non-*A* is *A*. But this is impossible and, consequently, such a conclusion does not obtain. Peter Lombard does not use formal logical argumentation here but he definitely knows the basic logical axioms and his thinking is reminiscent of them.

Thus, it has been established once again that the known things are but the information or content that is "virtually" in God's cognizing mind, and they are not really identical with God's nature. What God has (knowledge *of* something) is not what God is (knowledge *as* something – an aspect of God's nature).[335] It probably means that God knows the known things only as ideas or concepts is in God's knowledge but the Lombard is not fully clear in this regard.

But the *magister sententiarum* unfolds this problem even further and asks a more nuanced question: how there could be both good and evil things *in* God's knowledge, that is, his essence? For, indeed, even if everything known is present *to*, or *in*, God in the form of content of his wisdom, the good and the bad cannot be contained there in the same sense and measure. This is why, as the Lombard argues, only good things should be properly said to be in God (*esse in Deo*): he is their creator (*auctor*), and therefore they exist "through him" (*per ipsum*) and "from him" (*ex ipso*). So, it is logical to say that this type of things and events was and is in the

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[333] Ibid.

[334] *Sent*. 1, dist. 8, cap. 8, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:101; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:50.

[335] Cf. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:286.

mind of God in a full sense of the word.[336] Bad things are known as perfectly as good ones but there is a difference in what is meant by "knowing" here. The quantity is the same—full and exhaustive cognition—but the quality of the knowledge is different – "God does not know evil things entirely in the same way as good ones" (*non omnino ita noscit Deus mala ut bona*).[337]

Master Peter makes an interesting twist here and introduces a new distinction: that between knowledge as *pure or simple knowledge (noscit… tantum per scientiam)* and knowledge as knowledge with approbation and good pleasure attached (*noscit… etiam per approbationem et beneplacitum*).[338] The former is identified with awareness or acquaintance (*scientia, notitia tantum*),[339] which is analogously or metaphorically called the distanced or detached knowledge, the knowledge "from far away" (*quasi de longe*) on the basis of Ps. 137, 6: "And from far away, he knows high things." The latter has certain preeminence over this "awareness alone" and therefore must be dubbed the "near" or close knowledge (*prope*), since God is the creator and doer of good things, which originate in him.

Thus, it appears that there are two "qualities" or possible types of God's cognizing activity: (a) knowing or comprehending *alone* and (b) knowing or comprehending *plus* some kind of approval and pleasure. One could say, that the first type of action is cognitively full and devoid of affection and volition while the second is both cognitively and affectionally loaded: what is crucial here is an absence or presence of pleasure and willing activity on God's side. Peter Lombard evokes the authorities of Cassiodorus[340] and Augustine[341] and then repeats this dictum in the next paragraph as an established fact: "God knows good things in some way in which he does not know evil things. He knows both equally and in the same way as regards knowledge, but he knows good things also by approbation and good pleasure"

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[336] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:260; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:199.

[337] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:260; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:199.

[338] Ibid.

[339] See *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:277; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:215.

[340] Cassiodorus, *In Psalterium*, on Ps. 16, 16.

[341] Augustine, *Epistola 169 (Ad Evodium)*, cap. 1, no. 2.

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(*quodam modo cognoscit Deus bona, quo non cognoscit mala. Pariter quidem utraque eodemque modo noscit quantum ad notitiam, sed bona etiam approbatione et beneplacito cognoscit*).[342] It is not clear yet, whether the divine approval and pleasure are extra parts of the cognizing activity *per se* or they are "attachments" to knowledge belonging to the realm of actions of God's will. Nevertheless, the differentiation between two types of knowledge—that of what is essentially good and that of what is factually bad—is founded.

After it, the author of the *Sentences* closes up this section with a few clarifications about the knowledge of the good and bad things. He repeats that "be[ing] in God through the presence of cognition" (*esse propter cognitionis praesentiam*)[343] does not mean the essential presence. It is not the same as being actually and naturally *in* him (*in ipso*), that is, in his essence, or *of* him (*de ipso*), that is, from his essence. For it is true that everything that is of him (*de Deo*) as the direct author is also from God (*ex Deo*). But it is false, that everything that is from him is also of him.[344] In other words, God's knowledge does not function in isolation from God's other attributes, and when one speaks of God the knower, one also speaks of God the "willer" who (dis)approves or takes decisions or God the creator and governor who acts and causes things to happen.[345] Such a combination of qualities is again determined by the essential unity of the Trinity whose acts are indivisible, so that this kind of essentialism necessarily requires to retain the difference between the good and the bad as known and (not) performed by God. On the one hand, it helps to avoid any identification of the content of God's knowledge with God's essence, which would lead to pantheism;[346] on the other hand, it excludes any form of direct causation that could possibly be ascribed to the divine wisdom. Yet, the last idea will be explained by the Lombard later.

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[342] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 2, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:261; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:200.
[343] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 2, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:261; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:200.
[344] *Sent*. 1, dist. 36, cap. 2, no. 5; cap. 3, cap. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:261–263; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:200–202.
[345] See Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:286.
[346] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 80.

4.3. Distinction 37: approaching the mystery of the divine omnipresent and omniscient unchangeability[347]

In this distinction, Peter Lombard somewhat deviates from his epistemological theme under the auspices of theology proper and discusses the topic of God's presence in the created things and his (un)changeability. I will not present a detailed survey of all the problems he touches upon but will mention a few important contributions to the question investigated in this research.

First of all, it is worth noting that the Master of the *Sentences* highlights the relative and relational divine involvement in the affairs of the world, which does not influence his non-relative essence – and, by extension, his knowledge. God has always been, is, and will be present "in every place and in every time" (*in omni loco et in omni tempore*).[348] But this does not imply that he can be localized or circumscribed – rather, he is entirely unlocalized and uncircumsribable (*omnino inlocalis et incircumscriptibilis*).[349] He cannot move or be moved locally, since he has no physical dimensions and cannot be "put" into the box of space limits, for this is the nature of local change. Nor, by the same token, can he "become different according to the interior or exterior qualities which are in the very thing that is changed" (*variari secundum qualitates interiores vel exteriores quae sunt in ipsa re quae mutatur*), for this is the nature of the change through time (*mutari per tempus*).[350]

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[347] *Sent*. 1, dist. 37. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:263–275; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:632–636; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:202–212; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1: 632–636.

[348] *Sent*. 1, dist. 37, cap. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:270; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:208.

[349] *Sent*. 1, dist. 37, cap. 6, no. 1-2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:270; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:208.

[350] *Sent*. 1, dist. 37, cap. 6, no. 3; cap. 7, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:271; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:208–209. Lombard also adds a couple of words about the nature of time. According to him, a "change which happens according to time is a change of qualities which happens in the bodily or spiritual creature, and so it is called time" (*mutatio, quae fit secundum tempus, variatio est qualitatum quae fit in corporali vel spirituali creatura, et ideo vocatur tempus*) (cap. 7, no. 1). It is not a strict definition of time, but this phrase can still serve us as a statement about Lombard's own perception of the time per se.

It follows from this that his knowledge enjoys the same characteristics: it does not depend on time and space, remaining unlimited and not defined by the objects of its cognizing activity, even when these objects exist in certain times and certain places. It sounds as if God's knowledge functions from the outside of this spatiotemporal unity, which we call the universe. He is everywhere and at every point in time, and at the same time, he continues to be in his own divine eternity. Thus, it goes without saying that his essence—his knowledge included—pierces and penetrates everything, although the particular character of this "penetration" and all-encompassing cognizing "gaze" remains mysterious and unknown to us.[351] Yet, it is not a problem for a believer or a theologian, since there is a sufficient amount of the positive doctrinal content we can ponder and analyze: the Christian doctrine speaks of "God, existing ever unchangeably in himself, by presence, power, and essence [who] is in every nature or essence without limitation of himself, and in every place without being bounded, and in every time without change" (*Deus, incommutabiliter semper in se exsistens, praesenti aliter, potentialiter, essentialiter est in omni natura sive essentia sine sui definitione, et in omni loco sine circumscriptione, et in omni tempore sine mutabilitate*).[352] For the Lombardian theologian, it is enough.

4.4. Distinction 38: analyzing the causalities and possibilities of God's knowledge[353]

Now, that the needed clarifications have been made, Master Peter returns to the *loci communes* of the doctrine of God's knowledge and embarks on a triple discussion of (1) the allegedly causal character of the foreknowledge, (2) the

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[351] He says: "…an orderly progression would require that we also set out how he is present everywhere in his entirety through essence, if the sublimity and immensity of this subject were not wholly beyond the understanding of the human mind" (…*efflagitaret ordinis ratio id etiam assignari, quomodo ubique per essentiam et totus sit nisi huius considerationis sublimitas atque immensitas humanae mentis sensum omnino excederet*), and then hammers it with a quotation from John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, hom. 2, no. 1: "For example, we know and say that God is everywhere; but we do not grasp by our intellect how he is everywhere" (*Verbi gratia, quod ubique Deus est, scimus et dicimus; quomodo autem ubique sit, intellectu non capimus*). *Sent*. 1, dist. 37, cap. 3, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:267–268; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:206.

[352] *Sent*. 1, dist. 37, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:263; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:202.

[353] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:275–279; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:666–668; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:212–217; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:666–668.

mechanism and causes of the *scientia divina*, and (3) its supposed infallibility, granted rational creatures have free will. I will present the *Sentences'* interpretation of each of these questions in the order indicated.

Concerning the causation topic (1), Peter Lombard offers the classic theory of the causal power of divine foreknowledge. It seems, he says, that "God's foreknowledge is the cause of things subject to it and necessitates their coming into being because there would not be any future things if God had not foreknown them, and they cannot not come to pass once God has foreknown them. But if it is impossible for them not to come to pass because they have been foreknown, then the very foreknowledge by which they have been foreknown appears to be the cause of their coming to pass" (*Videtur enim praescientia Dei causa esse eorum quae ei subsunt ac necessitatem eveniendi eis facere, quia nec aliqua futura fuissent, nisi ea Deus praescisset; nec possunt non evenire, cum Deus ea praesciverit. Si autem impossibile est ea non evenire quia praescita sunt, videtur igitur ipsa praescientia qua praescita sunt eis esse causa eveniendi*).[354]

The crucial thing here is that God's necessary knowledge of future events seems to necessitate (*necessitatem facere*) their happening, which entails the inevitability of their happening and impossibility of their non-happening. The strict logical reasoning behind this scheme is well captured by John Marenbon in his discussion of the same problem as analyzed by Boethius,[355] although the argument itself must be traced back to Augustine:[356]

(1) God knows every event, including all future ones.

(2) When someone knows that an event will happen, then the event will happen.

(3) The proposition (2) is true as a matter of necessity, because it is impossible to know that which is not the case.

[354] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:275; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:213.

[355] Taken and partly adapted from John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2007), 43.

[356] Nico den Bok, "In vrijheid voorzien: Een systematisch-theologische analyse van Augustinus' teksten over voorkennis en wilsvrijheid," *Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie en Theologie* 56 (1995): 40–60.

(4) If someone knows an event will happen, it will happen necessarily, which is entailed by (2, 3).

(5) Every event, including future ones, happens necessarily, which is entailed by (1, 4).[357]

But Peter Lombard denies the conclusion without any actual dismantling of the philosophical-theological reasoning. Vice versa, he points out to the further implications of this line of thinking and applies the *reductio ad absurdum* method, so loved and frequently used by Anselm of Canterbury.[358] If the divine foreknowledge has causative power, then it leads to some "anomalies" (*inconvenientia*), the most important of which is the following: "But if this is so, then it is the cause of all evils, since all evil things are known and foreknown by God" (*Quod si ita est, est igitur causa omnium malorum, cum omnia mala sciantur et praesciantur a Deo*).[359] Hence, according to the Lombard, the propositions (1), (2) and (4) lead to new theses, presented in cap. 1, no. 5:[360]

(6) Both good and evil things and events will happen necessarily, as entailed by (5).

(7) Therefore, God's knowledge and foreknowledge of all events causes and necessitates evil things, which is implied by (1, 4, 6).

(8) Consequently: God is the author and doer of evil things (*Deus auctor malorum*).

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[357] In Peter's own words this logical chain sounds a bit differently but leads to the same conclusion both about the divine foreknowledge and divine knowledge: "God's foreknowledge is infallible, and so it is impossible for them [that is, future things] not to happen after being foreknown. Hence it follows that foreknowledge appears to be the cause of those things which have been foreknown. This very same thing is also said of knowledge, namely that, because God knows some things, they are" (*Dei praescientia falli non potest; impossibile est ergo ea [i.e. futura] non evenire cum praescita sint. Sic ergo praescientia causa eorum videtur esse quae praescita sunt. Hoc idem et de scientia dicitur, scilicet quod quia Deus aliqua novit, ideo sint*). *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:275–276; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:213.

[358] "[A] *reductio ad absurdum* [is] the type of argument in which it is shown that, from a certain premiss *p*, and other premisses the truth of which is supposedly unquestionable, using valid reasoning, there follows a contradictory conclusion. If this is really so, it must be the case that *p* is false (because a valid argument with true premisses must have a true conclusion)." Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, 125f. Anselm employs it in the *Proslogion*, when tries to demonstrate it must be the case that God as that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought does exist in reality as well as in the mind, and one who denies it is the fool indeed. See *Proslogion* 2-3.

[359] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:276–277; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:214.

[360] Ibid.

And here lies the evident problem: God is not and cannot be the creator of evil, because of his perfect essential goodness. Hence, (8) is obviously false. Then, by *modus tollens,*

(9) If the premise (7) leads to the conclusion (8);

(10) but (8) is false;

(11) then (7) is false, too.

Therefore, as the Lombard concludes, "God's knowledge or foreknowledge is not the cause of all things subject to it" (*non igitur scientia vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium quae ei subsunt*).[361] I suggest that he could have gone even further and elaborated a more detailed refutation and philosophical analysis, like the following:

(9*) If the *combination* of $(1 \supset 4 \supset 6 \supset 7)$ leads to the conclusion (8);

(10*) but (8) is false;

(11*) then the logical chain of $(1 \supset 4 \supset 6 \supset 7)$ is false, too.

The question would be where exactly this chain of arguments failed to give valid implications. But Peter Lombard avoids Abelardian games with formal logic and does not work with philosophical material of Aristotle and Boethius.[362] Rather, he remains totally satisfied with a simpler refutation by means of the *reductio*. But does it lead to an alternative thesis (*e converso*), that the future things are the causes of God's foreknowledge and the totality of known things is the cause of God's knowledge?

Peter responses in negative. He agrees, that when God knows that an event will happen, the event will happen (proposition 2), but denies that the future things are

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[361] Ibid.

[362] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:287. Cf. old complaints about Lombard's non-philosophical—if not anti-philosophical—approach in Kögel, *Petrus Lombardus in seiner Stellung*, 12–13, 17–18; Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus und ihre Stellung*, 10–11; Delhaye, *Pierre Lombard*, 99–100, and more appropriate evaluations of Luscombe and Rosemann, who note that Peter Lombard clearly "dissociated himself from the cult of classical philosophy" (Luscombe) and did not engage with the ancient philosophy, but still was able to work with some philosophical notions and use them for his theological project: Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 264, 279; Rosemann, "Peter Lombard," 2017, 64–65, 66–67.

known by God *because* there are going to happen (*non tamen ideo praesciuntur quia futurae sunt*).[363] It is not true due to a purely theological problem: the hypothetically causative character of the future events, be it the reason for God knowing them, would end up in a heretical idea of God's dependence on creatures. If God knows certain events because they have happened, are happening, or are going to happen, then his knowledge is influenced and, in fact, formed by the creatures, which is false, because of the same essential perfection whereby he is characterized. His knowledge must be perfect by nature, independently of any possibly created worlds and their chains of events.

But then, what is the cause and actual mechanism of the divine wisdom, which is the second topic (2) announced at the beginning of the section? It seems that the Lombard denies both lines of causations: neither the actually happening events cause God's knowing them, nor God's knowledge causes these events happening. But he is still sure there is a possibility to clarify the issue at stake. To do that, it is needed to take heed to the authorities Master Peter evokes and the statements he himself makes.

His key authorities here are Origen and Augustine, and he compares their two contradicting dicta. The former's one is this: "It is not because a thing will be that God knows it will be; but because it will be it is known to God before it happens" (*Non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat*),[364] and the latter's citation reads: "For created things are not known by God because they have been made; it is rather the case that they have been made because they are immutably known by him" (*Non enim haec quae create sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo quia facta sunt; potius ideo facta sunt quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur*).[365] Meanwhile, the key statement that the Lombard has made so far is this, and its particular formulation is important (with italics of mine): "God's knowledge or foreknowledge is not the cause of *all* things subject to it" (*non scientia*

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[363] *Sent.* 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:276–277; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:214.

[364] Origen, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, book 7, no. 8, on Rom. 8, 30. Quoted in *Sent.* 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:277; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:214.

[365] Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6, cap. 10, no. 11. Quoted in *Sent.* 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:276; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:214.

vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium quae ei subsunt).[366] Within the parameters of these three statements, the Lombard resolves the problem of God's knowledge in the following manner.[367]

Firstly, God's (fore)knowledge can be interpreted either as simple knowledge or awareness *alone (notitia tantum, notitia sola)*, or as knowledge *and* certain disposition or good pleasure (*nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio*). This is why the divine knowledge (*cognitio vel scientia Dei*) can be both said to *cause* some events—but not all—when it functions as knowledge with some voluntary, as I would suggest, disposition, and at the same time to have *no causative power* when the pure awareness or acquaintance is implied. Thus, the distinction 38 implicitly clarifies the double notion (*duobus modis accipitur*) of God's knowledge as understood by Peter Lombard: (a) sometimes it "behaves" as awareness of something, wherein there is no voluntary action, and (b) sometimes it functions as awareness and simultaneous—it is the crucial point—causal action of God's good pleasure (*notitia simul et beneplacito*). The former type of God's involvement in the world is of merely epistemological and essential character, but the latter includes both epistemological and voluntary elements.

Secondly, there are two types of things and events: good ones and evil ones. They are not known by God in the same manner, as was shown in distinction 36. Therefore St. Augustine's words are to be interpreted as speaking of good things alone, which cannot happen without God's involvement, and Origen's words as having a broader scope and implying evil things as well. For theologically it is necessary to say that God knows evil things but does not create them, and so his knowledge of evil things is but a simple knowledge, awareness alone – "so he foreknew those evils by awareness alone, not by the good pleasure of authorship" (*Praescivit ergo illa sola notitia, non beneplacito auctoritatis*).[368] But it is equally correct to state that God knows good things and at once (*simul*) causes or does them –

[366] Ibid.

[367] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:277–278; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:214–215.

[368] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 1, no. 9. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:278; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:216.

whether directly or indirectly. This is why, "God conversely foreknows good things as his own, as those things which he will do, so that in foreknowing them his awareness and good pleasure of authorship have [simultaneously] joined together" (*Unde datur intelligi quod Deus e converso praescit bona tamquam sua, tam quam ea quae facturus est: ut in illa praesciendo simul fuerint ipsius notitia et auctoritatis beneplacitum*).[369] Hence, with this "simul" and the denial of the direct causation the text of the *Sentences* seems to imply the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and (voluntary?) activity such as disposition or approval, on the one side, and the contingency of the created order and the rational creatures' free will, on the other side. The details remain unspoken but the implication is possible.[370]

Now, there remains the last question of this distinction (3): that about the supposed infallibility of the divine *scientia*, granted that there exists the free will of rational creatures. This is the third Lombardian topic that needs to be reviewed in this section.

Discussing this issue, the Lombard mentions the anonymous critics and poses the hypothetical syllogism with modal logical aspects:[371]

(12) God foreknew that such a person would lecture (*Deus praescivit hunc lecturum*);

(13) but it is possible that this person will not lecture (*sed potest esse ut iste non legat*);

(14) and so it may be otherwise than God foreknew (*ergo potest aliter esse quam Deus praescivit*);

And this syllogism allows continuing the logical chain further:

(15) it follows, then, that God's foreknowledge is fallible (*ergo potest falli Dei praescientia*).

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[369] Ibid.

[370] Colish speaks it out with confidence and, commenting on dist. 38, even says in *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:287, that "[i]n the case of contingencies, such as the willed actions of created beings who possess free will, God foresees the consequences of contingent actions but does not cause them." Yet, I do not think the text says precisely this. Such rendering is possible, but by no means necessary.

[371] On the basis of what is said in *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:278–279; Peter Lombard, *Sentences I (Silano)*, 1:216.

The formal structure seems to be this:

(12*) G ^{K} that $a \wedge p$

(13*) $\lozenge\, a \wedge \neg p$ (which by simplification turns to: $\lozenge\, \neg p$)

(14*) $\lozenge\, (G^K$ that $(a \wedge p)) \wedge (G^K$ that $(a \wedge \neg p))$,

which is an apparent contradiction in terms of the twelfth-century modal logic that necessarily questions God's cognizing ability and its infallibility:

(15*) $\lozenge\, G^{\neg K}$

or

(15**) G $^{P\,\neg K}$,

both of which are problematic.

Peter Lombard sees that this reasoning is "entirely false" (*omnino falsum est*) both logically and theologically. God's knowledge must be infallible and perfect by definition (thesis 12), but even from the logical standpoint, the hypothesis trying to prove its fallibility is wrong. Master Peter agrees that it "is certainly possible for something not to happen" (*Potest equidem non fieri aliquid*) (thesis 13). But he denies that it would require that God would *not* know that. For him, "if a thing were not going to happen, it would not be foreknown by God as happening" (*si illud non fieret, nec a Deo praescitum esset fieri*).[372] Then his answer is:

> (16) If something does not happen, then God does not foreknow it as happening or going to happen.

Quote interestingly, he does not put it positively: if a thing were not going to happen, it would be known by God as such, that is, as not happening. But the Lombard constructs his argument differently. Its formal structure is this:

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[372] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:216.

Instead of

(16*) If ¬*p*, then G ^{K} ¬*p*

he says:

(16) If ¬*p*, then ¬(G ^{K} that *p*)

But this is nothing more than an escape from modal logic to more practical thinking, theorizing in terms of the actual state of affairs. And here the Lombard easily refutes the "fallibility" argument by the same *modus tollens*:

(12*) G ^{K} that *p*

(13*) ◊ ¬*p*

(16*) But if ¬*p*, then ¬(G ^{K} that *p*)

So, the Lombard does not go deep into modal theories, but settles a rather modal issue by means of a logical technique: the *modus tollens* becomes his weapon, and he uses it appropriately. It shows that, again, Master Peter avoids acting and writing as a dialectician, preferring to stay within the boundaries of *sacra pagina* and the sentence genre, but he is well-acquainted with contemporary logic and knows how to use some of its methods and procedures masterfully when it is necessary or useful.

However, it is not the end, for there is additional reasoning that the unnamed critics offer. They suggest that a "thing can either happen otherwise than God foreknew, or not otherwise" (*Aut aliter potest fieri quam Deus praescivit, aut non aliter*).[373] In the first case, God's prescience seems to change or be fallible; in the second case, everything must happen by necessity. But since it is truly possible that (13) a thing can happen otherwise than it actually does, then there is also a possibility for God's knowledge to be mistaken or changed.

In this case, Peter Lombard's response is surprisingly grammatical and dialectical in the medieval sense. For a modern reader, it would be appropriate to

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[373] *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:216–217.

interpret it as a reference to the rules of formal logic and the philosophy of language. The *magister sententiarum* refuses to give a simple answer and points out that such a complex phrase can have a spectrum of meanings. It can mean either "it can happen otherwise than God foreknew" (*aliter potest fieri quam Deus praescivit*), or "it is possible for what God foreknew not to be" (*potest non esse quod Deus praescivit*), or "it is impossible for what God foreknew not to be" (*impossibile est non esse quod Deus praescivit*), or "it is impossible for all things that happen not to be foreknown" (*impossibile est non esse praescita omnia quae fiunt*). And even these derived or deduced dicta can be interpreted differently.[374]

To solve the riddle, the Lombard utilizes the distinction between two approaches to modal propositions: conjunctive reading (*coniunctim*) and disjunctive reading (*disiunctim*). The former is, probably, to be identified with the Abelardian *de sensu* or later medieval *in sensu composito*, meaning the modal or other logical operator modifies the whole phrase, and/or the phrase is taken as a whole without any additional distinctions. The latter is identical to the Abelardian *de re* and later *in sensu diviso*, meaning either that the modal or other logical operator modifies only one part of the phrase, or that the different parts of the phrase are analyzed separately – and perhaps even diachronically.[375] The Lombard himself does not give a definition of the two senses, but at least explains that the conjunctive reading is an interpretation of the modal proposition which includes—literally, "implies"—the condition itself

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[374] Ibid. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:216.

[375] On this, see Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, 2007, 156–57; Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 224–26. For more detailed expositions of these modal categories see: Simo Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; Springer Science+Business Media, 1981), 178–81, 188–90; Simo Knuuttila, "Modal Logic," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 347–48; Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, 84–88.

For example, in his "Modal Logic" (347), Knuuttila gives the following explanation of the two—compounded and diveded—senses as used in the medieval logic of the 12th-13th centuries: "The sentences "a man who is not writing can write' and 'a sitting man can walk' are false when the possibility is understood to qualify the conjunction of two mutually exclusive predicates with the same subject at the same time. But although it is true that a man who is not writing cannot write while not writing, and that while not writing he is necessarily not writing, the same proposition can also be taken in the divided sense. It is then true that someone-not-writing can write. …the possibility can refer to a supposed actualization of predicates at the same time (*in sensu composito*) or at different times (*in sensu diviso*)." And then he adds: "This analysis of modal sentences was widely accepted in the Middle Ages."

(*Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita*).[376] But since it is far from being a strict definition, it is right to suggest that he followed the mid-twelfth-century consensus here.

That granted, he proceeds and analyzes the aforementioned phrase and similar expressions in the light of this distinction. Here are his resolutions in my reconstruction:

- "It cannot happen otherwise than God foreknew" (*Non potest aliter fieri quam Deus praescivit*) is true conjunctively and false disjunctively, for "a thing can happen otherwise than it does, and yet God foreknew that it would happen in this way." In other words, the conjunctive thesis "It cannot be that (something happens otherwise than God foreknew it)"[377] is true, whereas the disjunctive thesis "A thing cannot happen otherwise than it does [*and* otherwise] than how God foreknew it"[378] is false.

- "It is impossible for a thing not to happen which God foreknew or as God foreknew it" (*impossibile est id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit*) is true conjunctively and false disjunctively.[379] In other words, the statement "It is impossible (for a thing not to happen which God foreknew or as God foreknew it)," is true,[380] whereas the statement "It is impossible for a thing to be *and* [it does] not happen what God foreknew or as God foreknew it" is false.[381]

- "It is impossible for all that happens not to be foreknown" (*impossibile est non esse praescitum omne quod fit*) is also true conjunctively and false disjunctively. In other words, the statement "It is impossible that (all that

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[376] *Sent.* 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:216.

[377] In Latin: *Non potest (aliter fieri quam Deus praescivit)*. It is my variation of the phrase. Original Lombard's sloppy formulation is this: *Non potest… quod Deus praesciverit ita fieri et aliter fiat. Sent.* 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279.

[378] In Latin: *Non potest aliter fieri / quam Deus praescivit*. This is again my variant. Lombard's wording is this: *non posse evenire quam evenit, quo modo futurum Deus praescivit*. Ibid.

[379] In the case of this thesis, Lombard does not formulate the true conjunctive and the false disjunctive proposition. He is content to say: *si coniunctim intelligas, verum dicis; si disiunctim, falsum*. In what follows I present my own reconstructions.

[380] In Latin: *impossibile est (id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit)*.

[381] In Latin: *impossibile est / id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit*, or *impossibile est id / non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit*.

happens not be foreknown)" is true,[382] whereas the statement "It is impossible *and* all that happens not be foreknown" is false.[383]

Hence, it becomes clear that Peter's answer to these "modal objections" is quite sophisticated and well-defined. He establishes the exhaustive knowledge and infallible foreknowledge of God. He also guards the possibility for created things and events to be otherwise than they are, yet without giving any detail about the nature of this possibility: what does the possibility mean? It can mean the things' potency or power to act or happen otherwise, or a simple logical—in other words, hypothetical—option that it could possibly have been different, or the diachronic contingency, which implies that something might happen otherwise at another time.[384] However, although the Lombard does not present such a deep analysis of the problem, he leaves a very rich material for his successors. It will be elaborated on by his commentators a century later.

4.5. Distinction 39: analyzing the capacities of God's knowledge[385]

In the next chapter, the Master of the *Sentences* asks a question about the capacity of God's knowledge: can it increase (*augeri*) or decrease (*minui*), or maybe change in some other way (*mutari*)? This cluster of questions implies interaction with some elements of modal logic. But the problem here lies in the fact that such a discussion employs concepts which are not always easy to interpret: the term *posse* and its cognates, meaning "can," "could," "be able," "be possible," is a good case. Therefore I will briefly sketch the landscape of medieval perception of possibility by way of excursion and then return to the text of the distinction 39.

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[382] In Latin: *impossibile est (non esse praescitum omne quod fit)*. This is my formulation based on Lombard's phrasing: *non potest esse utrumque simul, scilicet ut fiat et non sit praescitum*. *Sent*. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:279.

[383] In Latin: *impossibile est / non esse praescitum omne quod fit*. Original wording: *Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit*. Ibid.

[384] See Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 170–91, 195–207; Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, 45–98; Vos, *The Philosophy of Duns Scotus*, 225–26.

[385] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:280–284; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:682–683; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:217–220; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:682–683.

It has been recognized that medieval logic and theology knew four interpretations of potency and possibility. Following J. Hintikka, S. Knuuttila, A. Vos, and their colleagues,[386] I assume that after Boethius who translated and transferred the Aristotelian modal theory, these rather synonymous terms (*potentia, possibilitas, posse*) used to mean up to four different things. Possibility might be read as either (i) "potentiality as a power that strives to realise itself," or (ii) logically consistent possibility of something's happening ("what is possible can be assumed to be actual without any impossibility resulting from this assumption"), or (iii) possible as "at least sometimes actual" in the actual world, or (iv) a feasible act or event which is not realized at this time but can be realized at another time later.[387]

The first option is called by Hintikka and Knuuttila "the model of possibility as a potency," the second "the model of possibility as non-contradictoriness," and the third "the statistical model" or "a temporal frequency model."[388] The fourth option is identified as "the diachronical model" by *John Duns Scotus Research Group* in their research under the direction of Vos.[389] In the Aristotelian framework, all these theories imply that possibility is something that is logically and practically realizable which is going to be realized at some moment in time. A thing's possibility or power is this thing's natural capacity and inclination to a realization, that is, a step from potentiality into actuality. It is so because the Stagirite fully embraced the so-called

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[386] Jaakko Hintikka, *Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Jaakko Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; Springer Science+Business Media, 1981), 57–72; Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism"; Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*; Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval Modal Theories and Modal Logic," in *Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 2, Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam; London: Elsevier North Holland, 2008), 505–78; Simo Knuuttila, "Modality," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 312–41; Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-medieval/; Antonie Vos, *Kennis en noodzakelijkheid: Een kritische analyse van het absolute evidentialisme in wijsbegeerte en theologie. (Knowledge and Necessity: A Critical Analysis of Absolute Evidentialism in Philosophy and Theology (with a summary in English))*, Dissertationes Neerlandicae 5 (Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij J.H. Kok, 1981); Antonie Vos et al., *John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom.* Lectura *I 39. Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); Vos, *The Philosophy of Duns Scotus*.
[387] Knuuttila, "Modal Logic," 344–45; Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality."
[388] Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities," 64, 65; Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 163, 165, passim; Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality."
[389] Antonie Vos et al., "Introduction," in *John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom.* Lectura *I 39. Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 18–20, 24–25.

Principle of Plenitude: "each genuine possibility is sometimes realized,"[390] and therefore believed that potentiality as power always strives to turn to the actuality so that potentiality as a realizable possibility is determined to be realized earlier or later.[391] Hence, his understanding of modality in general and possibility in particular was one-sided and, hence, problematic: it allowed for the one and only world with the "unmoved mover" but no Christian God and no real yet unrealized potencies.[392]

The Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages reinterpreted these modal schemes[393] and slowly changed them by way of adapting and adjusting them to its theological and philosophical needs. It (1) came to regard possibility as potency (*potestas, potentia, cognatio*) in a broader sense, which allowed not only for *natural* but also for *supernatural* or *divine possibilities*, and (2) offered some creative variations of the diachronical and statistical models.

The results of the development of the potency theory (1) were these. For Boethius, the potency stood for "real powers or tendencies," or "potencies as generic tendencies or dispositions… [which] are, so to say, actualities minus certain

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[390] Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities," 68, passim.

[391] David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–29; R.M. Dancey, "Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; Springer Science+Business Media, 1981), 73–115; Hintikka, *Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality*, 27–39, 94–111; Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities," 58–69.

[392] Aristotle's line of thinking implied only natural possibilities realizable and realized in the one world of time and space, although he did not have the generic definition of possibility. Hence, he too closely connected time and modality and promulgated the necessitarian worldview in spite of his admission of some logical possibilities. Hintikka aptly summarizes this problem in *Time and Necessity*, 102–3:

> However firmly Aristotle may have believed in the principle of plenitude, it is very dubious whether he ever considered it as giving us a definition of his concept of possibility. In other words, however strongly he assumed that something is possible if and only if it is sometimes the case, he did not on most occasions think of this as exhausting the meaning of assertions of possibility. (…)
> Defining necessity and possibility in temporal terms (…) would have meant for Aristotle to base his modal notions entirely on what might be called a *statistical* model of modality: something's being possible must be shown by its *sometimes* happening, and what is always must be by necessity. Applications of modal notions reduce in effect to comparisons of what happens at different moments of time. (…) the whole statistical model can be said to have been one of the conceptual paradigms of Aristotle's theory of modality. It was not the only one, however, and hence did not quite yield to him *definitions* of the different modal notions.

[393] "Many thinkers of the Late Middle Ages distanced themselves from the traditional patterns of interpreting Aristotle's modal syllogistic and other received views or necessity and possibility," as concludes Knuuttila. It has started with Augustine, because "Augustine's idea of God's free choice involved an intuitive idea of simultaneous alternatives from which the actual providential history is chosen." Knuuttila, "Modality," 312, 321; Knuuttila, "Medieval Modal Theories," 517ff; Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 196ff. In the same manner, Vos declares the "medieval thought as an ongoing emancipation from ancient philosophy" and notes: "From the very start of early scholasticism, we meet ever new stages of emancipation from the ancient way of [modal] ideas." Vos, *The Philosophy of Duns Scotus*, 35, 215, passim.

circumstances."[394] These potencies were two-sided options: they could be realized and could remain unrealized, and such understanding was more fitting to the needs of Christian theology. But the origins of this interpretation of the potency lay with the legacy of Tertullian and Augustine who added a crucial point to the notion of potency: the actualization or non-actualization of a potency and use or non-use of someone's power is regulated by the will. For example, Tertullian admits that there are some things which God "could have done but has not willed so" – a "potuit sed noluit" principle[395] Thus, in the late patristics and the early Middle Ages, the Aristotelian idea of potencies was slightly altered. For Aristotle, "potency is said to be the principle of motion or change either as an activator (*potentia activa*) or as a receptor of a relevant influence (*potentia passiva*)," although in both cases the potency functions as part of the natural chain of potentialities and actualities.[396] For Anselm, Peter Abelard, Peter Damian, and other twelfth-century Christian thinkers, potency has the third meaning, as well: it is a capacity for action, regulated by one's will.[397] In general, this definition is a variation of the Aristotelian potency theory,

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[394] Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, 46, 48.

[395] *Non placet deo quod non ipse produxit. Nisi si non potuit purpureas et aerinas oves nasci iubere. Si potuit, ergo iam noluit; quod deus noluit, utique non licet fingi. Non ergo natura optima sunt ista, quae a doe non sunt, auctore naturae*. Tertullian, *De cultu feminarum*, ed. A. Kroymann, (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 70) (Vindobonae, 1942), I, 8, p. 68, quoted in Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 199, 244n91. The note 92 on the page 244 also contains a relevant quotation from Augustine's *De spiritu et littera*, ed. C. F. Vrba and I. Zycha (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 60) (Lipsiae, 1913), 1.1: *Absurdum enim tibi uidetur dici aliquid fieri posse, cuius desit exemplum, cum, sicut credo, non dubites numquam esse factum, ut per foramen acus camelus transiret, et tamen ille hoc quoque dixit deo esse possibile*.

[396] Knuuttila, "Medieval Modal Theories," 513.

[397] See how, for example, Anselm connects ability or power (*posse*) and will (*velle*) in his late *Philosophical Fragments*:

> It is noteworthy that sometimes we so will [something] that, if we can, we cause the occurrence of what we will—as, for example, when a sick man wills health. For if he can, he causes himself to be healthy; and if he cannot, nevertheless he would cause it if he could. This willing can be called an *efficient* will, since insofar as it can it effects the existence of what it wills. Sometimes, however, we will that which we are able to cause and yet do not cause…

> *Est considerando quia volumus aliquando ita ut, si possumus, faciamus ut sit quod volumus, velut cum aeger vult salutem. Facit enim us sit sanus si potest; et si non potest, faceret si posset. Haec voluntas potest vocari efficiens, quoniam, quantum in ipsa est, efficit us sit quod vult. Volumus autem aliquando quod possumus facere, nec facimus…*

Anselm of Canterbury, "Philosophical Fragments," 2000, 407; Anselm of Canterbury, "The Anselmian Miscellany at Lambeth MS. 59," I, 334.1-7.

See analyses of Anselmian modalities and his ideas in the *Fragments* in: Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions"; Jasper Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), 139–67; Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality," 119–20, 124–27; Sara L. Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic" (Ph.D. dissertation, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2009), 41–66.

Also, note how Lombard's contemporary Roland Bandinelli (later, Pope Alexander III) describes the Abelardian dictum that God cannot know or do more than he does: *Quod autem Deus plura non possit facere quam faciat,*

however, there are two differences: first, the potency means power to bring about something that does not belong to the necessary chain of potentialities-actualities (like the *creatio ex nihilo* and contingent decisions of the rational free will) and, second, the activator or controlling factor of this type of possibilities is not the actuality *per se*, but the will *per se*.[398] Thus, it seems, the eleventh-century theologians have a notion of potency and, by extension, omnipotence, which was "based on the connection between the possibility of action and acts of will."[399]

As for the diachronic interpretation of possibility (2), its medieval version runs along the lines charted by an anonymous writer of the twelfth-century treatise *Dialectica Monacensis* and encapsulated by Knuuttila: "every true statement about the present is necessarily true (*omne dictum de praesenti verum et affirmativum est necessarium*). This being the case, an unactualized possibility can only refer to future times. Hence… possibility does not refer to the future in a universal way but indefinitely with respect to some time."[400] So, a phrase, "it is possible that a walking man sits" (*possibile est ambulantem sedere*), would mean, "it is possible that a man who *now* walks will sit *later*." In this theory, possibilities pertain to an alternative state of affairs which is realizable at some point in time in the future, although the

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auctoritate Salemonis probatur qua dicitur: 'dominator Deus omnipotens, cui subest posse, cum vult'. Si subest ei posse tantum cum vult: ergo cum non vult, non subest ei posse. Tantum igitur que vult potest. Si tantum que vult potest: ergo tantum que vult operatur. Non ergo plura potest facere quam faciat. The source: *Die Sentenzen Rolands, Nachmals Papstes Alexander III*, Hrsg. Fr. Ambrosius M. Gietl (Freiburg im Bresgau, 1891; repr. Amsterdam, 1969), 49f, quoted in Ivan Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives. [Papers Presented at a Conference Held at The Ohio State University on March 3 and 4, 1982.]*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky, Synthese Historical Library 25 (Dordrecht: SpringerScience+Business Media, 1985), 206n24.

[398] E. Sirene shows that for Anselm the proper definition of possibility is capacity – a capacity to be or to bring something about: "In a 'proper' ascription, the assertion that it is possible for something to exist designates a capacity inherent in that thing. (…) 'possibility' 'properly' signifies a capacity and the lack of external constraint." She also notes that Anselm tends to explicate the nature of possibilities (in 'improper' sense) with the help of the idea of direct and indirect agency and agrees that Anselm's "full theory of human agency also includes some explanation of the nature of willing." Yet, she does not offer a detailed treatment of the Anselmian theory of will and its role in his view on modalities. See Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 120, 143, 144.

Cf. Rostislav Tkachenko, "An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man's Freedom in His *De Concordia*," *Sententiae* XXXII, no. 1 (2015): 20–22, where I show some srucial aspects of Anselm's theory of the will; Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 41–51, where she shows how Anselm understood agency (*facere*) as a modal concept and thought that "an analysis of *facere* [would] encompass an analysis of all verbs" with even "his analyses of *velle* and *posse* being modeled on the analysis of *facere* for the most part" (quotations are from pages 44 and 42); M.B. Pranger, *Consequente Theologie: Een studie over het denken van Anselmus van Canterbury* (Assen: Assen Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1975), 85, who encapsulates an important Anselmian thought in a phrase: "Potency without will is necessity" ("*Potestas* zonder *voluntas* is *necessitas*").

[399] Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196.

[400] Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 190.

past and the present are fixed and, consequently, necessary. But again, some theologians like Peter Damian were believed to challenge this theory and suggest that "God can change the invariant patterns called natural necessities," including the necessity of the present or the past. He is able to act upon the past, present, and future from his eternity and, then, even if the diachronic model is right from the perspective of human logic, the diachronic possibilities function differently for God: they are eternal opportunities, so that even the law of non-contradiction does not limit them.[401]

Now, given this broadened and updated definition of potency and the theologically challenged notion of diachronic possibility, what is the view Peter Lombard propagates or, at least, proposes in his *Sentences*? As was noted above, he starts his discussion of possibilities with an imaginary case study. He offers two theological paradoxes, which form the background—and, later, the "application"—of his discussion.[402]

The first paradox seems to justify the statement that "God can know what He never knows." (*potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit*). It can be encapsulated in the following chain of reasoning:

(17) there is someone, who is not going to read today (*Est enim aliquis, qui non est lecturus hodie*);

(18) yet it can be, that he reads today; for he can read today (*et tamen potest esse, ut legat hodie; potest enim hodie legere*);

(19) but nothing can come to be, which cannot be known by God (*Nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri*);

(20) Therefore, God can know, that this one (is) going to read today (*Potest ergo Deus scire, hunc lecturum hodie*),

(21) therefore, He can know something, which He does not know (*potest igitur aliquid scire, quod non scit*).

It can be formalized:

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[401] Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, 63–67; Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, 2007, 116–18.

[402] The text of the both paradoxes' theses is taken directly from *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:280; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:682.

(17*) $b \wedge \neg p$

(implicit 17A*) $G^K b \wedge \neg p$, which means by simplification that $G^K \neg p$

(18*) $\Diamond b \wedge p$, because $b \, P \, p$

(19*) $\neg((\Diamond b_1(b_2, b_3\ldots)) \wedge (\neg(G^{PK} b_1(b_2, b_3\ldots))))$

(20*) therefore $G^{PK} (b \wedge p)$

(21*) therefore $(G^{PK} p) \wedge (G^{\neg K} p)$

or, alternatively,

(19**) $\neg((\Diamond b_1(b_2, b_3\ldots)) \wedge (\neg\Diamond (G^K b_1(b_2, b_3\ldots))))$

(20**) therefore $\Diamond G^K (b \wedge p)$

(21**) $(\Diamond G^K p) \wedge (G^{\neg K} p)$

It is a very interesting paradox, whose details—especially with regards to theses (20) and (21)—remain somewhat unclear, since the Lombard does not utilize technical language, nor gives any detailed explications. But he immediately adds another one:

(22) there is someone going to read today, whom God knows (is) going to read (*Est enim aliquis hodie lectures, quem Deus scit lecturum*);

(23) but it can be, that he does not read (*At potest esse, ut non legat*);

(24) therefore, God is able not to know, that he (is) going to read (*ergo potest Deus non scire, hunc lecturum*);

(25) therefore, He is able not to know something which He does know (*potest igitur non scire aliquid quod scit*).

It also can be formalized:

(22*) $(c \wedge p) \wedge G^K (c \wedge p)$

(23*) $\Diamond (c \wedge \neg p)$

(24*) $G^{P \neg K} p$

(25*) $(G^{P \neg K} p) \wedge (G^K p)$

or, perhaps,

(24**) $\Diamond \neg (G^K p)$

(25**) $(\Diamond \, G^{\neg K} p) \wedge (G^K p)$

The same type of unclarity is to be found in the formulation of the second paradox, as well. The formal validity and power of the arguments is not analyzed here. The dividing line between two different meanings of *posse* is not drawn either: it can be seen as one's ability or potency[403] or as an abstract (logical) possibility for something's (not) happening.[404] And unfortunately, Master Peter is not very rigorous on this. Still, by employing a modal notion and a pair of (theo)logical paradoxes he is definitely willing to engage what we would call philosophical theology. It looks like the focus here is on the logical possibility which has bearing on our view of God's potencies: both paradoxes contain phrases such "God is able" or "a man is able," but the very beginning of both paradoxes with its impersonal "it can be" sets the scene and demonstrates that here we have a thought experiment. Hence, the logical possibility serves as the framework for an analysis of the divine potency.

Remarkably, Master Peter agrees that both paradoxes are valid and applicable to theology proper, but denies that they support the idea of the changeability of the divine wisdom. It cannot change because it is identical with the *essentia Dei*, which is perfect and immutable.[405] But the two paradoxical conclusions that (a) God can know something, which he does not know (*posse scire quod non scit*), and (b) God is able not to know something which He does know (*posse non scire quod scit*), are true. The former is correct because it is possible that something non-existing in reality is subject to his knowledge (*posset aliquid esse subiectum eius scientiae quod non est*). The latter is true because it is possible that something that does exist in reality is not a

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[403] See Silano's translation with his preference for "to be capable of" or "to be able to" as English renderings of *posse* in Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:217.

[404] See Bugnolo's translation used above with his opting for neutral phrases like "it can be that" or more ability-oriented but still broad "can" in Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:682.

[405] *Sent.* 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 2-3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:280–281; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:217–218.

subject to his knowledge without any change within, or of, his knowledge (*posset non esse subiectum aliquid quod est sine permutatione ipsius scientiae.*).[406] The first conclusion seems to imply God's knowledge of not (yet) realized possibilities, while the second is more mysterious as it speaks of God's potency not to know what he knows. The nature of such a hypothetical opportunity is uncertain but both cases show that it is logically possible that God's potency includes a wide range of additional opportunities.

Thus, once again the Lombard does not fully unpack an extremely promising theme, but still, he makes his point and does not shy away from speculative questions. Of course, he does not go deep in his philosophizing and "dialecticizing" but he shows his good acumen in this realm. Moreover, from the theological point of view, he defends the thesis about the permanent and unchanging nature of *scientia divina* by means of returning to his perfect essence theology. Additionally, he adds two more insights.

He includes a Trinitarian perspective to the discussion and also tells something about the divine "cognizing mechanism." With the help of Augustine[407] he establishes that when we speak of the divine knowledge we mean the *one* knowledge of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so that the knowledge of God is always the *triune* knowledge. It means that all three persons "know and see all things simultaneously," fully and unchangeably (*simul omnia sciunt et vident*).[408] Hence, the divine knowledge is always instantaneous and simultaneous, functioning within the Trinity *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Consequently, God cannot know things newly or with a connection to the time of the actual world (*noviter vel ex tempore*). He knows everything that happens in time from his eternity (*ab aeterno*). We may not know how exactly it works, but there is no reason to suppose his dependence on the flow of time. Therefore, he cannot "begin to know or foreknow anything" (*non tamen potest incipere scire vel*

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[406] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:281; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:218; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:682.

[407] Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15, cap. l4, no. 23; cap. 13, no. 22.

[408] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:281; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:218.

praescire), nor can he "have known" or "be about to know" with similar references to time. Any such category has meaning only inside the time frame, which does not exist in eternity. This is why it is impossible to impose this time-bound type of sayings on God.[409] Nevertheless, God's eternal knowledge captures whatever can be captured epistemically.

Furthermore, God can know not only what happens—or happened, or will happen—in the created universe. He also can know what he can do (*quod potest facere*), including possibilities, which will never be realized (*quod nunquam fiet*), and things or events with no actuality at all (*quod nunquam fiet, nec est, nec fuit*). It is right even to say that he "can now know or foreknow what he did not know or foreknow from eternity" (*posse scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit*). This phrase is true when we mean by it that God has the potency or "a power of knowing and/or foreknowing from eternity even something now, and yet it has not been foreknown nor is going to be" (*habere potentiam sciendi et praesciendi ab aeterno et modo aliquid, nec illud tamen praescitum est vel futurum*).[410]

What is interesting in this discourse on the possibilities of God's knowledge is that Peter Lombard constantly uses the *potest* verb without actually saying that God *does* know this or that set of possibilities. He feels comfortable with simply highlighting God's capacity to know both actualities and possibilities. In fact, the last quoted phrase is the epitome of this humble and accurate approach: God is *able* to know a thing, which he did not know yet. In other words, God's knowledge *can* potentially include more information than he knows now (*scire plura quam scit*) but, still, it *cannot* and *will not* change. Such a paradoxical conclusion, once again, is easily explicated in the light of what was said above: quantitatively the divine knowledge could have been—and as the Lombard argues here, potentially can be—different, but qualitatively it is always the same – full, exhaustive, and comprehensive. But now this statement should be modified. What changes is the

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[409] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:281; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:218.

[410] Ibid., Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:281–282; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:683.

quantity of *actual* things known by God only, not the character of the wisdom itself. The things known before as possible become known as actual, and this is the only change that may occur.[411] So, God knows the same set of things whose modal and ontological status may change without any mutation of divine knowledge.

Having said that, Peter Lombard closes the distinction 39 with some final—but not unimportant—theological remarks. He notes that providence (*providentia*) as "knowing care" that God takes for his creation does not have to be interpreted as the knowledge of particulars, individuals and their specific situations at this or that given moment of time. For example, God cares "universally for all the things which he made, so that each of them should have what is owed to, and suitable for, it" (*Providentiam ergo et curam universaliter de cunctis quae condidit habet, ut habeat unumquodque quod sibi debetur et convenit*).[412] In the same way, he has the full statistical information about the population or the life-and-death events in the life of lice, flies, or fishes. But God does not know this "at each single moment" (*per momenta singula*). Yet, his knowledge of these nuances is permanently full, for he sees all these and similar "things simultaneously and always" (*simul et semper omnia*).[413] It sounds confusing.

The main point here is about the universal divine providence, which cares for each creature, although in different ways because the rational ones have a special provision (*specialem providentiam*) while irrational do not. But the words about God's knowledge of the quantity of lice, flies and other small creatures are rather peculiar. Such a knowledge *simul et semper* is affirmed while such a knowledge *per momenta singula* is denied. This can mean two things. Either (a) God cannot know things as if by contemplating them from within the time and observing them through each single moment that passes for them (note the Latin preposition "per" here) because he knows everything at once from eternity, or (b) God cannot have a knowledge of time-indexed propositions about the irrational creatures and their life

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[411] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:282; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:219. Cf. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 265.

[412] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 4, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:283; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:220.

[413] Ibid.

spans because in his knowledge all propositions of this kind have no time indexes – there are but sets of eternally true and eternally false statements. In my view, the latter sounds very unconvincing[414] while the former must be acknowledged as the correct interpretation because of the obvious textual support. The very expression "non scit [Deus] hoc per momenta singula, immo simul et semper omnia" points in that direction. God does not have a knowledge that sees the succession of events in the strict sense and, thus, goes through a succession of moments itself (*per momenta*), for that would imply change; he rather contemplates all moments and events at once in his eternity. Also, the phrases "per momenta singula" and "simul et semper" modify the verb "scit" and not the object "omnia" so that the time index applies to the *mode* of knowing and not to the nature of known propositions or, rather, things and living creatures. Such interpretation does justice to the Lombard's text and fits in his argument in distinction 39: God's knowledge is exhaustive, eternal, and unchanging.

Besides, the Lombard makes an observation about predestination as another side of the foreknowledge. After quoting Augustine,[415] who says: "predestination is the preparation of grace, which cannot be without foreknowledge; but there can be foreknowledge without predestination" (*praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, quae sine praescientia esse non potest; potest autem sine praedestinatione esse praescientia*), Master Peter adds a short qualification. Reprobation has to do with the latter and, thus, it is a sphere of foreknowledge's jurisdiction alone. But predestination is the same as God's election of, and preparation of the goods for, the

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[414] As Knuuttila has convincingly shown, after Boethius many eleventh- and twelfth-century theologians and philosophers tended to interpret "statement-making utterances as temporally indeterminate sentences having an implicit or explicit reference to the moment of utterance (now) as a part of their meaning," but upon this reading the truth value of such statement must change depending on the time of utterance of this statement and then Peter Lombard must have added some rather sophisticated explanations of his position. He speaks here about the divine knowledge which is not connected to the time span, therefore if he means that God knows only the temporally indefinite propositions, it entails the conclusion about the necessary truthfulness or falsity of these propositions. If the proposition is temporally indeterminate and has no connection to the time index of the utterance because it is uttered in the divine eternal now, then it must be either eternally—and, hence, necessarily—true or eternally—and, hence, necessarily—false. See Knuuttila's explanation: "If it [the Boethian model of modality] is applied… to type sentences at the moment of their utterance, those sentences will be necessarily true if true and necessarily false if false." Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, 53; Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality," section 2.

It is possible but unlikely that Peter Lombard speaks about modal logical concepts here. (1) The topic of the paragraphs concerns universal providence and not truth or falsity of contingent propositions known by God; (2) the discussion lacks specificity and use of the appropriate terminology, for there is no indication of modal concepts; and (3) it would be too pretentious to reconstruct Lombard's thought about such a complex theme (if it is really discussed here) on the basis of one sentence. His thought moves in a different direction (see above).

[415] Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, cap. 10, no. 19.

elect that happens with his foreknowledge involved.[416] The Lombard's statement about it is very concise and not well-argued. It follows the Augustinian citation and reads: "He predestined those whom he elected but he reprobated the rest, that is, he foreknew that they would sin to eternal death" (*Praedestinavit eos quos elegit, reliquos vero reprobavit, id est ad mortem aeternam praescivit peccaturos*).[417] Thus, it seems that God's reprobation includes only one element – that of knowledge without any activity of his will, whereas God's predestination consists of two components as it is a simultaneous eternal action of knowledge and will, with no priority or logical order indicated in this distinction.

4.6. Distinction 40: theorizing about (im)possibilities for salvation, predestination, and reprobation[418]

The next chapter begins with a question about the possibilities, which are supposed to exist, granted that God could do or have done certain things. It is about "[w]hether any of the predestined may be damned or any of the reprobated be saved" (*An aliquis praedestinatorum possit damnari vel reproborum salvari*),[419] and has to do with questions about God's potency and real possibilities existing in the world. In fact, the theory that the Lombard has to face and which he neither approves nor wants to discuss is knit with could's (*posset*) and can's (*potest*).[420] It was raised and popularized by Peter Abelard, Roland of Bologna, and the author of *Summa sententiarum*.[421] This hypothesis is divided into two parts and here is what it says:[422]

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[416] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 4, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:283–284; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:220. Cf. *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap.1-6, no. 2, where it is stated: *Praedestinavit enim Deus ab aeterno homines ad bona eligendo, et praedestinavit eis bona praeparando*. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:255.

[417] *Sent*. 1, dist. 39, cap. 4, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:284; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:220.

[418] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:284–288; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:699–701; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:221–224; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:699–701.

[419] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:284; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:221.

[420] See *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 1-5.

[421] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:288.

[1] God could not apportion grace to those whom He apportions (it), and He could subtract grace from those whom He does not subtract (it); which if it were done, they certainly would be damned. Therefore, those could be damned, who will yet be saved. And so the number of the Elect could be lessened; thus too it could be increased, because the grace, through which they are saved, could be apportioned to those whom it is not apportioned. Therefore, they could be saved, having the grace, who yet without it shall be damned: and so the number of the Elect could be increased. …

[2] Nevertheless, they still insist and by arguing *according to the conjunction* proceed thus. "For it cannot be", they say, "that someone be predestined and be damned. Each of these cannot be together; but *one of the two* of these can *not be*, namely, that he is not predestined: for from eternity he has been predestined and he cannot now not be predestined. Therefore, since it is impossible, *that each be together*, and (since) it is impossible, that one of the two not be, it seems, that it cannot be *that the other of the two be*, namely that he be damned. Which if it is, therefore, it cannot be, that he not be saved."

The first part of the argument has a more metaphysical and theological character. It speaks of God's *potency* or *ability*, literally *possibility* (*Posset Deus*), to give grace to some of those who were (previously) denied it or take away grace from those who were (previously) given it. Such a possibility—either based on God' power to make changes in his own intentions as well as the actual world, or on some other notion of possibility—entails the conclusion that those still-damned could be saved (*possent salvari*) and those still under grace could be (*possent damnari*) damned.

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[422] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 2 and 4. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:700, italics in original are not reflected here, since they are not included in the critical edition. See the Latin text according to Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:284–285:

> *Posset Deus non apponere gratiam quibus apponit, et posset subtrahere quibus non subtrahit; quod si fieret, uti que damnarentur. Possent ergo damnari isti, qui tamen salvabuntur; posset itaque minui electorum numerus. Ita posset etiam augeri, quia posset apponi gratia quibus non apponitur, per quam salvarentur; possent ergo salvari habita gratia, qui tamen sine ea damnabuntur; posset itaque augeri numerus electorum. ...*
> *Verumtamen adhuc instant, et secundum coniunctionem argumentando ita procedunt: Non, inquiunt, potest esse ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Utrumque istorum simul esse non potest; sed alterum horum non potest non esse; scilicet quin iste sit praedestinatus: ab aeterno enim praedestinatus est, et non potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Cum ergo impossibile sit simul utrumque esse, et impossibile sit alterum non esse, videtur non posse alterum esse, scilicet ut damnetur. Quod si est, ergo non potest esse ut non salvetur.*

It is not immediately clear what these could's exactly mean in distinction 40. But it is clear that the Lombard is handling them on two levels: a metaphysical one as relating to the configuration of reality and a theological one as relating to God's nature.[423] The general opinion of the Master of the *Sentences* is unambiguous: the number of the saved and the reprobate cannot change, from God's point of view it is fixed and will not be increased or diminished.[424] He agrees with the point of his interlocutors but is not in fond of their argumentation.

On the metaphysical and, by extension, linguistic-logical plain, both of which were then believed to have and convey "the same logical coherence,"[425] it should be held that "both cannot be true at the same time: namely that anyone should be saved and not be predestined, or that anyone should be predestined and be damned" (*non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet ut aliquis salvetur et non sit praedestinatus, vel ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur*). It is simply impossible from the logical point of view. Peter Lombard turns the disputed theory into a contradiction and immediately refutes it by the law of non-contradiction: *A* cannot be not-*A* at the same time and in the same respect. In the same vein, the predestined cannot be damned at the same time and, vice versa, the reprobated cannot be saved. The theological reason behind it is that being saved and being predestined is one and the same thing, just as being damned and being non-predestined. But the two are mutually exclusive and,

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[423] Knuuttila observes the following tendency in the 12th-century thinking in "Medieval Modal Theories," 518, 568:

> Events which take place in accordance with the common course of nature or against it are naturally necessary or impossible with respect to the laws of the created order, but God as the Lord of this order can bring about effects which are naturally impossible. Miraculous divine interventions do not strictly speaking violate natural patterns, since they are meant to be subordinate. These ideas were codified in the commonly employed distinction between possibilities secundum inferiorem causam as possibilities *secundum cursum naturae* and possibilities *secundum superiorem causam* as God's possibilities. (…) While exemplification in the actual world was often regarded as a criterion of the genuineness of the types of natural possibility, it was not relevant for divine possibilities. In twelfth-century theology, natural possibilities *secundum inferiorem causam* were said to be possibilities *secundum cursum naturae* and possibilities *secundum superiorem causam* meant divine possibilities.

Quite interestingly, Peter Lombard has a distinction between *secundum superiores* and *secundum inferiores*, but he employs it in his discussion of *causae* and not *possibilitates* or *potentia*. Yet, the causes of created things are said to be "in God's potency and disposition from eternity:" *omnium rerum causas in Deo ab aeterno esse… in Dei potentia et dispositione ab aeterno… hae dicuntur primordiales causae… quae sunt causae causarum*. See *Sent*. 2, dist. 17, cap. 3; dist. 18, cap. 5-6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:412–413, 418–420 (the quotation is from dist. 18, cap. 5, no. 2, page 418).

[424] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:284; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:221.

[425] De Rijk, "The Origins of the Theory of the Properties," 161.

therefore, cannot be held "conjunctively." It cannot be that one is predestined and damned (*id est non potest esse ut praedestinatus sit et damnetur*), or one is reprobated and saved. But still, Lombard admits, on the practical level it is possible to say that the person whom *I say* to be predestined can be damned (*istum… posse damnari quem dico praedestinatum*), for "he could have been not predestined, and so he would be damned" (*Potuit enim non esse praedestinatus, et ita damnaretur*).[426] But this subjective perception of someone's eternal fate is different from the objective meaning of the phrase analyzed here.

Thus, the Lombard never fails to distinguish between the theological level—that is, theology proper or, so to speak, God's "level"—and human level of seeing the reality. God's knowledge of what is true is perfect while ours is not. Therefore, in God's mind, there are no people who are predestined but can be reprobate or the reprobate who can be predestined. But from our perspective, we may use this language while describing the current situation. Yet, when one asks about the objectively existing possibility or impossibility to be saved or damned open to a created thing, it is a different question, formulated in the second part of the theory with which the Lombard deals.

Here we enter the terrain of logical possibilities and hear Master Peter say that it is impossible to say that the one who was predestined from eternity is not predestined now (*impossibile est alterum non esse, scilicet quin iste modo sit praedestinatus: ab aeterno enim iste praedestinatus est*). This is the crux of the matter. For one cannot legitimately affirm that the same subject is predestined from eternity and not predestined now (*Non enim potest esse ut ab aeterno sit praedestinatus et modo non sit praedestinatus*) or that at one and the same moment a man is both predestined and non-predestined (*nec potest esse simul ut sit praedestinatus et non sit praedestinatus*). Both theses are logical impossibilities and must be denied.[427]

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[426] *Sent.* 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:285; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:221.

[427] *Sent.* 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:285; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:222

Nevertheless, it must be allowed to say that "it could be true from eternity that he was not predestined" (*potuit esse ab aeterno quod non esset praedestinatus*), and "he could have been not predestined from eternity" (*potuit ab aeterno non esse praedestinatus*).[428] The propositions have a slightly different meaning if analyzed lexically, but both are logically and theologically tenable. *Ex hypothesi*, it is possible for God not to have predestined this given man from eternity – such a situation does not imply any contradiction and so fits in the realm of logical possibility. But what follows from it?

The Lombard records that from a proposition of the type "from eternity God was able not to predestine him" (*ab aeterno Deus potuit eum non praedestinare*) some of his contemporaries (*quibusdam*) deduce that "even now God is able not to have predestined him from eternity" (*modo potest Deus eum non praedestinasse ab aeterno*). This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that "God is able not to have predestined him" (*potest Deus non praedestinasse eum*) and, conversely, "that person is able not to have been predestined" (*potest iste non fuisse praedestinatus*), and, finally, that "he is able now not to be predestined" (*potest modo non esse praedestinatus*). The last proposition must be true, because "if he had not been predestined, he would not be predestined" (*Si vero non fuisset praedestinatus, nec esset praedestinatus*).[429] In other words, some people think that "God could in eternity" or "God is able in eternity" entails "God can even now" and, then, it leads to a conclusion that even now it could have been otherwise. But this would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that, understood conjunctively, "it is possible for someone to be predestined and be damned."

What is crucial in this argument is the interplay between the tenses (*fuisset— esset; potuit—potest*) and adverbial constructions (*ab aeterno—modo*), for they reveal some crucial nuances and indicate what kind of possibility is implied. The grammatical forms of successively posed propositions run as follows:

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[428] Ibid.
[429] Ibid.

(i) the perfect tense of *posse* modified by *ab aeterno* + the main verb in the present infinitive*;* the subject is God (*ab aeterno Deus potuit eum non praedestinare*);

(ii) the present tense of *posse* modified by *modo* + the main verb in the perfect infinitive modified by *ab aeterno;* the subject is God (*modo potest Deus eum non praedestinasse ab aeterno*);

(iii) the present tense of *posse* + the main verb in the perfect infinitive; the subject is God (*potest Deus non praedestinasse eum*);

(iv) the present tense of *posse* + the main verb in the perfect infinitive (passive); the subject is man (*potest iste non fuisse praedestinatus*);

(v) the present tense of *posse* modified by *modo* + the main verb in the perfect infinitive (passive); the subject is man (*potest modo non esse praedestinatus*)

Such an approach to tenses with the regular conversion of perfect forms into the present and vice versa points to the Abelardian and post-Abelardian nominalist understanding of the truth-values of the proposition. Here is Knuuttila's summary: "The truth-value of Abaelard's *propositio* cannot change, because it is a unique linguistic event. … *Propositio* is, according to Abaelard, only secondarily true. Primarily true or untrue is *dictum* [i.e. what the proposation says], and its truth-value depends on whether things correspond to what is claimed."[430] In other words, what is true once is always true (*semel est verum, semper est verum*).[431] Hence, the change of tenses does not change the meaning of the sentence and therefore renders the same truth-value: a proposition that God could and still can change the status of the predestined or the damned man is always false.

Also, the alteration between the eternal "then/there" with perfect-tense verbs and the present "now" with present-tense verbs leaves no doubt that the Lombard and his

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[430] Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 181; also Laurent Cesalli, "Propositions: Their Meaning and Truth," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic*, ed. Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 248–49, 250, 260.

[431] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 139ff.

interlocutors speak of diachronic possibility and God's power to alter the present (or the past), just like in the controversy about Peter Damian's theory. In other words, it is stated that at some moment "before now" God could cause an alternative state of affairs. But since God abides in eternity he can even now act as if before now and cause an alternative state of affairs. Consequently, by simplification, God is capable of causing an alternative state of affairs. Conversely, an alternative—in fact, the opposite—state of affairs not only could have been caused but even now can be caused. This is an obvious contradiction for the twelfth-century mind because, since Boethius, it was thought "that if something happens to be the case, the opposite state of affairs is not possible with respect to the same time. So you cannot accept the formula

[1] p_{t1} & M $\neg p_{t1}$

for, if the possibility is assumed to be actualized, it would lead to the impossibility

[2] $(p_{t1}$ & $\neg p_{t1})$."[432]

The unnamed Abelardians reduce the rules of diachronic modality to *absurdum* and end up in necessitarianism: what is cannot not be and what has been done cannot be undone even by God. Peter Lombard is not sure how to counter their argumentation and laments: "They do not at all grant it in the actions or operations of God and men. For from the fact that something is done or said, they do not grant that it is able not to be or not to have been done; indeed, it is impossible that what is done or said should not be or not have been, referring its possibility or impossibility to the nature of an existent thing" (*Quod in actionibus vel operationibus Dei et hominum nullatenus concedunt. Ex quo enim aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt quod possit non esse vel non fuisse; immo impossibile est non esse vel non fuisse*

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[432] Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 171, 187ff.

quod factum est vel dictum, referentes possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem ad naturam rei exsistentis).[433]

The last phrase suggests the Lombard's criticism is directed against still another teaching of Abelard and his followers: they saw nature (*natura, natura rerum*) as a crucial element of their modal system. According to a well-documented study by Knuuttila, Abaelard frequently "refers to nature (*natura*); in fact… he defines possibility as freedom from contradiction with nature. Now, according to one definition of modal concepts, often repeated by Abaelard, necessity is identified with what nature demands, possibility with what nature allows, and impossibility with what nature forbids. The concept 'nature' in this connection means the metaphysically invariant structure of the world."[434] But since one can know of what nature allows (*potentia secundum naturam*) just by looking at how this nature in fact functions, only what exists is possible. Then someone's or something's potency is defined by his/its nature, determined by species and other regularities of the universe.

Peter Lombard seems to disagree with the Abelardian musings but his own words imply that he has problems with the notion of impossibility to be/have been otherwise at least in the diachronic sense (the conclusion of *quisdam*) but feels fine about other principles of the diachronic model of modality. By not refuting the argument of his opponents, the Lombard tacitly admits some validity of their argumentation and adequacy of the notion of the necessity of the present in the sense of immutability of the actual reality:

(26) if *A* is, it is impossible for *A* not to be or not have been

which can mean that

(27) if *A* is, *A* is necessarily.

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[433] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:286; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:222.

[434] Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 182, see especially the quotations and their explications on pages 181–183, 241n41. The most concise and substantial quotation (from *Dial*. 385.1-8) is found on the same page 182: *Quod enim in uno particularium videmus contingere, id in omnibus eiusdem speciei individuis posse contingere credimus; potentiam enim et impotentiam secundum naturam accipimus, ut id tantum quisque possit suscipere quod eius natura permittit, idque non possit quod natura expellit. Cum autem omnia eiusdem speciei particularia eiusdem sint naturae – unde etiam dicitur ipsa species tota individuorum substantia esse – , idem omnia recipere potentia sunt et impotentia.*

It looks like the Aristotelian notion of the necessity of the present or, perhaps, the Anselmian notion of *necessitas sequens*, although both options are unspoken. At least, by denying the proposition "he was predestined from eternity and now he is not predestined," the Lombardian thinker accepts the diachronic dicta: what is (done) cannot not be when it is (done).

On the other hand, Peter Lombard's hesitations and explicit words also mean that he assumes or at least permits that

(28) if *A* is, it could be possible for it not to be.

He agrees that statements "it could be true from eternity that he was not predestined" and "he could have been not predestined from eternity" could be true. But then he stops and does not develop his own theory of possibilities and impossibilities further. He refuses to determine the issue and says that he would prefer to listen to others (*magis vellet alios audire quam docere; mallem alios audire quam docere*).[435] Master Peter—as he regularly does in the *Sentences*—demonstrates "an attractive openness to a multiplicity of approaches" and in fact "provides no viable theory at all."[436] The only remark he makes concerns the focus of this sophisticated discussion: theology proper should not bother itself with natural or merely dialectical possibilities – it is expected to talk about divine modalities and, specifically, God's supernatural power. This is what the last sentence of the distinction 40 means: "But when we deal with God's foreknowledge or predestination, its possibility or impossibility is referred to the power of God which was and is ever the same, because predestination, foreknowledge, power, is one thing in God" (*Cum vera de praescientia vel praedestinatione Dei agitur, possibilitas vel impossibilitas ad potentiam Dei refertur, quae semper eadem fuit et est, quia*

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[435] *Sent.* 1, dist. 40, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:285; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:222.

[436] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 195.

praedestinatio, praescientia, potentia unum in Deo est).[437] When someone asks, whether God is able to damn any of the predestined and save any of the reprobated or in some other manner alter the actual state of affairs, this issue should be treated from the perspective of possibility as God's potency and power. A question about whether his decision and the actual turn of events *could* or *could have been* different is the question about non-possibility and, hence, is a "non-question" indeed, as M. Colish says.[438]

Having reacted to the theory of (im)possibility for the saved to be damned and vice versa, the author of the *Sententiae* adds some clarifications to the idea of predestination as he understands it,[439] but in fact, gives no new information. We are reminded that the divine predestination is foreknowledge indissolubly coupled with God's activity. Moreover, it is primarily God's action: a preparation of his grace, election, and graceful assistance throughout a person's whole Christian life. But reprobation is a different matter. It is primarily a foreknowledge of people's iniquities (*praescientia iniquitatis quorundam*) and secondarily God's active "preparation of their damnation" (*praeparatio damnationis eorundem*).[440] Yet, it must be carefully understood, for the sins are but foreknown by God and his judgment of sins is both foreknown and prepared. This allows distinguishing between what he *merely* knows and what he knows *and* actually does.

4.7. Distinction 41: explaining the logic of predestination and reprobation and the semantics of God's knowledge[441]

The first two chapters of distinction 41 follow up the predestination theme raised in the preceding sections. Here Peter Lombard seeks to figure out whether there is

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[437] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:286; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:222.

[438] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:289.

[439] *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:286–288; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:222–224.

[440] Ibid.

[441] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:288–293; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:725–727; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:224–229; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:725–727.

any merit or deserving of obduracy or mercy (*meritum obdurationls vel misericordiae*) on the human part.[442] It can be reformulated as the question of causes or reasons for God's mercy to some people and other people's obduracy.

The Lombardian response is fully Augustinian. Although he completely omits and never mentions the idea of irresistible grace, in other respects he sides with the mature Augustine in stressing the monergistic scheme of salvation.[443] According to the *doctor gratiae* and the *magister sententiarum*, "God elected whom he willed by a freely given mercy, not because they would be faithful in the future, but so that they might be faithful; and he gave grace to them not because they were faithful, but that they might become so" (*Elegit ergo quos voluit gratuita misericordia, non quia fideles futuri erant, sed ut fideles essent: eisque gratiam dedit non quia fideles erant, sed ut fierent*).[444] Hence, God predestines simply because he wills and not because he has previously foreseen some merit or good action of a human.

With regards to reprobation, Peter firstly admits that "no merit elicits mercy but obduracy is not without deserving" (*misericordiam nullum advocat meritum, obduratio vera non est sine merito*). But he immediately rejects this option and states that obduracy as the privation or subtraction of grace (*gratiae privatio sive subtractio*) is the effect of reprobation, which should be analyzed as a part of the divine *reprobatio*.[445] The result of such an approach is unambiguous and based on the story of Jacob and Esau (Malach. 1, 2-3; Rom. 9, 13): God neither elects because of one's merits nor reprobates (*nec illum elegit, nec illum reprobavit Deus pro meritis*).[446] In other words, as God elected whom he willed, so he also reprobated

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[442] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:288; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:224.

[443] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:288, 289.

[444] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 2, no. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:292; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:228.

[445] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:288–289; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:224–225.

[446] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:289; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:225.

whom he willed, not because of their eventual deserving which he foresaw" (*reprobavit quos voluit, non propter merita futura quae praevideret*).[447]

The Lombard follows Augustine in ascribing this to the mysterious but always right divine truth and justice. He dismisses other alternative interpretations of God's predestination and reprobation, some of which he finds "frivolous" (*frivolum*) and "carnal" (*carnaliter*),[448] and is definitely content with the monergistic picture of human salvation. He does not even dare to discuss the (possible) rationale for God's voluntary decisions of this kind. His purpose is to "emphasize the divine sovereignty and the freedom of grace," as Silano suggests.[449] Yet, having highlighted the undeserved nature of both predestination and reprobation he returns to the topic of God's knowledge as such.

He returns to the issues raised in distinctions 39 and 40 about possible immutability of God's knowledge and asks, "whether all things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and knew and foreknows and foreknew or whether he knew or foreknew once what he no longer knows or foreknows" (*utrum ea omnia quae semel scit vel praescit Deus, semper sciat et scierit, et praesciat ac praescierit, an olim scierit vel praescierit quod modo non scit vel praescit*).[450] And, maybe surprisingly, Peter does not give a sweeping positive answer. He rather proceeds to make two important distinctions.

First of them concerns the terms mentioned—namely, "knowledge" (*scientia*) and foreknowledge (*praescientia*): they are not of the same weight, for they refer to different subjects. Knowledge has a broader scope because in unqualified—or "divine"—sense it embraces whatever can be known. But foreknowledge grasps only the future things (*futura*). Consequently, God foreknows a thing *before* it happens and cannot foreknow it anymore *after* it has happened, because the foreknowledge is a "preceding" knowledge of things before they take place. Nevertheless, he should be

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[447] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 2, no. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:292; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:228.

[448] Cf. *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 2, no. 1, 5-6.

[449] Silano, "Introduction," xlv.

[450] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 3, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:292; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:228.

said to unfailingly know a thing always, independently of the time of its happening, because "God always knows all things that he knows at any time: for he always had, has, and will have all knowledge that he has at any time" (*Scit enim Deus semper omnia quae aliquando scit: ornnem enim scientiam quam aliquando habet, semper habuit et habet et habebit*).[451] So, foreknowledge actually is, when applied to God, an inappropriate term, because Gods' foreknowledge is simply knowledge. From the linguistic-logical perspective, foreknowledge is used as a relative term with two referents and a limited domain, whereas knowledge is used absolutely, without any qualifications.

After it, the Master of the *Sentences* questions the meaning of the verbs and grammatical tenses such as "knew" (*scierit*), "knows" (*scit*), and suchlike, because their misunderstanding generates many theological errors or confusions. What can help us here is the so-called *Nominalists' argument (opinio Nominalium)* to which the Lombard appeals. This opinion speaks of the semantic correlation between nouns and verbs, and in William Courtenay's version of it sounds like this: "whatever God at one time knew, willed, or was able to do, He always knows, wills, or is able to do [or, in other words,] once it is true, it is always true (*semel est verum, semper est verum*)."[452] Colish unpacks this definition: "According to this view, a verb signifies two things, an action and the time when the action takes place. A single action is signified, irrespective of the time. The time is only a passing circumstance. It is a consignification which does not alter the proper signification of the verb."[453] And this rule perfectly works in theology proper.

The argument has already been tacitly invoked in one of the preceding sections,[454] but now Peter Lombard explicitly cites and unfolds it, yet in a less concise manner than the contemporary scholars. He says God knows an event before it happens as well as after it has happened and so might be said to have known

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[451] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 3, no. 2-3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:292–293; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:228–229.
[452] Quoted in Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 139.
[453] Ibid.
[454] See *Sent*. 1, dist. 40, cap. 1, no. 5, and 2.2.7 above.

something (in the past) or to know something (presently). Since the state of affairs has already changed and what God foreknew has taken place,

> it is necessary to express this knowledge of his then and now by different terms. For what was then future is now past, and so the words must be changed to designate this. Similarly, when we speak at different times, we sometimes designate the same day by the adverb "tomorrow," when it is still to come; sometimes we call it "today," when it is the present; sometimes we call it "yesterday," when it is past. And so, before the world was created, God knew it would be created; after its creation, he knows it has been created. And yet this is not to know different things, but entirely the same thing about the world's creation.
>
> (*[L]icet tunc et nunc hane scientiam eius diversis exprimi verbis oporteat. Nam quod tunc futurum erat, nunc praeteritum est; ideoque verba commutanda sunt ad ipsum designandum. Sicut diversis temporibus loquentes, eandem diem modo per hoc adverbium 'cras' designamus, dum adhuc futura est; modo per 'hodie', dum praesens est; modo per 'heri', dum praeterita est. Ita antequam crearetur mundus, sciebat Deus hunc creandum; postquam creatus est, scit eum creatum. Nec est hoc scire diversa, sed omnino idem de mundi creatione.*)[455]

This means that it is not the form or tense of the verbs applied to God that directs our thinking, but their proper signification – the *action itself* that is being signified by the verb. The verb "to know," whether used in the past tense ("knew") or in the future tense ("will know"), has one and the same meaning – "having the knowledge," "being aware of," "cognizing something." Therefore we cannot say that there is a thing, which God knew but now knows no more or did not know but has come to know it. God immutably knows every single thing, and this is why he constantly knows and will know what he knew and had known *ab aeterno*.

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[455] *Sent*. 1, dist. 41, cap. 3, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:293; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:229.

However, from our perspective—and we live in time and speak in tenses (*sicut diversis temporibus loquentes*)—it is logical and correct to use different forms of verbs to express some theological truths about God's knowledge. For example, it is right to say that "before the world was created, God knew it would be created" and that now, that the creation had taken place, "he knows it has been created."[456] Thus, the manner and form of speech depend on the perspective from which one looks; yet, the content will be the same in spite of the emerging differences of locution.

Thus, we see how the Lombard accepts and happily exploits the Abelardian idea of "the univocal signification of a noun and the differing consignifications it may have in statements using the past, present and future tenses of the verb."[457] As a result of this appropriation, the proper understanding of God's knowledge has been defended and clarified. "And so let us hold without a doubt that God always knows all things which he knows at any time" (*Indubitanter igitur taneamus Deum semper omnia scire, quae aliquando scit*).[458]

4.8. Summary

So, what is, in a nutshell, Peter Lombard's doctrine of God's knowledge and how sophisticated is it?

Firstly, the Lombard asserts that God's wisdom or knowledge is an attribute that actually refers to one, simple, and indivisible divine essence *as* doing something and being connected to something. Thus, "God's knowledge" is a linguistic and theological concept that properly signifies God's essence and means the Trinity's awareness and knowledge of all things. In short, God's knowledge is the Triune God as knowing everything knowable. Hence, Peter Lombard's attention to Trinitarian theology and commitment to his essentialist perspective are obvious. Also, one

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[456] *Sent.* 1, dist. 41, cap. 3, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:293; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:229.

[457] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:287.

[458] *Sent.* 1, dist. 41, cap. 3, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:293; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:229.

should recognize the careful semantic approach to terms and concepts used in theology proper, as the Master of the *Sentences* builds his theory of divine knowledge on the Augustinian notion of signification, on one side, and the metaphysical nuances of his language, as he scrutinizes the idea of multiple attributes of one simple essence. This combination of semantics and metaphysics bears a fruit in the detailed exposition of the subcategories the Lombard delineates within his theory.

Thus, secondly, he notes that since God's knowledge refers to different knowable and known objects it is often described by a number of different, albeit traditional, concepts. Foreknowledge or foresight is the knowledge of what is going to happen in the future of the actual world; disposition is of what should be done; providence of what and how should be governed; predestination of who are to be saved and damned. But all these are narrow and more specific aspects of one and perfectly broad "simple" knowledge or wisdom of God: the full awareness of all things knowable. This positioning of divine epistemic subcategories under the umbrella of a comprehensive notion of wisdom or knowledge shows the systemic approach the Lombard takes and helps to see the bigger picture of his theory of the *scientia divina* in the *Sentences*.

In particular, this epistemological system of concepts demonstrates the range of objects with which the knowing divine essence is connected. They include God himself as the *internal eternal object* of knowledge, the angelic reality as the *external eternal object*, and the actual created world with its time-space continuum, various creatures, and events as the *external temporal object*. Also, this system allows Master Peter to carefully distinguish between two modes of God's epistemic activity, if one might use such a language. The Lombard says that there are things God merely knows and things God knows and approves. Both modes of action are simple and eternal, but the latter implies some kind of active volition on the side of God whereas the former does not. Hence, according to the *Sentences*, in God, there is both pure or simple knowledge and the knowledge with approbation and good pleasure attached. It is one and the same knowledge but with a different type of connection to the divine will. What is crucial here is the absence or presence of pleasure and willing activity

on God's side. Such a distinction highlights the point that God's knowledge does not function in isolation from other divine attributes, therefore, when one speaks of God the knower, one also speaks of God the "willer" who approves or disapproves some things.

Thirdly, God knows things which exist in time and space from and in his eternity. For the Lombard, it means that God can neither know things by contemplating them as if from within the time nor come to know something new or "un-know" something he used to know before. On the contrary, knowledge from all eternity implies immutability and awareness of everything at once. Here I confirm Colish's observation: "The dimension of time included by Peter in this definition of wisdom refers not to Gods knowledge as such, but to that knowledge as applied, in a relative sense, to a universe that exists in time."[459] Intrinsically, God's knowledge is simple, eternal, and immutable, being nothing more than God's essence *as* knowing things outside God. It is through this immutable awareness of every single possible and actual thing that God epistemically relates to the temporal world.

But, interestingly, this perfect awareness with no shadow of change does not mean that God is in principle incapable of knowing more than he knows. The author of the *Sentences* is content to assert that God's knowledge can potentially include more items than he knows now but, in fact, it cannot and will not change. In other words, quantitatively the divine knowledge could have been and potentially can be different, but qualitatively it is always the same: full, exhaustive, and comprehensive. What known as possibly existing might become known as actually existing or what is known as existing at an earlier point of time might become known as no longer existing at an earlier point of time. But, in both cases, it is the modal and ontological status of the known objects that changes, not God's knowledge of them. He permanently knows everything known and knowable.

Fourthly, the Lombardian discussion about God's knowledge serves as evidence that Master Peter averts from purely dialectical exercises and avoids sophisticated

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[459] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:724.

modal theories, just as Colish suggested 25 years ago.[460] He simply, and quite traditionally, affirms that divine wisdom embraces everything knowable and, thus, is complete, exhaustive, and immutable. But, as the cited paradoxes and employed techniques show, Peter Lombard is actually quite competent in logic and eager to use some of its methods and procedures when it is necessary. This point has not been sufficiently stressed by Colish, nor was studied by Rosemann.[461] He uses the *modus tollens* in dealing with problematic paradoxes, traces possible false implications of certain propositions by means of the *reductio ad absurdum* method, appeals to conjunctive and disjunctive reading of propositions, regularly speaks of necessity and possibility while the former tends to mean temporal fixity and the latter one's potency or capacity, and, as a result, turns out to be a humble proponent of the then-widespread diachronical theory of modality. For instance, the Lombard rejects the Abelardian necessarianism with its conviction that what is cannot be otherwise, but still agrees that what is, is necessarily, when/after it is. Additionally, the Lombard seems to allow for the possibility that, from the perspective of divine eternity, some things could or might have been different. Master Peter does not go too deep in this exciting discussion but, at least, passes it on to the posterity. Also, one cannot fail to see both his awareness of, and an ability to work with, these complex philosophical notions and his hesitation to press some points to far. God is the mystery and there should be a measure in philosophical musings about what he could or could not do. Such is the Lombardian approach to the modal dimensions of the doctrine of Gods knowledge.

Now, that the sketch of his doctrine has been offered, it is time to continue reading the *Sentences* further. The distinctions dedicated to God's wisdom yield to

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[460] On one hand, she notes, that "[i]n comparison with thinkers who viewed God's relation to the world in terms of the logical or physical relations between necessity, possibility, and contingency, Peter recasts the question into a metaphysical investigation into God's foreknowledge, providence, and predestination in relation to contingency and free will" and he, in fact, "dislikes, and criticizes, the tendency found in some quarters, ancient and modern, to collapse metaphysical questions concerning the deity into logical questions." On the other, she agrees that his "address to the inheritance of the Christian tradition, whether ancient or more recent, is, as we have seen, both thoroughgoing and independent. The same can be said for his attitude toward the artes and to the philosophy available in the schools of his day." Colish, 2:724, 723, 718, respectively.

[461] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:295–290; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:723–26; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 77–82.

the distinctions which has to do with God's power or potency. This is where I go now.

5. Peter Lombard's doctrine of God's power and modalities

5.1. Distinction 42: introducing God's omnipotence as related to his will[462]

Having looked at the divine foreknowledge, Peter Lombard turns his attention to the theme of God's potency, power, and will. And first of all, he inquires into the nature and the right definition of God's omnipotence in its relation to God's will. He assumes that there are two possible—and not necessarily mutually excluding—options: either God is omnipotent in the sense that he "can do all things" (*omnia possit*), or he is omnipotent in the sense that "he can do all things that he wills" (*ea possit quae vult*).[463] Then he analyzes the two and comes to the conclusion that although it is acceptable and right to say that God is able to do all things, such a proposition requires some qualifications, and, additionally, due to a number of reasons, it is much more correct to opt for the second option and call God omnipotent because he has potency to do whatever he wills. Let us unfold the Lombard's reasoning.[464]

When we confess that God can do anything or everything, it is important to modify the phrase and reinterpret some things that God is supposedly not able to do. For instance, he cannot physically walk or literally talk, but he still can be said to be able to do so in a preeminent way: he can create "walking," "talking," "seeing," and the similar phenomena, and make these operations in and through his creatures. So, in this case, a proposition of the type "he can do" means "he can create this act (by means of others)" and "he can make others do it."[465] In other words, there are some things God certainly can do but in an amended sense: he "cannot have these actions in himself" (*in se Deus habere non possit*) but he "can work them in creatures" (*in*

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[462] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:294–298; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:743–744; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230–233; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:743–744.

[463] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:294; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230.

[464] See, especially, *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 2-3. Cf. Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 193–200; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:297; Silano, "Introduction," xlvi.

[465] Although Lombard nor uses the terminology, nor bases his thinking on Anselm of Canterbury's theories this idea is reminiscent of the latter's "agency modality." He distinguished between direct agency (*facere per se*) and indirect agency (*facere per aliud*) as being different types and modes of doing or causing something to happen (*facere esse*). See Uckelman, "Modalities in Medieval Logic," 47–51.

creaturis potest operari).[466] Hence, these things are to be included in the sphere of God's omnipotence.

However, there are some things which God cannot do in any way (*nullatenus facere potest*), and it is exactly this "inability" that confirms his all-powerful character. For anything that implies weakness, passivity or suffering, cannot be said about, and be believed to pertain to, God. If God is the most supreme and perfect Being, he cannot be a passive agent who undergoes someone else's action and thus suffers, nor can he be subject to any passions and defects (*passionibus atque defectibus subici*). Therefore he must be unable to sin, lie, die, etc. But since all these deeds imply not power, but rather deficiency (*impotentiae*) and weakness (*infirmitatis*), an omnipotent being should be free from them.[467] Thus, God is truly omnipotent *because* he is unable to die, lie, and do other similar things, but is able to do all things "which are in accordance with his truth and justice" (*quod convenit veritati eius et iustitiae*), as the quote from Ambrosiaster puts it.[468]

But the most crucial thing is that God's power or potency is regulated by his will, and so God's omnipotence must be—and actually is, as the Lombard stresses— interpreted through the lens of the doctrine of God's will. He appeals to Augustine (who in fact cited Ambrosiaster's dictum) but offers his own reading of this authoritative text. The quote reads: "God could do all things at once, but reason forbade it" (*Potuit Deus cuncta simul facere, sed ratio prohibuit*).[469] But Master Peter deepens and modifies the meaning of the phrase: he states that "ratio" here means not the reason or God's intellect but the will of God (*voluntas*). He argues: "He no doubt called his will reason there because God's will is reasonable and most equitable"

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[466] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:294–295; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230.

[467] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 2, no. 2; cap. 3, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:295; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230–231.

[468] Ambrosiaster, *Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti*, q. 97. Quoted in *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:294; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230.

[469] Ibid., q. 106.

(*Rationem nempe ibi voluntatem appellavit, quia Dei voluntas rationabilis est et aequissima*).[470]

This step from the "potency discourse" to the "will discourse" is remarkable. The great *magister sententiarum* finds it insufficient and one-sided to talk about God's abilities and powers when the topic is his omnipotence. The theological essentialism of the Lombard shines through this dissatisfaction and paves the way for a more complex vision. The emphasis on the unity of Trinitarian essence makes Master Peter assume the strong connection of the divine all-powerfulness with other properties. The number one candidate for such a connection, which helps to clarify and settle some issues raised in the discussion, is God's will. This is why the long chapter 3 of the given distinction is dedicated to a detailed investigation of the true meaning of God's omnipotence which is defined by a double assertion: "he can do all things that he wills" (*ea possit quae vult*) and "he suffers nothing at all" (*nihil omnino patitur*).[471] The latter is classic Christian teaching and deserves no additional comments,[472] but the former is open to various interpretations some of which should be upheld and other rejected. It is here in mediating between these positions that "Lombard shows himself to be a first rate analytic thinker," in Ivan Boh's estimation.[473]

Here the author of the *Sentences* appeals to a number of other authorities (Augustine, John Chrysostom, John Mediocris, Apostle Paul) and shows that they insist that "God is called omnipotent only by the fact that he can do all that he wills, not because he can do all things" (*Deus ex eo tantum dicatur omnipotens, quod omnia potest, quae vult, non quia omnia possit*).[474] Master Peter notes once again that "to be able to do all things" (*omnia possit*) has too broad a meaning, which easily causes

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[470] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:294; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:230.

[471] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 3, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:295; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:231.

[472] Even Master Peter himself is very brief here. He dedicates only half a sentence to the issue: *Secundum utrumque Deus omnipotens verissime praedicatur, quia nec aliquid est quod ei ad patiendum corruptionem inferre valeat, nec aliquid ad faciendum impedimentum afferre*. Ibid.

[473] Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 195.

[474] *Sent.* 1, dist. 42, cap. 3, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:296; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:232.

risky confusions bordering on heresy. For one can take "omnia" as meaning *absolutely everything*, including all good and all bad things, but that would be a faulty move. Thus, we can hold that "God can do all things which it is fitting for him to be able to do" (*eum posse omnia quae convenit ei posse*).[475] But who decides what is fitting?

The criterion and actual "decider" is the *Dei voluntas*, for "he can do whatever he wills" (*potest quidquid vult*). But this statement—albeit definitely true—still needs a qualification. It does not mean: "he can do whatever he wills himself to be able to do" (*potest… quidquid vult se posse*), for it is too close to the human level – even people sometimes can be said to be able to do whatever they want to be able to do (if they think realistically or on the basis of the strong faith as the saints – *quilibet sanctorum Beatorum*). It can be regarded as too narrow an approach to God's omnipotence. For a creature by no means can do whatever it wants to be done, since even if it wants all people to be saved indeed, yet its will does not prevail in this case (*vult enim salvos fieri qui salvandi sunt; verumtamen eos salvare non valet*).[476]

But with God, everything looks differently: he "can do whatever he wills to be done" (*Deus autem quidquid vult fieri, potest facere*). The wording here does not stress God's potency or power which seems to play a major role in God's decision, since the phrase does not read *potest facere quidquid vult fieri*. Instead, it gives the place of honor to God's will and has the following form: *quidquid vult fieri, potest facere*. The measure of God's potency is his will and not vice versa. Master Peter continues and proves his point by saying: "For if he wills something to be done by himself, he can do it by himself and does it by himself; just as, because he willed it, he made the heaven and earth by himself. But if he wills something to be done through a creature, he also works through it… And so God is powerful from himself and through himself" (*Si enim vult aliquid fieri per se, potest illud per se facere, et*

[475] *Sent*. 1, dist. 42, cap. 3, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:296–297; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:232.

[476] Ibid.

per se facit; sicut caelum et terram per se fecit quia voluit. Si autem vult fieri per creaturam, et per eam operator… Et Deus quidem ex se et per se potest).[477]

The explanation Peter offers highlights both the primacy of the will and the broad range of possibilities in his account of God's omnipotence. It shines through the very first sentence, which starts with "if he wills…" (*Si enim vult…*) and is also obvious in his example of the creation: the world was made "because he willed it" (*quia voluit*) and not because he was able to do it. Therefore he comes to the conclusion: God is not only able to do what he wills but also powerful enough to "also do those things which he does not will" (*eum posse etiam ea quae non vult*), but still, whatever he wills, he can do that *(quidquid vult, potest)*.[478] In other words, "God can accomplish whatever He wants to accomplish, whether He wills it to occur directly or indirectly."[479] His potency makes available possible actions or decisions, and then God's will chooses what to realize and what to leave unrealized. Hence, *posse* here refers to the potency, which implies real logical and feasible possibilities as potential actions of the Godhead, and *velle* means contingently taking decisions and choosing.

Hence, it becomes evident that Peter Lombard provides a quite subtle doctrine of God's omnipotence. He makes a very interesting "connection between the possibility and the acts of will."[480] The unactualized possibilities continue to exist anyway, but God's potency rooted in his immense power to actualize them is restricted by his will alone. So, the will turns out to be the "dominant" quality of God as directed *ad extra*, and this safeguards God's freedom.[481] The Master completes this chapter with an apt summary. He writes:

> And so God the Trinity is truly and properly called omnipotent because through himself, that is, by his natural power, he is able to do whatever he wills to be done and whatever he wills himself to be able to do. For he wills nothing to be

[477] Ibid., Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:297; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:232–233.

[478] *Sent*. 1, dist. 42, cap. 3, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:297; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:232.

[479] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:297.

[480] Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196.

[481] Cf. Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 141.

done which he cannot do through himself or through a creature; and he wills himself to be able to do nothing which he cannot do. And all that he wills to be done, he wills himself to be able to do; but he does not will to be done all that he wills himself to be able to do. For if he willed it, it would be done, because nothing can resist his will.

(*Ideo igitur vere ac proprie Deus Trinitas omnipotens dicitur, quia per se, id est naturali potentia, potest quidquid vult fieri, et quidquid vult se posse. Nihil enim vult fieri, quod non possit facere per se vel per creaturam; et nihil vult se posse, quod non possit. Et omne quod vult fieri, vult se posse; sed non omne quod vult se posse, vult et fieri: si enim vellet, et fieret, qiua voluntati eius nihil resistere potest.*)[482]

Hence, the Augustinian distinction between God's potency and power (*potentia, posse*), on one hand, and the will (*voluntas, velle*), on the other, has been firmly established. The potency of God remains immense and infinite, whereas it is "limited" by, or, better, intrinsically connected with, his reasonable will (*Dei voluntas rationabilis*). But, then, it is, in fact, limitless, since the only thing that controls it is God's reason and his decision-making ability called *voluntas*, that is, his perfect essence. Nonetheless, the question of possibilities available for God has not been fully answered.

5.2. Distinction 43: contrasting the Abelardian and Augustinian-Lombardian notions of God's potency[483]

Peter Lombard needs to continue the topic of God's potency and God's will because of the discussion started by "some who, glorifying in their own intellect have attempted to encompass God's power within a limit" (*Quidam tamen, de suo sensu*

[482] *Sent*. 1, dist. 42, cap. 3, no. 6. Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:233. The Latin text is according to Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:297–298.

[483] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:298–303; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:761–763; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:233–238; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:761–763.

gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt).[484] No doubt, the Lombard is referring to Peter Abelard and his school.[485]

The problematic theory that *Abaelardus* brought forward consists of one strong thesis and several theo-logical arguments, which his *respondens Lombardus* carefully analyzes and refutes. Here is the thesis, found in the *Theologia christiana*: "What He wills, He must will necessarily; and what He does, He must do necessarily" (*Quae vult, necessario velit, et quae facit, necessario faciat*).[486] Such a proposition results in the conclusion that "God is not able to do anything other than what he does" (*Deum nil posse nisi quod facit*), which is the titular question of distinction 43.[487] But this conflation and equation of God's potency and God's activity entail the limitation of God's freedom and the imposition of logical necessity upon God's activity *ad extra*. Although this theory defends the doctrines of God's perfection and immutability, it does so at a very high price: the immutability appears to be confused with the impossibility to be able to act otherwise and the perfection appears to entail the existence of only one possible—and therefore necessary—course of divine choices and actions.[488]

Since the Lombard holds a different view on God's potency and will, he undertakes a detailed exposition and refutation of the Abelardian thesis. He does so in the form of a series of responses to a series of arguments: he lists seven claims that the other Master Peter makes and provides his counterarguments to each of them. Since there exist a number of good detailed expositions of this discussion, written by I. Boh, M. Colish, D. Luscombe, and, most recently, J. Marenbon[489] I will limit

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[484] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:298; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:233. The derogatory formulation belongs to Hugh of St. Victor, but the treatment of this arrogant intellectuals' theory in the *Sentences* belongs to the Lombard's own acumen. See Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 266f.

[485] Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196–198; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 144–146, 153; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:297; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 266.

[486] Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 5.42, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11 (Turnhout, 1969), 366, quoted in Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 153; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 124.

[487] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:298; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:233.

[488] See Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196–197; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 153.

[489] Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196–200; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard," 153–155; Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 124–125; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:297–299; Luscombe, *The*

myself to a very concise presentation of Abelard's statements, as the *Sentences* present them, and a bit more nuanced examination of the Lombard's reaction.

The Abelardians argue in the following manner:

(i) "God is not able to do anything other than what it is good and just to do. But it is not just and good for him to do other than what he does" (*Non potest Deus facere nisi quod bonum est et iustum fieri; non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo nisi quod facit*).[490] So, the essential perfection seems to put a limitation on God's potency, but it is looked at as a positive thing because it emphasizes God's goodness both in his nature (he *is* good and just) and in his acts (he always *does* what is good and just).

(ii) "He cannot do anything other than what his justice requires; but his justice does not require that he do anything other than what he does; and so he cannot do anything other than what he does" (*Non potest facere nisi quod iustitia eius exigit; sed non exigit eius iustitia ut faciat, nisi quod facit; non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit*).[491] His righteousness and justice—this is the complex meaning of the Latin *justitia*, which cannot be encapsulated in the English "justice" alone—is another expression of the divine perfection. This is why it has the right to regulate God's activity: he is righteous; therefore what he does is necessarily and naturally right and just. But this seems true even conversely and, hence, here is the equation of what is right for God to do and what is actually done by God.

(iii) "God cannot do other than what he ought; but he ought not to do anything other than what he does. For if he ought to do other things, then he does not do all that he ought" (*Non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet; non autem debet facere nisi quod facit. Si enim debet alia facere, non ergo facit omne quod debet*).[492] This peculiar statement continues the same logical chain and conflates the moral necessity or "obligation," which must be rooted in God's essence, with God's actions.

School of Peter Abelard, 266–267; Silano, "Introduction," xlvi. The most extensive and deep treatment of the Abelardian position—Marenbon calls it NAG, "no alternatives for God"—is to be found in Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, 217–225; John Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions: A Twelfth-Century Philosopher in His Context and Ours* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2013), 45–115.

[490] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:298–299; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:234.

[491] Ibid.

[492] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:299–300; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:235.

(iv) "He does, or leaves undone, nothing, except by the very best and reasonable of causes, although that may be hidden from us, according to which it is necessary for him to do or leave undone whatever he does or leaves undone" (*Nihil facit aut dimittit nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit, secundum quam oportet eum facere et dimittere quae facit vel dimittit*).[493] This is a rational explanation of why God does what he does and does not—or cannot—do other things: what he does is reasonable, and the converse is also true, for this is the dictate of God's reasonable and perfect nature.

(v) "There is reason for him to do what he does and not other things; and he cannot do other than what there is reason for him to do"[494] (*Ratio est eum facere quae facit, et non alia; et non potest facere nisi quod ratio est eum facere*).[495] It follows from (iv) that God does not do what is irrational or unreasonable for him to do. Therefore, if there is something he never did or will never do, it must be ill-grounded to do that.

(vi) "If God can do other than what he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow" (*Si potest aliud Deus facere quam facit, potest igitur facere quod non praescivit*), which is a theological contradiction and impossibility.[496]

(vii) Finally, the appeal to the authority of Augustine[497] is made and the following statement emerges: "he cannot do other than what he wills. But he does not will other than what he does" (*non posse facere aliquid nisi quod vult. Sed non vult nisi quod facit*).[498] Whatever God wills comes true, but then, it seems, his will acts within the only course of choices: God wills – God does, and that is it. Hence, God's will is equated with God's acts.

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[493] *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:300; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:235.

[494] This extremely literal translation must mean that God always acts reasonably and logically. Here is another possible rendering of Lombard's words: "God has a reason to do the things he does and no other things; and he cannot do anything without a reason."

[495] *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

[496] *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

[497] Specifically, Augustine, *Sermo* 214, no. 3; *Confessiones*, book 7, cap. 4, no. 6.

[498] *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

Peter Lombard finds all these seven arguments problematic, unless they are qualified and, by and large, corrected and reinterpreted. He notes that many of these phrases have a double meaning (*duplex sensus*), lexical ambiguities (*ambiguitatem locutionis*), or at least two alternative interpretations (*duplicem verborum intelligentiam*).[499] This is why their correct reading must be identified and established.

For instance, the right interpretation of dictum (i) is this: "he cannot do anything other than what, if he were to do it, would be just and good" (*non potest facere nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustum*). In other words, God's perfection does not limit God. It is rather reflected in his every act so that the divine internal goodness naturally entails the external goodness of his acts. But still, the Master of the *Sentences* denies the validity of the Abelardian implication according to which it is fitting for God to do only what he does (*non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo nisi quod facit*). On the contrary, the Lombard insists that God's potency includes numerous hypothetical possibilities although many choices will remain forever unrealized. Yet, whatever is, was, or will be realized will be good and just (*non potest facere nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustu*m).[500]

Further, the argument (ii) must be understood in the sense that God's actions are always totally consistent with his divine righteousness and justice. But it cannot mean that his will and potency have the same "content": it is one thing to be able to do and another to be willing to do. Hence, the *justitia Dei*, which is his just will (*justa voluntas sua*) makes choices, which are constantly in natural harmony with his justice (*eum non posse facere nisi illud quod, si fieret, iustitiae eius conveniret*) and can never be opposed to it (*eum non posse facere id quod iustitiae eius convenire non potest*). Additionally, the notion of "requirement" or "demanding" (*exigit, exactionis verbum*) has to be dismissed and should not be applied to God due to its being improper in this case.[501]

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[499] See *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 2, 3, *passim*.

[500] *Sent.* 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:299; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:234.

[501] Ibid.

By the same token, the term "ought to" (*debet*) used in the statement (iii) needs to be put aside. For God cannot be obliged to anyone and anything. This is why the only probable and acceptable reading of (iii) is the following: "God cannot do other than what he ought" is true in the sense that "he cannot do other than what, if he were to do it, would be truly suitable for him to do" (*non potest nisi illud quod, si faceret, ei bene conveniret*). Thus, Peter Lombard removes the internal necessity from the "control panel" of God's will and highlights the freedom of his decision. His will cannot be constrained by necessity just as his potency as such cannot be constrained by his will.[502] The necessity as coercion and preceding causation is denied, but a special type of the logical necessity, *necessitas consequentiae*, that is, the necessity of entailment gains an approval: it is necessarily true that *if* God does something, it will be fitting to his nature. The "if–then" relation in this implication must be necessary, while neither the antecedent not the consequent are per se necessary.[503] This is what the Lombard means. Consequently, even if he does not mention Anselm, he, in practice, once again accepts and employs his distinction between two types of necessity: the preceding, causal, physical necessity and the subsequent, caused necessity of immutable entailment. God cannot do anything that, if he decided to do that, would conflict with his justice or, by extension, other attributes.

This "if" definitely points to the necessity of entailment. God is not constrained by any external or temporal limitations but, *if* he wills something to happen, it happens in accordance with God's knowledge, potency, and will. For God, it is immutable because he wills it to be (if he wills so) and not because any other constraint.

The language of limitation or one-sided necessity has to be eliminated from thesis (iv), as well. That God has reasons to do one thing and leave undone the other does not mean that his reasonable will cannot have alternative options. The Lombard

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[502] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:300; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:235.

[503] On this type of necessity see Antonie Vos, "Paul Helm on Medieval Scholasticism," *Journal of Reformed Theology* 8, no. 3 (2014): 266–269; Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 174–175, 213–14; Ivan Boh, "Consequences," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 305–306; Tkachenko, "An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology," 9, 13–17.

insists that (iv) is valid if we mean by it that the divine will is "most equitable and most right" (*voluntas est aequissima et rectissima*), being indispensable, indivisible, and necessary for God. Whatever he does, he does by it (*qua*) and in accordance with it (*secundum eandem rationem*), but never against it (*contra quam*) or without it (*praeter eam*). But—and this is the crucial point—the same reasonable will allows for the existence of alternative options (*eadem manente ratione et causa, alia potuit facere et ista dimittere*). Such a proposition seems to open the door to a set of hypothetical alternative states of affairs. Then, the author of the *Sentences* must be seen as a faithful advocate of the Augustinian "potuit sed noluit" principle: God could have done everything differently if he willed so.

Furthermore, the Lombard continues and says: "For although the reason is in him by which he does some things and leaves others undone, nevertheless he can in accordance with the same reason, leave undone the things which he does and do what he leaves undone" (*Licet ergo ratio sit penes eum qua alia facit, alia dimittit, potest tamen secundum eandem rationem et dimittere quae facit et facere quae dimittit*).[504] The reason that abides in God and determines his actions should be interpreted as God's will, as was the case before.[505] Yet, there is no straightforward specification about the nature of *potest* in this sentence but it looks like it speaks of God's potency to actualize alternative sets of circumstances. It is highly probable that Master Peter from Lombardy has in mind the diachronic possibility and, thus, implies that what God does now he can alter later and vice versa. Of course, the diachronicity works on the level of this reality, and it is a human viewpoint to think in successive moments of time. But this is how such a statement should be explained, given the strong tradition of diachronic modal theories and its tacit acceptance in distinction 40. For God, the possibility to make something otherwise equals simply to his infinite potency and power to act, so to say, "in different directions." For humans, his power to change things unfolds along the time span and is equal to the diachronic perception of the possible state of affairs. In the last analysis, God can "do different reasonable and

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[504] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:300; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:235–236.

[505] See *Sent*. 1, dist. 42, cap. 1, and 2.2.8 above.

good things, other than the ones which he wills and does" (*posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, [praeter] ea quae vult et facit*). But, of course, he naturally and essentially "cannot do other than what is reasonable" (*eum non posse facere nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt*), for by nature he is reasonable and good. Yet, he *could* have acted otherwise, indeed. Such is the Lombard's response to the objection (v).[506]

The argument (vi) has been in fact rebutted before, in distinctions 38-39. So, the Lombard does not offer a detailed exposition of it, but the point he wants to make is easily grasped.[507] In Colish's decent summary, "God's omniscience includes the range of options out of which He selects the actions that He decides to perform."[508] Hence, God can do otherwise than he does, but if he does he foreknows that.

The authorities, which his opponents invoke, cannot prove their position but do prove the Lombard's position. For, as Master Peter shows, Augustine is on his side even when he says that (a) there is only one thing that God cannot do: it is that which he does not will (*quod non vult*), and that (b) God's will is not greater than his potency or power (*voluntas tua non est maior quam potentia*). Both statements of the *doctor gratiae* have to be understood correctly.

Thus, (a) means that "[t]hat alone God cannot do: what he does not will, namely [does not will] himself to be able to do" (*Id solum non potest Deus, quod non vult, scilicet se posse*).[509] So God is able to do anything possible for him and fitting to his nature, his will approving it, and is not able to do what he does not decide to do with his will.

At the same time (b) has a double meaning. Firstly, it means that neither God's will can be greater than God's potency, nor God's potency can be greater than God's will, for they are essentially one thing – God himself (*una et eadem res est potentia, voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus*). Secondly, it implies that "God is able to do more things

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[506] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 5. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

[507] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 6. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

[508] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:298.

[509] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:301; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:236.

than he wills, because more things are subject to his [potency[510]] than to his will" (*Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subiecta eius potentiae quam voluntati*).[511] It implies that the Lombard understands willing only in the active sense: he does not think that the same things that are subject to God's potency are subject to God's will, whether he wills them or *not-wills* them. For him, willing is limited to actual willing – the act of deciding to bring something about. This might prove problematic if one tries to analyze how the divine will interacts with unrealized possibilities but such an issue is not included in the present discussion. God has the potency to do a huge amount of possible things which fit his wisdom and justice, but it is his will that takes decisions as regards what possibilities are going to turn to actualities. Hence, the logical order of God's acting *ad extra* according to the Lombard's theological vision has been clarified better than before, albeit some questions remain unanswered or answered tentatively.

I do not think that Marcia Colish is totally right when out of this material she concludes that Peter Lombard "implied distinction between God's ordained and absolute power." She adds: "While the Lombard does not actually use the terms *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta*, this is the manifest sense of his text."[512] Perhaps, this is somewhat anachronistic and might lead to unnecessary confusions, which will but blur the "manifest sense" of the text. I contend that it overtly and unambiguously speaks about God's potency and God's will, while the distinction between two kinds of God's power can be applied to it only implicitly and in the restricted areas (such as dist. 42). If we want to stay historically accurate and faithful to Master Peter's own language and ideas it is better to speak of what he was speaking. And he deliberately chose to refer to God's essence, (fore)knowledge, omnipotence, potency, and will – hence, our choice of terms and concepts is basically

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[510] Here I alter Silano's translation and put "potency" instead of his "power" because I think that in this case a sublime differentiation is needed, for Peter Lombard means power as *potency to act in this or that way*, but does not mean power as *sovereignty, rule* or *strength*. This meaning is dictated by the text and its content and, thus, must be held in order to stay faithful to Master Peter's theological intentions.

[511] *Sent*. 1, dist. 43, cap. 1, no. 8. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:302; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:237.

[512] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:298.

defined. And then the Lombard appears to speak of God's absolute power and his "ordained" will or, better, God's ordaining will.

Nevertheless, Colish is right when she speaks of "God's radical freedom,"[513] defended by the Lombard in distinction 43. For, indeed, God's possibility to act differently than he does is freedom indeed. And it is truly radical, for its root (that is, *radix*) is God's omnipotence and perfect will. Hence, God's potency and will, so carefully distinguished and safeguarded by *Petrus Lombardus*, constitute God's freedom of choice and action as rooted in his being God. This is the lesson of the *Sentences* 1, distinction 43, and it continues in the next section.

5.3. Distinction 44: developing the idiosyncratic Lombardian notion of God's potency[514]

Here Peter Lombard picks another controversial teaching of Peter Abelard and other *quidam*'s and provides his own answer to two questions about God's potency and power: (i) can God do anything better than he actually does (*An Deus possit facere aliquld melius quam facit*)? and (ii) can God always do what he once could do (*utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit*)?[515] These questions were issues of debate in the mid-twelfth century,[516] with Abelard being a famous defender of the thesis that God cannot do any better than he does.[517] But the Master of *Sentences*

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[513] Ibid.

[514] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:303–306; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:779–780; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:238–240; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:779–780.

[515] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 1, no. 1; cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:303, 305; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:238, 239.

[516] See Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 196, 197–98; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:290ff, 299; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 14-59, 224–60; Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, 45ff.

[517] Boh calls it "Abelardian axiological necessitarianism" while Lovejoy dubbs it "necessitarian optimism" – Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 197; Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University, 1933*, 22nd printing (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1933), 70. In either case, the meaning is the same and it is aesthetically formulated by the same Lovejoy (pp. 70–71):

In the twelfth century, the issue became overt and acute through the attempt made by Abelard to carry out consistently the consequences of the principles of sufficient reason and of plenitude, as these were implicit in the accepted meaning of the doctrine of the "goodness" of deity. Abelard saw clearly that these premises led to a necessitarian optimism. The world, if it is the temporal manifestation of a "good" and rational World-Ground, must be the best possible world; this means that in it all genuine possibility must be actualized; and thus none of its characteristics or components can be contingent, but all things must have been precisely what they are.

answers both of them very attractively and in total consistency with his general views on theology proper.

To the first question, he responds in the following way. The identification of what God actually does with what is best for God to do leads to at least two antinomies. If the existing world is the most perfect world and, there is no way it can be improved or perfected (*non posse esse meliorem, nulla ei perfeclio boni desit*), then the creature becomes equal to God (*creatura Creatori aequatur*). If this wonderful world has no ability or potency to receive some more good from the divine Creator (*bonum amplius, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat*), then it automatically suffers from deficiency or impotence on its part (*defectionis est*). But then the negative answer to the first question is impossible. Therefore "God can make a thing better than he does" (*Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere, quam faciat*).[518]

However, this positive answer needs to be commented on. For the whole question speaks about "doing or making something better" – but better in relation to what? What is the character of this operation or *modus operationis*, as it is referred? The Lombard "relativizes" the notion of doing better and starts speaking of two possible criteria or the *termini* of this action: either the Maker's wisdom (*sapientiam opificis*), or the creature's characteristics (*modus ad rem ipsam*). In relation to the former, the "doing better" is not an option, since God's wisdom—probably, spoken of as his disposition and governance—always acts perfectly. Hence, God "can do nothing more wisely than he does" (*nihil enim sapientius potest facere, quam facit*), all his acts being by definition wise because God is wisdom itself and this wisdom cannot be quantified. But in relation to the latter, it is absolutely logical to say that a created thing's manner of being or operating can or could be different and even better (*et alius et melior potest esse modus*). It means that it is possible for God to make some things qualitatively different – he has potency for that (*potest*). Specifically, he can make a particular thing either somewhat better (*quaedam alio modo meliori*), or equally good but different in some respect (*quaedam alio modo aeque bono*), or even

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[518] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 1, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:304; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:239.

somewhat worse (*quaedam etiam minus bono*). But this scale ranging from "worse" to "better" has sense only for the creature, as it speaks of hypothetical "alternative arrangments"[519] of its qualities.[520]

In other words, God has the potency to act differently and remake something differently, but his voluntary decisions to act in a certain way as well as his individual acts *ad extra* are naturally perfect. This perfection of acts is ontically rooted in God's perfect essence. But when we speak of creatures' essences and God's potency to make them differently, we switch from the divine ontology and factual level to the realm of possibilities as (probably diachronically understood) potential entities and state of affairs, which is related to the "creational ontology." From this perspective, it is true that both (a) a creature could potentially be different and (b) God could make it different. Hence, the highlighted distinctions between the constitution of God and of the created world and between the divine will (and acts) and his potency (and its possibilities). God cannot act better than he acts because he, as the willing and acting subject, is essentially perfect. But God can do something better (or worse) than it is because it *qua* the willed and created objectcan be different. Also, as it was said earlier, God could have willed and done things he has actually done otherwise, were he to will it differently.

The situation with the second question is different. Here we have a question about the corresponding similarity or identity of God's acts and possibilities, not about their difference. But, anyway, the issue concerns God's potency, for it is asked, "whether God can always do what he was once able to do" (*utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit*). Its scope embraces, for example, his creation of the world, the Incarnation, and all other acts he performed in the actual world.

Peter's answer is built methodically on the concepts presented earlier: those of God's eternity as clearly distinguished from the spatiotemporal order of the created world and the "unitary signification of verbs,"[521] which was part of the mentioned

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[519] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:299.

[520] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 1, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:304–305; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:239. See also Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," 198–200.

[521] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 125.

opinio Nominalium. The former implies that God's activity, which takes place inside his essence and/or in the sphere of divine eternity, cannot be bound to the temporal world order. The latter states that "[i]rrespective of the time, the verb signifies a single action."[522] Or, in other words, the grammatical tense and the real time, sometimes implied by it, do not change the signification of the verb as it continues to refer to just one action. For, as the Lombard explains, "verbs of different tenses, spoken at different times and with the addition of different adverbs have the same meaning" (*Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum*).[523]

These two tools allow the Lombard to easily respond to the seemingly tricky question: yes, God has the potency to always do what he was once able to do. From the divine viewpoint, it is "required" by his internal constitution, because "he always knows all the things which he at some time knew, and he always wills what he at some time willed" (*omnia semper scit quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult quae aliquando voluit*).[524] That is, he eternally knows what he knows and eternally wills what he wills. Hence, his knowing of something or willing of something is unchanging. But, additionally, the immensity of his potency also requires the positive answer to the posited question, for "God is never deprived of any power of his" (*nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur*).[525] And this power has to do with innumerable possibilities, some of which turn to actualities of the world of history and remain so forever (for God). But even when something becomes an actuality in our world it does not stop being connected to the same power (or potency) for God.

For example, this is how the author of the most famous collection of sentences closes the paragraph 2 of this section and speaks about the Incarnation: "Therefore he is not deprived of the power of becoming incarnate or rising again, although he cannot now become incarnate and rise again. For just as he was once able to become

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[522] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:300.

[523] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

[524] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:305; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

[525] Ibid.

incarnate, so he is now able to have been incarnate; in which the power of the same thing is shown" (*Non est ergo privatus potentia incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo esse incarnatus; in quo eiusdem rei potentia monstratur*).[526] The assertion's structure goes like this:

(29) It is not true that God does not have the power of becoming incarnate again, although he cannot now become incarnate;

(30) for just as he was once able to become incarnate, he is now able to have been incarnate,

(31) hence, he has the same power of becoming incarnate.

The conclusion seems ill-grounded for it appears to contain a paradox. The first sentence would formally look like this

(29*) $\neg(G^{\neg P} p) \wedge (G^{\neg P} p_{t1})$

where p stands for "becoming incarnate (and/or rising again)," and the following thesis would have the following form:

(30*) $(G^P p_{t0}) \wedge (G^P p_{t1})$,

where t_0 stands for "once" (*olim*) and t_1 for "now" (*modo*), with the final thesis being simply:

(31*) $G^P p$

so that there is an obvious contradiction between $(G^{\neg P} p_{t1})$ and $(G^P p_{t1})$.

All individual propositions cited here speak of God's potency and, maybe, possibilities open to God. But two of five propositions do not have time indexes and definitely speak about the divine potency: "he is not deprived of the power" and "[he has] the power of the same thing." The other three theses all have time indexes "now" (*modo*) or "once" (*olim*) and contain the verb *posse* in three different tenses: "he

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[526] Ibid.

cannot now become incarnate," "he was once able to become incarnate," and "he is now able to have been incarnate."

Therefore, if one remembers the traditional distinction between the divine eternity or his eternal essence on the one side and the space-time continuum on the other side,[527] it is highly probable that the phrases with no time-indexing refer to God's potencies *per se* and *in se*, while the propositions with time-indexes speak of God's potency *as* manifested in and viewed from this world. God's power is measured by eternity, therefore it is always the same: God can be incarnate from all eternity. Then, the proposition "he has the power of being incarnate" is implicitly qualified by the adverb "eternally." At the same time the propositions about "once" and "now" definitely refer to different times and, thus, speak of the diachronicity. Then what they imply is the diachronic possibilities, which do not really apply to God's eternal potency. Peter Lombard's "linguistic" argument found in this and the following paragraph[528] strengthens this suggestion.

As it was mentioned in passing, according to Master Peter, from the human— linguistic-metaphysical and linguistic-logical—point of view, the verbs, which depict or denote God's acts have the unitary signification: whatever the tense, the time of utterance, or modifying adverbs, their meaning is always the same (*Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum*).[529] But then it is right to teach that "God always can (do) whatever He at one time could (do), that is, that he has all that power, which He at one time had: and the power for that every thing, for which He had (it) at one time" (*Deum semper posse et quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam cuius semel habuit*).[530] The expression of this truth will be subject to a special technique of adaptation to

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[527] See dist. 38 and 39 and sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 above.

[528] I.e. *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 2 and 3.

[529] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

[530] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:305; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:780. The last phrase of Bugnolo's translation can be made smoother: "…he has all the power he once had and the power for each thing for which he once had it." I would like to thank Nico den Bok for this suggestion.

grammatical tenses: we need to say, "God had been able to create the world" before it was created; but still, now that the world has been created, it is right to say, "God is able now to have created the world." This is how the Lombard continues his Incarnation-talk in the light of the postulated linguistic-metaphysical principle: "he was once able to be born and to rise again; and now he is able to have been born and have risen again; and it is the power of the same thing" (*Ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, et modo potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse; et est eiusdem rei potentia*).[531]

The manner and morphology of the phrases change but the truth remains: "God's omnipotence always transcends His actual use of it"[532] and is not bound to the time, since it functions *sub specie aeternitatis*. Having made his point, the Lombard closes distinction 44 by reiterating the mysterious paradoxical statement cited above: "God is always able to do whatever he once could, that is, to have all that power which he once had and the power of that entire thing which he once had; but he is not always able to do all that which he was at some time able to do; yet he can do or have done what he could at some time do" (*Deum semper posse et quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud quod aliquando potuit facere: potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit*).[533] As the final remark, he notes that the same principle works for God's knowledge and will: he wills now exactly what he once willed and will will in the future and knows now what he once knew or will know. Hence, Peter Lombard confirms my earlier suggestion that the statement about God's potency must be modified by "always" (*semper*) and that we should not confuse God's eternal power with its manifestations in the actual world regulated by time.

But the paradox is still there, for the Lombardian thinker again juxtaposes theses about "always" on the one side and "once" and "at some time" on the other in one cluster of propositions: "God is always able," God "once could," "he was at some

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[531] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:305–306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

[532] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:300.

[533] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

time able to do," and so on. How should we solve the riddle? Colish offers a solution and explicates Master Peter's words in this way: "What God can do is greater than what He actually does do. Without using its terminology, the Lombard here states, and fortifies, the distinction between God's ordained and absolute power. As an extreme index of this absolute power, he asserts that, although Christ's birth, death, and resurrection occurred once for all, if God willed it, He could replicate these events."[534] I agree with the general tenor of this reading but strongly disagree with the final point.[535]

In my view, the Lombard does not mean the power of replication of the events of the salvation history but tries to explain the connection between God's eternal potency and its manifestations in the created world. The power of God is eternally the same, but when God's will decides to actualize some events, they take place at this or that moment. Whenever they happen they prove that God *is* able to do this certain thing (like the Incarnation or the Resurrection). But on this, temporal, level possibilities and actualities form the chain of diachronic two-phase segments: the antecedent possibility (phase 1) turns to the actuality (phase 2) and thus becomes the already necessary (that is, immutable) state of affairs which can change in the future but not right now. What happened in the past or is happening now is already necessary in terms of immutability, and the possibility of change belongs to the future. In other words, any not yet realized potency implies change, but the only change available in this world is the "change through time; change consists of states of affairs which are successive in time but necessary on their own."[536] This notion of diachronic possibility or diachronic contingency was based on the Aristotelian principles and shared in this or that form by many twelfth-century thinkers, such as Peter Abelard, William of Sherwood, authors of such logical treatises as *Dialectica Monacensis, Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, etc.[537] And as this and the preceding

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[534] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 124–125.

[535] Also, I have already indicated that I have some reservations about the applicability of the two-power disintction to Lombard's teaching since he does not use the terminology and probably does not really teach this doctrine. See above.

[536] Vos et al., "Introduction," 24.

[537] Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," 181–91; Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality."

distinctions show, the Lombard is inclined to accept the theory of diachronic possibilities.

In (29) he denies that God can repeat what he once was able to do probably *because* he has actualized that opportunity. He cannot become incarnate now for his ability to do so *qua* manifested in the reality of the actual world is connected with the time index "once," "formerly," and consequently means a state of affairs in the past. It became a potency that was true at some time. In terms of our human level, what was possible in the past is no longer possible now, after the realization of the possibility. If we add to (29) the unspoken premise "he has become incarnate," the argument will look very logical: God has the power of becoming incarnate again, although he cannot now become incarnate, *for He has (already) become incarnate*. This logic is in fact confirmed in (30) which says, "for just as he was once able to become incarnate, so he is now able to have been incarnate." The flow of statements is from "once" to "now" which indicates that the principles of the diachronic modal logic are at work here. Then, (29)-(31) would have the form of a diachronically dressed argument and would unproblematically yield the conclusion (31). Such a restated, reordered, and partly reconstructed argument should look like this:

(29'a) It is not true that God does not have the power of becoming incarnate again (*general statement and a curtain-raiser for the following theses*).

(29'b) But it is true that he cannot now become incarnate,

(29'c) for he has (already) become incarnate (*added premise*).

(30'a) And it is true that he was once able to become incarnate,

(30'b) as it is true that he is now able to have been incarnate,

(31') hence, he has the same power of becoming incarnate.

Thus, Peter Lombard not only accepts the nominalist idea that "declarative singular propositions should be primarily treated as temporally definite and as having an unchanging truth-value" and that, when applied to God, they should be appropriately tensed: it is right to say that God *can have become* incarnate now but

wrong to say that he *can become* incarnate now.[538] He also implies the diachronic understanding of possibilities: what was once possible is not possible any longer because once the opportunity has been realized it no longer remains a possibility. Therefore, the Lombard concludes his treatment of the subject by saying: "God… is not always able to do all that which he was at some time able to do; yet he can do or have done what he could at some time do" (*Deum… non semper posse facere omne illud quod aliquando potuit facere: potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit*).[539] Such time-indexed restriction on God's potency cannot be understood as referring to his eternal dimension, it must be a reference to the divine power's manifestations unfolding along the diachronic span. On this level God is not capable of replicating *all* events that he once could do and then did because some of them, like the Incarnation and the Resurrection, were unique, just as he cannot replicate his own potency for bringing about every single event he could do and did for the diachronic strictures of reality put a limit on existing possibilities. Yet, the power to do or have done all the unique things and events remain the same in its eternity, just as the events themselves retain their idiosyncratic nature. The point here is not in replicating something. Quite the opposite, every event in this world and every proposition is temporally determinate and, therefore, unique. And these events and propositions unfold through time so that even potencies (or possibilities) are realized through time.

Thus, I come to the conclusion that Peter Lombard excludes the possibility of God's replicating the events he once did (*contra* the later Colish[540]) but insists on the permanence of his voluntary decisions, potential possibilities, and immeasurable power (*cum* the earlier Colish[541]). Additionally, he demonstrates his acceptance of the *opinio nominalium*, which signified an important development in the twelfth-century logic, and discloses the diachronical modal aspect of his theology. In this respect, the distinction 44 serves as a helpful supplement to distinction 43.

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[538] Knuuttila, "Medieval Modal Theories," 522–23.

[539] *Sent*. 1, dist. 44, cap. 2, no. 4. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:240.

[540] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 125.

[541] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:299–300.

5.4. Summary

Summing it up, one has to conclude that the Lombard's perception of God's potency is quite clear. God is not only omnipotent in the sense that he "can do all things" (*omnia possit*) but also omnipotent in the sense that "he can do all things that he wills" (*ea possit quae vult*). In other words, God has the potency to do whatever is possible for him and whatever is fitting to his nature *if* he wills so. Such potency implies a huge amount of possible acts, created objects, and state of affairs God can or could do. God is capable of creating or allowing many things but he wills to actualize only some of them. As distinction 43 (cap. 1, no. 8) has it, "God is able to do more things than he wills, because more things are subject to his potency than to his will." Here I totally agree with Colish's conclusion about the Lombard's teaching: "Given the infinite store of being that God possesses, or, better put, is, Peter stresses very heavily the point that God always has, or is, more than He does or chooses in actuality."[542] Divine potency as such is an immense reservoir of realizable potentialities and it is regulated by the divine will.

This will, in its turn, is understood as the deliberate act of deciding to bring something about, God's actual willing. It is this will that decides what possibilities are going to turn to actualities and commands them, accordingly. God's *posse* logically precedes God's *velle*, and implies a wide range of possible decisions but it is the will that pronounces his powerful "fiat!" and actually creates things. Whatever God does, he does by and in accordance with his will and never against or without it.

Yet, it would be a mistake to infer from this that the Lombard taught "voluntarism" because he knew nothing about this and other "isms" invented much later. Nor he thought that the will is more important or more "powerful" than the potency. On the contrary, he said that neither God's will can be greater than God's potency, nor God's potency can be greater than God's will. These attributes are in fact one thing, God's essence, God himself. By potency or power, we mean God as

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[542] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:723.

mighty and capable of doing something whereas when we speak of his will we highlight not his capacities but his efficient volition, God as willing something to come about. Peter Lombard does not set prioritized attributes within the Godhead. Rather, he carefully connects them, remaining faithful to his strong belief in God's essential unity and simplicity.

In particular, he does not allow for anything like the preceding and causal (physical) necessity to limit divine omnipotence. God is not coerced or caused to be able to act in a certain way. That is his potency and will are not regulated by anything logically preceding them and necessitating their abilities and volitions, respectively. On the other hand, it is all right to say that God's potency functions in accordance with the principle of the necessity of entailment. God cannot do anything that, *if* he decided to do that, would conflict with his justice or, by extension, other attributes. It is necessarily true that if God does something, it is fitting to his nature. Moreover, God can do only things which, if he did them, would fit who he is. What is necessary here is not the particular abilities God has or specific acts he does but the harmonious connection between what he can do and what is fitting for him to do. If there is potency there should be appropriateness. When the latter is absent from the scene one cannot talk of God as being able to do that. God's potency is not restrained by physical necessity but perfectly works with the necessity of entailment, and in this teaching, Master Peter follows the footsteps of Master Anselm from Aosta.

This notion helps to understand the way the diachronical necessity relates to God: he is not constrained by temporal limitations but, *if* he wills something to happen in time, it happens in accordance with God's knowledge, potency, and will and therefore cannot be undone. For God, it is immutable because he wills it to be (if he wills so) and not because any other constraint. This is the necessity of entailment appropriate for and really existing in God or, better, his volitions and acts. What is diachronically necessary in our world of time and space is necessary for God only in a sense of the necessity of logical entailment.

However, God's potency, as the Lombard sees it, not only logically precedes the divine volition but also continues "after" the will has willed something. On one hand,

God could have willed and acted otherwise, and his potency allows for the potential existence of alternative options. On the other hand, God's capacity or potency to do a certain thing remains intact even after he has willed to do that thing. Both statement hold because the power to do all sorts of things is always with God and in God, and the will does not change it. Actually, the will directs and not limits the potency. God could have created the world or could not have created the world if he willed so, and since he is outside the time this pair of possibilities *qua* his essential capacity is still the same. God is eternally capable of creating or not creating the world if he eternally wills so.

But Peter Lombard adds an important qualification. When one ascribes to God any capacity or efficient volition that has repercussions in the world of time and space, she has to be careful in her use of grammatical tenses. God exists, wills, and acts in eternity, but some of his volitions and acts unfold in time. Thus, as the *opinio nominalium* which Master Peter embraces requires, any declarative proposition about God's potency or volitions can, and at times should, change its grammatical tense but its lexical and theological meaning—and the truth value, of course—must remain the same. For example, it is correct to say that God *can have become* incarnate now but wrong to say that he *can become* incarnate now because his volition has already been realized in our time. But this realization did not exhaust or destroy God's power to do so. His potency to become incarnate is eternal. But his Incarnation is a time-indexed event. Therefore, God's potency is God's essence as eternally and constantly omnipotent. He cannot repeat or redo what he once did but his ability to do that very event is always with him. Its reflection and disclosure in the realities of the created world, though, is different.

When it comes to the connection between the divine potency and the world, it becomes clear that Peter Lombard imposes a famous "restriction" on our understanding of the divine power's manifestations unfolding in time. He accepts the statistical or diachronical theory of modalities, quite widespread in his time and described in detail by Knuuttila. (But Knuuttila never really included the Lombard

into his account and, so, my observations fit in, and add to, his research.[543]) This theiry holds it that what was once possible is no longer possible after it is realized because a possibility has turned to actuality and ceased to be a true possibility. God is not capable of replicating the events he once could do because they were temporally determinate and, in this sense, unique, irreversible. These events unfold through time and the propositions about them are time-indexed. Then, what has happened according to God's will is going to be a true fact forever. Or, alternatively, there are some things God did not do before but still can do in the future when he wills so. Probably, Master Peter could have referred to Jesus Christ's second coming as such an event. Anyway, from what was said earlier, it becomes obvious that, in his treatment of the divine potency, the Lombard thinks of necessity in terms of immutability and of possibility in terms of a potency-to-be at a later moment of time. Yet, these notions are to be applied to God's potency as connected to the divine doings in time only. In his essence, the possibilities to will or act in certain ways know no change. Yet, his will has a final say as to which of them stay mere possibilities and which are *also* actualities in the created world(s). It is, therefore, reasonable to continue the discussion with a more detailed treatment of the divine will.

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[543] I primarily refer to these works: Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism"; Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*; Knuuttila, "Medieval Modal Theories"; Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of Modality."

6. Peter Lombard's doctrine of God's will[544]

6.1. Distinction 45: introducing the divine will[545]

Having disclosed his understanding of God's potency as related to God's will, Peter Lombard comes to a treatment of the divine will as such. The distinction 45 becomes a platform on which he presents many nuances of this concept: here he speaks of the nature of God's will as God's characteristic and of God's willing as an act, analyzes its linguistic-logical and metaphysical aspects, and draws a distinction between the will and its signs. Master Peter notes, that "much discretion is to be exercised in the …cognition of the divine will" (*Magna enim est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinae voluntatis*)[546] and sets out for a theology of the will. As always, he appeals to various auctoritates, primarily the Scripture and Augustine,[547] but his voice is also clearly heard.

Firstly, he notes that the will or the willingness of God (*voluntas sive volens*) is his essential feature or, more precisely, his nature itself (*divina usia*) – due to the principal simplicity of God. For God to be (*esse*) means to know and to will (*velle*). Therefore, the divine act of willing should not be thought of as an external deed of God or a kind of motion in God (*non affectus vel motus est*). It is rather an aspect or mode of his essence, something seen "according to the essence" (*secundum essentiam dicitur*). Put briefly, it is *the divine essence qua willing (divina usia qua volens est)*,[548] and hear, rather remarkably, "volens" serves as a participle modifying a noun and does not mean "the willer" in the sense of the suppositum or agent. Instead, it clearly stands for "willing" which is an action or characteristic of the divine essence.

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[544] An earlier version of the two fragments of the following section (dealing with distinctions 45-46) has been previously published as an article. It has been slightly updated since publication. See: Tkachenko, "Peter Lombard on God's Will." Cf. Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio," 64–80.

[545] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306–312; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:794–796; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:241–246; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:794–796.

[546] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 7, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:312; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:246.

[547] For the registry of the authorities used and cited in these distinctions, see Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio," 66.

[548] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:306; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:241.

But when one speaks of God as knowing or God as willing, a linguistic-logical and, by extension, a theological problem arises. If God is his will(ing), then what God wills is somehow God. At least, this is a possible implication of the identification of God with his willing and knowing.[549] But Peter Lombard denies it and offers an important distinction that serves as his solution to this problem.

He says that there are two types of predications about God (*quid de Deo praedicetur*): one is taken to denote the divine essence "simply and absolutely" (*simpliciter et absolute*), whereas the other speaks of it "not simply and absolutely" (*non simpliciter et absolute*), that is, relatively, in connection with something else.[550] It is one thing to say "God knows" and "God wills" (*Deus scit vel Deus vult*) and the other to add an object to this phrase and state "God knows everything" or "God wills something" (*Deus scit omnia vel vult aliquid*).

In the first case, God is both the subject and the scope of the proposition – it is he who wills, it is he who knows. This expression is to be understood *secundum essentiam* and, hence, can be paraphrased, as "God is God *as* knowing" or "God is God *as* willing", for here "the divine essence is predicated and pronounced to be God" (*essentia divina praedicatur et Deus esse enuntiatur*).[551] And this is the simple and absolute predication about the divine essence. Hence, technically,

$$(32)\ G^K \supset (G \wedge K)$$

and

$$(32^*)\ G^W \supset (G \wedge W)$$

In the second case, "God knows" or "God wills" used relatively, and so the proposition has both subject(s) and object(s) and speaks of God who does something

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[549] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 2, no. 1-2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:307; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:241.

[550] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:307; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:242.

[551] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:307; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:241–242.

to, or with, or over, a certain object. It looks like, "God knows this thing" or "God wills that thing to happen". Formally, it would be

$$(33)\ G^K \supset G^K p$$

or

$$(33^*)\ G^W \supset G^W p$$

But then the focus of the proposition shifts from God's *essence* as such to the *relation* between God and a thing known or willed – in fact, between two or more different essences. Consequently, it can no more be equated with predication *secundum essentiam* and therefore excludes any possibility of identification of the objects of God's cognition or volition with God's own nature. In other words, "God cannot be said to be all things which he wills [or knows]" (*non tamen potest dici Deus esse omnia quae vult [vel scit]*).[552] Although *Lombardus* does not speak literally of transitive or intransitive interpretation of verbs' function or proposition's meaning, it will be a plausible explication of his words. His "simple and absolute" and "not simple" but relative types of predications should be equated with grammatical and logical idea of transitivity and intransitivity, respectively. Linguistically and theologically speaking, statements such as "God knows" and "God wills" can be understood in two ways: either *intransitively* whereby "God" is a subject of the proposition and "knows/wills" is a predicate, or *transitively* whereby "God" is a subject, "knows/wills" a verbal predicate, and there is an additional element signifying the object or addressee of the predicate's operation. This is how we may translate the Lombardian notion to contemporary parlance.

Such a semantic and theological solution to the problem of theological language clearly confirms and also deepens Colish's remarks. In her monograph, she noted, Peter Lombard's response to the twelfth-century debate about theological language was "to use the traditional language of the creeds, under the guidance of patristic writers whose own approach to theological language is a speculative one, and who

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[552] Ibid. Cf. *Sent.* 1, dist. 45, cap. 2, no. 1, 3.

are able to explain what they mean by their terms in ways both wide and specific enough to enable language to function as it must function in theology, without forcing it into any one, preemptive, philosophical mold."[553] But, unfortunately, she failed to pay attention to a rather subtle distinction between predications *simliciter et absolute* and not *simliciter et absolute*.[554] She highlighted the Lombard's faithfulness to the Augustinian theory of signification but downplayed the important distinction between two types of sayings, which have significant bearing on theological enterprise. I, however, contend that this is an important semantic-theological development that the *Sentences* contain and hand over to their readers.

This distinction in terminology implies the *ad intra* and *ad extra* "features" of God and highlights his total sovereignty and unique independence. He is the all-knowing and all-willing God anyway, even if there is no creation. His essence is perfect and infinitely powerful. But, granted that there is the (or a) God-made world, God is still permanently distinct from *what* he makes, knows and wills.[555] The world always remains the object of God's activity, which should—and could—never pretend to be of God-like status. Even the theological propositional principles deny this option.

But Peter Lombard does not stop at this denial of the world's hypothetical independence of God – he firmly emphasizes God's absolute freedom of the will by stating that God's will has no other cause for its decisions. It means that "this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are, or were, or will be made; and it is preceded by no cause because it is eternal. And so no cause for it is to be sought" (*Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naluraliter fiunt vel facta sive future sunt, quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est. Ideoque causa ipsius quaerenda non est*).[556]

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[553] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:149.

[554] See: Colish, 1:300–301.

[555] Cf. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:300–301.

[556] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 4, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:308; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:242.

The Master of the *Sentences* takes a clearly Augustinian—and also Anselmian—line of reasoning.[557] If God's willing has any cause for its operation and decision-making process, then there is something ontically greater than, and logically prior to, it. But that is theologically impossible. Furthermore, the authority of the *doctor gratiae* utterly denies such a possibility. God wills simply because he wills so *(quia voluit)*. Therefore the divine will has no cause whatsoever.[558] So, the Lombard removes the created things and any possible uncreated power from his list of candidates for the position of the ultimate cause of Gods'will, although he is silent about the details of the supposed network of relations and logical order between God's *scientia*, *potentia*, and *voluntas*: they are supposed but not overtly unfolded. It is clear that Master Peter moves in the direction Augustine once showed, and systematizes and further develops the bishop of Hyppo's intuitions about the primacy of divine will. The *Sentences*, actually, draw a much clearer picture of the divine will's operations, and explain quite well its relations with God's will and potency, yet this "portrait of the will" remains incomplete.

Instead, Master Peter tries to shed some light on the mystery of biblical expressions referring—or supposed to be referring—to the will of God (*Quibus modis in Scriptura accipitur Dei voluntas*). The Bible frequently speaks of God's will in the plural (*voluntates*) or by means of synonyms or figures of speech (*variis modis loqui, secundum figuram*), which make allusions to a sort of diversity or complexity within the will of God (*Dei voluntas diversa*).[559]

The Lombard denies any multiplicity of wills in God and asserts it to be one, simple and indivisible: "it is not God's will which is different, but the expressions concerning it are different" (*non est Dei voluntas diversa, sed locutio diversa est de voluntate*).[560] But he agrees that there is a perfect synonymical expression that is

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[557] See Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 28; ibid., *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, book 1, cap. 2, no. 4; ibid., *De Trinitate* 3, cap. 1, no. 6; cap. 4, no. 9; Anselm of Canterbury, DC I, 3-6; *De casu diaboli* 27.

[558] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 4, no. 2-3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:308–309; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:242–243.

[559] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 5, no. 1; cap. 6, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:309, 310; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:243, 244.

[560] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 5, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:309; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:243.

often used to denote the *voluntas Dei* and which grasps its nature very well. The expression he means is "the good pleasure or disposition of God" (*beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio*). For Master Peter, it is but a full synonym of the divine will.[561] Hence it becomes undoubtedly clear now, that when the Lombard was writing about God's foreknowledge as sometimes functioning in conjunction with God's good pleasure and disposition in distinctions 35-39, he, in fact, meant God's will.

However, it is the only full synonym of the notion of "will." Other biblical and extrabiblical terms—namely, the five nouns: precept (*praeceptio*), prohibition (*prohibitio*), permission (*permissio*), counsel (*consilium*), and operation (*operatio*)—are figures of speech only. They can be called "divine wills" but do not denote the will of God as such. Rather, they signify "signs of the divine will" (*signa divinae voluntatis*), for God's commandments, advice, admonitions, and other revelatory acts, which address the human audience, *express* what God wants but *are not* God's will essentially. These precepts and prohibitions are given in time and space for people who live in time and space, so that they might be able to act in accordance with them *hic et nunc*. This is their proper function.[562] In Peter's own words,

> five things are set out above which are called 'the will of God' according to a figure of speech, because they are signs of the divine will, which is one and immutable, namely God's good pleasure. And so let the reader diligently distinguish, where Scripture makes mention of the will of God, according to what sense it ought to be taken, namely whether for God's good pleasure or for some sign of it. … his good pleasure is eternal, while a sign of his good pleasure is not.[563]

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561 *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 2, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:309; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:242–243.

562 *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 6-7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:310–312; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:244–246. More on this, in Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio," 71–76.

563 *Quinque igitur supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur secundum tropum 'Dei voluntas', quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, quae una est et immutabilis, scilicet Dei beneplacitum. Ideoque diligenter distinguat lector, ubi de voluntate Dei Scriptura commemorat, iuxta quem modum accipi oporteat, utrum scilicet pro beneplacito Dei, an pro aliquo signa eius. ... beneplacitum eius aeternum est, signum vera beneplaciti eius non. Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 7, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:311–312; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:246.

Thus, the will of God is his disposition and his good pleasure, but is distinct from its own expressions of signs, which are meant by the five important and often used biblical words (precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel), collectively named "the wills of God". These five words point out to the multiple *signa*, which are the temporary and outward expressions and "signs" of their respective unitary *significatum* – God's will as such.[564] Additionally, this differentiation between the signs and the true signified allows for a place for the creaturely freedom vis-à-vis that of the Trinity: no man can fight or thwart the will of God, that is, his willing essence, but it is possible for men to resist and even break the signs of this will. So, as G. Silano notes, it is here "in this space between God's unchanging will and its variable signs that God allows human freedom to operate,"[565] although it is not the only "metaphysical locale" for the human freedom's implementation.

This complex linguistic-metaphysical construction helps the Lombard keep the uniqueness and numerical unity of the divine will and adequately interpret the plural form of the word "will" in the Bible as well as a set of other similar terms. So, it is useful on both semantic and theological levels, which Master Peter does not separate.

6.2. Distinction 46: contrasting the will of God and the will of man[566]

Although God's will is "the most highly good cause of all things that naturally are" (*summe bona causa est omnium quae naturaliter sunt*),[567] it is not yet clear how it cooperates or coexists with the will of rational creatures. This is why Master Peter decides to make an effort to settle this serious issue.

He cites several passages from the Bible, which speak of the all-encompassing nature of the divine will's operative power (Ps. 113, 11) and irresistibility (Rom. 9,

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[564] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:301.Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:301; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:726.

[565] Silano, "Introduction," xlvii.

[566] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:312–321; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:814–818; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:246–255; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:814–818.

[567] *Sent*. 1, dist. 45, cap. 4, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:308; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:242.

19), supplementing them with quotes from Augustine's *Enchiridion*. But he does not omit the texts, which defend the opposite thesis that the divine will does not always act efficaciously and, thus, is resistible (Matt. 23, 37; 1 Tim. 2, 4). In fact, the Lombard directly admits that there are authoritative statements that seem to contradict each other, but believes that it is an illusory impression.

He denies that "the Will of God, which He Himself is, can be cancelled in nothing"[568] (*voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, in nullo cassari potest*),[569] but does not really clarify the details of its correlation to the will of men. Yet, he provides a fascinating interpretation of two of the mentioned passages.

Firstly, Peter turns his attention to Matt. 23, 37,[570] which reads: "How often did I will to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks, and you did not will it." No resistibility or imperfection on God's part is implied here. Rather, the verse's meaning is to be explained following the intuitions of Augustine and the commentators of the *Glossa ordinaria*. The former is encapsulated in this point: "she [i.e. Jerusalem] did not will that her children be gathered by him, but despite her refusal, he gathered as many of her children as he willed: because *in heaven and on earth… he did whatever he willed*" (*illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit; qua tamen nolente, filios eius collegit ipse omnes quos voluit: quia* in caelo et in terra… omnia quaecumque voluit fecit).[571] The latter sounds like this: "*How often did I will to gather your children, and you did not will it*, that is, as often as I gathered them, I did so by my always efficacious will and against your will" (Quoties volui

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[568] The phrase rather should be rendered in English in the following way: "the Will of God… can by no means be cancelled." It means (negatively) that God's will can not become inefficient and (positively) that it always brings about what God intends to happen.

[569] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:312–313; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:814.

[570] It goes without saying that Peter Lombard's exegesis of two biblical passages has not been executed in "exegetical" manner, as we would call it. He was concerned not so much with the correct interpretation of the biblical text per se, but with the most correct—and quite creative—theological interpretation. He is more of a systematic theologian and polemycist than an exegete here. Therefore I will not judge his approach to hermeneutics, concentrating instead on the theological points he makes.

[571] Augustinus, *Enchiridion*, cap. 97, quoted in *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:247.

congregare filios iuos, et noluisti*, id est quotquot congregavi voluntate mea semper efficaci, te nolen te feci)*.[572]

It is the last quotation that the Lombard identifies with the sense (*sensus*) of the verse Mat. 23, 37.[573]   Thus, Augustine provides the foundation and the *Glossa* the formulation of his *solutio*. In spite of God's desire to gather the Israelites under his rule (*volui congregare*), they did not wish it (*noluit, nolente, noluisti*); but in spite of their refusal, God's efficacious will has managed to gather (*feci, congregavi*) those select people he willed to gather (*collegit ipse omnes quos voluit*). Thus, there is no direct conflict between the divine and human wills – there is some tension but it is not a problem for God. He is able to "overcome" or "vanquish" any creature's will, but instead, he efficiently acts upon it only if—and when—he wishes. His cooperation or negation of cooperation with the human will is ruled only by his free decision.

It does not look like a real exegesis of the text, but the Lombardian reading of this biblical passage is curious. Firstly, he changes the subject of the Matthean saying and instead of God's complex relationship with Jerusalem and his covenant people inserts this verse into the discussion over the mechanism of interaction of human and divine wills. Secondly, it seems, the Lombard does not distinguish between the will as intention and the will as execution. It is well-known that in the classic Latin the meaning of *velle* was primarily "to want," "wish," "have a desire," but the Christian theology of the Middle Ages added to this the strong emphasis on *velle* as the act of willing, taking decisions, executing or using the power to will,[574] so that, for instance,

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[572] *Glossa ordinaria* in Matth. 23, 37 (apud Lyranum V, 72c), quoted *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:247.

[573] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 2, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:247.

[574] See P. G. W. Glare and others, eds., *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), s.v. "uolo"; Niermeyer, van de Kieft, and Lake-Schoonebeek, *Mediae Latinitatis lexicon minus*, s.v. "velle"; Simo Knuuttila, "Naissance de la logique de la volonté dans la pensée médiévale," trans. Nicolas Combettes, *Les Études philosophiques*, no. 3 (Philosophie médiévale, logique et sémantique) (September 1996): 291–305; Thomas Pink, "Freedom of the Will," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 569–87; Ian Wilks, "Moral Intention," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 588–604; Vos, *The Philosophy of Duns Scotus*, 236, 423–24.

Anselm differentiated between these two meanings of the term and used both.[575] In the cited passage, however, Peter Lombard swings the pendulum to the extreme: he analyzes the interaction between the divine and the human will as implying only one aspect: that of actively willing, using the ability to will, its execution.

This association of the will not with desire and inclination but with the execution of will testifies to Peter Lombard's deviation from the ancient meaning of "will" and acceptance of the new meaning. The will is not an irrisistible desire that ancient Greeks and Romans, and the Augustine of the *Confessions* knew so well but free choice, execution of a certain capacity, *willing* as such, what Anselm of Canterbury used to underscore. The *Sentences* highlight this new meaning of an old concept and make it the key feature of the will of God. Later, Duns Scotus, while commenting on the Lombardian text, will take up this notion of will as active *velle*. He will also defend an thesis that God's will does not follow his intellect, as Aquinas suggests, for it has no reason for its volitions but itself. That is, Scotus will repeat the aforementioned Lombard's statement about the uncaused nature of God's volitions, which he inherited from Augustine, Anselm, and others and which he espoused against Abelard and his followers. God wills something because he wills it, and not because his potency or knowledge foreshadow or require certain volitions.[576]

Peter Lombard also supports and illustrates his rendering of the divine will as willing by citing another biblical text. The Master of the *Sentences* offers his "creative exegesis," bordering on eisegesis, of 1 Tim. 2, 4, where it is written: "He wills all men to be saved." The *prima facie* meaning seems to entail the conclusion about only partial fulfillment of God's desires and intentions. But this thought is impious, and it is not what the text says, according to the Lombard's view. He asserts that it means the following: "no man is saved except whom he wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom he does not will to be saved, but that there is none who is saved except whom he wills to be saved" (*nullum hominem fieri salvum, nisi quem*

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[575] Anselmus, *De casu diaboli* 7, 14; DC I, 6; III, 11-12. See also Tkachenko, "An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology," 826–27.

[576] On this, see Duns Scotus' *Lectura* I, 39, and cf. Aquinas *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19. Also, note informative comments by Vos in his *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, 413-421, and commentaries by the Utrecht Research Group in Vos et al., *Contingency and Freedom*, 124–51.

fieri ipse voluerit: non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salvum fieri velit; sed quod nullus fiat salvus, nisi quem velit salvari).[577] Hence, "He wills all men to be saved" is turned into "He wills all men who are to be saved (according to his divine counsel and mercy) to be saved," or, alternatively, "Non is saved, unless she is willed by God."

Here the Lombard simply implements the rules of conversion from the square of oppositions: the sentence "He wills all men to be saved" is converted into a universal affirmative statement *A*: "All men, who are to be saved, are willed by God," where "all men, who are to be saved" is a subject and "willed by God" a predicate. The quantifier "all" is traditionally put before the subject. Hence, his somewhat altered positive version of the biblical dictum.

But then Peter takes this affirmation and obverts it into a universal negative statement *E*: "No man is to be saved without being willed by God." And this is the second part of his explanation presented above. Hence, the manipulation with the Bible's verse turns into a clear and unambiguous statement about God's exclusively good intentions concerning men and inadequacy of the interpretation, which argues that the text has to do with some sort of inefficiency of God's will. By doing this, the Lombard shows good acquaintance with dialectical rules but also makes a problematic theological gesture. He limits God's desire to pardon Israel and save all people to the actual willing to save those who are to be saved. Hence, the doctrine of the will is reduced and confined to one of its two aspects. The Lombard defends the efficiency of God's will as actual willing at a price of removing the notion of will as simply desiring or intending from theology proper. This is how it is revealed in his own words: "many have strayed from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But that text [1 Tim. 2, 4] is not to be understood to have been spoken in that sense as if God had willed some to be saved and they are not saved" (*multi a veritate deviarunt, dicentes Deum multa velle fieri, quae non fiunt,*

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[577] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313–314; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:248.

sed non est intelligendum ea ratione illud esse dictum, quasi Deus voluerit aliquos salvari, et non salventur).[578]

In other words, it is right to suggest that here Peter Lombard implies the idea of the irresistible divine will's operation on humans, although these sections of the distinction 46 refer to soteriological teachings only. The biblical passages cited and their interpretation presented speak of God's salvific intentions. Yet, it does not stop the Lombard from extrapolating and making conclusions about God's efficacious will in general. But it is not the end of the discussion.

However, the problem of the interaction between the will of God and the wills of men is connected with the problem of evil (in this world at least). So, another question has to be raised: whether evil things are done by God's will or against his will" (*Utrum mala Dei voluntate fiant, an eo nolente*).[579] Since theodicy falls out of the scope of my research I will only mention the Lombard's solutions and comments that pertain to the nature or operation of God's will.

Master Peter starts his reasoning on the issue and comes to a first conclusion, namely, that nothing can happen without some kind of involvement of God's will, for it is the cause of all naturally existing things. But being perfectly good God cannot by nature will anything evil. Also, there is a freedom which he to a certain extent granted to the world, and this is a generic good plan (or some good purposes) for the world that God always has in mind.[580] Therefore here is the best solution for such a conundrum: "evil things are not done with God *willing* or *unwilling*, but with him *not willing*, because it is not subject to God's will that an evil be done or not done, but that he allows it to be done, because it is good to allow evil things to be done" (*Non ergo Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia non subest Dei*

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[578] *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:247.

[579] *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap. 3, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:314; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:248.

[580] See *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap. 3, no. 2-10. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:313–316; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:248–250.

voluntati ut malum fiat vel non fiat, sed ut fieri sinat, quia bonum est sinere mala fieri).[581] It must be true because otherwise God would not have allowed for any evil.

Thus, God's neutral not-willing, that is, not-willing-but-allowing, gives some room for the creatures' freedom in general and evil things in particular. This *not-willing* is identical to God's *permitting voluntary activity*, for his inactivity and neutrality are deliberately chosen courses of action. It is not that he is actively involved in the emergence of bad things, nor is he unable to do something about it. It is simply because he chose not to will anything particular in this case – in other words, he willed to permit it. Moreover, as the Lombard puts it, God allowed for the existence of evil things because he saw something good in it. What exactly?

The Master admits that such a statement is theologically problematic and explains what he—citing Augustine—means by "It is good for evil things to be done." God permits it because he is able and willing to "draw good things out of the evils which are done" (*quia ex malis quae fiunt Deus bona elicit*).[582] God directs evil courses of events to some better ends and specifically is engaged in spiritual pedagogy, for by means of some evils (or through them) he teaches, exhorts, purifies, and perfects people – primarily the elect, the saints.[583] Hence, even when the Lord permits an evil event to happen, he still has something good in mind, although he never has evil in mind. For his purposes, which he sets by his knowledge and will are always good *par excellence*.

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[581] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 3, no. 11. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:316; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:250, italics mine.

[582] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 4, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:317; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:250–251.

[583] *Sent*. 1, dist. 46, cap. 4-7. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:318–321; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:251–255.

6.3. Distinctions 47 and 48: making final remarks on the nature of God's will[584]

The last two distinctions deepen and amplify the teachings presented in the preceding two sections of the *Sentences*. The subject matter is the same – God's will and its relation to man's will. The problems are also the same or, at least, similar. The responses to them do not alter the already chosen course of theo-logical chains of assertions and arguments. It is more like harvesting what has been said in distinctions 45 and 46. Yet, a few important ideas are worth mentioning, for they do add some weight to Peter Lombard's theology of the will.

The Lombardian synthesizer and interpreter of miscellaneous authoritative sentences continues emphasizing the impossibility to resist God's will, which gives him another opportunity to state something positive about the nature of this will and its principles of interaction with the world of creation. Thus, he reiterates again the notion of the efficaciousness of God's will but adds: it is *always* efficacious and its decisions, whether they concern nature or mankind, must be fully and constantly fulfilled. The dictum reads: "Certainly, the will of God is always efficacious, so that all that he wills is done, and nothing is done which he does not will. This will, when it concerns man, is always fulfilled, whithersoever the latter may turn" (*Voluntas quippe Dei semper efficax est, ut fiat omne quod velit, et nihil fiat quod nolit: quae de homine semper impletur, quocumque se vertat*).[585]

Here the Lombard speaks only of God's willing (*velit*) and unwilling (*nolit*), but omits the third—already defended and explicated—option of God's not-willing, which pertains to evil things. Thus, he discusses here not only bad things that humans may do but rather implies the whole range of their decisions, which might be either in accordance with or in opposition to the will of God. And he comes to the conclusion, first formulated by Augustine,[586] that "in a wondrous and ineffable manner even what

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[584] *Sent*. 1, dist. 47. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:321–324; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:837–838; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:255–258; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:837–838; ibid., dist. 48. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:325–328; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Quaracchi)*, 1:849–850; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:259–262; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:849–850.

[585] *Sent*. 1, dist. 47, cap. 1, no. 1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:321; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:255.

[586] Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cap. 100.

is done against his will is not done apart from his will" (*mira et ineffabili modo non fiat praeter eius voluntatem, quod etiam fit contra eius voluntatem*).[587] That is, nothing is willed by creatures' wills without or apart from (*praeter*) the will of God. It is present, participates, and has its part—in forms of direct willing, direct unwilling, and neutral not-willing (freely willed by God)—in every decision of the creaturely will. Thus, "the eternal will of God concerning man is always fulfilled, even if man acts against God's will" (*voluntas Dei aeterna semper impletur de homine, etiam si faciat homo contra Dei voluntatem*).[588] Hence, once again, the Lombard presents God's will in one dimension – that of actual willing with intentions and desires ignored.

Even when a man decides to do something that opposes or goes against the divine precepts as expressions of his eternal intention, it does not mean that this man is capable of ruining God's plan. It just means that God voluntarily allows for the man's decision (*Ipsius namque permissione omnia fiunt mala; non praeter eius permissionem; Deus volens sinit mala fieri*). But God's will as such has no part in the evil volition of man (*omnia fiunt mala, quae tamen praeter eius voluntatem sempiternam fiunt*). Rather, he willingly does not will it to happen in the sense of not-willing it, which means that he simply permits and tolerates it.[589] Hence, even the "rejection of divine precepts and commands by the creature's free choice is itself a fulfillment of the divine will."[590] Yet, still, it is not a fulfillment of the will expressed in the precept itself or the will as God intention and desire – only a fulfillment of his permissive will. But then we have here a somewhat paradoxical situation: evil-doing of men is done against God will *qua* willing and prescribing but in accordance with his will *qua* not-willing and permitting, yet the will of God must be one and undivided. Master Peter does not notice this tension and seems content with stating

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[587] *Sent.* 1, dist. 47, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:322; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:256.

[588] Ibid.

[589] *Sent.* 1, dist. 47, cap. 2, no. 1, 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:323, 324; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:257, 258.

[590] Silano, "Introduction," xlviii.

that whatever happens takes place with God's will involved or, literally, with "God willing" (*Deus volens*).

Besides, it might happen that the divine and the human will do not coincide even if a man wills something obviously good (for example, when someone wants that his parent may live, but God wills his death). Also, it can be that God's will and human will coincide even if a man wills evil (for example, when the Jews wanted to kill Jesus, and his Divine Father willed his sacrificial death for the sake of humanity's salvation). Both options[591] are equally possible and actually have factual evidence in its support. But there is no full-fledged rational or philosophical explanation for this paradox. What Peter Lombard offers is a partial theological answer and a partial comment on the nature of the divine and human wills.[592]

On one hand, he says that one's willing should be deemed good or bad in the light of two aspects: (i) correspondence with his good (as created by God) nature, morality, and spirituality, and (ii) actual goodness of the goal, which he pursues (from God's perspective). For "in order that a man's will be good, it is necessary to note what is suitable for him to will, and to what end" (*Ut enim bona sit hominis voluntas, oportet attendere quid congruat ei velle, et quo fine*).[593] In this way, it is always good to wish somebody good health or long life, for it is fitting for the human being to wish it. But if this end is not envisaged by God's own will, then the man's will is still good by nature, but not perfectly good in light of God's plan. It has no bearing on man's salvation, if he wills otherwise than God does with good intention in mind. On the contrary, in this case, his pious desire is pleasing for God. However, the end, which the human will pursues, will remain but a man's unrealized desire. But then the man's goodwill that goes in conflict with God's will functions only as desire and intention. So, here all of a sadden the Lombardian *velle* recaptures its lost old meaning of wanting, but it happens only because the human will *qua* willing is thwarted by the divine will which wills the opposite. It is just a side effect of Master

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[591] The theses, as well as the examples used to illustrate them, are Peter Lombard's.

[592] *Sent*. 1, dist. 48, cap. 1-2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:325–326; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:259–260.

[593] *Sent*. 1, dist. 48, cap. 1, no. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:325; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:259.

Peter's way of looking at the relationship between God's and his beloved creature's wills.

As for the human evil will, it cannot be called good even if its intention appears to be incidentally in accordance with God's plan since God neither plans nor wills anything evil.[594] Therefore, for example, the following statement is true: "God willed Jesus Christ to suffer the passion or crucifixion inflicted by the Jews" (*Volebat eum sustinere passionem sive crucifixionem a Iudaeis illatam*). But its alternative, "He willed that the Jews should kill him" (*Volebat ut Iudaei occiderent eum*), is false. Why so? Because "God did not will the action of the Jews, which was evil, but he willed the good passion, and this will was fulfilled by the evil wills of the Jews" (*non enim volebat Deus actionem Iudaeorum, quae mala erat, sed volebat passionem bonam, et haec voluntas per malas Iudaeorum voluntates impleta est*).[595] Hence, again, it is God's will that is actually executed and realized. But in this case the human will does not play a role of unrealized desire, it rather functions as secondary willing active in bringing the crucifixion about. But, then, in which sense the wills of Jews are called bad (*malas Iudaeorum voluntates*)? They can only be bad *qua* bad intentions and bad desires. But the Lombard does not confirm or deny such a suggestion for, unlike Anselm or Abelard, he does not make this distinction in his First Book of the *Sentences*, postponing this discussion to the Second Book. It is only there that we may find a more or less clear distinction between (a) the will as the capacity to will and/or actual willing (*voluntas, velle*), (b) the end or purpose as what is willed or for what sake something is willed (*finis*), and (c) the intention as that for the sake of what something is willed (*intentio*).[596] But at this point, in his doctrine of

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[594] Ibid., also cap. 2. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:325–326; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:259–260.

[595] *Sent*. 1, dist. 48, cap. 2, no. 3. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:326; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:260.

[596] Of special importance are the distinctions 38 and 39, where a few chapters are dedicated exactly to this issue: "De voluntate et eius fine," "De differentia voluntatis et intentionis et finis," "Quare actus voluntatis sit peccatum, si actus aliarum potentiarum non sunt peccata." It is in the *Sent*. 2, dist. 38, cap. 4, no. 2 and 4, that Peter Lombard offers a definition—still not very rigorous—of the three aspects of the will:

> Quae sit voluntas, quis finis. *Ad quod dici potest inter voluntatem et finem certo atque evidenti modo distingui, quia voluntas est qua volumus aliquid; finis vero voluntatis est vel illud quod volumus, per quod impletur ipsa voluntas, vel potius aliud propter quod illud volumus.* — Quomodo accipiatur intentio. *Intentio vero interdum pro voluntate, interdum pro fine voluntatis accipitur... Finis ergo voluntatis, ut praemissum est, dicitur et illud*

God, the Lombard is pleased with an abridged version of the doctrine of the will which only alludes to the will as intention or, using Colish's term, "directionality,"[597] but overtly speaks of the will as willing and, of course, God's essence itself. Still, there is another point he wants to add.

It must be always remembered that the divine will and the human will belong to different "metaphysical levels". The Lombard does not use this terminology but, nevertheless, he means it. For he says, "there is such a gap between God's will and human will that in some things it is suitable for God to will one thing and man another" (*Tantum enim interest inter voluntatem Dei et voluntatem hominis, ut in quibusdam aliud congruat Deo velle, aliud homini*).[598] That is, the discrepancies and practical paradoxes of the correlation between God's will and man's will are to be explained by the principal ontological difference between the two. I assume that for Peter Lombard this difference has both qualitative (or ontic) and quantitative character. The former is identical with the fundamental distinction between the most perfect and uncreated divine essence and the less perfect (by definition) and created the human essence. The latter means that the wisdom, power, and efficiency of the two wills are incomparable, because the human being knows and wills only what accords with his nature and his understanding of ends, but neither this creaturely knowledge nor its power and will can match those of God. The Triune God knows the true nature as well as the true ends of everything, so that he can do whatever he wills, and nothing can resist his will.

Hence, at the end of the *First Book of Sentences*, Master Peter highlights the *divinity* (as absolute perfection in every aspect) of God's will and the *humanity* (as limitedness and creatureliness) of human will. It allows him to make some final remarks on his understanding of the *voluntas Dei* and in this way end his account of theology proper. No doubt, as Marcia Colish notes, here he reaches "the

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quod volumus, et illud propter quod volumus; et intentio ad illud respicit propter quod volumus, et voluntas ad illud quod volumus.

Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1971, 1:551–52. See also Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:473–84; Hoffmann, "Moral Action as Human Action," 77–80; Wilks, "Freedom of the Will," 592–97.

[597] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:483.

[598] Ibid.

thoroughgoing aim of restoring the transcendent dimension to the deity which informs so consistently Peter's doctrine of the Trinity and doctrine of God."[599] But, as we have seen, there is a number of topics or issues that were not sufficiently clarified or settled. Yet, it did not stop the *Sentences* from becoming the theological textbook of the thirteenth century and beyond. So Philipp Rosemann's observation looks appropriate:

> Remarkably, the tradition did not view Peter Lombard's loose answers to [some] questions as defects that would have disqualified the *Sentences* from performing its function as the fundamental theological textbook of the medieval universities. This situation suggests that medieval theologians expected their standard textbook not to present them with a finished doctrinal system, but rather to provide something much less ambitious: food for thought.[600]

6.4. Summary

The contours of the Lombardian theology of God's will must be clear now. And, since neither Colish, nor Rosemann, nor Mestre provides a comprehensive account of this Lombardian doctrine,[601] this text is supposed to shed light on a number of its aspects. Let me summarize the key points.

Firstly, the will of God (*voluntas sive volens*) is his nature *qua willing*. Therefore, this divine will is one, simply, eternal, and immutable, just as the essence of the most perfect being is expected to be. The best definition of this theological notion would be "the good pleasure or disposition of God" (*beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio*). The best explication would be that such a disposition means that God's essence actively wills certain amounts of things God knows and can do. The divine will implies the act of divine willing because Peter Lombard quite systemically and regularly speaks of it in terms of the execution of the will. Hence, the will of God is God's essence as actively willing and bringing something to be, so that this willing is

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[599] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:302.
[600] Rosemann, "Peter Lombard," 2017, 77.
[601] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:726; Mestre, "La Volontà di Dio," 79–80; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 2004, 82–83.

identical to God's being disposed to, and taking pleasure in, this willing and its supposed result.

Secondly, Peter Lombard clearly differentiates between various biblical and dogmatic notions, which have been used for centuries as denotations of God's will. There is only one divine will as such, that is, his good pleasure or active willing. But there are several signs or expressions of this one will: precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel, collectively named the wills of God, in the plural. These five notions are not identical to God's will *per se*; rather, they are temporary and outward expressions and outflows of that will. They are neither eternal, nor immutable, nor classifiable with the divine essence.

Thirdly, if there exists such complexity in the way we should analyze the doctrine of God, one must be careful with words. Peter Lombard calls us to remember that the predications about God either denote the divine essence "simply and absolutely" (*simpliciter et absolute*) or speaks of it "not simply and absolutely" (*non simpliciter et absolute*), that is, relatively, in connection with something else. Therefore, propositions like "God knows" or "God wills" mean "God is God *as* knowing" or "God is God *as* willing," because here God is both the subject and the predicate. And propositions like "God knows everything" or "God wills something" mean "God knows all (knowable) things" or "God wills that thing to happen," God being the subject and *something else*, not his own essence, the object of the phrase. The focus of the proposition shifts from God's *essence* as such to the *relation* between God and a thing known or willed.

In my view, this theological semantic can be legitimately read as a move similar to the contemporary grammatical and logical idea of transitivity and intransitivity. The Lombard's "simple and absolute" meaning of propositions would be identified with the quality of intransitiveness and "not simple" or relative type of predications with transitive reading. Then, statements such as "God knows" and "God wills" can be understood in two ways: either *intransitively* whereby "God" is a subject of the proposition and "knows/wills" is a predicate, or *transitively* whereby "God" is a subject, "knows/wills" a verbal predicate, and there is an additional element

signifying the object or addressee of the predicate's operation. It is a plausible rendering of the Lombardian idea, as far as I can see.

Also, this distinction in terminology has theological significance. It clearly implies the *ad intra* and *ad extra* "features" of God and highlights his total sovereignty and independence of creation. He remains the all-knowing and all-willing God, even if there is no creation. His knowing and willing essence is as perfect as it has always been.

Fourthly, the Lombard's formulation leave no doubt that he believes in the full efficaciousness of God's will. Its volitions and decisions, whether they concern angels, nature, or humankind, are always fulfilled. The divine will is irresistible and fruitful. Yet, we have to understand its involvement in the world's affairs correctly because God never wills evil and always will good. How is that possible?

Master Peter makes a distinction between three modes of God's willing or, at least our interpretations of its operation. God either *wills (velit)*, or *unwills (nolit)*, or *not-wills (non vult)* something, but, in every single case, his will is involved and nothing happens without God somehow willing it (*Deus volens*). Willing means God's directly commanding something to be; unwilling, probably, God's willing something not to be (the Lombard is unclear in this regard); not-willing God's permitting voluntary activity. Thus, when it comes to good things, God wills or efficaciously creates them, and, as for bad things, God not-wills, that is, permits them. This not-willing, that is, not-willing-but-allowing, gives some room for the creatures' freedom, in general, and evil things or events, in particular. And in all these cases of direct willing, direct unwilling, and permissive not-willing Peter Lombard speaks of God's will in the sense of actual willing, the act or execution of the will. It remains his primary definition.

Fifthly, the Master of the *Sentences* firmly emphasizes God's absolute freedom and uncaused nature of God's will. Neither divine potency nor knowledge determine what God is supposed to choose out of the options and possibilities available to him. God wills simply because he wills so, and, therefore his will has absolutely no cause whatsoever. But the supposed character of relations and logical order between God's

knowledge, potency, and will remain somewhat in the shadow, as the Lombard does not really discuss it in distinctions 45-48.

Lastly, on a few occasions, he implicitly used some philosophical and logical reasoning which confirms the philosophical-theological nature of his project. First of all, the Italian Master clearly appealed to semantic and metaphysical notions when he differentiated between simple and absolute predications, on one hand, and non-simple and relative predications, on the other. His application of the two types of propositions to theology proper, supplied with detailed explications, demonstrates his care for accuracy and expertise in logic. Also, his linguistic dissection of God's will on willing, unwilling, and non-willing testify to his shrewdness and a rather scholastic way of producing sharp distinctions and elaborate concepts. Finally, his sophisticated and rather ambiguous reading of 1 Tim. 2, 4 shows once again that the Lombard has good knowledge of dialectical tools and was able to use them when necessary. He applied the rules of conversion from the square of oppositions to the biblical text and turned a simple phrase, "He [God] wills all men to be saved," into a universal affirmative statement *A* ("All men, who are to be saved, are willed by God") and, then, a universal negative statement *E* ("No man is to be saved without being willed by God"). Hence, although the author of the *Sentences* deliberately denies reducing theology to an exercise in dialectic, he regularly employs a selection of logical tools to make his theological point and reconcile conflicting authoritative text. Hence, his doctrine of God's will is no less philosophical-theological than his treatment of other divine attributes.

Conclusion: towards Peter Lombard's philosophical theology proper

It has taken quite a while for intellectual historians to rediscover the true meaning and value of Peter Lombard's legacy. As the result of the concerted scholarly effort of the second half of the twentieth and first two decades of the twenty-first century, we have gotten a more adequate, less biased, and historically rooted approach to the Lombard. Now, it is time to delve deeper and rediscover the nuances of his philosophical theology.

The given research has dealt with a particular aspect of Peter Lombard's teachings, which were handed over to posterity in the very influential *Book of Sentences*, as my main goal has been to closely examine and analyze his doctrine of God's key attributes—knowledge, potency, and will. More specifically, I intended to proceed with a double purpose to (1) identify his theological points and (2) detect the philosophical and logical means he uses to drive his arguments home. Here are the conclusions to which I come and final observations I make concerning the task in question.

The first set of conclusions I draw might be called *methodological*. These are the points about how Peter Lombard theologizes about God and what his remarkable means are. Of course, as I noted earlier, it is incorrect to speak of the Lombardian "method" because the notion of *methodus* does not belong to the twelfth-century thought. However, it is totally possible to speak of his *approach* and *way* of theologizing and dealing with his sources. It has long since been established that the major achievement that granted the *Sentences* such high esteem and wide reception is the systematic organization of crucial authoritative theses and quotations (*sententiae*) and the scholarly rigor their compiler demonstrated while composing this collection. It was the matter of arrangement, proportion, and the angle from which the reader was expected to see the given quotation. This is the Lombardian approach from the bird's view, and there is no need to speak much about it. This macro-analysis has already been done by de Ghellinck, Brady, Colish, Rosemann, and others. Instead, it would be helpful to trace the logical, theological, and philosophical means,

techniques, and arguments he uses to make his points in a sort of micro-analysis. And according to the findings I have presented in chapters 3-6, these are the procedures and techniques Peter Lombard espouses.

It is crucial that, quite in the spirit of his age, he accepts the tenets of *terminist logic* and pays homage to *semantics*. More than once Master of the *Sentences* starts his strings of quotations and arguments with word definitions and comments on the way the key terms need to be understood. When speaking about the Trinity and the divine Persons (*personae*), the Lombard traditionally explains them as eternal and actual relations of paternity, filiation, and spiration and additionally defines them as subsistencies or "the ones" who subsist and exist (*entes, subsistentes*) as one divine essence. What is important about the Lombard's contribution is that he expresses the orthodox doctrine by means of several rather philosophical and logical concepts. He uses not only quite expected notions of "substance," "essence," and "persons," but also those of "subsistence," "subsistent," "being ones." And, when equating the *personae* with the latter group of terms, he directly states that they are only metaphorical or translated. Thus, on one hand, he adds a more recent theological terminology to his "quotation book" and, thus, legitimizes its usage. On the other hand, he safeguards the orthodox understanding of the trinitarian dogma by introducing the category of metaphorical or "translated" meaning of the notion of person.

More importantly, Peter Lombard distinguishes two types of predications about God, and it is of great importance for his theology proper. When a man says something about the Christian God, he either denotes the divine essence "simply and absolutely" (*simpliciter et absolute*) or speaks of it "not simply and absolutely" (*non simpliciter et absolute*), that is, relatively, in connection with something else. Therefore, propositions like "God knows" or "God wills" mean "God is God *as* knowing" or "God is God *as* willing," because here God is both the subject and the predicate of the phrase. Propositions like "God knows everything" or "God wills something" mean "God knows all (knowable) things" or "God wills that thing to happen," God being the subject and *something else*, something outside God, being the

object of the phrase. The focus of the proposition shifts from God's *essence* as such to the *relation* between God and a thing known or willed.

This division is based on an Augustinian distinction between the signification and the signified: God's nature is what is truly signified by our theological propositions and our notions of the divine attributes are the significations or signs of the thing signified. There is only one signified object, God's essence, and several significations ascribed to it by other nouns or adjectives, which, in metaphysical terms, means that the notions used to denote divine attributes, such as "God's knowledge" and "God's will" signify God's essence *qua* connected to "the varying states of things and (its) different effects" (*varios status rerum et diversos effectus*).[602] God relates himself to the world and acts in the world. As a result, the different objects and effects of his involvement require a number of terms and concepts to rightly express what is going on. Hence, the Lombard explains the diversity of the attributes of God on two levels: on the level of language and logic (here properties are *names and significations*) and on the level of metaphysics and ontology (here properties are *real relations and real actions*). And this idea finds its reflection in two types of theological predications which, in my view, can be easily rendered in a contemporary language. The Lombard's "simple and absolute" meaning of propositions would be identified with the quality of intransitivity and "not simple" or relative type of predications with a transitive reading. Then, statements such as "God knows" and "God wills" can be understood in two ways: either *intransitively* whereby "God" is a subject of the proposition and "knows/wills" is a predicate, or *transitively* whereby "God" is a subject, "knows/wills" a verbal predicate, and there is an additional element signifying the object or addressee of the predicate's operation. This is my suggestion, which attempts at the elucidation of the Lombardian thought and theological language and, in a way, adds nuance and depth

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[602] *Sent*. 1, dist. 35, cap. 1, no.1. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae I (Grottaferrata)*, 1:254–55; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Bugnolo)*, 1:597; Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1 (Silano)*, 1:194.

Silano's translation of the phrase "varios status rerum et diversos effectus" reads: "the varying states of things and *their* different effects" (italics mine), while Bugnolo has here: "the various states of things and (*its*) [that is, God's Knowledge's] diverse effects" (*italics mine*). I see no grammatical or theological necessity to agree with Silano's version and think that Bugnolo's reading is more correct: God's essence in general and knowledge, in particular, does not have to be concerned with the created thing's actions and effects in order to be named or described. Rather, God can have a kind of interaction with those things wherein he is the one who produces "the various effects."

to the earlier findings by Colish. She downplayed the important distinction between two types of sayings the Lombard makes. I, however, suggest that this is an important semantic-theological development testified to in and transferred to posterity through the *Book of Sentences*.

In addition to semantics, Peter Lombard regularly refers to and uses quite a few *logical tools and techniques*. By doing this, he adopts some elements of the Aristotelian, Boethian, and Abelardian logic and adds them to the means, which were traditional for the Augustinian neoplatonism of the early Middle Ages. He more than once uses the *modus tollens* in dealing with problematic paradoxes, appeals to conjunctive and disjunctive reading of propositions (the readings *coniunctim* and *disiunctim*), employs the *reductio ad absurdum* method while tracing possible false implications of certain ambiguous theological propositions, and applies the rules of conversion based on the square of oppositions when interpreting 1 Tim. 2, 4 ("He [God] wills all men to be saved"). Eventually, Master turns the biblical text to a universal affirmative proposition *A* ("All men, who are to be saved, are willed by God"), and, then, converts it to a universal negative statement *E* ("No man is to be saved without being willed by God"). These relatively simple techniques the Lombard pulls out of his toolkit both show his reluctance to lean on more sophisticated dialectical tools and testify to his decent competence in logic. He uses these logical tools very knowledgeably and skillfully. As my formalizations demonstrate, these techniques help him build solid arguments and respond to some critics or supposedly arrogant and heterodox thinkers of his time. The formalizations themselves are applied to the Lombard's text for the first time.

Also, Master Peter creatively and consistently uses the *opinio nominalium* regarding the meaning of theological propositions with altered time indexes or grammatical tenses. This principle prescribes that any declarative proposition about God's potency or volitions can, and actually should, change its grammatical tense when needed but its lexical and theological meaning—just as its truth value—must always remain the same. It holds because God exists, wills, and acts in eternity, but some of his volitions and acts unfold in time and, as a result, our propositions

normally refer to certain points of time by means of their tenses. But God is not essentially bound to time. Therefore, our propositions about him and his nature must respect both the time-indexed nature of the time-indexed event God knows and wills and the eternal essence of God who knows and wills. Hence, it is right to say, "God knew that his Son was going to become incarnate" or "God knows that his Son was incarnate" but it would be improper to accept the utterance: "God knows that his Son is going to become incarnate." Such propositions signify God's eternal and immutable knowledge but the object of this knowledge, Christ's incarnation, has a time index and is fixed in time. And both aspects are to be respected.

The Lombardian appropriation of the Nominalist Opinion has been thoroughly studied by Colish but here I criticize her later stance[603] and defend the correctness of her earlier position.[604] The late Colish came to believe that Peter Lombard thought that the *opinio* implied God's ability to replicate the events he once did. Instead, I insist that his position underscores the permanence and unchangeability of both his voluntary decisions and the set of possibilities open to him. Therefore, in my interpretation, it is correct to say that God *can have become* incarnate now but wrong to say that he *can become* incarnate now because his volition has already been realized in time. But this realization did not exhaust or destroy God's power to do so. It means that the divine potency to become incarnate is eternal but his Incarnation is a time-indexed event. Therefore, God cannot, and does not need to, repeat or redo what he once did. Yet, his ability to do that very event is always with him, and this is what the Nominalist Opinion, accepted by the Lombard, entails. Our way of speaking about God changes but the meaning of our words as well as the immutable truth of an established fact remains.

Finally, in terms of the Lombardian "methodology," it is notable that he starts with the Trinity as such and only later deals with the divine attributes shared by the Three Persons. This is his important organizational and structural decision. His approach is characterized by a *rinitarian and essentialist perspective*. He approaches

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[603] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Philosophy," 125.
[604] Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard"; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 1:299–300.

the whole topic of divine attributes through the lens, and only after the treatment of, the divine Trinitarian essence. Unlike Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, Peter Lombard treats the Trinity *before* a full exposition of God's attributes shared by all trinitarian persons. (The "Summas" of both Alexander and Thomas start with what relates to one divine essence, including all the attributes, and, only after it, discuss the distinction of Perons.) The structure of the First Book of *Sentences* reveals the order of priorities its author has in mind while discussing the Godhead: (1) the trinity of persons and the perfect unity of essence, and (2) distinct attributes of the Triune God. The Trinity as Trinity is treated in distinctions 2-34, and the divine essential attributes in the distinctions 35-48.

This structural decision highlights the "essentialist" approach the Lombard takes and has both methodological and theological value for his project. The emphasis is on the unity and simplicity of the divine essence. It means that such attributes as God's knowledge or God's will are aspects or "sides" of one, perfect, and simple divine essence as "one and the highest reality" (*una et summa quaedam res*). From this perspective, any divine attribute is identical with what God is, with his essence. The question about how, then, one can speak of numerous attributes is solved with the help of two types of predications about God and the distinction between the signification and the signified, which have already been summarized above.

According to this "Trinitarian essentialist" model, all three Persons of the Godhead share one simple essence. This essence has no parts, and therefore such things as knowledge, wisdom, or will are actually one and the same thing in God: they are one essence. Yet, God's nature is differently manifested in his outward actions, which allow a theologian to speak of some distinct and distinguishable properties or aspects of this nature. Therefore, it is right to say that there *is* knowledge, potency, and will in God as distinct attributes or expressions of the one essence as it relates to the intratrinitarian and extratrinitarian "worlds". Ontically, these three attributes *are* one and the same nature, but functionally, they are *not*. Thus, according to Peter Lombard's rendering of traditional Christian theology God's knowledge, potency, and will are essentially one and the same nature (*secundum*

substantiam) but functionally and relatively—that is, in their connection to the Trinitarian constitution and the created realities—they are different (*ad aliquid, secundum relationem, relative*).

Neither God's knowledge nor God's potency or will ever function in isolation from God's other attributes. Both can operate *with* or *without* each other, but only in the relative sense, depending on what exactly the operation in question is and what its object is. For instance, God the Father generates the Son by nature but he also knows him and wills him as he eternally begets him; here the will and the knowledge are connected with paternity and filiation as inseparable from the divine essence and its triune constitution. But when God permits evil things and events in the created world, he knows them but does not will them. It is crucial to permanently observe the distinction between the *essential perspective* and the *relational view*: it is one thing for God to know and will something *ad intra* and another to act *ad extra*. But in the distinctions that have to do with properties of divine knowledge, potency, and will Peter Lombard primarily treats of God's extratrinitarian actions. In this regard, God the Trinity knows and wills simply and "singularly," for such a unique and unified action is required by the parameters of the divine essence in accordance with the Lombard's Trinitarian essentialism. The Three persons share—and, actually, are— one essence and therefore have one knowledge, one potency and one will.

This priority of the Triadology and such a strong prominence of the doctrine of God's essential simplicity are crucial for a correct understanding of Peter Lombard's theology of divine attributes. With these observations of my own, I confirm the validity and unpack the meaning of Marcia Colish's words as she summarizes the Lombard's position: "in their role *ad extra*, what [the Trinitarian persons] manifest and exercise is the divine nature, not Their divine personhood. The divine persons are fully coactive in anything They do *ad extra*, including missions which may be delegated to one or another Trinitarian person in particular."[605] This is the starting point for the Lombardian philosophical theology of God's attributes.

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[605] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1994, 2:723.

Now, it is time to sketch out the dissertation's *theological conclusions*. By this, I mean an overview of Peter Lombard's doctrines of God's knowledge, potency, and will. In this way, I substantially add to and further develop the earlier research findings of Marcia Colish, Philipp Rosemann, Clare Monagle, and others. I will consider the attributes of divine knowledge, will, and potency in this order.

For the Lombard, God's knowledge (*scientia Dei, cognitio Dei*) is God's awareness of and acquaintance with everything knowable. In fact, this wisdom or knowledge is an attribute that actually refers to one, simple, and indivisible divine essence *as* knowing some things and being epistemically connected to them. Thus, "God's knowledge" is a linguistic and theological concept that properly signifies God's essence and means the Trinity's awareness and knowledge of all things. In short, God's knowledge is the Triune God as knowing everything knowable. The knowable includes everything that God can do (potentialities), does (actualities), and allows (evil actualities). In other terms, it refers to God himself as the *internal eternal object* of knowledge, the angelic reality as the *external eternal object*, and the actually created world with its time-space continuum, various creatures, and events as the *external temporal object*.

It is important to remember that God knows temporal and spatial things eternally, that is, in his divine eternity. For the Lombard, it means that God can neither know things by contemplating them as if from within the time nor come to know something new or "un-know" something he used to know before. His knowledge from all eternity implies immutability and awareness of everything at once. Intrinsically, God's knowledge is simple, eternal, and immutable, being nothing more than God's essence *as* knowing things outside God. It is through this immutable awareness of every single possible and actual thing that God epistemically relates to the temporal world. Potentially, God's knowledge is capable of including more items than he knows now but, as a matter of fact, it cannot happen. Quantitatively, the divine knowledge could have been different, but qualitatively it is always the same: full, exhaustive, and comprehensive. What is known as possibly existing might become known as actually existing or what is known as existing at an earlier point of

time might become known as no longer existing at a later point of time. In both cases, it is the modal and ontological status of the known objects that changes, not God's knowledge of them. He permanently knows everything known and knowable.

The theological distinction between the essential and relational perspectives, presented above, has also bearing on the doctrine of God's knowledge because it requires a nuanced understanding of various "relations" that God has with various realities of the world. In particular, Peter Lombard says that knowledge or wisdom is identified with, and actually called, either (1) simply "knowledge" whereby is implied his total awareness of everything knowable inside and outside the divine nature, or (2) "foreknowledge" as awareness of all future events, or (3) disposition and providence as ill-defined divine knowledge *as joined to* his will to act in certain way in the created world, and (4) predestination as well-defined divine knowledge *as joined with* his salvific will and concerned with the election and salvation of some people. The aspects (1), (2) and (4) are presented in detail in distinctions 36-39 whereas (3) does not receive such a treatment in the first volume of the Lombard's *opus magnum*.

God's epistemic activity implies two modes of "functioning." It can be a purely cognitive act as awareness alone (*notitia tantum, notitia sola*) or a double cognitive and voluntary act as awareness and simultaneous volition in the form of approbation or good pleasure (*notitia simul et beneplacito*; *nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio*). It is one and the same knowledge but with a different type of connection to the divine will. What is crucial here is the absence or presence of pleasure and willing activity on God's side: he either merely contemplates a thing in his knowledge or knows and approves or allows it to exist. His knowledge is either "connected" with the will or "disconnected" from it.

This difference between the various types or "sides" of God's knowledge has been even more sharpened by a similar distinction between (a) "distant," pure or simple knowledge, that is, *awareness or acquaintance (scientia quasi de longe, notitia tantum)*, and (b) more active and "close" knowledge, namely, one *with approbation and good pleasure (scientia prope, per approbationem et beneplacitum)*.

The latter clearly indicates the intimate connection between the knowledge and the will, while the former excludes it. Additionally, the latter pertains to all naturally good things only and the former to all things, including evil ones. Yet, such a distinction necessarily entails the question of the causal power of God's *fore*knowledge and the nature of his will.

Quite logically, God's foreknowledge (*praescientia, praevidentia*) is God's awareness of and acquaintance with everything knowable that is still in the future (from the human perspective). This kind of knowledge can have a simple, unitary, or a twofold nature—cognitive and/or voluntary—just like the broader knowledge of God. Hence, depending on the context and the specific theological situation, foreknowledge means either the awareness and perfect cognition of future events, or the awareness and actual willing of future events. Hence, the Lombard seems to allow for a contraction between God's knowledge and God's will, although in later distinctions, he carefully distinguishes the two aspects involved.

He solves the problem of the alleged causal power of God's knowledge by denying both lines of causations: neither God's knowledge causes these events to happen, nor are actually happening events the causes of God's knowing them. The first option leads to a metaphysical and ontic necessity (*necessitatem facere*), which denies any freedom and implies that God is the creator of evil. But this is impossible and, therefore, the Lombard utterly rejects it (*non igitur scientia vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium*). But the second option entails the compromising of God's perfect and independent nature by making it dependent on creatures' voluntary decisions. This is equally impossible and must be rejected, too (*non tamen ideo praesciuntur quia futurae sunt*).

Instead, Master Peter asserts that God's knowledge can be said to cause a thing to happen in a narrow sense and, at the same time, to have no causal power in a broader sense. Sometimes it "behaves" as awareness alone, with no voluntary action. Sometimes it functions as awareness and simultaneous causal action of God's good pleasure (*notitia simul et beneplacito*). The former type of God's involvement is of merely epistemological or cognitive character, but the latter includes both

epistemological and voluntary elements. The second option is reserved for good things only, but the first for evil things as well. For God creates and causes whatever is naturally good but he simply knows and never does whatever is morally bad. Hence, God's knowledge, in general, is not causative, but God's knowledge of the good is causative because he both knows and wills what is good (*praescit bona tamquam sua, tam quam ea quae facturus est: ut in illa praesciendo simul fuerint ipsius notitia et auctoritatis beneplacitum*). This "simul" and the denial of the direct causation in the text of the *Sentences* seem to imply the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and voluntary activity on the one side and the contingency of the created order and the rational creatures' free will on the other side. But the details of this conception remain unrevealed at this point.

God's will (*divina voluntas, divina usia qua volens, velle, Dei voluntas rationabilis, justa voluntas sua*) is the divine ability to reasonably will and decide to act in a certain way. Better put, the will of God (*voluntas sive volens*) is his nature *qua willing*. Therefore, this divine will is one, simple, eternal, and immutable, just as the essence of the most perfect being is expected to be. It is also called "the good pleasure or disposition of God" (*beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio*). Whatever God does, he does by it (*qua*) and in accordance with it (*secundum eandem rationem*), but never against it (*contra quam*) or without it (*praeter eam*). The best explication would be that such a disposition means that God's essence actively wills certain things God knows and can do. The divine will implies the act of divine willing because Peter Lombard quite systemically and regularly speaks of it in terms of the execution of the will. Hence, the will of God is God's essence as actively willing and bringing something to be, so that this willing is identical to God's being disposed to, and taking pleasure in, this willing and its supposed result.

There is only one divine will as such, that is, his good pleasure or active willing. But there are several signs or expressions of this one will: precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel, collectively named the wills of God, in the plural. These five notions are not identical with God's will *per se*; rather, they are temporal

and outward expressions and outflows of that will. Hence, it is the only divine decision-making "ability," and it has one, simple and indivisible nature.

The will of God is always informed by, and functions in intimate relation to, the knowledge of God. In fact, it directly called rational, although the dynamics of relations between the *scientia* and the *voluntas* have not been explicated. The will itself is simply *willing – velle*. In the analyzed chapters of the *Sentences*, Peter Lombard almost exclusively speaks of the divine will in one sense—that of execution of the will, the active willing—only once or twice alluding to the dimension of desire or intention.

He also stresses the totally free nature of God's will, which is said to be preceded by no cause (*summe bona voluntas causa est omnium… quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est*). That is, God wills simply because he wills so (*quia voluit*). Neither divine potency nor knowledge determine what God is supposed to choose out of the options and possibilities available to him. God wills simply because he wills so, and, therefore his will has absolutely no cause whatsoever. But the supposed character of relations and logical order between God's knowledge, potency, and will remain somewhat in the shadow. Yet, the Lombard admits that God's will is always in accord with God's essence, and it cannot be otherwise. But no necessity is implied here. It is a simple reference to his essentialist perspective with its emphasis on the simplicity of divine essence. Since the will of God *is* his essence *qua* willing it cannot will inappropriately for this essence. So, God wills in a way perfectly appropriate for God.

Additionally, the Lombard's insists on the full efficaciousness of God's will. All its volitions and decisions are always fulfilled, as it is always irresistible and fruitful. But the will's involvement in various aspects of the world may vary. God either *wills (velit)*, or *unwills (nolit)*, or *not-wills (non vult)* things. So, nothing happens without God somehow willing it (*Deus volens*) in one of three modes. Willing means God's directly commanding something to be; unwilling God's willing something not to be (although the Lombard is somewhat unclear in this regard); not-willing God's permitting something to be. Thus, when it comes to good things, God wills and

efficaciously creates them, and, when it comes to evil things, God not-wills, permits them. This not-willing-but-allowing gives some room for the creatures' freedom, in general, and evil things or events, in particular. So far about God's will.

As for the *potentia divina*, the Lombard does not clearly differentiate between potency and omnipotence, as both should have the same meaning for God, but he provides a clear definition for the latter. God's all-powerfulness (*omnipotentia Dei*) is the divine ability to do whatever he wills to do (*ea possit quae vult*) and, additionally, whatever is in accordance with his truth and justice (*quod convenit veritati eius et iustitiae*). Thus, it is, in fact, God's *power or potency* to do everything he wills to be done.

In other words, God has the potency to do whatever is possible for him and whatever is fitting to his nature *if* he wills so. Such potency implies a huge amount of possible acts, created objects, and states of affairs God can or could do. God is capable of creating or allowing many things but he wills to actualize only some of them. Divine potency as such is an immense reservoir of realizable potentialities and it is regulated by the divine will. God's *posse* implies immediate God's *nosse*, logically precedes God's *velle*, and implies a wide range of possible decisions.

However, God's potency, as the Lombard sees it, not only logically precedes the divine volition but also continues "after" the will has willed something. On one hand, God could have willed and acted otherwise, and his potency allows for the potential existence of alternative options. On the other hand, God's capacity or potency to do a certain thing remains intact even after he has willed to do that thing. Both statements hold because the power to do all sorts of things is always with God and in God, and the will does not change it. The will directs and not limits the potency. God could have created the world or could not have created the world if he willed so, and since he is outside the time this pair of possibilities *qua* his essential capacity is still the same. God is eternally capable of creating or not creating the world if he eternally wills so. But the fact of the world's having being created must remain true because this is something God's will has established, and that should not change. The *factum* is *factum*.

At the same time, the notion of potency (*potentia, posse*) in general is not technically defined by the Lombard—unfortunately, but not surprisingly, granted his purpose to mediate the orthodox tradition and his negative view of logical formalities. It tends to mean God's capability of doing infinity of things and his having of, or the access to, a multitude of hypothetically possible choices and actions, which God can do (*multa potest facere quae nec bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt nec erunt, nec bene fiunt vel fient, quia nunquam fient*). It is his power to act "in different directions," or possibility to act in this or that manner. God is not coerced or caused to be able to act in a certain way. That is his potency is not regulated by anything logically preceding it and necessitating its abilities.

Even granted that God has decided to act in a determined way, still, his reasonable will allows for the permanent existence of hypothetical and alternative options open for him – God *could have done* otherwise, and this openness to potentiality cannot change (*eadem manente ratione et causa, alia potuit facere et ista dimittere; potest tamen secundum eandem rationem et dimittere quae facit et facere quae dimittit; posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, [praeter] ea quae vult et facit; potest Deus meliorem rem facere, quam faciat*). But the last thesis entails modalities and requires for a more elaborate notion of possibility.

Therefore, in the end, I highlight and explicate the implicit modal notions, which relate to the three divine attributes I discuss. These are the *"modal conclusions."* Peter Lombard does not offer a separate treatment of divine modalities in the *Sentences*. But it is obvious from his text that he *does* understand, has some clear ideas of, and works with a few complex modal notions such as necessity and possibility. In my research, I attempt to discover and explain for the first time how Master of the *Sentences* understands these notions and applies them to theology proper. In fact, they are an implicit part and parcel of his philosophical theology, and, by employing these concepts Peter Lombard, in fact, accepts and promulgates the practice of appealing to certain modal-logical paradigms that was initiated by Boethius and continuated by Damian, Anselm, and Abelard. Thus, he contributes to the formation of the ground for a later synthesis of theology and philosophy, which

will be an aspiration of the thirteenth-century theologians: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and others.

Possibility has no strict definition in the *Sentences* 1, whereas contingency is altogether absent as a term or clear concept. The notion of possibility is presented by the verb "posse," which means "can," "is able," and "it is possible that" in its indicative (*potest, potuit*) or subjunctive (*possit*) forms. It lacks technicality and thus can be interpreted as one's internal (natural?) ability or an objective possibility to act in this or that manner that is available for a being in question. The divine possibilities and the creatures' possibilities are presented rather obliquely in the Lombard's oeuvre, but there are a few important insights.

Probably, its most important insight is, that the range of possibilities open to God is wider than that of actualities. From the divine perspective, the possibilities are potentially doable or choosable (by God) things or events, which are permanently present to God's knowledge and belong to the realm of God's potency (in eternity). For "God is able to do more things than he wills, because more things are subject to his [potency] than to his will" (*Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subiecta eius potentiae quam voluntati*).

From the creaturely perspective, a possibility is an option of hypothetically having been created otherwise and/or freely choosing how to act in the future (in time). This notion is poorly presented in the *Sententiae* 1, being restricted to statements such as "potuit esse quod non esset" and "et alius et melior potest esse modus."

The word "contingent" (*contingens, contingentia*) is excluded from the Lombardian theological lexicon, as I noted above. But the anti-Abelardian musings in distinctions 40, 41, and 43 allow for the conclusion that in God's case a genuine possibility must be looked at from the perspective of eternity and, therefore, immutability while from the human perspective possibilities are subject to the time flow and, hence, to the diachronicity and mutability. God can do what he once did, for his power is unchangeable and his possibilities eternal, but the manifestations of his potency in this world are constituted by the diachronicity: God cannot now do

again what he could do two thousand years ago, although he still can have done the same thing. The *opinio nominalium* gives the Lombard the language to differentiate between God's eternal properties and how we describe them, and the diachronic modal theory helps him systematically express his teaching. Hence, in the *Book of Sentences*, *potentia* and *posse* stand either for God's potency as the ability to choose and act, or for potential entities, events, and states of affairs – permanently available for God in his eternity and unfolding in time or remaining forever unrealized. Yet, one will not find here a serious reflection on the modalities of alternative state of affairs, for the author refuses to give a determination on the questions about how and what can (or could) have been otherwise.

The implicit contingency that Master Peter allows for, and never openly negates, is the freedom of will that characterizes the rational creatures. He never doubts that God's will is powerful enough to subjugate the will of man, but he says that the divine will freely allows for creatures' exercise of freedom, although sometimes— when he wishes—he decides to act against or upon the human will.

As for another important notion—that of *necessitas*—it has a definition as well, but it is not very strict and precise. The Lombard definitely starts off with an idea of necessity as compulsion and coercion. He overtly contrasts it with things that happen voluntarily, by choice, and early in his *Sentences* 1 says that in the trinitarian relations there is no place for an antecedent or compelling necessity. This is what we would call a causal or physical necessity. There could be *an external compelling necessity* as the "requirement" or "demand" imposed on God from the outside (*exigit, exactio, debet*), but such an option is utterly denied. There can also be an *internal and natural compelling necessity* (*coactus, naturali necessitate ductus, voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti*), which is also inapposite for God. Thus, Peter Lombard agrees that the *necessitas* stands for compulsion, coercion, and constraint, just as his predecessor Anselm of Canterbury thought, and asserts that God does not know such a thing.

The world God creates, on the other hand, has this kind of necessity. God's knowledge and will can necessitate (*necessitatem facere*) some events' happening,

which entails the inevitability of their happening and impossibility of their non-happening. But the character of operation and implications of such necessity are unclear, and Peter Lombard leaves several options open. The text declares that nothing can be otherwise than God knows and wills. Also, it seems, nothing existing or having existed cannot cease to be, but still, it could have been otherwise. Thus, Master Peter neither asserts nor denies the necessity or non-necessity in the created world, which must stem out of God's knowing and/or willing. But, most probably, a proposition "nothing can be otherwise than God knows and wills" refers to another type of necessity.

The Lombard regularly speaks of necessity and possibility when the former tends to mean temporal fixity and the latter one's potency or capacity to do otherwise at a later moment. Therefore he turns out to be a humble proponent of the statistical understanding of modality (Knuuttila) or the diachronic theory of modality (Vos). For instance, the Lombard rejects the Abelardian necessarianism with its conviction that what is cannot be otherwise, but still agrees that what is, is necessarily, *when* it is or *after* it is. So, a diachronic necessity is the necessity that applies to things that have taken place in the past or are happening in the present and, as such, belongs to the category of what can no longer change. (Consequently, a diachronic contingency would apply to things, which have not yet taken place and might or might not happen in the future.) Here the Lombard thinks of necessity in terms of temporally established immutability and of possibility/contingency in terms of potency to be otherwise at a later moment of time. The modalities are influenced by the temporal aspect. What was or is, is diachronically necessary. What will be or will not be is still diachronically contingent and possible. These diachronic notions perfectly apply to God's acts in the created world because what God has done or allowed to be can no longer be undone, and what God has not done yet, might happen or not happen in the future. But this type of necessity does not impose any limitation on God's essence because temporal categories do not apply to him. Hence, the diachronic necessity does not necessitate God.

There is, finally, the third kind of necessity, which is implicitly present in the Lombardian *opus*. It is the notion of necessity of entailment. God is not physically or diachronically coerced or caused to be able to act in a certain way. For there is no power that could necessitate his decisions and acts, just as there is no time in his eternity so that something could diachronically determine his intentions. But it would be acceptable to say that God's potency functions in accordance with the principle of the necessity of entailment. This kind of necessity implies the operation of logical entailment: the necessity operator refers to the implication itself and means that *if* the event happens, *then* the event happens. What is modalized is the connection between the antecedent and the consequent of the implication: neither of them taken alone is necessary but the consequent necessarily follows from the antecedent if the antecedent obtains. Its formula is "N $(p \rightarrow q)$."

According to the Lombard, God cannot do anything that, *if* he decided to do that, would conflict with his justice or, by extension, other attributes. It is necessarily true that *if* God does something, it is fitting to his nature. Moreover, God can do only things, which, *if* he did them, would fit who he is. What is necessary here is not the particular abilities God has or specific acts he does but the harmonious connection between what he can do and what is fitting for him to do. The necessity of entailment is obvious in these examples. It also helps to understand how the diachronic necessity relates to God: he is not constrained by temporal limitations but, *if* he wills something to happen in time, it happens in accordance with God's knowledge, potency, and will—that is, basically, his essence—and therefore cannot be undone. For God, it is immutable because he wills it to be (if he wills so) and not because of any other constraint. What is diachronically necessary in our world of time and space is necessary for God only in a sense of the necessity of logical entailment. Therefore, one must conclude that Peter Lombard is familiar with and capable of using the notion of necessity in at least three meanings: those of coercion, diachronic fixity and immutability, and logical entailment. And it is the latter that is properly ascribed to God and related to his essential attributes. Hence, the Lombard obviously and consistently applies a rather new idea of the consequent necessarily to theology

proper and uses it in his treatment of the divine potency and will. Thus, he significantly broadens the Augustinian vision of divine modalities and introduces the Anselmian and twelfth-century notion into theological scholastic discourse. Later, this notion will be part and parcel of the thirteenth-century discussions and will make its way into the classical Roman Catholic and Reformed theology.

In the last analysis, Peter Lombard's theology of God's knowledge, God's potency, and God's will as presented in his textbook proves to be both philosophical and doctrinally orthodox. The *Sentences* do not provide a full-fledged system of theology but draw a fairly harmonious portrait of God: he is the Unity of Three Persons who share one perfect essence, which expresses itself differently in relation to various external objects and entities. This essence is characterized by an infinite potency as the power to act in any way that is fitting and appropriate for God. Yet, it is the divine will that decides which possibilities will be actualized. God's knowledge embraces both realized and unrealized possibilities—that is, what God can and wills to do, on one hand, and what he simply can but not-wills to do—thus having a universal grasp of the knowable things without having causal power. Even his will does not necessitate everything, since its activity is always free, yet efficacious. Thus, an important, though not in all respects clear, the distinction between God's potency (what he can or could potentially do), God's knowledge (what God is aware of), and God's will (what God chooses and wills to do) has been presented and systematically held. This is the Lombard's achievement that he made with the help of numerous quotations and an impressive list of logical tools and modal logical notions.

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
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