

## ІСТОРИЯ І МЕТОДОЛОГІЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ НАУКИ

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ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETIES  
IN THE RESERCH OF TATU VANHANEN

*The article analyzes ethnicity and ethnic conflict, previous studies and explanations on the evolutionary roots of conflicts and arguments to justify ethnic conflicts. This article concerns certain issues Tatu Vanhanen's political philosophy of ethnic conflicts of interest in ethnically divided societies. For this purpose, the 176 countries of this study are divided into three main categories on the basis of the residuals produced by the regression analysis.*

*Keywords: Ethnic Conflict, Biological Roots, Ethnic Nepotism, ethnically divided societies, ethnic interest conflicts, index of political resources, Index of Power Resources.*

**Introduction.** The purpose of the work is to find a common factor capable, at least partially, of explaining the emergence of ethnic conflicts of interest in ethnically divided societies. With the help of the methods of modern ethnic conflict, Tatu Vanhanen in his books indicates potentially explosive areas of disagreement between the ethnic interests of different ethnic groups. The author argues that cultural, political and historical explanations of the causes of ethnic conflicts are always limited to individual countries, regions and historical periods, and do not give us a hypothetical example of the worldwide prevalence of ethnic conflicts. He also argues that the ultimate explanation for the roots of ethnic conflicts lies in racial favoritism, an expanded form of familial bias. The author carries out a rational reconstruction of the consideration ethnically divided societies by democratic compromises. The purpose of this book is to seek a common explanatory factor for ethnic conflicts, a factor which can explain, at least to some extent, the emergence of ethnic interest conflicts in practically all ethnically divided societies.

**The presentation of the primary material.** This article envisages rational reconstruction of Vanhanen's discovery is based on the cumulative index of political resources, the Index of Power Resources, which can describe and characterize 60-70% of democratization variations more accurately than other measured factors. Numerous statistical data for calculating the Index of Power Resources Tatu Vanhanen has gained from the Central Archive of Social Sciences, which is located at the University of Tampere. The accounting of parameters was carried out since 1810, which repeatedly allowed to increase its representative accuracy [31].

Tatu Vanhanen analyzes the essence of concepts in articles and monographs developed by other researchers. In the context of illustrated reflections, E.O. Wilson published, inspired the Finnish scholar to create a unified concept of social sciences, based on evolutionary theory and sociobiological ideas so that it is possible to reliably describe and predict social, as well as political, historical processes [33]. The author stated his arguments in the book «On the Evolutionary Fundamentals of Politics», which he backed up with the theses of the then biopolitics science, relying on the works of the American scientist Albert Somit [21].

Studies of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as well as of theoretical explanations were reviewed in Tatu Vanhanen's research «Ethnic Conflicts. Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism» (2012). For this purpose, the 176 countries of this study are divided into three main categories based on the residuals produced by the regression analysis. Empirical variables needed to test the hypothesis about the important impact of ethnic nepotism on the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict will be defined — empirical data on the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts and the level of ethnic heterogeneity. The research hypotheses are tested by anecdotal evidence on dependent and explanatory variables. Correlation analysis is used to test the theories, and the results are complemented by multiple correlation analysis. The results of correlation analysis are supplemented by regression analysis. Regression analysis is used to disclose how well the average relationship between the measure of ethnic nepotism and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts applies to single

countries. The main conclusion: because the ratio of ethnic nepotism used in this study explains more than half of the global variation in the extent of ethnic conflicts across all civilizational and developmental boundaries, and because the evolutionary roots of ethnic nepotism are in our universal human nature, it would be unrealistic to expect the disappearance, or even a decrease, of ethnic conflict and violence from the world.

Linz J., whom Tatu Vanhanen met at Yale University, suggested testing the mentalities of peoples for their ability to democratize. This pushed the scientist to discover another pattern: he put ethnic intellectual abilities in line with ethnic conflicts, which allowed a new perspective to consider the entire world history.

Berghe, Pierre L. van den in the introduction to his book *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, substantiated the theory of ethnic favoritism, which is understood as the desire to favor all members of their racial-ethnic group in any way.

Tatu Vanhanen immediately grabbed on this idea, as he saw a clear link between the degree of ethnic favoritism and the level of conflict. On the basis of his statistical analysis, it became quite apparent that the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of society, the higher the probability of the emergence of ethnic conflict with the use of violence.

The results of this theoretical and analytical work were summarized in the monograph «Ethnic Conflicts Explained with the Use of Ethnic Favoritism» in 1999. In 2012, the scientist, completing his research with new material, carried out a second edition of the book, entitled «Ethnic Conflict: Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Favoritism». Thus, the concept began to acquire evidence.

Tatu Vanhanen is Emeritus Professor of Political Science of the University of Tampere, Finland and Visiting Researcher at the Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki. Before his academic career, he worked at the headquarters of the Agrarian League/Centre Party in Helsinki. He became Doctor of Social Sciences at the University of Tampere has held positions at the University of Jyväskylä, the University of Tampere and the University of Helsinki. His first books dealing with ethnic conflicts and ethnic nepotism were *Politics of Ethnic Nepotism: India as an Example* and *On the Evolutionary Roots of Politics*. Among his recent books are *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 countries*, *Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism* (1999), *Geenien Tulo yhteiskuntatieteisiin* (*The Coming of Genes into Social Sciences*) *IQ and the Wealth of Nations*, *Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries*, *IQ and Global Inequality*, *Globaalit Angelman* (*Global Problems*), *The Limits of Democratization: Climate, Intelligence, and Resource Distribution* (2009) and *Intelligence: A Unifying Construct for the Social Sciences* in 2012.

Ethnicity has been conceptualized in different ways, but researchers have not been to agree on any general definition of ethnicity.

According to A. Lijphart, the primordialist theory assumes «that ethnic identity is an inherent characteristic and, if not permanently fixed, at least very difficult to change» [15, p. 857].

J. Markakis argues that the common denominator of most available definitions of ethnic identity is culture, which means that ethnic groups are social constructs.

For Cl. Corlin, ethnic groups are cultural constructions.

A. Giddens says that many different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups, for example, language, history or ancestry, religion, and styles of dress or adornment [8, p. 253].

R. Jenkins in his book *Rethinking Ethnicity* supports the idea of the social construction of ethnicity. For him, ethnicity is a matter of social differentiation.

D. L. Horowitz concept of ethnicity embraces differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin; it covers tribes, races, nationalities, and castes [13, p. 54].

M. Weiner argues that «ethnicity» emphasizes «common origin and descent, and shared characteristics based on language, race, religion, place of origin, culture, values of history, but not a state» [32, p. 320].

F. Salter argues that «ethnic they» is «a preferable term to «ethnic group» because members of such a category usually do not form a group.» He means by his term «ethnic» a population sharing common descent.

Goetze D. notes that ethnic groups «are often defined as groups of individuals that perceive themselves to be bound by common descent, common language, common religion, or other cultural features.» He continues that the term «national group» may be used as a synonym for the ethnic group «or may refer to ethnic groups that express political demands or share common territory» [9, p. 272].

Pierre L. van den Berghe says that ethnicity is defined in the last analysis by common descent. The core of an ethnic group is made up of people «who know themselves to be related to each other by a double network of ties of descent and marriage» [2, p. 26].

The mixing of cultural and primordial elements is characteristic of many definitions of ethnic groups. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) emphasizes the cultural nature of ethnic divisions and speaks of cultural diversity and cultural identity rather than ethnic diversity or ethnic identity. As Henry E. Hale notes: the main divide is between cultural definitions of ethnicity constructivism and primordial definitions which emphasize biological determinants of ethnicity [10, p. 458].

The concept began to acquire versatility [6]. For example, D. A. Smith speaks of the ethnic origins of nations and supports his argument by extensive historical evidence.

R. Reilly notes that ethnicity is a notoriously slippery concept, «it can be seen both as an ascriptive phenomenon, based on socio-biological traits, such as race, tribe, as «primordialism,» an adaptive expression of more malleable or constructed identities formed in reaction to external pressures and incentives» [17, p. 54].

A. Lijphart combines cultural and primordial characteristics of ethnicity; an ethnic group «can be defined as a group of people who see themselves as a distinct cultural community; who often share a common language, religion, kinship, and physical characteristics (such as skin color); and who tend to harbor negative and hostile feelings toward members of other ethnic groups»; notes that nowadays the term ethnic group has become virtually synonymous with communal group.

According to the definition, Hutchinson discusses the primordialist and instrumentalist definitions of ethnicity. In the case of primordialism, they refer to a sociobiological proposal, «which regards genetic reproductive capacity as the basis, not only of families and clans but of wider kinship-based groupings like ethnics» These groups are bonded through mechanisms of «nepotism» and «inclusive fitness» and by the myths of descent.

E. Henderson's definition of the ethnic group includes both cultural and primordial elements: the ethnic group is «A group of people sharing a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on common cultural traits such as ethnicity, language, religion, or race, and perceptions of common destiny» [11, p. 751].

In the opinion of the author in the world of increasing intrastate ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. Interstate violent ethnic conflicts may also increase. International terrorism represents a new dimension of ethnic violence. It has become adapted to the opportunities provided by modern weapon and communication technologies. The research problem and theoretical arguments are formulated it would be worthwhile to explore institutional means to mitigate ethnic conflicts and to avoid outbreaks of racial violence, but the chances to prevent ethnic violence by institutional means may remain quite limited for the reason that it is often difficult for parties to agree on the nature of appropriate institutions intended to share power between ethnic groups. We should learn to accept the fact that the world we live in is unsafe and that it is impossible to eradicate the evolutionary roots of interest conflicts. The international and domestic struggles for survival and scarce resources are often taking place between ethnic groups, and these struggles are powered by ethnic nepotism.

Researcher at the Department of Political Science Vanhanen identified that many examples show that ethnic violence also breaks out in democratic countries. Besides, international terrorism as a new dimension of ethnic violence crosses all political boundaries. Democracy does not eradicate our disposition to ethnic nepotism from human nature, but because there are some

examples of ethnically divided societies in which democratic institutions have helped to maintain ethnic peace, it is worthwhile to explore what kinds of democratic institutions might be best adapted to particular ethnically divided countries and to experiment with them.

The results of the regression analysis of ethnic conflict on level of ethnic heterogeneity in the group of 176 countries identified.

According to Tatu Vanhanen ethnic violence could be avoided in many ethnically divided societies by democratic compromises, which presuppose the adaptation of political institutions to satisfy the reasonable interests of all essential ethnic groups. In practice, we cannot expect any significant increase in the use of democratic compromises for the reason that few ethnic groups are willing to give up privileges they have achieved. Besides, the unprivileged ethnic groups are not always satisfied with the concessions made by dominant ethnic groups. The making of democratic compromises may become even more difficult in situations in which more or less similar ethnic groups struggle for the control of the same territory.

Before talking about conclusions, it is worth looking at the methodological problems that exist in his study. Vanhanen used a variety of indexes. Like the index of democracy, derived from the level of political participation and voting for opposition parties. On large arrays it works, but in some cases questions arise. Voter turnout may be a consequence of administrative mobilization (even if its level is above 70%), while votes «in favor» of the winning parties may also be obtained not during the voting, but due to «distribution». Difficulties also arise with main indicators used in the book being analyzed - Index of Ethnic Conflict and Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity. In «Ethnic Conflicts,» the author proudly writes that he compared data from 176 countries around the world. But, no matter how trite it may seem, it is very difficult to make such extensive comparisons of very different countries. Inevitably, the question of the reliability of information arises. Problems cause and used indexes. The scale of the Index of Ethnic Conflict of five values looks very rough and not sensitive enough. But - otherwise you can get confused. The overall picture painted by Vanhanen, albeit coarse strokes, is very similar to the truth. The author also uses the concept of ethnic heterogeneity, as a percentage opposite to the proportion of the largest group.

But Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity in many countries is constantly growing. It is clear that working with such large data arrays in a number of individual cases leaves many questions.

The Vanhanen classification divides the countries into 4 main groups. At first, a low level of ethnic separation is expectedly accompanied by a low intensity of ethnic conflicts, as the intensity of ethnic conflicts grows the Index of Ethnic Conflict (the second group) also grows. The following two groups of countries have a higher (low) level of ethnic conflict in relation to the expected. It is necessary to look for other important explanatory factors. The author is trying to do this, although, of course, one person is not able to know the situation in all countries of the world. Certain stereotypes also work.

Although for many, even a brief summary of the conflicts in 176 countries can be useful food for thought, even if you do not take into account the regression. And the overall picture looks plausible. The main thing is that the Finnish scientist states the ineradicability of ethnic contradictions.

These interests of different ethnic groups are different and we must look for a balance. Recommendations to reduce ethnic tensions are general. Vanhanen proposes a set of measures that includes «institutional reforms», democratic compromises [31, p. 238].

It's worth fighting with ethnic tensions not with «tolerance», and, at least, not to increase the growth of the level of ethnic heterogeneity, at least not to force the level of foreign ethnic migration. Existing ethnic divisions do not necessarily lead to acute conflicts and then, even to solve them, one can rely on something like a «co-public democracy» in the concept of A. Leiphart [15].

Using the methods of modern ethnic conflictology, Tatu Vanhanen in his book indicates potentially explosive conflict zones of ethnic interests of various ethnic groups [30]. The author argues convincingly that cultural, political and historical explanations of the causes of ethnic conflicts are always limited to individual countries, regions and historical periods and do not

provide us with a theoretical explanation for the global prevalence of ethnic conflicts. He also argues that the ultimate explanation of the roots of ethnic conflicts lies in ethnic favoritism, an extended form of family favoritism.

**Conclusions.** The author concluded that Vanhanen has explored the confrontation between democracy and ethnicity based on the hypothesis that democracy reduces the danger of ethnic violence and creates democratic, ethnic peace, which might ultimately cover the whole world. Unfortunately, the results of this analysis provide only limited support for such an expectation of democratic, ethnic order. The level of democratization explains hardly anything of the variation in ethnic conflicts independently from the level of ethnic heterogeneity, and democracies are nearly as frequent in ethnically heterogeneous and ethnically homogeneous countries.

Ideal position and the central message of Vanhanen is that ethnic conflict and violence, empowered by ethnic nepotism and the inevitable struggle for scarce resources, will not disappear from the world. It is more probable that the incidence of ethnic violence will increase in the more and more crowded world. However, despite this prediction on the persistence of ethnic conflicts, it is worthwhile to explore how competing ethnic groups could resolve their interest conflicts by peaceful means.

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**Ткач О. І., Ткач А. О.** *Етнічний конфлікт та насильство в гетерогенних суспільствах в дослідженнях Тату Ванханена*

*Автори статті аналізують засоби пом'якшення етнічних конфліктів і насильства за допомогою методів сучасної етнічної конфліктології в працях Тату Ванханена, який визначає зони зіткнення етнічних інтересів різних етносів. Ванханен аргументовано стверджує, що культурологічні, політичні, історичні пояснення причин виникнення етнічних конфліктів обмежені окремими країнами, регіонами та історичними періодами, не дають теоретичного пояснення поширення етнічних конфліктів; що пояснення коренів етнічних конфліктів в етнічному фаворитизмі, звертає увагу на інституціональні реформи, демократичні компроміси, можливості запобігати або зменшувати етнічне насильство за допомогою стратегій, які знаходяться під свідомим контролем людини; невикористані можливості для пом'якшення етнічних конфліктів за допомогою інституціональної інженерії через демократичні інститути*

*Ключові слова: Ванханен, етнічні конфлікти, етнічні інтереси, етнополітика, насильство, стратегії, політичний інструмент, шкала оцінок рівня конфліктів*