

ПРОБЛЕМИ ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИХ ПЕРЕТВОРЕНЬ

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**INSTITUTIONAL TRAPS IN POLITICAL PRACTICE
OF POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: CASE OF UKRAINE**

Political protest in Ukraine on winter 2013-2014 in its type is unconventional, so is as well as spontaneous and unpredictable. However unconventional political participation can have a devastating effect on the political process more than a change of power in unconventional ways. Neglect and failure to eliminate the causes of unconventional behavior on the part of public authorities to cause further escalation of the political crisis, threatening the existence of the state as a whole. This article aims to analyze the causes, characteristics and manifestations of unconventional political participation in the Ukraine, and to author try to formulate opinions and concerns about further political process.

Keywords: political participation, political protest, unconventional behavior.

When I applied for the participation in the congress and named the topic of the presentation, I thought I would limit my address by the issue of inefficiency of the system of political institutions in Ukraine. But now it became clear that the issue resulted in huge political crisis, which started as the «revolution of dignity» and grew up into de facto Ukrainian-Russian war conducted by guerilla armies on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, I'll focus on the essence of «institutional traps» in Ukraine and main traits of current political conflict, which is a logical consequence of the inefficiency of the system of the state power.

Political regime in Ukraine and the whole process of political development during the post-communist period are characterized by significant instability and fluidity (even in comparison with other post-soviet republics). During the last 23 years Ukraine went through several cycles of development, which could be separated into the four following:

1. Hybrid state with authoritarian regime of competitiveness (1996-2004).
2. Hybrid state with electoral regime of competitiveness (2005-2010).
3. Hybrid state with authoritarian regime of competitiveness (2010-2014).
4. Since 2014 – hybrid state with electoral regime of competitiveness.

The latter period started in Ukraine after the tragic shooting of peaceful protesters at Maidan Nezaleznosti in February 2014, flight of the President Yanukovich, the following reformation of the government and return to the constitutional model of 2004 according to which Ukraine became a parliamentary-presidential republic. Considering social demand for broadening instruments of political and social participation, which is accompanied by «institutionalization of protest» (new civic organizations, political parties, numerous social movements are being created) – there are grounds to state that current period will be more qualitative and substantial than previous ones, as it starts with the huge consolidation of society based on the idea of national state and democratic values, – i.e. principles, which formed the ground of the «revolution of dignity» 2013-2014.

Prerequisites and causes of the conflict 2013-2014.

There are multiple ways to explain current political conflict in Ukraine (the deepest and the most dramatic in its modern history so far). Probably the main version among discussed is geopolitical, according to which it is the conflict between the West and Russia, where Ukraine is just unlucky enough to become the battle field due to its geographical location. Anyways, the conflict cannot burst without internal reasons, social base and moving forces.

If to apply theoretic concepts of Political Conflict Resolution Studies to Ukrainian realities, we can state that hypothetically current political conflict has had «being prepared» by the system of state power during all years of independence. As for me, the main issue lies in the fact that the power did not create efficient mechanisms of interaction between society and political class. Indeed,

if we look at the conditions of the democratization process, we will see that in comparison with other post-communist states Ukraine had rather favorable «point of departure». At the same time, having high level of industrial development, fifth biggest GDP among soviet republics, high scientific potential and qualitative human resources, absence of foreign debt (for comparison Poland had 47 bin USD of foreign debt), favorable geopolitical location, Ukrainian leadership failed to bring the country to satisfactory level of development. Together with general growing GDP we had unacceptably low economic growth. During 2012-2013 among post-soviet republics only Moldova was developing more slowly. Ukraine was the second worst with the economic decay (95 % GDP in comparison to 2012) despite the favorable foreign-economic environment [1, p. 6].

If we look at sociological data, we'll see that since 2011 growth of political tensions was observed in Ukraine. Since that time indexes of conflict potential of society were reaching 4.2 points from 5 maximum points. We should mention that during the «Orange revolution» this index was hitting 4.4-4.5. Normally mass protests start when the index reaches 4.6. Ukraine has been balancing on the edge of the conflict for a long time. Sociologists and political scientists were warning the public on the matter for a long period. Nevertheless, considering the traits of Ukrainian society, which is highly tolerant and is characterized by electoral negativism and political absenteeism on the one hand (these qualities evolved historically) and is also very passive (as the consequence of life under conditions of soviet totalitarian regime), only highly cynical policy of power and enormous corruption could have led to mass protests. Despite official statements by the government of Mykola Azarov on «gradual improvement», standards of living of population were decreasing and it coincided with shrinking of democracy. However, economic reasons are secondary for the evolution of political turmoil of winter 2013-2014.

Based on sociological surveys, the same reasons as in earlier conflicts made people go out to Maidan and settle there. First of all it was about repressions towards protesters (61 %), then general motive «to improve life in Ukraine» (51 %, was – 36 % during the first weeks of protest). As earlier refusal of Victor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU (47 %) and desire to change power in Ukraine (46 %) were perceived as sound reasons of protests to go out to the streets [2]. Thus, the reason of protest was in values. This speaks for the fact that political protest in Ukraine went out to the new level (when values are more important, than ordinary decisions, or decrees of power) and its resolution is almost impossible by the existing Parliament of the outdated format. Weak coordination of protest movements on Maidan by political opposition could be explained by general political alienation. This can be proved by sociological surveys. According to the data only 3 % of protesters came out to the streets because they were called by opposition. Percentage of those who joined protest because of usual desire of revenge for the deeds of power elite was not higher than usual 10 %. At the same time absolute majority of protesters named certain requests to politicians as the reason of participation in Maidan. Among such requests: resignation of Yanukovych and early presidential elections (85 %) freeing of arrested participants of peaceful protest and stop of repressions (82 %) [2].

Lack of popular belief in instrumental abilities of democracy is one of the reasons, which explains patterns and causes of escalation of political conflict in Ukraine. Crisis, which started from the conflict of interests in autumn 2013 grew up into conflict of values, when protesters could have being satisfied only by the change of the rules of the game in political decision-making and public policy as such. Demand to come back to the constitutional model of 2004, according to which Ukraine was parliament-presidential republic with following anti-corruption policy, was perceived as necessary change of the rules. The main problem of Ukraine was in the fact that instruments of democracy, which proved to be efficient in stable democracies, provided very limited opportunities in our country. Any civic activity was blocked by the backwardness of the system. Citizens preferred massive disobedience to the state voluntarism. There just was no other way to be heard by the state.

Another peculiarity of political conflict during winter 2013-2014 in Ukraine is the fact that citizens did not associate themselves with the opposition, as it was not considered to be the force able to represent interests of protesters in the Parliament. Thus, the conflict of values in

contemporary Ukraine lies in imperfection of the political process formed as the result of inadequate development of political institutions. Many years of disregard to the processes of socio-political development could not have led to other outcome.

Moreover, current political protest has not been a conflict between the power and opposition from the very beginning. The moving force of the protest was citizens of various social backgrounds and geographical regions. Sociological researches conducted by the Foundation Democratic initiatives named after Ilko Kucheriv in December 2013 demonstrated that protesters consisted half from Kyiv dwellers, half from people from the provinces. The majority of people, who came from provinces (92 %) stated that they had come on their own and only 6 % came in groups organized by social movements, only 2 % – by political parties. Absolute majority of Maidan participants (92 %) were not members of any political party, or civic organization. Average age of Maidan participant was 36 years (38 % in the age of 15 – 29 years, 49 % – 30-54 years, 13 % – 55 years and elder). People with higher education dominated at Maidan (64 %), 22 % had general and specialized education, 13 % – university students, less than 1 % did not graduated from secondary school. Speaking about professions, the largest group 40 % were specialists with higher education, 12 % – students, 9 % – entrepreneurs, 9 % – pensioners, 8 % – senior managers, 7 % – workers [2]. Social and political structure of protesters evidences that this conflict was not a conflict between government and opposition, but a conflict between society and political class, which explains low level of support of opposition by Maidan participants.

Nevertheless, politically unreasonable flight of president Yanukovich posed the problem of the legitimization of change of government. In fact, opposition, which was not supported by protesters, picked the power, which was not controlled by anybody. That led to the period of lack of authority, which was used by Russia to start occupation of Ukrainian territory using the argument of protection of ethnic Russians.

Political conflict of winter 2013-2014 grew up into separatist movements in Crimea and in Eastern oblasts of Ukraine and resulted into annexing of Crimea and creation of war zone in Eastern oblasts. It should be noted that sociological studies show that indigenous separatist movements are not that radical to lead to the consequences, which we observe currently. This point to certain artificial character of Ukrainian separatism, which developed only thanks to efforts of Russia. It should be noted that in Crimea 40 % of population were proponents of integration with Russia. At the same time, the level of support of the idea of separatism in Eastern Ukraine is high, but not sufficient for dissolution of the country. Moreover, according to the survey conducted in March 2014, the total majority (89 %) of population perceive Ukraine as their motherland – from 97 % in Western Ukraine to 89 % in Donbass. the idea of the separation of particular oblast (region) from Ukraine and union with other country was supported by 8 % of surveyed (maximum in Donbass – 18 %, minimum in Western oblasts – 0,5 %). The idea of creation of independent state based on Eastern and Southern oblasts is in general supported by 11 % of population (10 % of population in South, 10 % in East (18 % – Donbas) . The idea of separation of Southern and Eastern oblasts from Ukraine and their joining Russia is supported by 9,5 % of population in South, 11 % of population in East and 27 % of population in Donbass. Only 6 % wanted their oblasts to become separate from Ukraine and create their own independent states. The highest percentage is in Donbass (17 %), the smallest percentage is in West (2 %) [1]. This data proves fraud at so called referendums on independence of Crimea and on independence of so called Donetsk and Lugansk peoples republics.

At the same time, the fact that population of Donbass do not accept new Ukrainian government should not be disregarded. Population of Donbass perceived win of Maidan as their personal defeat. Thus, the main task of new government is to overcome difference between regions and consolidation of the country. It is not a secret that significant part of the population (32 %) believes that there are deep political contradictions, as well as cultural differences and economic disproportions between eastern and western regions of the country, which can lead to the dissolution of the country. In general such view is supported by 58 % of population in Donbass, 48 % in South, 20 % in central and western Ukraine [1].

It should be acknowledged that such perceptions have certain ground. All sociological researches support the thesis on mental and economic difference between regions of Ukraine. People living in East have more paternalistic attitudes. We think it can be explained by the structure of economic production in the Eastern regions, which has not changed much since Soviet times. Accordingly, differences in political identity lead to different types of political behavior of the representatives of different regions. Social behavior of inhabitants of Western and Central Ukraine is more active. 19.7 % of people living in western and 17.6 % in central regions believe that they can influence socio-political processes. But only 7.6 % of population in East and 10.9 % of population of south consider they can influence socio-political processes. Respectfully 81.9 % and 78.9 % of population in these oblasts don't think they are able to change anything in politics, or social life. [3]. This is reflected in the level of political activity of the inhabitants of these regions. During the recent months 47.4 % of people in Western Ukraine took part in protests, 23.9 % – of inhabitants of central regions protested. Percentage of people from the East and South who took part in protests is minimal – 10.3 % and 8.2 % accordingly [8, p. 12].

Although Ukrainians recognize the difference between regions, they don't perceive such difference as the threat to existence of Ukraine. 72 % of citizens believe that there are considerable threats to unity of Ukraine. Among such threats they name seizure of the territory of Ukraine (or its part) by other states (48 %), dissolution of Ukraine into several parts (43 %) economic decay (42 %). It should be noted, that Ukrainian citizens see the threat of seizure of the territory coming only from Russia [8].

The threat of military intervention of Russia became a factor of consolidation of the views of Ukrainians on foreign policy. The level of support of joining Customs Union and integration with Russia decreased significantly. This is worth mentioning that the overall level of support of this idea decreased due to the change of the mood in Eastern oblasts. According to the data provided by Kyiv international institute of sociology, the number of supporters of joining Customs Union in Eastern Ukraine decreased to 55 % (in February 2014 the percentage was 72 %). In Southern oblasts the level of support decreased to 32 % (from 56 % in February). The level of support of EU integration in eastern and southern oblasts increased almost two times and reached 61 % average in Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that in 2013 the idea of joining Customs Union was supported by 45 % of population, idea of joining the EU – 41.6 % [8, p. 8]. Only one year ago, in 2013 48 % of Ukrainians considered Russia and CIS states to be the main ally of Ukraine for the following 5 years. Only 2.4 % surveyed believed the main ally was USA, – 29.6 % – the EU [8, p. 465]. Aggressive policy of Russia led to the fact that the percentage of supporters of the integration with the Customs Union decreased to 19 % in Luganska and 21 % in Donetsk oblasts. In December 2014 the level of support of integration with the Customs union reached 37 % in these oblasts [1, p. 92].

Thus, aggressive policy of Moscow led to the negative political consolidation of Ukrainian society and became one of the important factors of forming of political nation and national identity of the citizens of Ukraine. Thus, according to the data provided by the sociologists 83 % of the population of Ukraine condemned decision of the Union of Federation which allowed Putin to send military forces to the territory of Ukraine (93 % in West against 4 % who supported it and 68 % in East against 15 % who supported). After the military intervention the percentage of people who say that Ukraine is their motherland grew up to 88 % in South and to 99 % in West (average 95 %) [5].

The dynamics of such perceptions is more than positive. If we compare the data of the surveys conducted in 2008, percentage of Ukrainians who considered themselves to be Europeans grew on 9 % and percentage of those who don't think so decreased on 15 % (from 70 % to 55 %). This indicator creates favorable social preconditions for realization of pro-European policy by authorities. Ukrainians first of all associate European with the standard of living (59 %). Other indicators are related to democratic values and standards – 40.5 % think that the feeling of being protected by the law is important, 32 % – respect to the human rights and democracy [1].

I'd like to underline that the statements voiced by Russian politicians and V.Putin on the negative attitude of Ukrainians toward Russians and genocide of Russian-speaking population in

Ukraine are overestimated. According to the results of the research conducted by the Razumkov center, citizens of Ukraine make difference between Russian propaganda in media, Russian politics aimed at preserving Ukraine in the sphere of Russian influence on one side, and Russian people on the other side. In particular, 70.8 % of surveyed Ukrainians have negative attitude to the president of the Russian Federation V. Putin, 67.6 % surveyed have negative attitude towards the government of RF, 66.6 % – to Duma (and only 10-11 % surveyed have positive perception and 14.6 % – neutral). At the same time 44.9 % of Ukrainians have positive attitude to the citizens of Russia, only 16.6 % surveyed have negative attitude, 32.5 % neutral. The negative perception appeared due to the aggressive politics of Russia and seizure of Crimea. In particular, 67.1 % of Ukrainians confirmed that their attitude towards Russia worsened after the annexing of Crimea (2.3 % – improved, 21.7 % – did not change) [9].

It is also obvious that citizens of Ukraine don't consider armed conflict in Donbas to be a result of struggle between internal political forces, or civil war. Ukrainians consciously call the conflict a result of clash of geopolitical interests of Russia and the West. According to the sociological surveys the influence of the government of Ukraine is comparable with the influence of Russian leadership headed by V.Putin (77 % each) and is coming close to the influence of the USA and the EU (65 % each). It is important to mention that despite all external and internal threats total majority of Ukrainians (63 %) believe that Ukraine can presume its unity as the state. Only 12 % of surveyed think that Ukraine is too different and people inhabiting it cannot live in one state [7].

In current circumstances political passivity of the citizens of the eastern regions of Ukraine, their traditional unwillingness to fight for their interests is favorable for Ukraine and limits potential of guerrilla armies brought from Russia. It is not a secret (and we mentioned this earlier) that there is significant potential and social base for separatist movements due to the high percentage of ethnic Russians living there, as well as «revolution of dignity» was not well received by the population of the eastern Ukraine. But traditional ignorance and passive behavior of the eastern population does not allow them to stand for their pro-Russian beliefs. Majority of population actively supporting integration with Russia limited their protest by participation in so called referendum for independence of Lugansk and Donetsk republics. It gives ground for the assumption that if the border with Russia was closed, separatist movements would soon fade away as they just do not have enough active supporters among local population.

Speaking about the possible scenarios of the future conflict development in Ukraine, I will mention several factors, which will work for the decrease of current political confrontation. According to the sociological surveys, currently belief of Ukrainians in instrumental opportunities of democracy is growing. This means that there is a popular demand for institutionalization of the forms of protest, which dominated during the recent months in times of so called «revolution of dignity». It is also evident that the level of political absenteeism is decreasing, which makes it easier for the government to institutionalize the protest and conduct reforms. In particular, the level of skepticism towards elections as an instrument of democracy decreased. Percentage of citizens who believe that upcoming parliament elections will be fair and transparent increased. New government demonstrates openness and readiness to the change, which increases trust to the conventional forms of political participation and decreases protest potential of society.

At the same time the factor, which decreases potential for political protest of inhabitants of all regions of Ukraine is attitude to the future of the country. Percentage of those who believe that the situation in the country develops in the wrong direction decreased from 73 % in March 2012 to 52 % in March 2014. Percentage of those who believe that the situation is changing in the right direction grew from 13 % in March 2012 to 30 % in March 2014 [1, p. 85]. Unfortunately the situation in regions does not look so bright. If in western regions and in the center the situation is evaluated as positive by 42 % 54 % respectively, in south and east on the country 77 % and 72 % evaluate situation as the development in the wrong direction [1, p. 86]. Expectations of the population in regards to the economic situation are also worrying. When answering the question »During the following 12 month you would expect the economy of Ukraine to develop towards... ?» only 12 % answer for the better (in September 2013 this number was 14 %), and 61 %

is expecting worsening of the situation (in September 2013 it was only 46 %). Worsening of the situation is expected by 77 % of population in the south and 73 % of population in the east. In western regions and central Ukraine this indicator reaches 46 % and 49 % respectfully [1, p. 89].

It is also worth mentioning that overthrowing of Yanukovich regime is perceived by majority of Ukrainians (42 %) as the factor, which turned the situation in the country for the better. 37 % of surveyed believe that this event only worsened the situation [1, p. 109].

Mentioned facts support the statement that Maidan as the instrument of articulation of the popular demands was supported by the majority of population, however as the form of protest (violence, seizure of public buildings, clashes on the streets) it is not supported by the majority of population. Thus, the problem of decreasing intensity of public protest is not as sharp as it seems to be and it requires just time to be solved. The real problem is the need to integrate extremist organizations into normal political process and shifting from the practices of revenge, to the legal sphere and unification of the efforts around solution of common problems.

What can unite Ukraine?

Sociological surveys suggest that 50 % of citizens consider anticorruption legislation as the priority reform, 24 % – provision of security, 24 % – social protection, 22 % – economic development, 21 % – improvement of public administration, 19 % – improvement of healthcare, 17 % – provision of citizens' rights, 14 % – lustration, 13 % – decentralization [1, p. 119]. Solution of these problems is perceived as the priority in all regions of Ukraine. Also, the majority of citizens support democracy as the most desired type of political regime for Ukraine (51 %), 20.5 % of population prefer authoritarian regime, 12 % do not care [1, p. 120].

Ukrainian sociologist Iryna Bekeshkina stated that there is definite list of problems, solution of which unites all regions of Ukraine. In the list of 35 problems – 12-13 are the same for all population. They are – standard of living, jobs, education, medicine, fighting corruption, solution of social problems [3].

It is surprising but population of Ukraine has single view on the form of government. The majority of population does not support federalization of Ukraine. According to the survey conducted on March 14-26, 2014 by the «Rating» Group 64 % of people believe that Ukraine should preserve unitary form of government; only 14 % of surveyed are proponents of federal state. Even in east and southern regions of Ukraine despite promoted in Russian political discourse idea, federalization is supported only by 26 % of population and 45 % of surveyed support unitary state [7].

It is also important to mention that even in times of language based confrontation in 2013, language was named as unifying factor only by each 10th Ukrainian (10-e place among 14 unifying factors), which proves that language problem is not so pressing for Ukrainians, who in their majority are bilingual and freely use both Ukrainian and Russian in daily communication.

Summing up all abovementioned, we can state the following. Ukraine, despite the dominating in Russia opinion, has become a state. However, inefficiency of institutional development created so called institutional traps, which lay in the gap between formal and real functions of political institutes, which led to dysfunction of the whole system of public administration. Now it led to the problem of the preservation (rebuilding) of the state sovereignty in the borders of 1991, i. e. including Crimea.

Together with this, revolutionary cycles of 2004 and 2013-2014 evidence substantial progress in development of political nation in Ukraine and its movement to consolidated democracy. As these revolutionary events developed as the reaction to authoritarian trends and deterioration of democratic procedures, growth of corruption, they prove of qualitative development of Ukrainian society. This gives grounds for the statement that the next window of opportunity for the development of Ukrainian state is opened and gives ground for optimism in relation to the future destiny of Ukraine as the European state.

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Зеленько Г. І. *Інституційні пастки в політичній практиці посткомуністичних країн: випадок України*

Політичний протест зими 2013-2014 років в Україні за своїм типом є неконвенційною, а тому стихійним і непередбачуваним. Однак неконвенційною політична участь може мати більш руйнівні наслідки для політичного процесу, ніж сам факт зміни влади неконвенційною способом. Зневага і неусунення причин неконвенційного поведінки з боку органів державної влади загрожує подальшою ескалацією політичного конфлікту, створює загрози існуванню держави в цілому. У статті ставиться за мету проаналізувати причини, характерні риси та прояви неконвенційної політичної участі в Україні, сформулювати висновки і застереження щодо подальшого політичного процесу.

Ключові слова: політична участь, політичний протест, неконвенційною поведінку.

Зеленько Г. И. *Институциональные ловушки в политической практике посткоммунистических стран: случай Украины*

Политический протест зимы 2013-2014 годов в Украине по своему типу является неконвенционным, а потому стихийным и непредсказуемым. Однако неконвенционное политическое участие может иметь более разрушительные последствия для политического процесса, чем сам факт смены власти неконвенционным способом. Пренебрежение и неустранения причин неконвенционного поведения со стороны органов государственной власти чревато дальнейшей эскаляцией политического конфликта, создает угрозы существованию государства в целом. В статье ставится целью проанализировать причины, характерные черты и проявления неконвенционного

политического участия в Украине, сформулировать выводы и предостережения относительно дальнейшего политического процесса.

Ключевые слова: политическое участие, политический протест, неконвенционное поведение.

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Новакова О. В.

ДИНАМІКА ДЕМОКРАТИЧНОЇ РЕЦЕСІЇ В СУЧАСНОМУ СВІТІ

Проаналізовано тенденції демократичного розвитку у XXI столітті, його проблемність та суперечливу динаміку. Обґрунтовано кількісні та якісні показники демократичної рецесії, яка виявляється в згортанні та викривленні відповідних перетворень у перехідних країнах, обмеженні демократичних свобод та прав людини, підсиленні авторитарних впливів та внутрішньодержавної й міжнародної конфліктності. Найбільш вагомую причиною гальмування та викривлення демократичних перетворень виступає неорганічний характер цих процесів, невідповідність форми демократії та її сутності. Підкреслено, що сучасні політичні явища та процеси виходять за межі класичних уявлень і наукових підходів, руйнують лінійне уявлення про історію людства. Відповідно зростає важливість нових комплексних досліджень проблем формування, становлення та консолідації політичних режимів, їх модифікації під впливом потужних викликів сучасності.

Ключові слова: політичний процес, демократичний розвиток, демократична рецесія, політичний режим.

Постановка проблеми. Починаючи з кінця XX століття демократія розглядається як основний орієнтир розвитку для більшості держав світу, незаперечний критерій прогресу у внутрішній і зовнішній політиці. Разом з тим, актуальний досвід останніх десятиріч демонструє суперечливу динаміку як становлення «молодих демократій», так і функціонування її «класичних зразків». Перебіг трансформаційних процесів, які характеризуються багатовекторністю та різноманітністю, призводить до руйнування традиційних ієрархічних зв'язків, підвищення відкритості та взаємозалежності політичних систем, розвитку тиску та протестної активності мас, які рішуче вимагають політичних реформ та якісних соціальних змін. Таким чином, виникають політичні явища та процеси, що виходять за межі класичних уявлень та наукових підходів, і руйнують лінійне уявлення про історію людства. Відповідно зростає важливість нових комплексних досліджень проблем формування, становлення та консолідації політичних режимів, їх модифікації під впливом потужних викликів сучасності.

Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій в цілому підтверджує нелінійний, циклічно-хвильовий характер процесів демократизації. Вивченню різноманітних аспектів цієї проблематики присвячені праці Ж. Блонделя, Л. Даймонда, Г. О'Доннелла, Т. Карозерса, Х. Лінца, А. Пшеворського, Д. Растоу, А. Степана, С. Хантінгтона, Ф. Шмітера та ін. Проблеми сутності та специфіки демократичного переходу висвітлюються в роботах вітчизняних вчених О. Бабкіної, В. Горбатенка, Г. Зеленько, О. Кіндратець, П. Кутуєва, О. Куценко, М. Михальченка, О. Романюка, О. Фісуна, Ф. Рудича та ін. Разом з цим ще не сформувалася усталена позиція щодо сучасного етапу демократичного розвитку, особливостей його виявлення в різних групах країн, напрямків побудови ефективного демократичного управління суспільством. Виходячи з цього, **завданням даної статті** є характеристика сучасної проблематики демократичного розвитку країн, визначення специфіки становлення режимів політичної влади у перехідних країнах.

Основні положення статті. Відповідно до концепції С. Хантінгтона, який обґрунтував хвильову парадигму розвитку, наприкінці XX сторіччя почалася третя хвиля демократизації,