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MODUS MATRIX IN DISCOURSE: MODAL TAGS

There is a broad view of modality as qualifications of states of affairs, pointing to the traditional view of three basic modal categories: dynamic, deontic and epistemic (Palmer, 1979) though we can find an existing terminological diversity: Palmer's dynamic modality corresponds to Goossens's (1985) *facultative* modality and Hengeveld's (1988) *inherent* modality [6, 227]. Additionally, we can distinguish *situational (dynamic) modality* to cover cases in which dynamic modality is "inherent in the situation described in the clause as a whole". For deontic and epistemic modalities a scalar view, covering negation, can be introduced, see: alternative approaches, such as Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), Bybee et al. (1985), and Coates (1983).

In English, the concept of modality has been the subject of studies crucial to the understanding and functioning of the language. Modality governs, for example, the choice of whether to use "may", "shall", or "must" as an auxiliary of the main verb in sentences. The study of these modal auxiliaries reveals the speaker's intention when making statements. Modality is innovative as an English-language text that examines a wide range of grammatical categories in terms of both modal and propositional content – namely, modal auxiliaries, aspectual categories, and conditionals – reveals a new approach to modality that relies more centrally on concepts developed in the study of English modality. Yuki Johnson argues that modality can be thought of as an expression of the degree of a speaker's conviction concerning a proposition's truth or realization in the form of possible/non-actual words. Such a definition provides practical and applicable perspective to the study of modality: propositions, for example, become objects of that study in the form of conditional sentences and aspectual categories.

Modality is a general term which describes unrealised states and possible conditions and the forms of language which encode them such as: *possibly, perhaps, could be* and *ought to be*. Modality also covers indications either of a kind of speech act or the degree of certainty with which something is said

He left at once

differs in modality from

Leave at once

He can't have left (epistemic) from

You can't leave now (deontic)

Modality is a speaker or writer's attitude towards or point of view about a state of the world. A term used in syntactic and semantic analysis to refer to meanings connected with degrees of necessity, obligation or desirability, certainty, probability and possibility. It is expressed mainly by verbs but also by associated forms.

Speaker-oriented modus is an object of research in this paper, speaker's modus predicative units in particular.

Semantically, modus is considered to be the *attitude on the part of the speaking subject with regard to its content* (Ducrot and Todorov, 1972), as opposed to the *Dictum* which is the linguistic realization of a predicate. While a predicate is most commonly represented with a verb, modality can be uttered in various manners: adjectives and adverbs (*definitely, probable*), using thought/belief verbs, mood, intonation, or with modal verbs.

The classification of types of modality has been extensively addressed in the literature. Traditionally, there has been a distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘deontic’ modalities [11], whereas Bybee et al. (1994), for example, one can mention agent-oriented (e.g. ability, obligation, desire, intention), speaker-oriented (e.g. imperative, optative, hortative, permissive) and epistemic modalities (e.g. possibility, probability). However ‘none of the terms is without problems’ In fact, a two-dimensional model can be introduced to make it logic: speaker-oriented vs. event-oriented modalities; the former ‘is linked to the speaker’s own modal judgment at the time of speech in the given speech situation,’ whereas in the latter ‘the non-factuality is the result of a modal judgment expressing conditions on a participant of the described event, independent of the speaker and the present speech situation.’ [9, 685]

A key point in H.Narrog’s model is that modal meanings ‘clearly tend to change towards more speaker-orientation [9, 722], which could offer interesting insights if we consider how modal values are expressed The system of desirability, duty, attitude to the degree of obligation which the speaker does not expect to be disputed on.

Epistemic modality: modal verbs, modal lexical verbs, modal adverbs, phrases and expressions, perception verbs. Epistemic: commitment to the truth of the proposition: i.e. the speaker’s confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed, reflects the certainty and the authority of these propositions. Therefore modality is the speaker’s assessment of the probabilities inherent in the situation (epistemic modality) or of the desirability, rights and duties (deontic modality). It allows the speaker to introduce a personal view of the non-factual and non-temporal event. When a modal verb is used to express the speaker’s opinion about a statement, then this is *epistemic modality*:

It might be true.

Here, the speaker is expressing their attitude about whether it is true or not, accepting that there is a possibility, but not being certain.

Modality in language underlines our subjective assessment of things, e.g.: adverbs like: *probably, generally, apparently*; phrases like: *it is certain, I am sure*; verb predicative units such as: *it seems, it appears*; or the use of the present tense. Modal forms are an interpersonal aspect of grammar and are central to all spoken and written language use. In conversational discourse they serve to mark out personal relationships and to convey important features such as politeness, indirectness, assertiveness etc.

Deontic modality: modal verbs, deontic expressions, evaluative adverbs and adjectives. Associated with power and formality. It refers to the logical status of events or states, assessments of likelihood. Associated with confidence and lack of confidence but also with power and authority.

Dynamic modality does not express the speaker’s opinion, nor does the speaker affect the situation When a modal verb is used to affect a situation, by giving permission, etc., this is *deontic modality*:

You can go when you’ve finished.

Here, the speaker is giving permission, so there is *deontic modality* used to control the situation.

In this framework, agent-oriented and speaker-oriented modality roughly divide the area of root modality, or deontic/dynamic modality. The deciding factor in Bybee et al.’s framework is: who or what is the enabling factor? If it is the speaker, then we are dealing with speaker-oriented modality, otherwise it is an instance of agent-oriented modality. From the semantic perspective, modality is coarsely divided into *epistemic modality* (the amount of

confidence the speaker holds with reference to the truth of the proposition) and *deontic modality* (the degree of force exerted on the subject of the sentence to perform the action) views [5].

Another distinction frequently made in typological studies is that between real and unreal events, or a *realis – irrealis* distinction. It has been claimed that there are languages that encode modality this way rather than in a *deontic – epistemic* way. This is an important observation and a separate section is devoted to this distinction. The next set of terminology is found in such studies as Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994). Their work is based on the premise that, in order to understand the range of modal meanings in a language, one must understand the diachronic developments of modal elements. They propose therefore the following division of modality [2, 177]. *Epistemic Agent-oriented, Speaker-oriented, and Subordinating* The use of the term *epistemic* is relatively straightforward, since they include possibility and probability among the epistemic meanings. Another epistemic category is inferred *certainty*, which is used when the speaker has good reasons to believe that the statement is true, e.g.:

There must be some way to get from New York to San Francisco for less than \$600.

Subordinating moods refer to the use of modality in subordinate clauses, such as *concessive* (although ...) and *purposive* (so that ...) clauses. The term *agent-oriented modality* refers to those cases in which the agent of a clause is influenced in some way in performing the action described in the clause: “Agent-oriented modality reports the existence of internal and external conditions on the agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed in the main predicate.”

The most controversial case of epistemic modality is modal tags. While tags like *I think* are derived from pure matrix clauses, they behave more like modal adverbs and they show signs of grammaticalization. Corpus research shows that the complementizer *that* is often omitted (in about 90% of the cases). They can occur at various places in the sentence (initially, medially, and finally). A further step on this grammaticalization path would be the use of tags like *I think* as a pure adverb. One can distinguish between expressions of epistemic modality which involve the speaker's own current evaluation of a state of affairs, and such which only report on an epistemic evaluation without the speaker subscribing to it him/herself. In the example:

I think they have run out of fuel

I think I might go with you tonight.

I think it's OK.

I believe she sent the letter this morning.

I think he would come.

I guess he is right.

I think (mental activity verbs to express opinions, thoughts, attitude and feelings that may or may not take that-complementizer:

agree, assume, believe, bet, decide, discover, doubt, dream, estimate, expect, fear, feel, find, forget, guess, hope, imagine, know, learn, notice, predict, presume, pretend, proof, realize, recall, recognize, regret, remember, suppose, suspect, understand and others).

Expresses an epistemic evaluation of a state of affairs which the speaker has performed him/herself and to which (s)he is fully committed at the moment of speaking. J. Nuyt considers the *I think* units “performative”: epistemic forms which express the speaker's current attitude towards the state of affairs, i.e. which do involve his/her commitment to the qualification at the moment of speaking, as in the given example, will be called

'performative' [10, 21–39]. Notwithstanding the explicitness of the performative matrix the deep level as well as the context reveal an attitudinal component. My point of view correlates the following: The speaker's attitude to what this other person has said is neither one of trust nor one of skepticism. Rather, it is noncommittal: the speaker is not casting doubt on the other person's words but doesn't accept responsibility for their validity either. At the most, it is implied that that person "can think that they know"—they can think that because they have some evidence, some grounds for thinking so, but this evidence may be insufficient or unreliable [12, 279].

While tags have not received very much attention in the literature, it seems that they are also mostly epistemic in nature. An exception might be volition verbs, like *want*. Volition is a dynamic modal category, not an epistemic one, but this example shows that matrix clauses with a 1SG subject have a tendency to become tags, and then adverbs or particles. Van der Auwera and Plungian [1, 80–86] make a distinction between participant-internal and participant-external modality. Participant-internal modality is more or less identical with dynamic modality as it deals with ability and need (as in *John needs a book*). Participant-external modality is again divided into deontic and non-deontic participant-external modality. In this view, deontic modality is a subtype of participant-external modality. It encompasses permission and obligation (either from the speaker or another source). Non-deontic modality deals with possibility and necessity. It refers to circumstances wholly external to the situation. There is then no need for a special category of subject-oriented modality because it is either subsumed under deontic modality or, in the case of imperatives, optatives etc., because it is not considered to be part of modality. In addition, volition is in their view not part of modality either. As the authors themselves admit [1, 84], the term participant-oriented is perhaps too vague, given that a sentence usually has more than one participant.

Some types of agent-oriented modality are obligation (there exist external factors that compel the agent to complete the action, as in *All students must obtain written permission from the Dean ...*), necessity (there exist physical conditions, as in *I need to hear a good loud alarm in the morning to wake up*), ability (there exist agent-internal enabling conditions, see above), and desire (there are internal volitional conditions). This concludes the section on terminology. While there is as yet little agreement about the correct terminology, there seems to be at least a consensus to use terminology which reflects linguistic ways of analysis. This is a welcome development. Some scholars have sought to refine this framework while keeping the basic structure intact. Kees Hengeveld uses the term participant-oriented modality instead of agent-oriented modality [6, 227–269]. This is done to include those cases in which the subject of the sentence is not actually an agent (as in *John needs to be left in peace today*, in which the subject, John, has the thematic role of patient). Epistemic modality, the expression of speaker's confidence, can be expressed with such tags as *I think*, *I guess*, and *I believe*. Epistemic modality (see: Nuyts 1992) is defined here as (the linguistic expression of) an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a possible world which serves as the universe of interpretation for the evaluation process, and which, in the default case, is the real world (or rather, the evaluator's interpretation of it. The *I think* matrix expresses the author's attitudinal component which transfers the sentence from the real world into the probable one.

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ПОЛИТИКА “ЯЗЫКОВОГО ИМПЕРАТИВА” АНТИЧНОСТИ КАК ОБРАЗЕЦ ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ ЯЗЫКОВОЙ НОРМЫ

Понятие “языковой императив” относительно недавно вошел в научный оборот, поскольку нашел свое активное применение лишь в XX веке. Являясь неотделимым элементом языковой политики, он зачастую обозначает любые меры, направленные на поддержку одного конкретного языка. На практике “языковой императив” не предстает как нововведение и “know-how” прошлого века. Преференции в сторону одного языка существовали уже давно, поскольку формирование языковой нормы всегда было приоритетным направлением в процессе формирования государственности с последующими попытками самоидентификации нации. “языковой императив” имел и имеет место там, где формирование языковой нормы происходит под влиянием административных мер. Культура Древней Греции, выступая парадигмой для последующего развития европейской культуры, наглядно демонстрирует пример так называемого “языкового императива” в процессе формирования единой языковой нормы.

Античная словесность предстает, таким образом, как образец, на который ориентируются и сейчас европейские культуры. А единство их языковых традиций определяют связь с системой и образами, сформулированными греко-латинскими учеными. Взаимодействие искусства речи с другими искусствами, а также знаковыми образованиями в коммуникации наложили отпечаток на форму и содержание языковых практик и их теоретическое описание в древней цивилизации. В рамках