



**Eastern
Orthodoxy
in a Global Age**
Tradition Faces
the Twenty-first Century



Edited by
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Foreword

Sabrina P. Ramet



THE PUBLICATION of this volume, *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age*, is timely—both because of the rapid changes which have been occurring across the globe, including the fall of communism just fifteen years ago, affecting much of the Orthodox world, and because of accelerating tendencies toward globalization, manifested in the expansion of the European Union and NATO, the expanding purview of American foreign policy, the development of global terrorist networks, the spread of the Internet, and other factors, all of which present Orthodox Churches with specific and particular challenges. This volume also provides an occasion to reexamine some age-old questions, among them: What is the nature of the religious interest in politics? How has spirituality changed over the past decades and how should we expect it to change in the coming decades? What is the relationship between public religion and private spirituality? What is the relationship between organized religion and morality? And what does it mean to preserve the “unbroken tradition” of Orthodoxy in a world in which the pace of change is itself accelerating at an unprecedented rate?

Where the life of the Russian, Serbian, Romanian, and Ukrainian Churches—all discussed in this volume—is concerned, the need for a political engagement in the communist era was clear enough. Communist authorities set clear boundaries within which the Churches could operate, exacted a price for continued existence, and forced the clergy to choose among variations on the theme of either cooptation (i.e., cooperation) or

Globalization, Nationalism, and Orthodoxy: The Case of Ukrainian Nation Building

Victor Yelensky



SCHOLARS RECOGNIZE that their output of analyses of globalization is so abundant and has extended to such a pale of differentiation and specialization that a typology of theories of globalization is on the agenda (Mendieta 2001). Undoubtedly, this is not the right place for discussing different approaches toward such a typology. However, a few preliminary points elucidate the complex and contradictory interrelation between religion and globalization applicable to post-communist space as a whole and to Ukraine in particular.

The central theme of this chapter is the role of religion in post-Soviet Ukrainian nation building. Specifically, attention is focused on the contribution of Orthodoxy to post-1989 Ukrainian nation-building efforts. In the post-Soviet Ukrainian context, several factors have contributed to a highly

ambiguous nation-formation process. These factors include the “belatedness” of Ukrainian nationalism, its peculiar historical evolution, and the legacy of the Soviet period. I begin with a discussion of comparative analyses of the encounters between religion and nationalism and examine whether the “belatedness” of nation formation can lead to a qualitatively distinct relationship between religion and national identity. With this general framework in mind, then, I turn to an exploration of the peculiarities of the Ukrainian case. Next, I turn my attention to Orthodoxy’s role in Ukrainian nation building in our Global Age.

Religion and Nation Building in the Global Age

Globalization is making the world “a single place” (Robertson 1987, p. 43). Even if globalization does not necessarily lead toward cultural and religious convergences, it renders encounters among different religious traditions inevitable. The great masses of people who are now living in a “global village” and purchasing goods on a global market do not intend to change their religious affiliations. In some corners of the globe they express strong loyalty to traditional sets of beliefs, in other regions their religions take implicit vicarious¹ forms, but there are definitely no signs of worldwide searching for religious alternatives, nor weak sprouts of a “common human religion.” Instead, the globalized world witnesses the omnipresent clashes between institutional religions and vigorous religious uprising in almost all continents.

It is a sort of truism in the sociology of religion that since the late 1970s the world is witnessing the great return of religions. The previously most devoted supporters of secularization theory are hastening to reconsider their books and their thoughts arguing that “the world today . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was” and that “a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken” (Berger 1999, p. 2). Religion leaves the “ghetto of a privatization” (Casanova 1996), and its globalization does not lead to the vanishing of religious identity. On the contrary, globalization promotes the revival of movements traditionally connected to group self-identity. Globalization leads, as Peter Beyer has argued, to the renewal of religion’s influence on the public arena (Beyer 1994). Furthermore, in the beginning of the twenty-first century globalization not only strengthens religious and ethnic identities but imparts them with renewed importance. As Bronislaw Misztal and Anson Shupe (1998, p. 5) point out, “[g]lobalization breaks down barriers of polity

In reality, latecomer nationalisms arbitrarily selected symbols, myths, and ideas for nation building. In this process of transforming ethnic commonalities into rising nations, religion was not always a key component in this selection. This assertion seems to be equitable for the majority of belated nation buildings—including even these cases where religion constituted a core element of national mythology and has had a centuries-long history of preserving the very essence of group identity. Thus, Theodor Herzl in *The Jewish State* has admitted that “[o]nly in the faith of our fathers can we recognize our common historical heritage” but, at the same time:

Shall we end by having a theocracy? No, indeed. Faith unites us, knowledge gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks. Army and priesthood shall receive honors high as their valuable functions deserve. (Herzl 1970, pp. 100, 171)

In a completely different political and cultural context, Kemal Atatürk, founding father of Turkish nationalism, took a series of decisive steps to prevent Islam from playing an active role in law and education, as well as from being the official religion of the state. Kemal’s goal was to generally reduce Islamic influence among Turks in favor of a “scientific mentality” or, more precisely, of what would virtually become an entirely new national ideology (Kemalism) (Weiker 1981, p. 105).

Forging nations undisguisedly is not confined to those collectivities blessed by a specific religion, for nations aspire to gain a status akin to religion itself. Nations become a modern-day functional equivalent of religion: To live, to die, to suffer, to love, and to hate in the name of a nation becomes a virtue comparable to anguish and suffering for God. In the era of nationalism, Ernst Gellner notes in his classic *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), societies do not worship themselves in the guise of religious cult. They worship themselves candidly and headlongly, without any masks or covers. Nationalism as a substitute for, or supplement to, historic supernatural religion is a core idea of Carlton Hayes’s book (Hayes 1960).

In some cases the religion of the forging nation seemed to national elites as an impediment because of a particular religion’s intimate connection with elements of pre-national identity that are undesirable to elites. The birth of Czech nationalism is extremely instructive in this regard. At the very beginning

of modern Czech awakening, Tomas Masarik openly appealed to compatriots with a call to abandon Catholicism, for Catholicism seemed inextricably tied to the idea of Austrian identity. Instead, he sought to ground the Czech idea in the religious traditions supported by the Reformation. Responding to his call, between 1918 and 1930 about 1,900,000 citizens of the Czechoslovak republic changed their religious affiliation, with the overwhelming majority of them abandoning Catholicism (Manhattan 1949, p. 253).

No less remarkable is the case of Poland. There, in contrast to the experience of the Czech lands, the Catholic Church assumed the part of the bulwark of Polish identity. After Poland's partition, this stance was hardened in opposition to the religions of the two occupying forces (Russian Orthodoxy and German Protestantism, respectively). Religion gave to the Polish national idea a mighty mythic-symbolic dimension. The central and most powerful messianic metaphor of Polish national rhetoric was framed precisely on this dimension: "Poland, the Christ of nations" (Brian 2000, pp. 27–29). In the communist era the Catholic Church in Poland acquired another important function. It substituted for civil society as the most organized, consistent, and skillful opponent of the regime. On the one hand, the authority of *Kościół* (Church, in Polish) placed communism beyond the framework of the Polish national heritage. On the other hand, the Church engaged in a conflict-ridden dialogue with the authorities on behalf of all of society. It openly confronted and defied the communist authorities, compromised with them at times, but also won concessions from them.

Theoretically speaking, several factors have contributed to the prominent role of religion in "belated" nation buildings. Such a prominent role is present when religion is the central element of proto-national mythology; or when religion has provided the forging nation with its symbolic boundaries, leading to the dissolution of earlier collectivities; and/or when a nation-making *ethnie* (ethnic group) has lost other important identity markers (such as common language or shared territory); and/or when the ethnic core of the modern nation coincides with a religious affiliation; and, finally, when a newly formed nation has been deprived of political institutions, thereby leaving the Church as the sole remaining force for institutional nation building.

But reality is frequently much more complicated than the above typology. Nationalism is the principal reason for the much messier reality of the historical record. As Liah Greenfeld (1992, p. 7) suggests, nationalism is "an emergent phenomenon." That is, by its very nature, the possibilities for the development of the preconditions of nationalism as well as for the development of fully fledged national movements are determined by

the successful blending of the various elements of the national idea. The development of full-fledged nationhood is based on the degree to which various elements are successfully united into a whole and imparted with special significance.

Orthodoxy and the Forging of Ukrainian National Identity

Did the forerunners of Ukrainian nationalism consider religion as the “Ukrainian navel”?⁵ They did not do so, although they undoubtedly alluded to the significance of religion for the forging of Ukrainian ethnic identity. Different variations of this theme are found in the writings of the forerunners of the Ukrainian national movement, such as the writings of Panteleimon Kulish⁶ (1819–1897) and Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885), as well as in the works of outstanding figures of the Ukrainian national pantheon (Taras Shevchenko [1814–1861], Mykhailo Dragomanov [1841–1895], and Ivan Franko [1856–1916]). It is also present in the writings of those authors whose nationalism was expressed in explicitly political forms (such as, for instance, Julian Vassian or Mykola Mykhnovskyi). Specifically, for generations of Ukrainian nationalists, the writings of Mykola Mykhnovskyi (1873–1924) served as the main frame of reference. In his writings, Mykhnovskyi expressed the view that religion could provide the fabric for nation formation, but that could only become reality at some point in the distant future, since at the moment “not only [the] Tsar-foreigner reigns over Ukraine but God [himself] has become an alien [to Ukraine] and does not speak Ukrainian.”⁷

The crucial factor that shaped the attitude of Ukrainian national figures toward religion was their social convictions. The famous remark of the Ukrainian historian Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi about youngsters with “Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* in one pocket and Shevchenko’s collected poems *Kobzar* in the other” (Lysiak-Rudnytskyi 1987, p. 139) is very indicative of the intellectual atmosphere in the Ukrainian national movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Ukrainian activists, similar to elites of other stateless nations, strived to mobilize the masses and spoke highly of onslaught, the will to live, and liberation. Neither humility nor repentance ranked highly in the qualities they stressed.

Since Eastern Orthodoxy was one of the central pillars of the common Ukrainian-Russian identity, Ukrainian nationalists viewed it as destructive for the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses. This attitude was expressed irrespective of these activists’ personal religious backgrounds and

beliefs. (Taras Shevchenko's caustic remark about the Byzantine religious-political tradition and its Russian imperial incarnation were not unique.⁸)

Globalization, meanwhile, not only had led to the construction of "imagined communities" in the world's most affluent centers, but it had also set in motion similar processes in the globe's spacious peripheries. In his version of Ukrainian ethno-genesis, Roman Szporluk offers the following narrative: During the eighteenth century Ukraine was a retarded suburb of Russia and Poland. In turn, both Russia and Poland were, to a degree, cultural suburbs of the far more advanced Western Europe. In the modern epoch, when nationalism became a means of the global modernization of backward ethnic communities, the Polish and Russian societies were transformed into modern nations. In that way, the formation of the modern Polish and Russian nations presented Ukrainians with a challenging choice of alternatives: either they become a part of these modern nations or they try to transform themselves into such a nation. As Ukrainians themselves were not satisfied with the place reserved to them in modern Russian and Polish nation-building projects, as they had preserved certain historical and cultural traditions, as they had an elite (or, in the strict sense, rather latent elite) and a feeling of local patriotism, they opted for transforming themselves into a nation. This choice offered them the possibility of achieving greater status in the world, which would not be the case had they remained a periphery to their more advanced neighbors. The growing Ukrainian nationalism aspired to transform the unarticulated cultural identity already existing in some cases for centuries into a political aspiration of national independence.⁹

What role did religion and Churches play in the formation of the unyielding determination of the Ukrainian elite to pursue nation building? The particular salience of this role can be traced in the case of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.¹⁰ When, after the first partition of Poland (1772), Ukrainian Galicia passed under Austrian rule, the Greek Catholic hierarchy received the support and the protection of the imperial government. The educational reforms of the Habsburg rulers Maria-Teresa and Joseph II led to the formation of an intelligentsia coming from the educated Greek Catholic clergymen that represented the subordinated Ukrainian population of Galicia. Under the relatively liberal Austrian rule, the Greek Catholic hierarchy (seminarians, priests, and bishops) flourished. Some among them conducted the initial "heritage-gathering" work typical for the cultural stage of national movements. Although since the 1860s the secular intelligentsia had begun to assume the leadership of the national movement, clergymen

were elected to the Galician Diet and the all-Austrian Parliament and remained even more important at the local level, where they founded various educational and cultural establishments. They also provided critical institutional support for Ukrainian candidates in elections (Himka 1988, pp. 105–42). The Greek Catholic Church assisted in the rejection of three alternative models for the national development of Galicia's Ukrainian population (the Moscowphile model, the Polish model, and the Austrian-Rusin model). Eventually, after years of rather sharp intellectual debate among supporters of different orientations,¹¹ the Greek Catholic Church supported *narodovstvo*, that is, the Ukrainian national movement.

Interpreting the Greek Catholic Church as the guardian of Ukrainian originality constitutes a wonderful component for a national myth.¹² But this component clashes with that of the most important element of collective conscience, namely, with the so-called Cossack myth. John Armstrong maintains that the Cossacks' myth of belligerent, chivalrous republics of free and patriotic militants became a central component in the emergence of a distinctive Ukrainian ethnic identity (Armstrong 1982, p. 78). After the Union of Brest, Cossacks assumed the leadership role to restore the Orthodox Church's hierarchies in Ukraine. In 1620 under the Cossacks' protection, Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem consecrated new Orthodox bishops in Kiev. Cossacks were pivotal in the process of revival of the "Rus' faith" and became a carrier of a distinct Ruthenian or Rus' identity within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. A crucial element of the Cossack myth was the Cossacks' participation in the seventeenth-century wars. But these were wars carried out under religious slogans, for the protection of the "Native Orthodox Faith" and the "Cossack Church," against Catholic expansion, and so on. Therefore, Ukraine's actual religious composition and the concrete historical circumstances of its nation formation demanded that the Ukrainian nationalists maintain a degree of deliberate distance from the religious factor. The founding fathers of Ukrainian nationalism considered religion a stumbling block rather than a reliable resource for nation building. In his 1906 article, "Ukraine and Galychyna," Michailo Hrushevs'kyi warned his compatriots of the reoccurring danger of Serbs and Croats, religiously divided nations, which have arisen on the common ethnic base (Hrushevs'kyi 1906). Similarly, in Ivan Franko's writings, religion was not a fuel for nation building but first and foremost a source of acute tension between Ukrainians. At the next stage of the formation of the national consciousness of the Ukrainian elite, the conceptual dimension of the political nation building was forged. Its main parameters were integral Eurocentrism,

unification of all ethnic Ukrainian lands into a nation-state, and, last but not least, secularism.

To what extent could the emerging Ukrainian “imagined community” base its own legitimacy upon Orthodoxy? Based upon Ukrainian history, it seems that Orthodoxy did not play a vital role in Ukrainian nation building because Orthodoxy was an ineffective identity marker between the new nation and Russia, the nation that Ukrainians compared themselves to and the nation that the most ardent nationalists among them wished to be separated from. But such an argument openly neglects the Polish factor, which had exceptional importance for Ukraine even after the eighteenth-century partition of Poland.¹³ Examining the Polish factor in Right-Bank Ukraine from the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, Matsuzato Kimitaka came to the conclusion that the Latin-Catholic tradition observed in the region continued to surpass the Greco-Orthodox tradition in resources and influence even at the beginning of the twentieth century (Kimitaka 1998). Roman Szporluk rightly argues that the Russians were resolved to prove that Right-Bank Ukrainian lands were not Polish. In these efforts, Ukrainians supported them. “It took some time before the Russians realized the Ukrainians were also to prove that the lands in question were not Russian, either” (Szporluk 2000, p. 77).

Even after the 1863 to 1864 uprising and the eventual abolition of Polish autonomy, and for most of the nineteenth century, Right-Bank Ukraine was marked by violent antagonism between Polish gentry and Ukrainian peasants. This conflict was heavily colored by confessional sentiments. The case of the so-called *hlopomany* (Ukrainian activists originating from previously Polonized families) is indicative of the high tensions between rival religious traditions. Among these activists were Ukrainian historian Volodimir Antonovich (1834–1908) and Taddey Rylskyi, father of the famous Ukrainian poet Maxim Rylskyi. When the *hlopomany* declared their return to their “native nationality” they accompanied it with converting (or “returning”) back to Eastern Orthodoxy from Roman Catholicism. At the time, for Ukrainians in Right-Bank Ukraine, Eastern Orthodoxy was viewed as a rather anti-Polish and anti-Jewish than anti-Russian identity marker. At the same time, for a Ukrainian peasant from a Volyn or Podolia’s village, a Russian (or Great Russian, as the terminology of the day dictated) was still a stranger, a bureaucrat from a distant city whom he or she might never come across during his or her entire life.¹⁴ Orthodoxy in their eyes was not a belief imposed by the Russians but the native faith of rustic folk. Its originality and ethno-specific shape remained to a great extent indissoluble, notwithstanding

the routine campaigns instigated by the St. Petersburg's Holy Synod against Little Russia's "harmful peculiarity" in liturgy, rites, and devotions.

Further considerations on Orthodoxy's role in shaping Ukrainian identity remind us that, during the early modern period, both the formation of early imperial Russian identity and the forging of the Russian Orthodox tradition came about with eminent Little Russia's endorsement.¹⁵ The Little Russia Church's impact on ecclesiastical life in the State of Moscow and, then, in the Russian Empire has been the subject of extensive study. To date, cultural influences running the opposite direction, that is, from the Russian Church toward the nineteenth-century Ukrainian peasantry, have not been similarly studied. On the one hand, some research has been done on the history of elimination of differences between the Kievan metropolity and the Orthodox Church in the Moscow kingdom and then in the Russian empire. After the incorporation of the Kievan metropolitan seat into the Moscow Patriarchate, a series of actions were undertaken: Unification led to the liturgical books' "improvement" (e.g., standardization according to Moscow standards), as well as to the erosion of organizational and architectural uniqueness, and, more broadly, the general uniqueness of Ukrainian religious culture (including, for example, the imposition of the requirement that Ukrainian clergy do not shave their beards). On the other hand, little is known about the real impact of all these efforts upon the spiritual life of the Ukrainian masses and their self-consciousness. The most distinguished Ukrainian historian and prominent figure among the founding fathers of Ukrainian nationalism, Michailo Hrushevs'kyi (1866–1934), evaluated such an impact as completely negative. He claimed that since the mid-nineteenth century the government pressed for the replacement of Ukrainian clerics by "Moscow elements." This policy, according to Hrushevs'kyi, has led to far-reaching consequences: The old practice of the priests' election by councils of laymen and clerics was abolished, and the people's native tongue was expelled from sermons, leading to the alienation of the lower clergy from the peasantry. Subsequently, discontent against the official Church was widespread (Hrushevs'kyi 1992, pp. 153–57). These processes were reflected in Ukrainian literature: In his story "Scoundrel from Athon," Ukrainian novelist Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi (1838–1918) has colorfully described a priest who had lost touch with the peasants and, consequently, later became increasingly interested in evangelical movements.

But this might not be the full story. There is plenty of evidence that challenges Hrushevs'kyi's perception. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian Church was neither completely absorbed into the Russian Church nor did it stand

against it as an alien body. The main reason for this was the immense influence of Ukrainian bishops and theologians on Russian Orthodoxy from the time of the incorporation of the Kievan metropolitan seat into the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686. Suffice it to say that the first president of the Holy Synod (the governmental body which was in charge of the Russian Church's issues after the abolishment of the patriarchate by Peter the Great in 1700) was Ukrainian Stefan Yavorsky (1658–1722). Also, Teofan Procopovich (1681–1736), one of the main ideologues of Peter's religious "enlightenment," was Ukrainian. Altogether, in the first half of the eighteenth century about 70 percent of the upper-level hierarchs were from Ukraine or Belarus (Wilson 2000, pp. 74–75). As Georges Florovsky has evaluated, in the first encounter of Ukrainian and Moscow Churches "Kiev emerged victorious" (Florovsky 1979, p. 113). Moreover, Ukrainian clerics created an image of the Rus' past that transcended political boundaries. Through their compilations of varied and often contradictory opinions from Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian writings, they were able to link Ukraine and Muscovy through religion, dynasty, land, and even people (Kohut 2003, p. 64). That is why the Orthodox Church was the only important Ukrainian institution that was successfully integrated into the Russian imperial system during the first part of the eighteenth century (Kohut 1988). And that is why the Orthodox Church in eighteenth-century Ukraine can hardly be considered as a passive object of "Russification." Naturally enough, it retained uniqueness in language and liturgy and kept a whole structure of property rights deeply rooted in Ukrainian legal and social systems.

Memoirs of the Ukrainian Church's figures from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century abundantly demonstrate the great persistence of the ineradicable Ukrainian spirit among the clergy and churchmen in Ukraine. Olexandr Lototskyi, who had studied in the theological school in Right-Bank Ukraine in the late 1880s, wrote that despite all Russification efforts the Ukrainian language was the sole spoken language between students (Lotots'kyi-Bilousenکو 1966, part 1, p. 35). Ukrainian church historian Ivan Vlasovskyi described theological schools as a real "hotbed of *Ukrainianness*" (Vlasovskyi 1956).

It stands to reason that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine had not been an awakening force for Little Russia's peasantry nor a patron of the Ukrainian national movement. But at the same time it was not entirely effective as an assimilating tool either. The explanation of this perseverance of Ukrainian elements within the consistently Russified church structure cannot be confined to historical and sociological factors (e.g., a deep chasm

between Russian hierarchy and Ukrainian clergy, a nearness of low-rank priests to peasants, the popularity of socialist ideas among clergymen, the non-systematic efforts of the Russian state and church administration toward the Russification of Ukraine, and so forth).¹⁶ In the realm of religion, symbols and traditions descend from generation to generation, obtaining the status of “ultimate values.” In this realm, attitudes toward “others” assume a tough and rigid posture. For example, it is the cultural space created by religion where the controversy over the number of fingers for the sign of the cross elevates to an ontological level and where ritualistic differences seem unbearable to opposing camps.

On the eve of the fall of the Russian Empire, then, the aspiration of the huge masses of Ukrainian peasants for obtaining a “native,” “proper” Church was exclusively powerful, notwithstanding the fact their religious identity lacked a proper articulation. The philosopher, church leader, and public figure Fr. Vasiliï Zen’kovskiy vividly recalled the extent of his surprise by the storming “Ukrainian Church Sea”: “I came to the conclusion that Church’s Ukrainianess was very strong in rural areas, that within the Church’s Ukrainianess, there was a strong yearning for expression of its own national character through the means of religious (church) life” (Zen’kovskiy 1995, p. 39).

Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Nation Building

In the late 1980s and early 1990s this “Ukrainian Church Sea” (in Zen’kovskiy’s term) did not exist for a long time though. Religion ceased to be the core component of Ukrainian peasants’ identity after barbarian Stalinist modernization, famine, homicide, and suppression of the Churches’ activity. Arguably, religion has played a minor role during the Soviet stage of Ukrainian nation building. However, the Soviet period was not a sort of “lost time” for the forging of the Ukrainian nation, and it was of central importance for the formation of Ukrainian identity. First, the Soviet regime united the Ukrainian ethnic lands. Second, it twice legitimized Ukrainian identity both within the borders of the quasi-state formation and in the passport of every ethnic Ukrainian (e.g., the notorious “fifth entry” indicating the ethnicity of every Soviet passport).¹⁷ Third, the regime institutionalized the Ukrainian language as well as the corresponding cultural and educational establishments. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime consistently suppressed even the most insignificant displays of nationalism on behalf of the elite in each Soviet republic. In Ukraine, this suppression was probably the most severe:

The regime pursued a policy of interethnic mixing, it stimulated the mobility of elites throughout the Soviet Union, and it pursued the complete elimination of Ukrainian ethnic identity and its replacement by a Soviet identity shared across the Soviet Union (Kulik 1999, pp. 7–8).

It is understandable, again, that during this stage of nation building, Churches were unable to play a significant role in weaving the tapestry of Ukrainian national identity: In the 1930s, the Church suffered almost utter institutional devastation in Central, Southern, and Eastern Ukraine (we will deal with Western Ukraine below). In addition to the extermination of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, there was a complete expunging of every reference to the religious roots of Ukrainian culture. The elements of ethnic and religious identities were preserved only in a marginalized milieu.

Resistance toward Soviet anti-religious politics had a broader significance than the mere protection of religious values and institutions. Such resistance came from several spheres: First of all, popular religiosity was seriously undermined but was not destroyed, and, therefore, a popular base survived the Stalinist purges.¹⁸ Second, political dissidents provided another nucleus of resistance toward Soviet religious politics. They fought for human rights, including the rights of religious freedom, native language, and culture. Ultimately, they stood up for human dignity. At the same time, resistance in Ukraine operated under very different circumstances in comparison to many other communist countries (and even other Soviet republics). The regime did not leave any free space for the expression of oppositional views. Clubs of intelligentsia, non-Marxist social movements (which have played a significant role in consciousness-raising), free trade unions, or at least non-governmental media were unthinkable in Ukraine. Displays of national communism, which became prevalent in the Transcaucasian republics, were equally unthinkable.¹⁹ Even the most modest manifestation of disagreement with the official politics of de-nationalization was prohibited in Ukraine. Expressions of benign concern about cultural heritage—such as the so-called “rural prose”—which was tolerated among Russian writers, was not tolerated among Ukrainian authors.

Another center of resistance to Soviet national and religious politics was the Galician popular-religious enclave, which displayed a clear Ukrainian identity and strong religious sentiments. Up until World War II, the Greek Catholic Church dominated Galicia. The enclave was formed by *irredenta* Ukrainian Catholics (priests, monks, and nuns) forcedly reunited with the Russian Orthodox Church but culturally and institutionally unassimilated

within their Greek Catholic parishes. After Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Galicia became a region with the highest concentration of Orthodox parishes throughout the Soviet Union. In its effort to expunge the "remnants of Uniatism"²⁰ the regime pursued in Galicia a somewhat different policy in comparison with other Slavonic regions of the USSR.²¹ To deal with the "Uniate threat" Soviet officials unintentionally opened the door for a "quiet Ukrainianization" of Orthodoxy in the region. In the mid-1970s, thirteen out of sixteen Orthodox hierarchs in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, nine of them were Western Ukrainians, and three of them were former Uniate priests. In 1966, and for the first time after many years of exclusion, an ethnic Ukrainian, Archbishop Filaret (Denisenko), was appointed to the post of Kiev Exarch. The next year, former Greek Catholic Archbishop Nicolayi (Yurik) headed the Lviv and Ternopil Eparchy, the largest single eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiv 1977, p. 83), with more than thirteen hundred parishes out of approximately six thousand parishes within the USSR borders. The latent process of the urbanization of Orthodoxy in Ukraine was spearheaded by priests of Greek Catholic background who had converted to Orthodoxy and then strove to create a Ukrainian spirit in their parishes. Among these clergymen were Frs. Vasiliy Romanyuk (1925–1995) and Volodimir Yarema (1915–2000), future primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP)²² and the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (UAOC), respectively.²³

On the eve of the USSR's collapse and of Ukrainian independence it was easy to predict that the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be not far off. There were about four thousand Orthodox parishes in Ukraine (two-thirds of all Orthodox communities in the USSR), while natives from Western Ukraine made up 50 percent of all students in Leningrad theological schools (Pavlov 1987). The Ukrainian bishops were the largest ethnic group within the Russian Orthodox Church (Mitrohin and Timofeeva 1997, pp. 15–19), and two ethnic Ukrainians (Metropolitans Filaret [Denisenko] and Volodimir [Sabodan]) had been contenders for the seat of the Moscow Patriarchate in the 1990 Russian Orthodox Church Local Council.

However, the course of events has revealed that Ukraine was to be a much more complicated case. First of all, emerging from its forty-three-year-long "catacomb," the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has not only crucially undermined the foundation of the Russian Orthodox Church's very existence in Galicia, but also seriously challenged Ukrainian elements within

Orthodoxy as well. Their response to the increasing Ukrainian nationalism and surge of Greek Catholicism turned out to be the proclamation of a “real Ukrainian” Orthodox Church independent both from Rome and Moscow. Beginning in 1989, hundreds of Russian Orthodox Church parishes (mostly in Western Ukraine) declared themselves as belonging to the UAOC (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church). As of 1 January 1992 the UAOC had 1,619 parishes but remained much smaller than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), which had 5,473 parishes (Sysyn 2003, p. 117).

The Moscow Patriarchate gave an extremely hostile reception to the restored UAOC. Taking into account the precarious position of the Russian Orthodox Church in the country and the growing danger from the pro-Ukrainian Church national movement, the patriarchate granted in 1990 a semi-autonomous status to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).²⁴ Hence, the post-1991 “great Ukrainian compromise” between Ukrainian communists and Ukrainian nationalists that made possible the declaration of Ukrainian independence did not apply to church issues. The post-1991 evolution of Ukrainian Orthodoxy vividly mirrors its ambivalent nature as both an immense contributor to the creation of Russian imperial identity as well as a guardian of “native Ukrainian,” “Cossack” identity.

As a result, four Churches emerged, each of them drawing their ecclesial identity from the Baptism of Kyivan Rus’ (988): the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). These Churches maintain relatively deeply stratified structures and reliable systems of communication well adjusted over the centuries, possessing the means of transplanting quite sophisticated ideas into the fabric of ordinary consciousness. At the same time, these Churches represent different centers of political, cultural, and ethnic mobilization. We can speak about the presence of a quite definite correlation between declarations of belonging to some particular Church and political preference and political behavior. It is not surprising that surveys about the political behavior of Ukrainian citizens reveal that adherents of the UOC MP and those who claim to be adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church are more likely than others to vote for the Left, even when ethnicity is controlled for. By contrast, the faithful of the Ukrainian independent Orthodox Churches and UGCC are more likely to vote against the Left. Affiliation with one of the previously

banned churches has a powerful deterrent effect for left-wing voting (Birch 2000, pp. 108–11, 121).

Orthodoxy and Nation: The Challenge of Globalization to Ukraine

What does the contemporary process of globalization mean for the Orthodoxy in Ukraine? I will not be concerned with tremendous changes in economic and political developments, which, without doubt, do heavily affect Orthodoxy as a cultural and communicative system. Neither will I address the changes that have been caused by growing religious diversity, which has transformed Ukraine, as Jose Casanova argues, into “the most pluralistic and competitive religious market in all East Europe” (Casanova 1996).²⁵

I will address the role of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the country’s modernization project, a project that takes place in a global context replete with acute contradictions. The modern era of globalization crucially challenges Ukraine with a dilemma about how this new independent state is going to be involved in the “global project.” Is Ukraine going to be involved directly in the affairs of the world as an independent, sovereign state or is it going to be a periphery to the oil-gas “liberal empire” of post-Soviet Russia?²⁶ Within the Orthodox milieu of Ukraine, practically every discussion about globalization is indissolubly connected with this dilemma. For those who affirm the choice of independent sovereign statehood, the term “globalization” takes a completely different meaning in comparison to those who reject this option.

For Igor (Isichenko), the archbishop of the Kharkiv and Poltava Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, globalization means, first of all, open borders for the dissemination of ideas, the spread of information, and new possibilities for the evangelization of the world. The age of globalization reinforces the Church’s role as the historic repository of nationhood, national values, and cultural identities. According to the archbishop, globalization offers to every Orthodox culture and every local Church an unprecedented opportunity to testify about itself to the entire world (Igor [Isichenko] 2002).

In contrast to this optimistic view, other Orthodox hierarchs, theologians, and clerics directly or indirectly oppose Ukraine’s sovereign status and its autonomous participation in global affairs. For them, the dominant image of globalization is an image of a process that undermines Slavonic and Orthodox unity. The address delivered by the metropolitan of Odessa and Izmail UOC MP Agaphangel (Savvin) to the Eighth World Council of

Russian People provides a particularly useful illustration of the nature of globalization as represented in anti-globalist discourse. For Metropolitan Agaphangel, globalization is leading the entire world to its own destruction. The metropolitan believes that the entire Orthodox world is challenged by globalization. Only Russia, a powerful Orthodox state and the legal successor of genuine truth and real statehood, has the potential to frustrate the guileful plans of global evil. According to Metropolitan Agaphangel, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays an outstanding role resisting globalization. Additionally, the Russian Orthodox Church is the only structure that unites almost all former Russian geopolitical space, including Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, and the Baltic states. Moreover, the ROC could and should contribute to the unification of these states (as well as other nations) with Russia. Later, Greece and the Balkan states could join this bloc ("Rossiya" 2004).

This anti-globalist discourse is in full agreement with the post-Soviet political discourse that calls for the reintegration of the states of the former USSR. The goal is to construct a mighty power center that will be founded on an intriguing ideological mixture of communism, political Orthodoxy, and militant anti-Westernism. According to the Ukrainian Communist leader Petro Simonenko, globalization in a cultural sense is nothing else but Americanization, the forcible imposition of Western values and lifestyles to the rest of the world. For the Slavonic peoples and the post-Soviet cultural territories, the core component of this cultural process is the aggressive expansion of Catholicism and Protestantism—two religions alien to the Eastern cultural tradition. Canonical Orthodoxy²⁷ is an irreconcilable adversary to these new forms of "global religion." Consequently, the West aims at its extinction. Spiritual disarmament of non-Western people is the main prerequisite of their submission to the West's political and economical interests, argues Simonenko (2001a).²⁸ In his opinion, even the mere existence of Ukrainian nationalism and of Churches closely affiliated with this idea is completely unacceptable because it undermines the unity of Ukraine with Russia.

The Ukrainian Communist leader's perception of the principle of ecclesiastical autocephaly (a notion to which he pays special attention) is a good example of the way leaders develop their opinions about ecclesiastical issues based upon whether they are in favor of or against a sovereign Ukrainian state.

The same applies to the interpretation of the principle of autocephaly by different Orthodox hierarchs. Simonenko interprets autocephaly as a tool used for the ruining of the fraternal unity of Orthodox peoples. He repeatedly fails to pay attention to the historical fact that autocephaly

(independence and self-government) is not only an attribute of the major Orthodox Churches. On the contrary, as the discussion in this volume's introduction shows, autocephaly is a central ecclesiastical principle of the inner organization of Orthodoxy. Historians and canon law experts have argued persuasively that, from its very origin, autocephaly involved political considerations and realities, and the ecclesiastical realities were the ones that were usually adapted to the political considerations of their day (Theodor 2000). The histories of Bulgaria (see, among others, Meininger 1970), Romania (Riker 1971), Greece (Frazee 1969, especially pp. 89–196), Georgia, Serbia, Poland, and Albania (Roberson 1999) bear witness to the historical reality that the establishment of a self-governed Church coincides with the establishment of statehood, while the fall of statehood ultimately leads to loss of autocephaly.²⁹ In several cases the Church's role in gaining autocephalous status was not the decisive one. On the contrary, state authorities assumed the pivotal role in this process.³⁰

In this regard, the situation of the post-Soviet republics over the last decade of the twentieth century was almost identical to the situation in the Balkans over the nineteenth century.³¹ After gaining independence, nations were striving to secure autocephalous status for their Orthodox Churches, while the church metropolis procrastinated and reacted with excessive sensitivity to its loss of power and the institutional cloud that this process inevitably entailed. The post-Soviet states' new elites were more or less persistently pressing for independence of their Orthodox Churches. Their interest in the canonical status of the Church is manifested in the letters Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk addressed to Aleksyi II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' (1991) and to Bartholomew I, Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarch (1993). This interest was also clearly shown in the meetings of Moldovan President Petru Lucinski with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Odessa (1997), as well as in the statements of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in support of the autocephalous status for the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has also made repeated statements about the need for an independent status for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Since 1997 the president has insisted on the necessity for religious unity in Ukraine and, to put it more explicitly, on the construction of a united and independent Church of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (Kuchma 1997). In August 2000, the Ukrainian president sent a letter to the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church asking them to grant autonomy to the UOC MP as a step toward the unification of the UOC MP with the UOC-KP and

UAOC in order that all three Churches form a single autocephalous Orthodox Church. The council refused even to discuss the presidential request.

Over the post-1989 period, the preservation of jurisdiction of foreign spiritual centers over Orthodox Churches in the post-socialist newborn states has created a concern of the new states' governments that the metropolitans might exert "undesired" influences on their citizens. Such concerns have been voiced in Ukraine, Moldova, and Estonia, citing both real actions undertaken by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as well as speculation over the ability of the ROC to undertake a whole range of hypothetical activities. Attempts to address these concerns led to actions that were not always correct from the political and judicial points of view, let alone from a purely canonical viewpoint. However, some observers caution against underestimating this threat and even tend to overly dramatize it. For example, Alain Besanson (1997) insists that

the international communist movement has now been eliminated, and has been to a certain extent replaced by a spiritual force that can act in a much more limited sphere—the national Russian Orthodox Church. It has retained powerful means of pressure on what is called the "near abroad" in Russia, i.e., on Ukraine, Belarus and some Baltic states. This influences the Orthodox arc of Europe—Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia.

Orthodoxy in Ukraine represents a cultural pattern crossing denominational boundaries. It is a pattern embodied in symbols, signs, holidays, customs, regulations, practices, fragments of historical memory, and identity markers and not in a network of strong formal institutions. In this regard, it is indicative that 25 to 32 percent of those surveyed in different opinion polls declare that they belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, while only 7 to 12 percent declare they belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This result contrasts sharply with the resources of these two institutions: While the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has three times the number of institutional establishments the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate has, it has only half as many faithful as its main competitor.³² For insiders acquainted with the realities of Ukrainian religious life there is only one explanation for these results: When a person declares that he or she belongs to the Kiev and not to the Moscow Patriarchate, this statement is understood as a declaration of his or her national identity.

Additional “strange” results corroborate this interpretation. For example, statistical research indicates that 12.2 percent of the Donetsk region’s population and 35.3 percent of Simferopol’s population belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. Yet in Donetsk, at least officially, there is no such church, and in Simferopol less than ten such churches exist compared with four hundred congregations of UOC MP. Clearly, these results are a demonstration of Russian identity in these regions. Furthermore, most respondents are nominal Christians—“non-practicing” and, sometimes, “non-believing”—Orthodox members. Where the survey form allows the option of “*an Orthodox who did not determine his position regarding the denomination*” (as was proposed by the SOCIS-Gallup-Ukraine service in 1997), 40 percent of the respondents in some regions chose this response.

Obviously, then, in Ukraine there are people who deal with real difficulties in the sense of their cultural (including their religious) identity. The share of those who consider themselves Orthodox exceeds the number of people who call themselves believers in God. Many people identify with a larger Slavic or Orthodox community of believers. This community can be defined, among others, by a religious designation (“Eastern Orthodox”). This designation or label is far more important than the practice of the faith itself.

At the same time, many of today’s Orthodox Ukrainians are yesterday’s Soviet people. In the past they did not have any problem with self-identification. Yet, the Soviet label is suddenly gone, and the people simply do not appear to have acquired a new one. Their attitude is not hypocritical, in other words. Rather, their religious affiliation presents more an attempt to revive an interrupted cultural tradition than an effort to establish ties with a personal God. For many people, particularly in Central and Eastern Ukraine, belonging to Orthodoxy *in general*, but not to a specific Church, offers an opportunity to avoid painful dilemmas about their ultimate identity.

For a fragment of the modern Ukrainian elite, Orthodoxy and the Church should play a much more central role in the post-communist nation-building efforts than in earlier phases of Ukrainian nation building. As far back as in 1995, members of the Ukrainian Parliament’s right-wing faction created a group striving for unification of the split Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Their slogan called for a “Single Local Independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” Ukrainian parliament MP and the group’s coordinator Lilya Hrihorovitch has claimed:

[T]he creation of the Single Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church is my goal. . . . If in our society such a spiritual mechanism comes into ser-

vice, the first stage of nation building will be accomplished. The State will arise. The State, I mean, which will never join any "unions." On the base of mental unity the nation will form. A better common ground [for national unity] than Orthodoxy nobody could invent. (Hrihorovitch 2000)

In the first years after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence the exclusive license for religious issues used to be in the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. The Soviet Ukraine's nomenclature had unconditionally yielded the realm of culture and religion to their temporary allies in exchange for freedom of action in the economic sphere. However, gradually religion gained a new status as a political resource and the Churches became particularly attractive for persons and groups striving to acquire or preserve positions of power. Consequently, Orthodox issues turned out to be in the center of sharp political debates in the Ukrainian polity, and the entire spectrum of parties and political leaders had to articulate their own religious policy. While the National Democrats demanded that the government take an active part in gaining autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the Communists and the pro-Russian political circles fiercely opposed this agenda.

Hence, the key paradox of post-communist Ukraine: In order to make a serious contribution to nation-building efforts, the Churches cannot organize their revival on a purely religious basis, but only by activating non-religious themes colored with a strong national connotation.

Conclusion

Jose Casanova points out that globalization promotes the return of the old civilizations and world religions as meaningful cultural systems. These new supra-national imagined communities are now able to surpass the imagined national communities in strength and influence. Globalization will not abolish nations as relevant imagined communities. Nations will continue to be the repository of collective identities within the new trans-national or global cultural space. However, trans-national identities, particularly religious ones, are likely to become ever more prominent. Casanova admits that globalization gives the greatest opportunities for those religions which always had a trans-national structure while the de-territorialization of religion threatens the mode of operation of those religious traditions that have been embedded in concrete geographical territories traditionally affiliated with a specific civilization (Casanova 2001, p. 430). Eastern Orthodoxy is a remarkable case

of such an embedding. Despite the waves of emigration and exile from its indigenous territories, Eastern Orthodoxy is still a "territorial religion" to a much greater extent than it is a trans-national or a global one. Locality is still the main and entirely legitimate ecclesiastical principle of the Eastern Orthodoxy institutional structure; the autocephalous status for a Church of Orthodox people is still in effect an act of general recognition of their nation, an act that showcases state maturity. The local Church remains identified with the nation, notwithstanding numerous and convincing theological studies to the contrary as well as statements by Orthodox hierarchs that powerfully argue that a local Church should not be identified with a nation.³³ In other words, it is hard to see how, at some point in the foreseeable future, Ecumenical Orthodoxy would be able to make good use of some of globalization's "gifts"—such as decreasing significance of territorial divisions or the unprecedented possibilities to construct identities and communities irrespective of national feelings, space, and frontiers and the potential for creating a global identity across national borders (see Scholte 1998).

As a matter of fact, patterns of similarity and difference play a key role in the foundation of collective identities. However, the articulation of boundaries between insiders (or members of an emerging collectivity) and outsiders, while extremely important, is not sufficient for identity construction. Identity construction needs the creation and maintenance of trust and solidarity within a new collectivity. This means that links within the rising collectivity should be sturdier than those links that determine the previous identities of its members.

While Orthodox theologians speak of "genuine" values to be defended against West-centered globalization and its carriers, it is the "local" identities within Ecumenical Orthodoxy that appear much more powerful in comparison to Orthodox universalism. There are a lot of controversies that evidently undermine all-Orthodox solidarity. These controversies exceed the bounds of routine jurisdictional disputes (e.g., between Constantinople and Moscow over supremacy in Eastern Orthodoxy, heated debates between Beograd and Skopje about the Macedonian Orthodox Church's autocephaly, the Russian-Romanian quarrel over the Moldavian Orthodox Church, etc.). Much more important is that for the majority of the people who constitute the Orthodox Churches and Orthodox nations at the turn of the twenty-first century this is still a time of intensive search for new identities, of rethinking nation-building myths and former ideological constructs. Ukraine's predicament is not unique. There are also other Orthodox nations facing similar urgent questions: What kind of nation do they want to be in

the global age and what role should religion play in their future self-determination? How solid is the Orthodox ethos as a holistic phenomenon and to what extent is it compatible or incompatible with globalization?³⁴

What may be asserted with a fair degree of certainty—at least for now—is that globalization as a multifaceted and contradictory process can facilitate religious development in unpredictable ways, forging new collective identities and reshaping old ones, as well as bringing down classical sociological theories. What the Ukrainian case of intersection between Eastern Orthodox religion and nation building shows in particular is the following: (a) the components of collective identity were not given once and for all time; (b) at least some of these components have been the product of conscious design (and they are redesigned deliberately in the current phase); and (c) the role of religion in nation building may increase considerably, notwithstanding the growing social differentiation that deprives religion of some of its formerly important functions.

Notes

1. For a substantiation of the “vicariousness” concept, see Davie 2001.
2. As Orthodox priest Vladimir Zelinskii argues: “What if not omnidominance of information which worn any locked up borders has destroyed communism before our very eyes? Indestructible, as it seemed to be, built forevermore, set aside for covering by itself all earth, it fell apart smoothly and almost unnoticeably. . . . Communism, at bottom of fact, the first real global project, was destroyed by another similar project, more powerful but more sly and insinuating at the same time” (Zelinskii 2001).
3. “Close association of the Protestant and national cases . . . represented the national sentiments as religious at a time when only religious sentiments were self-legitimizing and moral in their own right” (Greenfeld 1992, p. 87).
4. Some authors prefer to discuss differences between “historic” nationalisms and “secondary” ones. See, among others, Smith 1996 (p. 185).
5. This notion, of course, was borrowed from Ernst Gellner. See the chapter “Do nations have navels?” in his *Nationalism* (1997).
6. In his letter to Kostomarov (1846) Kulish wrote: “Christianity should in no way dampen our striving to develop our own native resources, and not without reason a seed has been cast into the soul and has taken deep root already. The worst that can happen is the loss of our language and customs, and you say it is only important to us to be Christian. . . . Do not forget that an ordinary Ukrainian is a Christian as long as he keeps all customs and beliefs.” Quote from Luckyj 1986 (p. 37).
7. Quotation from Protsenko and Lysovyi 2000 (p. 153).
8. See, among others, his “Ja ne nezduzchaju . . .” (1858):

Meanwhile the gentry will be lulling her,
 Erecting still more palaces and churches
 Loving their brand-new tsar , and still extolling
 Byzantine-style servility at court
 At nothing else, at nothing else. (Shevchenko 1964, p. 506)

9. Szporluk 2000 (pp. 361–94). At the same time, Szporluk notes that the origin of modern Ukrainian national conscience can be dated with relative exactness; he traces its beginnings to the late eighteenth century.

10. The Uniate Church in Ukraine was the output of the union between the Holy See and hierarchs of the Orthodox Kiev Metropolitan seat in the Council of Brest, 1596. The name “Greek Catholic Church” was introduced by the Austrian Empress Maria-Teresa in 1774 to distinguish this Church from the Roman Catholic and Armenian Catholic Churches. The contemporary official name for this Church is Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

11. For thorough analyses of “orientation” discussions within the Greek Catholic Church see Himka 1999.

12. Even Mykhailo Dragomanov, who insisted that modern religions not enter into a circle of national attributes in any way and that “identification of any nationality with religion is an absurdity,” made a sort of exception for Greek Catholicism. He wrote in his *Stranger Thought about Ukrainian National Case* that exactly religion, namely Eastern Rite Catholicism, has rescued Uniates from Polonization.

13. See, for example, Rudnytsky 1980.

14. According to the 1897 census Russian speakers made up only 3.5 percent of the total population of Volyn province, 3.3 percent of Podoliia province, and 5.9 percent of Kiev province (*Pervaia vseobshchaia* 1897, vol. 8, p. viii).

15. See, for instance, the fundamental study of K. V. Kharlampovich 1914.

16. Alexei Miller (1997) pays attention to such an approach comparing the nineteenth-century efforts of Russian and French governments toward assimilation within the Russian Empire and France, Ukraine, and Provence, respectively. Andrew Wilson (2000, p. 82) also argues that the Russian authorities’ anti-Ukrainian measures were not radical enough to utterly destroy the Ukrainian movement.

17. Since 1930 the passports of Soviet citizens contained a fifth column. This column indicated the passport holder’s “nationality,” which meant in reality not a nationality in the Western sense but ethnic origin. Soviet citizens were unable to change their “nationality”; it was predetermined by parents’ “nationality” as it was fixed in birth certificates.

18. Secret reports, submitted by party officials, reveal that in 1985, the first year of Gorbachev’s reforms, 26 percent of newborns were baptized, nearly 3 percent of adults consecrated their marriage in a church, and over 40 percent of the dead were buried with a church’s assistance. The Statistical Report from the Council for Religious Affairs (“Document” 1996) stated that in 1984 almost two hundred thousand baptisms were conducted in Ukraine and reported the principal increase in baptisms of children of

school age and, particularly, of adults. Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian figures are seriously underestimated. They do not include baptisms and funerals conducted by underground religious institutions, by clergymen in private, or by those not registered in a special book. In the big cities, these practices were common.

19. In exchange for loyalty to the Kremlin administration, suppression of anti-communist activity, and ritual rhetoric against remnants of bourgeois nationalism, Armenian and Georgian communist elites received favorable conditions for strengthening local nationalisms. Georgian and Armenian Churches which had played an outstanding role in preserving their respective nations' originality found themselves in relatively better positions—Western observers even wrote about the second baptism of Georgia. See "Georgian Orthodox Church" 1988 (p. 307).

20. Soviet ideologists' official stand was that the "Greek-Catholic Church did not exist any longer" and there were just "remnants or fragments of Uniatism" in three Galician provinces. For Soviet bibliography on the "Uniate" problem see Il'nitska 1976.

21. It seems to be rather indicative that unofficially in the end Moscow admitted it was unrealistic to pursue the religious policy it pursued in Russia, Byelorussia, and Great Ukraine with regard to the Western Ukraine (as well as to Lithuania or, of course, to Islamic republic). This means that even in the times of the Soviet Union, which waged a tough and centralized war against religion and where eradication of religiousness was an inalienable element of state policy, the status of religious institutions and religious-social development was to a very large extent determined by the character of religious culture formed over centuries and by the type of religion and nation interaction.

22. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kiev Patriarchate was created in June 1992 by Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko), who had been removed from the direction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Moscow Patriarchate, and his supporters from a part of the episcopate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Since October 1995 Filaret has been the head of this Church, with the title Patriarch of Kyiv and all Rus-Ukraine. In February 1997 he was anathemized by ROC's Bishops' Council. This anathema raised his profile among his faithful and demonized him in the eyes of Russian Orthodox believers. The UOC-KP does not presently have official recognition from Orthodox Churches in other countries and so is considered "uncanonical."

23. The "first" Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was created in 1921. It had been banned from Ukraine since the 1930s and had been based abroad. At its All-Ukrainian Council in Kiev in June 1990, the UAOC proclaimed itself a patriarchate and elected as its first patriarch ninety-two-year-old Mstyslav Skrypnyk (1898–1993), the head of the UAOC in the West.

24. As stipulated by the statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, "[t]he Ukrainian Orthodox Church shall be self-governing with the broad right of autonomy. In its life and activity it shall be guided by the Tomos of the Patriarch of

Moscow and All Russia of 1990 and by the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church confirmed by its Primate and approved by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia." However, this is autonomous status *de facto*, but not *de jure*.

25. It is necessary to admit that this diversity is neither religious pluralism nor a non-aggression pact between "great religious powers," but a quite fragile balance based on equal possibilities of parties. "Pluralism," as it is put by George Weigel, "doesn't simply happen. Genuine pluralism is built out of plurality when differences are debated rather than ignored, and a unity begins to be discerned" (Weigel 1999, p. 34).

26. Anatoly Chubais, the head of the Russian energy conglomerate, has been the first person who has applied to Russia the notion of "liberal empire," arguing that Russia's top twenty-first-century goal should be to develop "liberal capitalism" and build up a "liberal empire."

27. "Canonical Orthodoxy" in Ukrainian Communist rhetoric is another term for Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate designed to distinguish it from the "nationalist and uncanonical" Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate.

28. The attitudes of Ukrainian Communists toward the Ukrainian Orthodoxy question is possible to deduce in Simonenko 1995, 1999, 2001b.

29. The literature on the history of the problem is voluminous. See, among others, Skurat 1994.

30. Very significant in this discourse seems to be the sixteenth-century's case of the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchy. See, in detail, Skrynnikov 1991 (esp. pp. 345–63). Not merely indicative is that the *Complete Orthodox Theologian Encyclopedic Dictionary*, in the entry "Autocephalous Church," emphasizes: "The creation of such a Church [Autocephalous] . . . is accomplished in consent of State authority" (*Polnyi Pravoslavnyi Entsiklopedicheskyi Slovar'* 1913).

31. On the nineteenth-century Balkans and the establishment of national churches, see Roudometof 2001.

32. At the beginning of 2004 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate had 10,310 communities, 151 monasteries and convents with 4,095 monks and nuns, 8,620 priests, and fifteen theological schools. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kiev Patriarchate had 3,352 communities, 34 monasteries with 185 monks, 2,588 priests, and sixteen theological schools. In the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church there were 1,154 communities, 685 priests, five monasteries (twelve monks and nuns) and seven theological schools. See *Lyudina i Svit* 2004 (note 1, p. 31).

33. See Walters 2002. However, the attitude toward the "heresy of phyletism," or overemphasizing of the national component in church building over ecclesiastical foundations, is heavily dependent on political and, again, national agendas. For instance, tough condemnation of phyletism from the direction of Moscow Patriarchate is a relatively new stand decisively connected with aspiration for reintegration of decomposed Soviet space. As long ago as 1989 the official *Journal of the*

Moscow Patriarchy claimed that accusation of the very fact of church organization creation on a national basis pronounced by the Constantinople Council in 1872 possesses merely local significance and may be applied only for Constantinople Church. See Skurat 1989 (pp. 47–48).

34. According to the fourth annual A. T. Kearny/Foreign Policy Globalization Index there were four countries of traditional Orthodox culture among the sixty-two most globalized world's countries: Greece (ranked twenty-eighth), Romania (thirty-ninth), Ukraine (forty-third), Russia (forty-fourth). See "Measuring Globalization" 2004. Despite such a moderate ranking, some authors argue that "Orthodoxy will in principle have no difficulty in accommodating itself within an advanced capitalist system" (Kokosalakis 1995, p. 249).

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