

RUSSKIYE IN UKRAINE: MYTH VERSUS REALITIES OR VICE VERSA

Methodological remarks

Discourse actuality. Today's world is diversified so much that the ethnically homogeneous countries almost do not exist. In territorial and geographical limits, which form this or that country, there are dozens of ethnic communities. I classify Ukraine as a country with multi-ethnic population composition, where the representatives of about 130 ethnic groups (in the broader terminological interpretation – ethnic communities) live: the most numerous are Ukrainians and Russkiye. After Ukraine's independence (1991) the problems of ethnic development have actualized much. The determinants in this process three factors are: a) the desire of ethnic Ukrainians to strengthen the bases of their Nation-State; b) changes challenged of *Russkiye* in Ukraine – from the imagine dominant majority (at least, so they felt themselves in the former Soviet Union, regardless of their number in this or that ethno-social organism – autonomous units) to the real ethnic minority; c) ethnocultural renaissance among other ethnic groups, which was characterized by increasing of ethnic self-consciousness and activation of their life as component of the ethno-national structure of Ukrainian society. Actualization of the ethnic factor as such in the social development of the country caused the intensification of research and interpretative interest in the processes on which a significant impact have these factors. The range of such interest's mobilizers is from scientists to amateurs, who like to initiate discussions *per se*.

Russkiye in Ukraine are not the exception in this discourse, moreover, they are the most important (perhaps after ethnic Ukrainians) subject of it. The ethnic issues researchers (Ukrainian, Russian, American, European, etc.), as well as politicians, public figures and journalists take an active part in the discourse. At this time the considerable array of sources, scientific literature, print and Internet publications, in which the main actor *Russkiye* in Ukraine is, are accumulated. With some part of them you can get acquainted in the list of cited and used literature, on which I base my analysis, and in the appendixes, that supply the exposition.

Terminology. There is no adequate term in English which reproduces the essence of the phenomenon in question. The term «*Russkiye*» is the proper to fulfill the mission. I differentiate between two terms «*Russians*» and «*Russkiye*». The first one means the people who are the citizens of Russia (Russian Federation) – state-Russian. In this case the state and ethnic belonging do not coincide, for example Tatars are citizens of Russia and ethnic Tatars; the second one means people of ethnic Russian origin living in Russia (Russian Federation) (citizens of Russia) and abroad. There are now both categories in Ukraine: «*Russians*», people who stay as usual temporary on the Ukraine' territory (visitors, relatives of citizens of Ukraine, those who are on business or scientific trip, working in state or business companies from Russia); «*Russkiye*», citizens of Ukraine of ethnic Russian origin are living here permanent and are the stable component of ethno-national structure of Ukrainian population.

Technology of the analysis. My presentation deals with the analysis of the *Russkiyesness* phenomenon in the ethno-national space of Ukraine, with laying a special emphasis on its bearers (ethnofors) - these are *Russkiye*, citizens of Ukraine, practically excluding from the analytical field (the field of my analysis) its bearers of other ethnic origin. That's why I propose the following methods and analysis' consistency of the subject mentioned in the title: 1) the classification of myths that are circulating today, both in Russia and Ukraine; 2) determination of their mediators and their spreading spaces; 3) identification of their nature and content; 4) the technologies of mythicizing of myths concerning *Russkiye* in Ukraine and related to the latter phenomena, units, processes, discourses; 5) the analysis is based on various sources, especially on the scientific literature, official and public bodies documents, publications in print media and Internet resources, statements of authorities and their speakers concerning phenomenon in Ukraine. The suggested approach, in my opinion, is productive – at least to some extent it can provide a sufficient level of validity of research results.

The chosen analysis technology makes me to take another step in order to structurize more clearly not only the material's presentation, but at the same time to

stress in the discussion more markedly my opinion on this or that issue concerned with the subject of research. I mean the two-level analysis construction. The first level – the questions concerning the myths' development and their functioning; the second – the techniques and technologies of their mythicizing. In this context it would be logical to say, what I am doing, about the inclusion in the discourse of the material and information that confirm the mythicizing of the phenomena associated with *Russkiye*, actually those, I think, that can deny this or that myth. Some of these materials will be discussed in the units, which cover certain aspects of the situation of *Russkiye* in Ukraine.

Main issues of the myth's problems

During the scientific, political and informational discourse several myths about socio-economic, political and cultural situation of Rysskiye have been formed. Before the following the analysis, I propose to classify them and to operationalize the term «*myth*» in the context of this analysis. Interpretation of the myth in various reference issues is similar. Taking into account the etymology of the term (in Late Latin and Greek languages *Mythos* – **a fairy tale, legend, story**) and coming back to the theories of Carl Gustav Jung on myth as an attempt to find a real connection with nature, we can find several meanings of the term «*myth*» that links us with the ancient history of mankind (on the example of figures and events), with the origin of different phenomena. «**MYTH – a fable or a legend embodying the convictions of a people as to their gods or other divine personage, their own origin and early history and the heroes connected with it, or the origin of the world; in a looser sense, any invented story** (I add, any idea, or concept); **something or someone having no existence in fact**». For our case the most adequate definition, in my opinion, is the second part of the quoted definition, which is transformed into false propaganda statement.

Analyzing the sources and literature, the object of which *Russkiye* in Ukraine is, we found some of the most generalized and widespread allegations of mythological character, which misrepresent the real situation concerning the current state and

development prospects of the phenomenon. Among them we can separate two groups: a) those which aim is to disguise behind the global problem the mythicizing approaches concerning the explication of *Russkiye* position in Ukraine, i. e. displace accents of the problem essence; b) those which are directly linked with the phenomenon of *Russkiyesness* in Ukraine, of course with the situation of its ethnophors.

Into first group I include: 1) the development trends in integrative processes in Ukraine crucially depend on the attitude of national minorities to the society consolidation processes and state building; 2) mythicized interpretations of *Russkiyesness* (ideology and activities orientated towards *Russkiye* in Ukraine) and *pro-Rossiyskost'* (ideology and activities orientated towards Russia); 3) the anti-Russian line is today the main in the official policy of Ukraine.

Into second group I include: 1) the myth «Russian-speaking population of Ukraine»; 2) *Russkiye* of “near abroad”, including Ukraine, are under the pressure of new state policy and efforts of national (in the myth’s interpretation nationalist – in negative sence) forces and movements and are «washed out» and even eliminated; 3) rapid deformation and extinction of *Russkiyesness*, such of its markers as language, spiritual culture, monuments of material culture.

Note, that we have determined three main sources of formation and propagation of these myths: a) The Ukrainian pro-Russian (please do not confuse with *pro-Russkiye*) oriented researchers of problems of *Russkiye* in Ukraine, in fact those, who live in Ukraine, and b) Russian researchers who study the problems of *Ryskiyesness* on the state territories, that belonged to the former Soviet Union, c) publicists of both countries – Ukraine and Russia. The politicians time to time are joining the myth constructing. About the reliability of the information concerning the status of *Russkiye* in Ukraine, with which the above myths are filled, and about the validity degree of the latter we’ll speak in the following sections of presentation, when we shall discuss this or that aspect of the ethnic community’s situation.

Regarding the intension to talk about mythicizing of the myths, I link this process with the attempts of myths’ legitimacy, i.e. the efforts of their mobilizers to

provide them with official recognition as the factor of ethno-national development (through the advancement of the bills, the subject of which *Russkiye* in Ukraine is, as in the situation concerning languages – those are prepared more than ten; myths spreading in the public opinion, using media for this, as well as imitative “public discussions”, scientific conferences, symposiums etc.). And in this context, I propose to understand mythicizing as not simply a transformation of this or that statement in the myth, or the interpretation of this or that care speaking about the concrete (specific) procedures of mythicizing of the myths themselves, so firstly I mean the desire of politicians to use these myths as a basis for legislative design of their political activities – the consolidation of the benefits of *Russkiye* in legal acts and the creation of the favorable atmosphere for entrepreneurship (promotion) of the *Russkiye* ethnicity (*Ruskiyessness*) in the ethno-national space of Ukraine to gain for it the dominant positions in the Ukrainian society. An example of such entrepreneurship is the activities around the bill on language of deputies of the Ukrainian Parliament S. Kivalov and V. Kolesnichenko, one of the main motives of which the desire to raise the status of Russian language in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic area is. These activities not only stimulate the discussion on the Russian language, but also provide an opportunity to focus the intention of the "*defenders of the rights of Russkiye*" on other issues of *Russkiyessness* in Ukraine, usually emphasizing their «disadvantage» state, and on this basis, to advance demands of more prestigious status for them. The logic of this strategy comes to light, if we remember that one of the deputies heads the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots Organizations, through which the significant financial flows (both from Russia and Ukraine) pass, allegedly in support of *Russkiyessness* in Ukraine. And in this context, it is clear that the process of mythicizing of myths is linked primarily with two factors – activity of pro-Russian orientated politicians and the same way orientated researchers who ignore or do not value the importance of accounting a wide range of indices, linked with ethnic issues. They are looking for opportunities to prove the ideologems of the alleged underestimation and defiance of a value of *Russkiyessness* in ethno-national development of Ukraine.

Myths' filling rhetoric

Characteristic myths' features of the first group of myths. The particular attention should be paid to **the first myth**, the content of which focuses on important, I would say extremely acute for an independent Ukraine moment – building and strengthening **of independent state, the main structure creating component of which the Ukrainians (Ethno-Ukrainian nation) are. It seems that here we are talking not only about the importance of Russkiye, because they are not especially stressed in this context. However, bearing in mind that Russkiye form three quarters of national minorities**, then, following the logic of the myths' statement, the consolidation processes can be set depending on the Russkiye attitude to them. Incidentally, the author clearly articulates on this correlation. Thus, upon the positive attitude of 22 percent of the population towards the state-building processes, representing another than Ukrainian, ethnic communities, to some extent the integrative development of the Ukrainian multi-ethnic society depends. And yet, as Ukrainians are the basic construct of the ethno-political organism (state), so upon their position the result of state-building processes in Ukraine crucially depends. ***All other claims (especially when they are outside their content leave such a significant factor as the interaction of certain components of the ethnic structure of Ukrainian society with Ukrainians) turn*** into myth – the desire to change (transform) real situation into a myth.

The second myth, which has many aspects (multidimensional myth) is linked with the interpretation of *pro-Russkiyesness* and «*pro-Rossiyskiyesness - pro-Russkost'*». Indeed, here we can speak not about the myth itself, but rather about the mythicizing of the mentioned two phenomena, that became the factors of the ethno-national development of Ukraine in connection with the presence in the Ukrainian society of the appreciable proportion of ethnic Russian origin population. It is forming such a tradition that *pro-Rossiyskiyesness* is being understood as an activity that should be focused on issues related to the development of *Russkiye* in Ukraine. Obviously, the problems arises now among *Russkiye* to a perceptible part are caused

by changes in their ethnic status – today the Ukrainian society has positioned them as a minority. *Pro-Rosiyskisness* orientates toward Russia, not toward the need to maintain their ethnicity in Ukraine. The danger to the integrity of the Ukrainian state is that the mobilizers of single *Russkiyesness* identity tend to combine these two aspects in order to build a strong pro-Russian movement in Ukraine, linking it to Russia. Actually, this situation is associated with the phantom ideologies of «friendship of peoples» and «united Soviet people» in which supporters of the Soviet Russian Empire tried to unite all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. In the modern interpretation, an analogue of this unity, at least, of Russians and citizens of ethnic Russian origin from other countries must become an ideological construct – Fund "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World"). It is positioned as a Russian organization that has to be engaged in popularizing the Russian language and culture in the world (that, in my opinion, deserves approval). However, the analysis of the fundraising structure and the activities of its departments or affiliated organizations give the reasons to view the pro-Russian dominant in its activities. This is particularly acute for its activity in Ukraine. In this context, the arguments in favor of this statement are the next: 1) *building a unifying communications based on artificially constructed concept of "compatriots"*, with which pro-Russian promoters seek to unite not only born in Russia (they are really compatriots of Russian citizens, but not in any way of Russkiye abroad), and even those with ethnic Russian origin, who was not born on Russia's territory; 2) *inclusion in the field of "Russkiy Mir" activities of the so-called Russian-speaking population of modern independent states*. The situation of the interpretation of the term "Russian-speaking population" concerning the Ukrainian context will be discussed below.

The third myth of the first group – **the anti-Russian line in the official policy of Ukraine** – is also a complex construct (more political), because its subject is also multifaceted and covers a wide range of relations between Ukraine and Russia. This myth is aggregated by Russian-oriented researchers and politicians in Ukraine and frank Ukrainianphobs in Russia. At first glance, *Russkiye* in Ukraine are not its object, but the information field in which the myth is functioning is specially

produce. And in this cohesion, the main goal of a new structured information field, in my opinion, is to create an image of inadequate interpretation of external Russian factor (what is happening in Russia) in Ukrainian politics and Ukrainian society and somehow to transfer its negative impact into internal Russian factor – *Russkiye*. So excited the special kind (that is not true) of disposition of *Russkiye* for the perception of the processes within the country as not favorable to them and *Russkiye* who are in Ukraine, allegedly, suffer all sorts of infringements.

In modern globalization the links of people from this or that country with «ethnic homelands» (special term-work inherent to post-Soviet reality) play an important role in maintaining and developing of the ethnicity in the countries of residence. Therefore, with the «negative» attitude of the country of residence (in the context of the mentioned myth) the representatives of heteroethnic origin start disturbing about their fate in this country. Please note, this sense is *a priori* characteristic to any ethnicity that find themselves in circumstances, which objectively require them to «reset» the coordinates of their development, primarily related to the need of adaption to new conditions of existence. For *Russkiye* in Ukraine, this situation is no exception, and perhaps *Russkiye* as the most numerous ethnic minority feels it more than other communities. Under uncertain (especially social, economic, political), sometimes turbulent, situations ideologema of anti-Russian policy of Ukraine stimulates the feeling of anxiety and especially fear of losing once acquired during the Soviet Union's existence dominant status. Please note, during the years of independence of Ukraine the basis of this status (in the ideological as well as in social-role context) considerably weakened as a result of *Russkiye*'s transformation in no dominant ethnic community (into national minority).

Developments in Ukraine, the actor of which *Russkiye* community is and those, which concern it, particularly in the part relating to the policy of Ukraine to Russia, do not prove the myth «of anti-Russian line in the official policy of Ukraine». Yes, there are problems, sometimes even very sharp, in relations between Ukraine and Russia, but they are not linked (associated) with the formation of «anti-Russian line», and first of all with attempts (in my opinion, still not quite able and persistent) to

defend Ukraine as an independent state, where Ukrainianness (ukrayinskist') the structure-formative component of the Ukrainian political nation is. Defending of its positions to preserve at least some autonomy in the «gas issue», the «cheese war» with Russia etc., absolutely does not correlate with targeted «pressure» on *Russkiye* in Ukraine. However, I do not exclude the moment that these or that *Russkiye* consciously or unconsciously are involved in this processes of confrontation. The first, usually, take Russia's side, others support the Ukrainian point of view. Note, that it is almost impossible to determine the exact number of these and that, as well as the direct dependence of «anti-Russian line» impact on the polarization among *Russkiye* of Ukraine in the attitude to the country, the citizens of which they are, and its foreign policy. However, you can indirectly reflect, that it affects at least at the level of their anxiety, resulting in increasing focus on ethnic self-preservation. The latter is largely linked with the *kin-state* (Russia), because it is formed an opinion that only it (Russia) can protect them from the assimilation pressure, in expressions of particular pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine – «*Ukrainization*». To some extent the results of the impact of the myth, that is debated, are evident in the dynamics of indicators by which the level of patriotism feeling, orientation toward the eastern or western vector of Ukraine's development, the attitude to the Ukrainian or Russian language and more are measured. I see in the aggregation of «anti-Russian line» ideology an attempt of pro-Russian mobilizers, at least, to stimulate *Russkiye*'s unity to display the opposition to the so-called *Ukrainization*, and thus weakening the consolidation efforts of that forces (not only Ukrainians, but also people from other ethnic communities) which are trying to strengthen the principles of independent of Ukrainian state, also against the Russia's pressure.

The short characteristic of the second group myths: 1) The myth of «Russian-speaking population of Ukraine». The term «Russian-speaking» is in its content already a myth itself. I can affirm, that it is heavily exploited by the supporters of ethnic *Russkiye* of Ukraine rights preservation in order to present them as, if not dominant force in the Ukrainian ethnic space, then at least, as one that should determine its content and design. Mobilizers of this myth within the construction of

new meta-communities go further, affirming, that «most of the population of Ukraine – is not Ukrainians and not *Russkiye* – these are the Russian-speaking Slavs». The linguists within search of confirmation of the difference between two terms («Russian speakers» and «ethnic *Russkiye*»), constitute the following arguments: ethnic *Russkiye* got Russian language as a natural heritage from their ancestors; from approximately 45% of citizens of Ukraine who speak Russian, *Russkiye* are 17 percent, the latter are mostly Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Remembering that 68% (from 78%) Ukrainians considered the Ukrainian language to be native, so really Russian-speaking are 10 percent of Ukrainians. «The other two thirds of the so-called Russian-speaking Ukrainians speak in everyday life mostly Russian (the language of the similar, but other people) and still see Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Though this is paradoxical, but it means that two thirds of the so-called Russian-speaking Ukrainians are Russian-speaking only because they are simply unable to speak their mother tongue because of the linguistic environment «pressure» in which they live, learn and work. And this language environment, which makes them use a foreign language, aroused not itself. It was formed in Ukraine for two and a half centuries of systematic Russification».

2) The myth: Russians of «near abroad», including (especially) Ukraine, under the pressure of new states and efforts of national (in the myth's interpretation nationalist) forces and movements are «washed out» and, even eliminated. Here, in fact, there is a distorted (intentionally provocative) interpretation of *Russkiye*'s adaptation processes to the new conditions of existence, which led to some changes in quantitative and qualitative indicators, that fix their current situation and characterize the dynamics of their development. In the context of this myth, in my opinion, the two things are important: 1) understanding the reasons, that determined a significant reduction of *Russkiye* amount in ethno-national structure of Ukrainian society; 2) an adequate perception of the nature of transformation of their ethnic status; 3) identification of the opportunities for their prospects in terms of Ukraine's development as an independent state, multi-ethnic state.

3) The myth of rapid deformation and extinction of *Russkiyesness*, those of its markers as language, spiritual culture, monuments of material culture is connected with the assertion of reduction of Russian presence in Ukraine.

Of course, that inadequate understanding of the objective nature of the processes that determine the dynamics of the development of Russkiye in Ukraine in the context of Ukrainian realities promote the spreading of the myth, which is built on tendentiously chosen facts and pulled out of context statements, which have to convince that this myth is not a myth, but it reconstitutes the state of affairs.

Arguments for discussion

Russkiye: general data. Russian ethnos is one of the oldest Slavonic ethnoses. It was formed over several centuries: initially they were descendants of Eastern tribes as Ilmensky Slovenes, Krivichi, Viatichsi, Siveryany and Radymychi; later the assimilated Finno-Ugric tribes (Merya, Meshchera, Murom) joined them. Today, *Russkiye* are the most numerous Slavonic ethnoses: they number (at least those who declare their ethnic origin) about 150 million people in the world. The majority of them are settled in Russia (over 115 million), much of them live in the following countries: Ukraine (more than 8 million), Kazakhstan (about 4 million), USA (just over 3 million people who ascertain their ethnic Russian origin), Uzbekistan (about 500 thousand), yet in other 14 countries from 100 to almost 800 thousand live, and in 17 countries – from 3 to 100 thousand. The ethnic language of *Russkiye* is Russian, which a subgroup of the eastern Slavonic group of Indo-European language family is.

Russkiye in Ukraine massively appear after the rise of Moscow Principality, which proclaims itself a collector of all Rus' lands and inheritor of Kyiv State, especially since the XVI century. After the accession of Ukraine to Russia (Pereiaslav'ska Rada (Council), 1654) the migration of Russians to Ukraine increased. In Ukraine, in XVI-XVII centuries *Russkiye* were known as «Moskovyny», «Moscow people», and Russia itself as «Moskowshchyna». For that time the so-called State Colonization was characteristic – relocation of various categories of «serve-martial people» who served here in the army, receiving for this

the settlement and land. Since the second half of the XVIII-th century the so-called landlord colonization strengthened – migration by the Russian landlords, who received huge plots of land in Ukraine, of the enslaved peasants from the central provinces of Russia. Over time, more visible role in the formation of the *Russkiye* community in Ukraine a «free» colonization played, which initially consisted mostly of peasant-fugitives from the Russian provinces. The largest flow of Russian immigrants (among them overwhelming majority *Russkiye*) directed to southern and eastern regions of modern Ukraine, which at that time were relatively small populated – Prychernomorya (by-Black Sea region), Pryazovya (by-Azov Sea region), Slobozhanshchyna. According to 1678 data, on the Left Bank and Right Bank of Ukraine there were almost no *Russkiye* there. They were recorded at that time only in Novorosiya (New Russia): them were here 11 thousand (6.7% of the total population). In 1719 on the Left Bank Ukraine, there were already 40 thousand, and in the Novorosiya their number increased to 72 thousand. On the Right Bank Ukraine the Russian (*Russkiye* too) population appeared only after the second partition of Poland (1793), under which Russia got the Ukrainian lands, which became part of the Russian Empire. Their number increased abruptly: if in 1795 there were only 4 thousand here, then in 1858 their number reached 1 million 407 thousand. Most *Russkiye* concentrated in New Russia and on the Left Bank Ukraine, the least – on the Right Bank. The number of Russians rapidly starts to increase in the second half of XIX century, which was linked with the very rapid industrial development of the Ukrainian territory. According to the first All-Russian census in 1897 in Ukraine lived 4 million 636 thousand Russians. The First World War caused a significant outflow of the Russian population of Ukraine. In 1917 in its current borders there were 3 million 620 thousand Russians. To the mid 20-ies of XX century due to losses during the civil war and migration caused by it, the further reduce of Russians is observed – to 3 million 164.8 thousand.

After the civil war the number of Russian population due to its increasing flow, especially in large cities and industrial centers, was growing rapidly again. In 1939, the number of *Russkiye* has increased to 4 million 315 thousand people, with their

proportion in the population of Ukraine (in its present borders) – up to 10.4%. In 1959 there were already 7 million 91.3 thousand of Russians (16.9% of the republic's population), in 1970 – 9 million 126 thousand (19.4% of the population), in 1979 – 10 million 471.6 thousand (19.4% of the population), in 1989 – 11 million 355 thousand persons or 22.1% of the republic's population.

The current demographic dynamics and settlement structure. According to 2001 census *Russkiye* are the largest ethnic minority in Ukraine and the second ethnic community after Ukrainians, which includes 8334,1 thousand people (17.3% of the total population). Today, *Russkiye* are settled in our country dispersed: the most numerous community of *Russkiye* are in Donetsk region (1,184.4 thousand – 38.2%), Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (1180.4 thousand – 58.3%), Luhans'k (991.8 thousand – 39.0%), Kharkiv (742.0 thousand – 25.6%), Dnipropetrovsk (627.5 thousand – 17.6%), Odesa (508.5 thousand – 20.7%), Zaporizhzhya (476.8 thousand – 24.7%). Note, that only in two regions (Zakarpatska – Transcarpathia) and Chernivetska oblasts) *Russkiye* are outside the top three most numerous national minorities of Ukraine, as in most of them they are on the second place after Ukrainians. The vast majority of *Russkiye* live in large and medium-size cities in Ukraine – about 84%. Today much of them are concentrated in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Luhans'k, Odesa, Kharkiv, Simferopol' and others cities. For the demographic dynamics of *Russkiye* in Ukraine the following features are characteristic: 1) before Ukraine became independent, *Russkiye* increased constantly. Only during the period of 1926-1989 its number increased 4.3 times. Almost half of *Russkiye* (43.3%) were born, according to the 1989 census, outside of Ukraine. With the formation of an independent Ukraine, the immigration growth of *Russkiye* in Ukraine in the early 90-ies even slightly increased in comparison with the previous decade, reaching 72.5 thousand persons in 1991 and 69.9 thousand in 1992. However, in subsequent years Russian migration balance is negative.

The census of 2001 recorded a noticeable reduction of *Russkiye* in Ukraine – by more than 3 million, or 26.6%. The demographic dynamics of *Russkiye* (in the direction of their reduction) was different for different regions: the West – about

48%, Center – more than 37%, South – 23.5%, East – 23%. The only settling area, where the growth of the *Russkiye* population was recorded, was Sevastopol – a little over 30 thousand. The main reason for this trend in the demographic situation of *Russkiye* – the possibility of free expression in the own ethnicity (nationality) census of the large number of another-ethnic citizens of Ukraine and self-identification with the one or another ethnic community (numerous or less numerous), which in our country there are nearly 130. Migration of *Russkiye* from Ukraine to Russia and other countries of the world did not affect significantly the demographic dynamics of the Ukrainian citizens of Russian ethnicity. Concerning the identification of *Russkiye* themselves, then there are such tendencies – most *Russkiye* identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine, that is to the basis of their identification they firstly lay the indication of common citizenship and to a lesser extent – ethnic origin. These confirm the polls: in 2004 34.5% of *Russkiye* perceived themselves as citizens of Ukraine, in 2005 – 40.3%, in 2006 – 42.9%. This trend is stimulated to some extent by the fact of *Russkiye* transformation from the dominating by the political and social weight during the Soviet times ethnic community into *Russkiye* ethno-national minority in the independent Ukraine, that is change of their ethno-social status.

Some parameters of social well-being of Russkiye in Ukraine. The fact that *Russkiye* traditionally settled mostly in urban areas determined to some degree their social status. They, having a high level of education (about 40% of *Russkiye* have higher education), are significantly represented among the engaged in mental work, and among engaged in physical work they are among the persons of high qualifications. *Russkiye* are intensively involved in the areas of labor activity, such as industry, transport and communication, health, social welfare, education, culture, art, science and scientific services. A small percentage of *Russkiye* are engaged in agricultural production, which is connected with the specificity of their settling structure, in which the urban population far exceeds the rural. This ensures *Russkiye* the pretty strong positions in the middle and higher levels of social hierarchy of the Ukrainian society, that defines an adequate level of their social well-being and comfort in social and cultural contexts of country development. Social monitoring,

which is being conducted since 1992 by the Institute of Sociology of Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences, affirms that *Russkiye* do not meet with the discrimination cases (harassment of rights and interests) more frequently than the members of other Slavonic peoples – from 4.4 to 9.5%. According to the polls in Kyiv by the language indication only 11.9% of Russian-speakers were discriminated. An important indicator of well-being of *Russkiye* in Ukraine the index of national distance is; attitude of representatives of other ethnic communities to them. During the period from 1994 to 2008, it amounted from 1.9 to 3.3, and Ukraine's average from 4.4 to 5.3; 2012, for instance, 3.3. This confirms the thesis, that *Russkiye* feel comfortable in the process of inter-ethnic interaction in contemporary Ukrainian society.

Cultural and social life of Russkiye. Today in Ukraine at various levels – from local to nationwide – more than 140 NGOs and associations of the *Russkiye* ethnic community are functioning. Among them, four have the all-Ukrainian status: the National Cultural and Educational Society «Russkoye Sobraniye» («Russian Assembly»), the Society of Russian Culture «Rus'», NGO «Russian Community», NGO «Russian Community of Ukraine». These associations carry out various social activities, are engaged in the cultural-educational work among their members and the *Russkiye* and Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, hold conferences, «round tables», contests, events on Russian language and culture functioning, Slavonic culture feast etc. They participate in joint cultural activities of national minorities in Ukraine, for example, all-Ukrainian festival «We are all your children, Ukraine».

The language situation according to territorial differentiation. According to the census 2001, 29.6% citizens of different nationalities considered Russian language to be their native. The percentage of monolingual *Russkiye* using Russian language only ranges from 80 to 85%. According to polls in 2008, about one third of citizens consider the introducing of a second state language to be expedient, while the majority – two thirds, or 60.9% of respondents vote for keeping only Ukrainian language in the state status.

Concerning the attitude to the Russian language among the population of contemporary Ukraine noticeable differences remain: according to polls, which were carried out during 2006-2008 by Razumkov Center, the dynamics of Russian language recognition as the mother tongue was as follows: West (3.8 – 3.4%), Center (13.0 – 10.1%), South (52.0 – 48.0%), East (54.0 – 44.4%). However, the positions of Ukraine's population at regional division concerning the Russian language one can fully appreciate, if we take into consideration the fact of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism: Russian and Ukrainian languages simultaneously were recognized: the West (3.3 – 4.9%), the Center (14.3 – 29.1%) in the South (17.0 – 35.4%), East (23.5 – 44.4%). About the spreading of Russian language and its strong positions in the social life of Ukraine the following data affirm: in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in more seven areas the absolute majority of the population primarily uses Russian language for communication (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2004 data) – 97,0% of the population; Donets'k oblast – 93.0%; Luhans'k oblast – 89.0%; Odessa region – 85.0%; Zaporizhzhya region – 81.0%; Kharkiv oblast – 74.0%; Dnipropetrovsk oblast – 72.0%; Mykolayiv region – 66.0%. The latest survey (February 2012) conducted by the same institution confirms the tendency of expanding of the space for the use of Russian language. Obviously, the discussions about Russian as a second state language, or at least the official, which are stimulated by the Russian-oriented politicians in Ukraine and the leaders of Russian public communities, can facilitate strengthening of Russian positions in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic space.

Spaces of the Russian language functioning. The largest spaces of Russian language functioning in Ukraine are, of course, educational institutions – schools, colleges and universities. In 2008/2009 academic year, Ukraine had 20,045 secondary schools, which enrolled 4,438,383 students: including – 1 199 secondary schools – with tuition in Russian (in which educated 403,719 students), and 1628 schools – with education in Ukrainian and Russian (in Russian were taught 368,594 students). There are also schools with tuition in three languages (Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, Russian and Romanian, Ukrainian, Russian and Bulgarian,

Ukrainian, Russian and Moldavian). In general, in schools of Ukraine 779,423 pupils are taught in Russian. In addition, the Russian language as a subject is studied by 1,292,518 pupils, as well as optional, or in circles – 165 544 pupils. Thus, the number of Russian schools in Ukraine is 5.9% of the total amount (for comparison, in 1991/1992 there were 3,364, representing 15.9% of the total). In Ukraine 919 public vocational schools are functioning. In 35 institutions all subjects teaching is conducted in Russian. Number of pupils who study in Russian, is 51.4 thousand people, or 12.5% of all pupils. All subjects are taught in Russian in Crimea – in 29 vocational schools, and in Sevastopol – in 6 of these institutions. Partly subjects in Russian are taught in some institutions of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Odessa, Kharkiv regions. Higher education institutions that offer education in Russian are mainly located in Lugansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa and the Crimea. In 2008/2009, the number of first-second accreditation levels institutions' students, studying in Russian, was 45,907 and the number of third and fourth accreditation levels institutions' students, studying in Russian, was 280,767; i.e., with 326,674 students. Additional information for 2011 one can get from the appendix.

The next space of the Russian language active functioning in Ukraine are the institutions of culture and art. Today there are 14 state Russian-speaking theatres in Ukraine, more than 100 theaters-studios, three children's puppet theaters give performances in Russian, and also about twenty – in Russian and Ukrainian. The Museum of Russian Art is successfully functioning in Kiev. The book publishing sphere affirms, that the Russian language in Ukraine has strong positions. According to the Book Chamber, in 2009 in Russian language in our country were issued 2,460 books in 8341 thousands of duplicates. To this we should add, that in the book market of Ukraine prevails (numbers of printed copies) literature in Russian published outside the country, primarily in Russia.

As for mass media, that form the space of this or that language dissemination, then, according to the Ministry of Justice in 2009 in Ukraine there were 25 933 in Ukrainian, 3 659 in Russian and 17 690 in Ukrainian-Russian languages newspapers

and magazines registered. The Russian-language press register is 150 pages in the catalog of publications of foreign countries, available for residents' subscription (2009). Also, as in the case of book publishing, the information space of Ukraine is freely filled with the printed mass media from Russia. It concerns the situation with internet space.

Latest data (2011-2012 years) show the displacement of exactly Ukrainian language, but not Russian from many spaces: a) de-Ukrainization of education (in the eastern regions of Ukraine the number of schools with tuition in Ukrainian is reducing – in Luhans'k region the amount of first-graders in those schools decreased by 4,7%; in Kherson region – by 1.9%); b) changes in the information space: comparing with 2009 the edition of Ukrainian-language newspapers in 2011 fell from 32 to 30%, while the Russian- language has increased from 63 to 66%; dominance of Russian in TV: monitoring of the most rating TV-channels showed that the Ukrainian language sounded only in 22.2% of broadcasting, 31% – are bilingual, 46.8% – are Russian programs, the quota on audiovisual product of national production, under the law, is reduced from 50 to 25 percent. In this context, it is needless trying to convince, that the development of the Russian language has to be stimulated in addition.

In discussions about the need to protect the Russian language in multi-ethnic Ukrainian society, pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine call on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, after the ratification of which to the languages, that need to be protected, in Ukraine the Russian language was referred. I consider it necessary to pay attention to a few defining moments in this context, that deprive pro Russkiyeness arguments on improving the status of Russian language in Ukraine. Adopting the Charter, the Council of Europe based on few crucial points, that are fixed in the Preamble. In particular, the following moments were taken into account: 1) the desire of the Council of Europe to achieve a greater unity between its members, to preserve and realize the ideals and principles, which are their common heritage; 2) the need to protect the historical regional languages or minority languages, some of which are threatened with possible extinction, and this protection

in turn helps to maintain and develop the cultural wealth and traditions of Europe; 3) the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages should not be carried into practice contrary to official languages and the need to study them (Note that this point is practically ignored in the discussions of the Charter's implementation in our country, especially when it comes to protection of minorities, including linguistic sphere); 4) the unique feature of the Charter is that it focuses on language, rather than on national (ethnic) minority. This point is very important in the discussions that take place in the Ukrainian space: representatives (leaders) of Russkiye minority often use the Charter (better to say the information about it) as an argument for the expanding of the legal framework (field, sphere) of the community's functioning; 5) The Charter focuses on well-defined markers (indicators) of identity – in this case on the language, and a measure of the attitude to regional or minority languages is their use. It follows, that frequently used languages, that are not threatened with extinction (for example, Russian), need not necessarily to be the subject of consideration from the standpoints of the Charter, as well as languages, that have lost their bearers.

Russian ethnicity in Ukraine is largely supported and confirmed by the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, which has an extensive network of institutions and, except Ivano-Frankivs'k, L'viv and Ternopil' areas is the dominant denomination throughout Ukraine. According to the State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions (early 2011), this network consisted of 45 dioceses, 12,043 parishes, 186 monasteries, 20 religious educational establishments, 9,680 priests, 4,344 Sunday schools and more. The visits to Ukraine of the Orthodox Church Patriarchate Kirill which are were often in recent time can be considered as one of ways to intensify the pressure on Ukrainian society with the aim to strengthen the position first of all the Russian-oriented factors using for this purpose the presence of Russkiye in Ukraine.

Final remarks

The policy of the Ukrainian state concerning *Russkiye* is determined by the legislation in the context of the ethno-national policy of Ukraine formed throughout

the life of its independence, which is in line with the spirit and general principles of international law on the rights of minority ethnic state. These are such acts as the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, Law «On National Minorities in Ukraine», Law of Ukraine «On Public Associations», Law «On Principles of Legislation on Culture» and international instruments ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, first of all, the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on the Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. This policy is built in such a way that the *Russkiye* in Ukraine have the opportunity to maintain and develop their ethnicity, including the financial assistance of the Ukrainian state, as well as Russia.

APPENDICES

Perception of polyethnicity in Ukraine (*On the base of survey (March – April 2011): «Interethnic Tolerance in secondary school students of Ukraine»*)

Positive – 31.59 %

Rather positive - 25. 42 %

Indifferent – 21.31 %

Rather positive – 6.17 %

Ukraine for Slavonic people only – 7.10 %

Ukraine for Ukrainians only - 4.67 %

Difficult to answer – 3.74 %

Perception of different ethnicities in Ukraine: The high level of perception by Ukrainian citizens is typical for ethnic groups of Slavonic origin, among them the highest level for Ukrainians and *Russkiye* (the difference between total acceptance and total ignorance):

Ukrainians – 59.00 % (61.51% - 6.19 %)

Representatives of Ukrainian Diaspora – 35.34 % (40.39 % - 5.05 %)

*Russians (*Russkiye*) – 17.80 % (25.92% - 8.12%)*

Byelorussians – 10.36 % (14.97 % - 4.67 %)

Poles – 8.32 % (14.51 % - 6.19 %)

Slovaks – 1.53 % (8.59 % - 7.06 %)

Czechs - -1.34 % (7.22% - 8.56 %)

Bogardus Social Distance Scale (concerning Russkiye). The scale asks people the extent to which they would be accepting of others.

As close relatives by marriage - 25.92 %

As my close personal friends – 16.63 %

As neighbors on the same street - 8.32 %

As co-workers in the same occupation – 20.12 %

As citizens in my country - 16.68 %

As only visitors in my country – 4.06 %

Would exclude from my country – 8.12 %

Situation with the Ukrainian language in education

% of Students Educated in Ukrainian	Total Students	1st Graders
Crimea	8,1	6,7
Dnipropetrovsk oblast	81,5	81,2
Kyiv oblast	99,3	99,1
Luhansk oblast	48,5	43,8
Odesa oblast	73,5	69,7
Kharkiv oblast	75,5	74,5
Kherson oblast	85	83,1
Cherkasy oblast	99,2	98,8
Total in Ukraine	82,3	81,2

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