

THE  
CAMBRIDGE  
DICTIONARY  
OF  
CHRISTIANITY

*Editor*  
DANIEL PATTE  
*Vanderbilt University*



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,  
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press  
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9780521527859](http://www.cambridge.org/9780521527859)

© Cambridge University Press 2010

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception  
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,  
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written  
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2010

Printed in the United States of America

*A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data*

The Cambridge dictionary of Christianity / edited by Daniel Patte.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-0-521-82096-7 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-521-52785-9 (pbk.)

1. Christianity – Dictionaries. I. Patte, Daniel. II. Title: Dictionary of Christianity.

BR95.C24 2010

230.003 – dc22 2009019272

ISBN 978-0-521-82096-7 Hardback

ISBN 978-0-521-52785-9 Paperback

Additional resources for this publication at <http://hdl.handle.net/1803/3906>

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for  
external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that  
any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

# CONTENTS

Editorial Board	<i>page</i> vii
Area Editors and Advisors	ix
Contributors	xi
Preface by Daniel Patte	xlv
Acknowledgments	lxi
Abbreviations	lxv
<b>Dictionary</b>	<b>1</b>

For a comprehensive bibliography, see  
<http://hdl.handle.net/1803/3906>.

was ordained in 1913 and the first bishop, Joseph Kiwanuka, was named in 1939. Similarly Bishop Tucker College was opened to educate Anglican clergy. A revival movement of the Balokole (the Saved), which was started by Ugandan Anglicans in Rwanda\*, spread through Uganda and put new life into the rather dry spirituality of the time. Malaki Musjjakawa founded (1914) the Malakite Church, a revivalist church that rejected Western medicine and was soon banned by the British administration. Being Anglican or Catholic was so important for one's identity that African Instituted Churches did not thrive in Uganda. In 1929 Spartas Rueben Mukasa broke away from the Anglican Church to form an African Orthodox Church, later affiliated with the Greek Patriarchate.

**1950–65.** Christianity continued to play a major role in politics; the two main parties were the Democratic Party (mainly Roman Catholic) and the Uganda People's Congress (mainly Anglican). Tension between these parties were reflected in the churches as Uganda achieved independence (1962) under the premiership of Milton Obote.

**After 1966.** Obote abolished monarchies and political parties, then turned to Marxism. The advent of Idi Amin Dada, who ousted Obote with British help (1971), was disastrous to Christianity: there were years of persecution, missionaries were deported, clergy and prominent Christian politicians were killed, and Uganda was proclaimed an Islamic state (although Muslims were only 5% of the population). During this difficult period, individuals who spoke out, such as the Anglican Archbishop Janan Luwum, were brutally murdered. There was more unity between Catholics and Anglicans. Instability continued after Amin until 1986, when Yoweri Museveni came to power (1986), although his regime faced resistance organized by the Christian "Lord's Resistance Army," followers of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement in the north (a war that has been going on for more than 20 years). Since 1986 new, especially Charismatic\*, churches, have proliferated as a result of both local initiatives and the arrival of evangelical missionaries, especially from North America. Many of these churches preach personal salvation\* and a prosperity\* gospel. Muslims have tended to decline in number, as adherents of African\* Traditional Religion have also diminished. Women's leadership has always been a key feature of Christianity in Uganda. The Anglican

Church has ordained women priests since 1980. The Roman Catholic Church has a great number of dynamic and well-trained women\* religious, a major force in education and social work. However, patriarchal structures are still in place in most churches.

Sexual ethics have dominated the political and theological debate in recent years. In the face of HIV/AIDS, an urgent issue in the 1980s and 1990s, churches have responded in different ways. Pentecostal and Charismatic churches have offered faith healing\* sessions. Some churches have discouraged the use of condoms. Yet the main churches have supported the government's openness to the problem; as a result, Uganda is seen internationally as a success story in the fight against AIDS.

Ritual practices in most of the churches include charismatic and exuberant worship that is an occasion for socializing and building a sense of community. Music and drama play an important part. Traditional instruments together with Western ones provide lively accompaniment. Pilgrimages to shrines of the martyrs are important among Catholics and Anglicans, while the Charismatic churches often hold healing sessions with all-night vigils and the celebration of baptism\* (by immersion).

Important theological issues include inculturation\*, liberation\*, reconciliation\*, social\* justice, human\* rights, and economic development. Most churches have been involved in social\* and economic development projects. Individual Christians have defended human rights, although church leaders have sometimes been slow to denounce abuses. Mainline churches have founded universities to promote the Christian ethos. Uganda's turbulent history has been characterized by ethnic tensions in all parts of the country. Church leaders occasionally perpetuate divisions and conflicts, even as they work for reconciliation.

**Statistics:** Population (2000): 22 million (M). Christians, 19.3 M, 89% (Roman Catholics, 9.2 M; Anglicans, 8.6 M; members of African Instituted Churches, 0.8 M; Protestants, 0.6 M); Muslims, 1.1 M, 5%; African Religionists, 1 M, 4.4%. (Based on *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2001.)

ROBERT KAGGWA

**Ukraine.** Ukraine, whose cultural identity was forged under the influence of Christianity, has been a meeting place of Western and Eastern Christian traditions, which has led both

to historic clashes and to growing pluralism. Many Ukrainians integrate symbols, customs, and fragments of historical memory from both traditions, even while the formal institutions of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, along with several later movements, serve as conflicting centers of ethnic, cultural, and political mobilization.

Starting in the 9<sup>th</sup> c., Christianity began to influence the nobles and military elite of the Kievan Rus state (mid-9<sup>th</sup>–mid-13<sup>th</sup> c.). The first Christian bishop was sent to Kiev (Kyiv) from Constantinople\* in 866 or 867. Despite the dominance of non-Christian religions, by the mid-10<sup>th</sup> c. there was already a Christian community in Kiev led by Byzantine priests. Princess Olga\* was the first ruler of Kievan Rus to convert to Christianity (955 or 957). Her grandson Prince Volodymyr (Vladimir\*) the Great accepted Christianity in its Byzantine form and established it as the state religion (988).

Situated at the convergence of two great trade routes, the Varangian (Viking) Road (from north to south) and the Silk Road (from east to west), Kiev developed into a formidable Christian state. The coming of the Mongol hordes (13<sup>th</sup> c.) interrupted the life of both state and church. The metropolitan see was moved from ruined Kiev to Vladymyr-Suzdal' (1299). The princes in Western Ukraine obtained Constantinople's authorization to create their own metropolitanate for a time (1303–47).

In the late 14<sup>th</sup> c., Ukraine was partitioned between Poland\* and Lithuania\*, with the Tatar Golden Horde ruling parts of the southern steppes. Partition caused the division of the Kiev Metropolitanate into the Ruthenian Church (with Polish links) and Muscovite Church (with Lithuanian ties), and two distinctive patterns of Eastern Orthodox religious culture developed.

Throughout the 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> c., Polish and Lithuanian rulers introduced legislation that favored Roman Catholics to the detriment of Orthodox clergy and believers. The Orthodox Church was challenged by Western political and intellectual superiority and by deepening inner crises.

Toward the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> c., the search for a solution led Orthodox bishops toward union with the Holy\* See. The Council of Brest\*-Litovsk (1596) established a church united with Rome, known as the Uniate\* or Greek Catholic Church. Yet some hierarchs and members of the Kiev Metropolitanate were dissatisfied with the Roman vision of unity and insisted on maintaining canonical dependence on the Patriarchate of

Constantinople. They successfully demanded a parallel hierarchy (1620) and official recognition by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1632). The confessional division of the Kiev Church into Eastern Orthodox and Eastern Catholic churches led to bitter polemics between supporters and opponents of the Union of Brest that have continued to the present.

The war of liberation from Poland led by the Cossack hetman (commander) Bohdan Kmelnytskyi (Chmielnitsky; 1648–54) improved the position of the Orthodox Church and seriously endangered the Uniates. The war for the protection of the "native Orthodox faith" and the "Cossack Church," carried out under these religious slogans in opposition to Roman Catholic expansion, became an important feature of the Ukrainian national myth. During this war, practically the whole of Ukraine fell under Cossack control. Yet a lack of resources led Khmelnytskyi to sign the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654), swearing loyalty to the Moscow czar in exchange for protection from the Poles. In 1667 Ukraine was partitioned along the Dniro (Dnieper) River, with the western side under Polish control and the eastern side an autonomous hetman state under Russian protection.

In 1686 the Kiev Metropolitanate was transferred from the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople to that of Moscow. Educated, Westernized Ukrainians had an immense influence on Russian Orthodoxy and the early Russian Empire. The first president of the Holy\* Synod (1700) was the Ukrainian Stefan Yavorsky (1658–1722); the Ukrainian Teofan Procopovich (1681–1736) was one of the main ideologues of Peter's religious "enlightenment." About 70% of the upper-level hierarchs were from Ukraine or Belarus in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> c. Ukrainian clerics created an image of the Rus past that transcended political boundaries. Through their compilations of varied and often contradictory opinions from Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian writings, they were able to link Ukraine and Moscow through religion, dynasty, land, and ethnicity.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> c., Russian policy eroded the organizational and architectural uniqueness and, more broadly, the general character of Ukrainian religious culture. Paradoxically, however, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was neither completely absorbed into the Russian Church nor set against it as an alien body.

When the Western Ukraine, after the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795), was annexed by the Hapsburg Empire, the Greek

Catholic Church flourished under relatively liberal Austrian rule. The civil authorities encouraged the formation of an ecclesiastical administrative structure for the Greek Catholics. The educational reforms of the Hapsburg rulers Maria-Teresa and Joseph II gave Ukrainian youth access to education in their native language. Greek Catholics were given legal status equal to that of adherents of the Latin Rite, and their spiritual leaders were given at least minimal material subsistence. This led to the close integration of the Greek Catholic Church with the national political structure and social life, and the active participation of the clergy in the Ukrainian national movement.

In 1860 the Evangelical\* Movement spread through Southern Ukraine. Baptist doctrine was welcome among educated workers and peasants with high moral standards who disliked the formalism of the established Church. Ukrainian Baptists\*, Evangelicals, and later Pentecostals\* saw Evangelicalism not as a "foreign" doctrine brought from the West but as an autochthonous spiritual phenomenon, the natural result of God-seeking activity among the common people.

The collapse of the czarist government (1917) led to the formation of a Ukrainian government and temporary independence that occurred simultaneously with the movement for independence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was formed in 1921 but lacked recognition by the Orthodox community. Soviet authorities perceived in this church and the various Evangelical groups a counterbalance to the Russian Orthodox Church, and thus provided them with limited and short-lived support. In 1929 the Soviet regime unleashed war against all churches and denominations. Mass arrest of the hierarchy and clergy culminated in the liquidation of the churches in the 1930s.

Forced agricultural collectivization and the 1932-33 "Famine Genocide" were followed by religious persecution, the demolition of sacred buildings, and repression of the clergy. By the beginning of World War II, only 3% of the pre-revolutionary parishes in Ukraine remained open to the public.

World War II brought a dramatic Christian revival and a "concordat\*" between Stalin and the Russian Orthodox Church. This did not mean the cessation of mass persecution of Christians in Ukraine. In early 1945, the Greek Catholic Church was accused of supporting Nazi and Ukrainian partisans; its metropolitan, Yosyf Slipyi, and all prominent priests were arrested

and sentenced to long prison terms. In March 1945, this church was forcibly united with the Russian Orthodox Church and officially liquidated, after which it maintained only a clandestine existence.

In the years of Khrushchev's antireligious campaign (1953-64), almost half of all Orthodox churches in Ukraine were closed, including the well-known Cave Monastery in Kiev (1961). During the next 20 years, however, Christianity in Ukraine was viewed by the thinking public as an alternative system of values that was able to withstand the official ideology\*, whose untenability became more and more obvious. Noticing the increase in adult baptisms, the obsession of the intelligentsia with religious literature, the growing popularity of religious broadcasts from foreign radio stations, and the outspoken neglect of atheistic propaganda, Communist Party officials expressed anxiety over anti-Communist trends. Secret reports submitted by Party officials revealed that in 1985, the first year of Gorbachev's reforms, 26% of newborns in Ukraine were baptized, contrary to official statements about "the country of mass atheism." Nearly 3% consecrated their marriages in a church, and more than 40% were buried with the church's assistance.

Beginning in mid-1988, the Kremlin's "new way of thinking" finally affected church-state relations. During Gorbachev's first years in power, legal and secret restrictions on religious practices were somewhat relaxed; by 1989 all religious prisoners and deportees, including a number of Uniate priests and defenders of religious freedom, were allowed to return home. From 1988 to 1991, there was a mass opening of formerly closed churches, monasteries, and ecclesiastical schools. The number of religious communities increased an average of 30% every year during that period. At the same time, the fall of Communism revived old controversies and pent-up conflicts. Beginning in 1989, hundreds of Russian Orthodox parishes (mostly in Western Ukraine) declared themselves to belong to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Challenged by this church, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church asked the Moscow Patriarchate to transform it into a semiautonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church and later (1991) to grant it autocephalous\* status. The Moscow Patriarchate refused to do so, suspending the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Philaret, who managed to organize (1992) the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev

Patriarchate. Consequently, three Orthodox churches were constituted in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (more than two-thirds of all Orthodox parishes), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (one-fourth of all Orthodox parishes), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (7% of all Orthodox parishes). The Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Orthodox churches now recognize only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow jurisdiction and reject the other two as "heretical schismatics."

All Ukrainian Orthodox churches recognize the canons of the seven ecumenical\* councils as normative for doctrine, canon\* law, and church life. They share the common Eastern Orthodox liturgical practices, sacraments, holy days, and fasts. The conflict among these churches is rooted in their differing attitudes toward the Moscow Patriarchate. While some Orthodox believers reject the latter's authority and regard subordination to Moscow as offensive, others accept it. The post-1991 evolution of Ukrainian Orthodoxy vividly mirrors its ambivalent nature as both contributing to the creation of Russian imperial identity and guarding "native Ukrainian" identity. More generally, the split within the Orthodox Church in Ukraine is an accurate reflection of the political and cultural contradictions in Ukrainian society and the conflicting patterns of historical memory.

The legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church after more than 40 years of prohibition and humiliation has also created an explosive nexus of contradiction. The very existence of this church, with 3.5 million adherents, was doubted by the Orthodox hierarchy, while its years in the catacombs have sparked feelings of triumph and even a desire for revenge from the Greek Catholic side. As a result, a severe struggle between Orthodox and Greek Catholic factions arose in Western Ukraine over which church would gain the loyalty of believers and achieve the dominant position in the parceling of church buildings and property. This struggle, accompanied by physical frays between adherents of the conflicting churches (early 1990s), was far from being fully resolved in the early 2000s.

Roman Catholics (Latin\* Rite), having made tremendous gains since Soviet times (from about 100 communities in 1985 to 870 in 2006), have a distinctly ethnic character. Two-thirds of them are centered in the regions where most Ukrainian Poles live; a number of Hungarians and Slovaks also have traditionally belonged to

Roman Catholic communities. By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> c., Ukraine had become the country with the largest Baptist, Pentecostal, and Charismatic communities in Central and Eastern Europe. Their evolution after the fall of Communism has further increased religious diversity and given rise to attempts by these groups to gain a more noticeable place on the religious map of the country.

Orthodox hierarchs sharply criticize the activity of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, accusing it of proselytism\* and expansionism toward the east. Even though the Catholic community in Ukraine (Latin and Eastern Rites together) is the largest of those in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Orthodox hierarchs under the Moscow Patriarchate tried to block both the visit of Pope John\* Paul II to Ukraine (2001) and the move of the administrative center of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church from the western city of Lviv to the Ukrainian capital of Kiev (2005). At the same time, both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches demonstrate a hostile attitude toward foreign Evangelical missions and new religious movements. Halting or eliminating these rivals became one of the chief goals of the churches' leadership. Their hierarchs appeal constantly to the public, to local authorities, and to the Ukrainian government for protection against foreign missionaries and so-called cults\* and sects\*.

The fact of religious pluralism, with multiple centers of religious power, prevents any one of these centers from repressing its rivals. Each addresses its own sector of public opinion and its own circles among the political elite. This balance of power prevents the establishment of a religious institution that can dominate others and be identified with the Ukrainian nation.

Almost all Christian churches deny ordination to women, insisting on alternative ways for them to exercise leadership (as parish deans, Sunday school teachers, members of seminary faculties, theological lecturers, church hospital executives, cantors). The issue of additional leadership roles for women is still contested despite the work of the theologians and women's organizations.

Christian leaders are one in claiming a greater presence in various social spheres, first of all in schools and in the military, where social service might be accompanied by apostolic service. There is a growing unity among Christian activists in criticizing the moral situation in Ukraine, especially abortion\* and youth crime. Sometimes secular circles interpret these criticisms

as a campaign for clerical domination of the society.

Ukrainian Christians are searching for an appropriate theological response to the challenges of the post-Communist situation. Will the churches support the anomalies of this situation, remaining silent about social stratification, corruption, and official irresponsibility? What is the role of Ukrainian Christians in East-West Christian reconciliation? How can one harmonize the individual's right to hold any belief, change his or her religion or belief, and manifest that religion, with the collective right to defend one's traditional religious identity? How can the Christian motifs in the Ukrainian tradition be developed while avoiding chauvinism and aggressive nationalist feelings?

The "Orange Revolution" (2004) powerfully challenged Ukrainian Christians by raising questions about the churches' participation in politics (during political clashes, Christians were on different sides of the barricades) and about the admissible forms of defending truth and justice\* and resisting evil.

**Statistics:** Population (2001): 48.4 million (M). Christians (2000), 39.3 M, 81.2% (Orthodox, 34 M; Catholics, 4.3 M [Roman Catholics, 0.8 M; Greek Catholics, 3.5 M]; Protestants, 1.M); Muslims, 0.9 M; Jews, 0.1 M; nonreligious, 7.5 M. (Source: Plokhly and Sysyn, *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*, 2003).

VICTOR YELENSKY

**Ulfiga** (c311–83), "apostle to the Goths\*." Born of Cappadocian parents captured by the Goths, he spent some time in Constantinople, converted to Christianity, and was ordained (341) by the city's Arian\* bishop. Returning to the Goths, he translated the liturgy and most of the Bible (except for the warlike Books of Kings) into their language, using an alphabet of his own devising. He was present at the Homoian\* Council of Constantinople\* (360). The Goths championed this moderate form of Arianism\* for several centuries, partly to maintain their cohesion through contrast with the Latin-speaking Catholics.

**Ultramontanism** (Lat *ultra*, "beyond," *montanes*, "the mountains," i.e. the Alps). This term designates a 19<sup>th</sup>-c. movement within the Roman Catholic Church supporting the centralization of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Rome, the pope, and the papal administration (the Curia). It stood in opposition to nationally oriented movements such as Gallicanism\* in France and

was characterized by a clear opposition to liberalism (as in Pius\* IX's Syllabus\* of Errors, 1864). It reached its zenith with the promulgation of the doctrine of papal infallibility\* at the First Vatican\* Council (1870) (opposed by Old\* Catholics in German-speaking Europe).

PETER C. ERB

**Unam Sanctam** ("One Holy [Church]"), bull\* issued by Boniface\* VIII (1302) during the quarrel with Philip the Fair of France, establishing the high point of papal claims: that there is no salvation\* outside the Roman Catholic Church, that the pope has supreme authority in the Church, and that the two\* swords remain within the authority of the pope.

**Unction**, anointing\* at baptism\* and confirmation\*, and especially the anointing of the sick (a sacrament\* for Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican churches).

**Underhill, Evelyn** (1875–1941), independent lay scholar, religious writer, spiritual guide, retreat director. Underhill published 39 books and more than 150 articles. *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (1911) became a classic, interpreting mysticism\* for ordinary people. Although baptized and confirmed in the Church of England, Underhill was nonpracticing. She was attracted to Roman Catholicism, but the condemnation of Roman Catholic Modernism\* discouraged her. In 1920 she returned to the Church of England. She credited Friedrich von\* Hügel, her spiritual director (1921–25), with leading her from a disembodied mysticism to a more integrated spirituality.

ELLEN M. LEONARD, CSJ

**Uniate Churches**, common designation (but a name that neither these churches nor the Roman Catholic Church use) for churches that separated from Eastern or Oriental Orthodox churches (which in most instances still exist independently), retaining their traditional language, liturgy, and canon\* law but acknowledging the primacy of the pope\*. They are thus in union with Rome (hence the term "Uniate") and are properly known as Eastern Catholic or Greek Catholic churches.

The first such unions were with the Maronite\* Church (1182) and the Armenians\* of Cilicia (1198). The Council of Florence\* approved unions with the Greek\* Orthodox and Armenian\* churches (1439), as well as with the Syriac\* Orthodox (polemically nicknamed "Jacobites\*"), Copts\*, and Ethiopians\* (1442). The